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Impossible Indians is a study of 20th-century U.S. Latina/o and Latin American 
theatre and performance artists whose works of art are inspired by the 
15thand 16th-century Conquest of the Americas. The “decolonial turn” in 
Latin American and U.S. Latina/o Studies urges scholars to theorize 
post/colonialism from the birth of modernity/coloniality in the Americas 
during the early colonial period. Few studies, however, have theorized the 
place of performance in the consolidation of modernity/coloniality. While 
the formal colonization of non-indigenous people in the Americas has a 
beginning (the Conquest) and a presumed end (colonial independence), 
colonialism is also a process that haunts their postcolonial imaginary in what 
José Rabasa has called “a ghost-like continuity” that staged and restaged for 
centuries. My dissertation theorizes this tragic framework by studying the 
ways in which dramatic artists consistently turn to indigenous colonial and 
pre-Columbian pasts as a manner of imagining their own racial present 
bound to the history of colonialism in the New World.  
I argue that playwrights like Rodolfo Usigli, Cherríe Moraga, Sergio 
Magaña, William Shakespeare, Aimé Césaire, and Migdalia Cruz, and 
performance artists like Coco Fusco, Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Antonin 
 Artaud, and Nao Bustamante, stage a vision of the their modern world that 
questions the linear temporality attributed to historical formations of race. In 
creating their racial presents vis-à-vis ideologies of indigeneity that are 
always-already originating outside of modern time, the subjects of my 
dissertation stage colonialism as an unfinished process by strategically 
returning to scenarios of conquest. My argument is two fold: I trace the 
employment of performative and archival knowledge as ethnographic tools 
to invent the indigenous racial subject of the Americas from a colonial and 
colonizing standpoint; and I analyze theatre and performance art that have 
crated decolonial ideals of indigeneity and indigenous people in order to 
reproduce and discard racial ideologies transferred from the colony to the 
postcolonial. I insist that this mode of cultural production creates a cultural 
politics of conquest that poses a radical challenge to linear conceptions of 
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A mi Pa Carmen, 
por llevarme a los concursos de primaria, y por no querer que mis manos 
dejaran de poder escribir.  
A mi Papa y mi Mama,  
por nunca dejar de apoyarme en mi carrera, sin importar los sacrificios.  
 
To the villages that raised me, 
I once wrote to tell you que su lengua se había convertido en la mía, pero mi 
lengua educada aún no se convertía en la suya.  
Hoy escribo para decirles que mi lengua educada no es sólo mía, 
también es de Ustedes.  
 





My arrival to this stage in my academic career and personal life would 
not have been possible without the people and institutions who’ve pushed 
me to the finish lines I’ve crossed over the years. If it takes a village to raise a 
child, it has taken the following villages to raise me. I am thankful to you and 
them for showing me love, even as I (perhaps) am not able to name each 
and everyone who helped me get to where I am now. 
Impossible Indians would have been (ironically) impossible to complete 
were it not for the members of my dissertation committee. Debra A. 
Castillo, Mary Pat Brady, José Edmundo Paz-Soldán, and Gerard Aching 
allowed me into their busy lives and schedules so that we could geek-out 
over race, indigeneity, coloniality, Latinidad, theatre, and performance. 
Debbie has been my most avid supporter since I stepped into her office my 
first year of graduate school, and she guided me through the riddles of U.S. 
Latina/o and Latin American theatre and performance in ways I could not 
have done on my own. I am forever grateful for her support of students and 
our intellectual caliber, and I am indebted to her for the personal time and 
energy that she invested into making Impossible Indians a reality. Many years 
ago, Mary Pat answered an email from an undergraduate student from 
Brown University who was a bit too eager to talk to her about Cherríe 
Moraga’s Xicana Dyke Nationalist theatre. I thank her for having had that 
conversation with me then, and for pushing my thinking in innovative, 
challenging and provocative ways during the six years that followed. My 
ways of thinking about Latinidad and coloniality would not have been the 
same if Mary Pat had not been here to question my arguments, and I 
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consider myself a better thinker and scholar because of her. Edmundo also 
received a letter-length email from me in 2005, when I decided that it was a 
good idea to explain in detail my reasons for wanting to go to Cornell. 
Luckily for me, he took the time to write me back with an encouraging 
response. I am thankful for his reminder that the theoretical questions I raise 
are speaking to the violence that accompanies knowledge in terrains framed 
by conquest, and that mine are questions that need to be asked. I also owe 
him my gratitude for fostering my newly discovered love for translating 
fiction, and, most importantly, for the care he has shown me since that email 
from so many years ago. Gerard first inspired me to continue my work 
theorizing race and colonialism when he gave his job talk at Cornell several 
years ago. He arrived at Cornell shortly before my A Exams were taking 
place and well after I had finished my coursework, but he nonetheless 
welcomed me into his office to discuss my work. To him I owe much of the 
terminology I employ throughout Impossible Indians, since it was in those 
conversations that it became evident to me that what I was trying to wrap 
my thinking around were ideologies of indigeneity and native subjectivity. I 
am also indebted to him for reminding me to be patient with myself as I 
negotiate the large body of dense material with which I work, and to be 
more critically attentive to the intellectual and political work being done by 
the artists that I study. If anything from my dissertation sounds like Debbie, 
Mary Pat, Edmundo, or Gerard, it’s probably because I heard it from them 
first.   
Sasha-Mae Eccleston, words cannot describe how much our 
friendship has meant to me since we first met in Em-Wol a decade ago. I 
look forward to many decades more. 
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Melissa Figueroa has been a best friend and sister to me since the first 
day we shared hateration for a common force. In true “bolicua”-fashion, we 
will one day find ourselves walking through NYC in high-heeled shoes and 
diva clothes to match. 
Ana Minian, mi amor, you and I will always and forever have our “me 
llamo Raquel.”  
I owe a very special thanks to my modernity bristers: Bradley A. 
Pecore, Natasha Bissonauth and Derica Shields entered into my life and 
made it brighter. Natalie Léger has taught me about the tragedy of 
modernity, and constantly reminds me that Carpentier is not pronounced 
with a rolling “r.” Ariana Vigil has been my cheerleader extraordinaire 
throughout my entire graduate career, exchanging ideas, sharing our 
research, and making sure sanity is maintained. Alicia Munoz and Ben 
Hamilton have fed me very well these past six years, and Alicia (in her 
pearls) has wowed me when talking about killer women. Nohemy Solorzano-
Thompson, Monica M. Martínez, Omar Figueredo, Nancy Morales, Kavita 
Singh, Rodrigo Hasbún, Wanda Casillas, David Sánchez, Nancy Quintanilla, 
Kimberly Williams, Victoria Innocent, Liliana Colanzi, Tyi McGray, 
Deondra Rose, Edwardo Valero, Rodrigo Alatriste-Diaz and Mercy Barrera, 
Elda María Roman, Abigail Rosas, Ana Rosas, Laura Gutierrez, Robb 
Hernández, Noemi Velazquez: All of them friends of mine, all have shown 
me love.  
Helena Maria Viramontes is a force to be reckoned with. Their Dogs 
Came With Them, in my humble opinion, is one of the best works of 20th-
century literature, and in its pages Helena shows herself to be a true master 
of her craft. I only hope that I can continue to be guided by a small piece of 
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her shining light, brilliance and resilience. 
Troy Richardson helped me think through decolonial arguments and 
pushed my thinking about theatre and performance in ways that only a 
committee member could. I consider him my unofficial fifth member of my 
dissertation committee because I learned much from him and his knowledge 
about philosophy and theories of indigeneity.  
Juan Antonio Hernández’s course on race in 19th-century Cuba and 
his class on film and literature of the Cuban Revolution were two of the best 
courses that I had the pleasure of taking as a graduate student Cornell. These 
courses were the miracles that saved my first year of graduate school, and I 
am indebted to Juan Antonio for fostering my intellectual curiosity in his 
response to my ideas.  
Unknowingly, Santiago Morales-Rivera’s class on guilt in 20th-century 
Spanish fiction set the ground for some of the ideas on tragedy drawn out in 
Impossible Indians. As with Juan Antonio, Santiago took special interest in my 
work written for his class and then encouraged me to follow up with an 
independent studies with him. Our independent studies on violence and 
Spanish theatre also paved the way for my study of Latin American and U.S. 
Latina/o theatre and performance, and I thank him for helping me put 
together the pieces of my puzzle. 
María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo, Patricia Ybarra and Alicia Schmidt-
Camacho are three of the most influential scholars in whose classrooms I’ve 
been fortunate enough to sit. Josie inspired me to become a professor when 
I first stepped into her “Chicano Popular Culture” course in 2003, and she 
has guided me along the way towards earning my Ph.D. If anyone is to be 
held responsible for how I’ve managed to make it this far, that would be 
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Josie. Patty taught me to love theatre and performance in her classes on 
Theatres of Conquest and Latina/o Drama, two of the courses that helped 
me frame what my scholarship would like since very early on in my career. It 
was Patty who first encouraged me to study the work of Cherríe Moraga in 
ways that her essays and plays had not been studied before; if it weren’t for 
her guidance of my undergraduate thesis, my dissertation would not exist. 
Alicia’s course on Cultures of the Americas gave me a breath of intellectual 
fresh air in a time when I felt I needed it most. Her writings, her teachings 
and her discussions of cultural production allowed me to think in 
frameworks that I had not been able to explore at Cornell, and she was 
among the first to help me piece together the dissertation prospects that 
eventually turned into Impossible Indians. These three scholars have taught me 
the meaning of interdisciplinary scholarship of the highest caliber, and I 
hope to follow in their footsteps. 
My graduate studies were supported in part through a Pre-Doctoral 
Diversity Fellowship from the Ford Foundation, travel grants from Cornell 
University’ Graduate School, research grants from Cornell’s Latino Studies 
Program and the Society for the Humanities, and research grants from the 
Graduate Initiatives Program of the Mellon Mays Undergraduate Fellowship 
Program funded by the Andrew Mellon Foundation. As with the intellectual 
and personal support that I have received over the years, I’ve also been 
fortunate enough to receive funding from these institutions to pursue my 
scholarship. 
Four generations of my family have stood behind my education and 
have been relentless in their support of my intellectual goals. My family sat at 
the beginning of my educational and intellectual journey where it all began 
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over two decades ago, and they have helped me reach this finish line called 
my Ph.D. There are no words to be written or spoken that can pay tribute to 
what you have given me. The words that follow now are simply to show you 
that I have learned to speak another language, but in between the language 
of my dissertation research, you can see traces of love. Love is what you’ve 
taught me, love is what I have learned from you, and for that I Thank You.  
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INTRODUCING THE IMPOSSIBLE INDIANS:  
RACE, TIME, AND PERFORMANCE, OTHERWISE 
 
 
I will tell you how hungry my body is to know something beyond the colony. 
— Cherríe Moraga, An Irrevocable Promise: Staging the Story Xicana 
 
In Spain there were many complaints that our skin was not dark enough for 
us to be “real” primitives. 
— Coco Fusco, English is Broken Here 
 
Pero hay, en la historia de México, algo que no previó ningún tragediante 
griego… Y ese algo es la destrucción de un grupo de dioses, de una teogonía 
y de una mitología, por otro dios. La lucha de Cuauhtémoc contra el español 
y contra Cristo es inferior a la lucha de Cuauhtémoc contra el indio 
mexicano, contra las profecías y contra sus propios dioses. Cuando los 
dioses mexicas caen y el templo mayor cede el solar a la catedral… cuando el 
mexicano es cargador de piedras y extractor de minerales, Cuauhtémoc se 
defiende y lucha aún…. Muere, tal como surge la Virgen de Guadalupe, por 
un mundo que vendrá a ser por encima de todo lo que es. Su muerte toma la 
forma volitiva testimoniada por el héroe trágico griego.1 
— Rodolfo Usigli, Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana  
 
                                                
1 Rodolfo Usigli, “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana (1950)” in Rodolfo Usigli, 
Teatro completo, Vol. 5, Ed. Luis de Tavira and Alejandro Usigli. Mexico City: Fondo de 
cultura económica, 2005.   
* My translation: “But in the history of Mexico there is something that no Greek tragedian 
foretold… And that something is the destruction of a group of gods, of a theogony and a 
mythology, by another god. Cuauhtémoc’s battle against the Spaniard and against Christ 
is inferior to Cuauhtémoc’s battle against the Mexican Indian, against the prophecies and 
against his own gods. When the Mexica gods fall and the Templo Mayor cedes its space 
over to the cathedral… when the Mexican becomes a beast of burden carrying rocks and 
extracting minerals, Cuauhtémoc still resists and defends himself … He dies, just like the 
Virgen de Guadalupe surfaces, for a world that will come to exist over everything that is. 
His death takes the volatile form experienced by the Greek tragic hero.” (277). 
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ARIEL: So then what’s left? War? And you know that when it comes to that, 
 Prospero’s invincible.  
CALIBAN: Better death than humiliation and injustice. Anyhow, I’m going to 
 have the last word. Unless nothingness has it. The day when I begin
 to feel that everything’s lost, just let me get hold of a few barrels of
 your infernal power and as you fly around up there in your blue skies 
 you’ll see this island, my inheritance, my work, all blown to 
 smithereens… and, I trust, Prospero and me with it. I hope you’ll like 
 the fireworks display –it’ll be signed Caliban.  
— Aimé Césaire, A Tempest  
 
Sadly, over 40 percent of our audience, no matter where we were, believed 
that the exhibit was real, and did not feel compelled to do anything about it. 
— Guillermo Gómez-Peña, The New World Border 
 
In Fur, each character lusts for the character most likely not to give them 
what they want or need… Each character in the play is at first repulsed by 
the one who loves them most, but in the end learns something about the 
true nature of love. 
— Migdalia Cruz, Fur 
 
Think about [this burrito] as the representation of the modern indigenous 
peoples… I’d like to think of my performance not as audience participation 
so much as audience salvation. I like anyone here who spittles the guilt of 
the last 500years to please report to the stage now. I’d like to ask any white 
men who would like to take the burden of the last 500yrs of guilt to report 
to the stage now… Anyone who is offended by this I really encourage you to 
just leave your body … I just want to encourage you to feel the healing rush 
that is going to surge through your body as you take the guilt for all those 
people who were too much of a coward to come up on stage for you. Cause 
everyone is channeling all their shit right into your body right now, you 
know that, right? It’s ok, relax. And then what I’d like you all to do in order 
to participate, because we all know for everyone to participate in order for a 
ritual to actually work, is when his teeth actually bite down on the burrito, 
I’d like each of you to say “A Man,” not “Amen,” but “A Man,” and think 
of somebody who you believe needs to be absolved for 500 years of guilt 
and repression so we can just move on… I’d like to thank all of you for 
taking the brunt of the guilt.  
— Nao Bustamante, Indig/urrito 
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In the spirit of Sylvia Wynter, I begin by providing the reader of my 
work this set of epigraphs as a guideline with which to follow the arguments 
I articulate in Impossible Indians: Race, Performance and the Cultural Politics of 
Conquest.2 Taken together, the order in which I place these words by Cherríe 
Moraga, Coco Fusco, Rodolfo Usigli, Aimé Césaire, Migdalia Cruz, and Nao 
Bustamante narrates a terrifying story that these artists have lived. Their 
story is the story of damnation inherited to them since 1492, the year that 
the world’s order was made anew with the arrival of Christopher Columbus 
on lands and peoples he did not know existed. Impossible Indians begins and 
ends with these artists’ theatre and performance art generated from their 
damnation, a common life of tragedy that each artist negotiates by turning to 
the indigenous subject originally invented in the colony in 1492. I believe 
that their theatre and performance art deriving from conquest are a 
philosophy of the colonial difference because these live at the crux where 
race, performance and coloniality/modernity constitute the invention of the 
Americas in the 20th-century. 
                                                
2 For Wynter, the epigraphs she places “at the beginning of select sections [of her essays] 
are intended to serve as guide-quotes… to orient the reader as the Argument [of these 
essays] struggles to think/articulate itself outside the terms of the disciplinary discourses 
of our present epistemological order” (2003, footnote 1). As with “Introducing the 
Impossible Indians,” the four chapters that follow my introductory chapter also begin 
with a set of epigraphs. I have chosen to include in this introductory chapter an epigraph 
by each of the artists I study in chapters 1 through 4, and this duplication is meant to 
orient my reader towards tracing a cultural politics of conquest expressed by these artists 
through their works of art. 
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Theatre ,  Pe rformance  and the  Time of  Rac e  Beyond the  Colon y 
 
 Together, the epigraphs are telling of this invention’s repercussions 
felt in everyday life in the Americas. Cherríe Moraga’s embodied desire for 
knowledge beyond the conscriptions of the colony leads her to theorize the 
ideal subject of her theatre of liberation as an Indian dead in the pre-
Columbian past. The anticolonial performance of Coco Fusco and 
Guillermo Gómez-Peña also desired a mode of relationality in 1992 that did 
not reproduce the anti-relational mode of Columbus’ genocidal discovery. 
As part of the performance, they tactically dressed themselves in Indian 
garbs, trapped and exhibited themselves inside a golden cage, and silently 
waited for their audiences to recognize that the Indian in the cage 
represented 500 years of colonialism and needed to be set free from 
damnation. “Sadly,” their audiences knew the Indians in the cage were not 
existing in the modern world as equally modern as themselves, and their 
anticolonial intent did not succeed in the setting the Indian free. Rodolfo 
Usigli’s 1950 essay on 20th-century Mexican tragedy looks back to the 
Conquest of the Aztecs to recuperate Cuauhtémoc, the last fallen emperor 
of the Aztecs, as a tragic hero of modernity in the Americas. The Indians of 
his Mexican theatre live in a time that is centuries removed from his own.  
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  Also in a tragic mode of theatre, Aimé Césaire (2000) adapts William 
Shakespeare’s 17th-century play, The Tempest (2004), for the stage of his Black 
theatre and recreates Caliban as the authorized native subject of his anti-
colonial revolution. Migdalia Cruz (2000) then rewrites Caliban for the stage 
of Latina theatre and fulfills the native’s original promises of war, death and 
destruction at the hands of Citrona, her Latina lesbian protagonist. Citrona’s 
fulfillment of Caliban’s promises, however, cannot give these natives what 
they desire most: freedom from damnation never comes to bring salvation 
for the oppressed. As Cruz’s words suggest, the true nature love generated 
under the auspices of colonialism, even when beyond the conscriptions of 
the colony, does not mean the end of damnation for native subjects. The 
decolonial gift of salvation for the damned comes to them dressed as a 
burrito strapped onto Nao Bustamante’s crotch. The Latina gift of 
decoloniality is a gift that breaks native subjects free from the tragic time of 
colonial/modernity, and it is a relationality of race framed by love, not life in 
hell. 
 Impossible Indians is divided in two parts, each one containing two 
chapters. Part I, “The Indian in the Archive,” focuses on essays and plays by 
two Mexican playwrights, Rodolfo Usigli and Sergio Magaña, and a Xicana 
playwright, Cherríe Moraga. These artists’ desire to know indigeneity beyond 
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the colony, I argue, leads them to find an Indian buried in the archives of 
colonial history of the Americas without coloniality/modernity, and to 
exclude the Indian living beside and within modernity/coloniality in the 
present. Part II, “The Indian in Other Times,” centers primarily on the 
relationship between the archive of colonial history and theatre and 
performance art deriving from but not reproducing the archive’s limitations.  
This second part focuses on Coco Fusco’s and Guillermo Gómez-Peña’s 
performance art in light of Antonin Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty; Aimé 
Césaire’s and Migdalia Cruz’s adaptations of William Shakespeare’s The 
Tempest; and Nao Bustamante’s decolonial performance. I argue that these 
artists’ engagements with embodiment and the archive develop from the 
ideological limitations of the previous chapters to find an Indian that dwells 
elsewhere from damnation.  
 In my first chapter, “Tragically Mexican: Rodolfo Usigli’s Racial 
Performativity,” I study Usigli’s essay, “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia 
mexicana” (1950), and his play, Corona de luz (1963), the last part to his 
trilogy of antihistorical plays on Mexican colonial history. The first section of 
this chapter analyzes Usigli’s reflection on the state of 20th-century Mexican 
theatre, whose underdevelopment he believed was due largely in part to 
modern playwrights’ inability to recognize the country’s centuries-long tragic 
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tradition, one that overrides the Renaissance’s claims to the Ancient Greeks 
and their tragedies. For Usigli, the fall of the Aztec empire at the hands of 
Cortés set the grounds for a tragic experience and a tragic hero that Greek 
tragedians nor their European inheritors could ever lay claim to. In the Aztec 
rituals observed by Fray Juan de Zumárraga and the indigenous peoples’ 
resistance to spiritual conquest, he says, was a mode of being that partnered 
ontology with a dramatic form in a manner that was uniquely and tragically 
Mexican. I argue that the playwright’s theory of tragedy built on Zumárraga’s 
citations and Cuauhtémoc’s imperial subjectivity, productive as it is in 
theorizing tragedy by way of race, refuses 20th-century indigenous peoples an 
access to tragic modernity and its performative ontology in the present. He 
relegates the lives of indigenous peoples in 1950 to the colony, which he sees 
as enunciated in his present, but since the Conquest no longer exists, the 
Indians’ time of the colony is incongruent with his own present.  
The second section of the chapter is a close reading of Corona de luz, 
where the playwright rehearses the debate between Fray Bartolomé de las 
Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, and stages the divine apparition of the 
Virgen de Guadalupe. Usigli first takes his play as an opportunity to to 
correct the idea of the human born from the Valladolid trial in 1550 in light 
of his ideas on Aztec performativity, and introduces Zumárraga’s 
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observations as an answer to the question of the Indians’ human condition. 
The play culminates in a scene where the indigenous ontology produced by 
Guadalupe-Tonantzin’s apparition exceeds the logic of the colonial masters, 
and Usigli materializes a notion of indigenous ontology excluded by the trial 
in 1550. Corona de luz’s emphasis on the radical potential of performance to 
produce a being that challenges the colonial order, I argue, also provides us 
with a theory of the coloniality of being where race and ontology are 
constituted through both language and the performative. Furthermore, 
Usigli’s racial performativity and tragic modernity question the separation of 
colonialism and coloniality as incommensurable with each other, and reveal 
that the colony not only haunts the artist’s time, it frames very his present 
directly when he excludes the living Indians from the tragic stage of Corona de 
luz.  
“Against Knowledge: Mayan Gods and the Colonial Residue of 
MeXicana Theatre,” my second chapter, reads Moraga’s and Magaña’s plays 
and essays that are indirectly influenced by Usigli and his denying indigenous 
peoples a possible history of the present. Perhaps the least cohesive of my 
chapters, “Against Knowledge” theorizes Usigli’s engagement with 
indigenous peoples and tragic temporality as one that is framed by a residue 
of colonialism. I then trace this colonial residue in two essays by Moraga 
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where she most clearly articulates what a theatre of liberation looks like for 
the indigenous peoples who have survived modernity’s centuries-long 
genocidal project. For Moraga, the resistance to erasure can only be 
performed by the Indian whose DNA derives from her imperial Aztec 
scribes and the Mayan Daykeepers of the “myth” of the Popol Vuh, but not 
the mestizos and indigenous peoples who do not invoke the Indian when 
she desires to know beyond the colony. I argue that Moraga’s theatre is a 
decolonial project that denies liberation and freedom to those mestizos and 
indigenous peoples living in the colony but are unable to lay claims to her 
ideology of indigeneity based on genetics. Moraga’s vision of liberation is 
antihistorical in that she refuses to see history as framed by a linear notion of 
time. Her brand of liberation also becomes anti-historical when she sees 
indigeneity as living in a time before and without colonialism, and excludes 
indigenous peoples whose lives dwell within and beyond the colony. 
Building from this critique, I then provide a close reading of her puppet 
theatre, Heart of Earth: A Popol Vuh Story (2001a), and Sergio Magaña’s Los 
Enemigos (1990). I argue their plays’ insistence on representing Mayan 
peoples as primitives —as is the case of Magaña’s play rewriting the Mayan 
ceremony of the Rabinal Achi— or as a-historical myths of the pre-
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Columbian period, effectively denies Mayans a coeval existence with the 
artists’ own time.    
 In my third chapter, “Spectacular Indians: Antonin Artaud and the 
Cruelty of Latino Performance,” I study a performance and a performance 
method that are foundational to the world of 20th-century modern art. 
Fusco’s and Gómez-Peña’s Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit … has been 
most often celebrated as a performance that challenged the post-racial 
arguments of U.S. multiculturalism in the early 1990s.  Building on these 
celebratory notes, I focus on the performance’s end results to highlight the 
ways in which the performers were not able to fulfill their anticolonial 
imperatives because these were articulated through the very colonialism they 
wanted to critique. In light of their unending captivity, I argue that Fusco 
and Gómez-Peña re-conscript within the tragedy of modernity the 
indigenous peoples that they set out to liberate from a life damned by the 
colony. I also provide a close reading of Artaud’s essays on his Theatre of 
Cruelty in relation to the French dramaturge’s experiences with colonialism. 
Artaud began to theorize cruelty as a medicine for the tragedy of modernity 
when he encountered the dancers from Bali forced to perform in the 1931 
Colonial Exposition, and when he invented Mexico’s indigenous peoples as 
primitively bound to a time before Cortés. While the Latino performers’ 
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tragic flaw hinged on their inability to liberate the Indians from the trap of 
colonialism/modernity, Artaud’s cruelty set up the trap of modernity itself 
where the colonized were not to exist beyond the colony in the present.  The 
spectacular Indians in both scenarios of conquest ended in damnation. 
 Of the chapters that make up Impossible Indians, “Rehearsals of the 
Damned: Damnation, Freedom, Salvation” covers the most historical, 
temporal, geographic and ideological ground. The previous three chapters 
set up the groundwork for theorizing the damnation of indigenous peoples 
through an unsurpassable mode of tragedy. In this fourth chapter, I argue 
for a mode of tragedy that can indeed bring a different future for the 
damned, precisely by rehearsing the scenes of subjection that took place in 
the terrain of the colony. The first part of chapter analyzes the Spanish 16th-
century Requerimiento as a historical event where we can begin to theorize 
the damnation of colonial subjects in the name of Christian salvation. 
Following the work of José Rabasa and Sylvia Wynter, I trace this 
conjugation of native subjects in Shakespeare’s The Tempest (2004) and its 
20th-century adaptation by Césaire, A Tempest (2000). I argue that while the 
Renaissance playwright cannot fathom a Caliban capable of rationalizing a 
desire for freedom, the Martiniquan anticolonial playwright imagines the 
slave as capable of reasoning his desire to be free but still unable to perform 
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said desire. In the second part of the chapter, I read Cruz’s Fur (2000) as a 
Latina play whose protagonist rehearses Caliban’s damnation. Unlike 
Caliban, Citrona fulfills her desire for freedom: she cannibalizes her masters 
binding her to racial slavery, but with her life of freedom in place and 
beyond the colony, she nonetheless ends her days in an isolated darkness. I 
argue that the beast’s living free without love reproduces the anti-relational 
modes of colonialism, leaving salvation from damnation still unattainable 
even when freedom abounds. The third part of the chapter then focuses on 
Indig/urrito, Bustamante’s performance commemorating the Quincentenary 
where she asked white men to come up to the stage, bite a burrito she 
strapped-on to her crotch, and absolve themselves from 500 years of racial 
guilt. Following Rabasa’s theorization of the Requerimiento and José 
Esteban Muñoz’ work on affect and racial performativity, I argue that 
Bustamante’s insistence on reworking the relational field of race between her 
and her white audiences members has but one purpose in mind: salvation for 
the damned. Indig/urrito’s political imperative to move on beyond the colony 
hinges on its equally important ethical imperative to make it possible for the 
racialized self to recognize herself and the other in alterity. The brownness 
of love is the decolonial gift of salvation and freedom for the damned who 
wish to dwell in an altogether different time beyond the colony.   
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What does life for racialized subjects look like beyond the colony? 
These artists answer this question by offering us two answers: damnation or 
love, both mediated through embodiment. Usigli, Magaña and Artaud 
assume that colonialism has ended and its effects haunt their present lives, 
but when they invent their respective understandings of the authenticity of 
indigenous peoples as dead in the past, they do not account for their own 
trafficking in colonial relations as one more of these lasting effects of 
colonialism. While Usigli’s, Magaña’s, and Artaud’s racial temporality is a 
time of tragedy that is unconscious of its colonial repetitions, racial 
temporality in the work of Moraga, Fusco, and Gómez-Peña refuses to see 
colonialism as a finished process precisely because the effects of colonialism 
still frame the relational field of race.  
The first mode of tragedy recognizes the past’s colonialism as a ghost-
like continuity haunting the present, but the second mode of tragedy engages 
colonial hauntology as the living present, not a dead one. Both temporal 
modes of tragedy, however, are unable to offer an ideology of indigeneity 
that can transcend indigenous peoples’ damnation past and present —their 
future is still bound to a life in hell. In contrast, Césaire and Cruz rehearse 
the scenes of colonial subjection haunting the modern art of Usigli, Moraga, 
Magaña, Artaud, Fusco and Gómez-Peña, to transgress the mode of tragedy 
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espoused by The Tempest. Their rehearsals repeat the tragedy of modernity 
and challenge damnation by tackling its anti-relationality head-on, even as 
their attempts to stage freedom do not bring damnation to its own tragic 
end. Salvation comes to these artists in the shape of a burrito strapped onto 
a phallic Indian woman whose performance redefines the relational field of 
race along the lines of alterity. Bustamante, I argue, pushes her audiences 
and the theorists of race to displace self-love onto others so that we can see 
that the other in alterity is living within a relational field, one that includes 
ourselves as well. Indeed, love is the heart of her decolonial performance 
asking us to move beyond and besides modernity/coloniality.   
For the damned, the difference between a relationality of damnation 
(anti-relational) and a relationality of love (relationality in alterity) lies in each 
artist’s modes of engaging time, race and conquest to bring about their 
future. As a way of engaging time and conquest, each artist invents an idea 
of what indigenous peoples are and then creates art based on this ideology of 
race. Their inventions of indigeneity, however, reveal that the time of race is 
incongruent with their own reality. Each artist theorizes the future of race by 
reflecting on it or performing it in the present, but the ways in which they 
envision the time of race —by way of the Conquest and its legacies— end 
up producing a relational field of race as one still framed by colonial relations 
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of power. The incongruence between the desire for decoloniality —
expressed in their (re)employment of the Conquest in the service of 
transgressing colonial relations— and the end results of their decolonial 
projects —binding indigeneity to a time without a possible history of the 
present and without a future beyond the colony—,  is what I am theorizing 
as the temporal incongruence of race. 
 
 
Maldonado-Torres  and the  Col onial i t y of  Be ing  …  
 
In one of the most insightful essays to emerge from the recently 
formed Latin American Modernity/Coloniality Research Program,3 Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres traces what he and others have called “the coloniality of 
being” through the work of several philosophers and theorists fundamental 
to 20th-century critical thinking. “On the Coloniality of Being: Contributions 
to the Development of a Concept” (2007) reads Martin Heidegger, 
Emmanuel Lévinas, Walter Mignolo, Enrique Dussel, Anibal Quijano, and 
Frantz Fanon side-by-side to form a kind of genealogy on the question of 
being. In his genealogy, Maldonado-Torres offers an answer to ontology by 
situating in dialogue philosophies emerging from the experience of 
colonialism with philosophies of Western modernity. Drawing from 
                                                
3 For a set of key essays on this project, please see the special issue on “Globalization and 
the Decolonial Option” in the journal Cultural Studies, Vol. 21, Issue 2-3, 2007.  
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Heidegger’s and Lévinas’ challenge to a philosophical tradition founded on 
the Cartesian notion of self, and Dussel’s introduction of the ego conquiro to 
their ideas on ontology, he concludes that Mignolo, Quijano and Fanon 
provide a blueprint for a more libratory project “transforming the 
modern/colonial world into a transmodern world: that is a world where war 
does not become the norm or the rule, but the exception” (Maldonado 263). 
Fanon’s experience with colonialism and his thinking from within the 
trenches of 20th-century colonialism, in particular, become for Maldonado-
Torres the place from which to theorize “the existentialia of the ‘subject’ of 
the coloniality of Being” (243). The philosopher’s ontological model 
theorizes a mode of being for modernity/coloniality at the turn of the 20th-
century, and he argues that it is a radical project centering on the decolonial 
as the lens through which modernity ought to be constructed in the present.  
The line of decolonial thinking that the philosopher is employing 
through Quijano, Dussel, and Mignolo stems from an understanding of 
modernity/coloniality rooted in the 15th and 16th-century Americas. This 
history of colonialism, I would suggest, is a far different experience of 
colonialism than the one he especially privileges in Fanon. Damnation 
addresses the experience of slavery and the (un)making of Blackness as 
inhuman in the history of the modern/colonial world, but the making of the 
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world explicitly through the non-ethics of war began, as Quijano, Sylvia 
Wynter and Maldonado-Torres himself have stated, with the construction of 
“race” as social-biological hierarchy in the 16th-century argument between 
Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas.4  The Conquest of the 
Américas and its invention of indigenous peoples as subhuman in the 
Sepúlveda-Las Casas trial drops out of Maldonado-Torres’ logic to give way 
to Fanonian damnation as the modus operandi for the coloniality of being. 
The experience of indigeneity —from its initial 15th and 16th-century 
invention to the present—, I argue, escapes the philosopher’s logic in his 
theorizing of the coloniality of Being from Heidegger to Fanon. 
Maldonado-Torres states that “the concept of coloniality of being 
emerged in discussions of a diverse group of scholars doing work on 
coloniality and decolonization,” but the idea itself is “owe[d]” to Walter 
Mignolo, who first began to write about it in the mid-1990s (Maldonado-
Torres 2007, 241). This body of scholarship is founded on “the idea […] 
that colonial relations of power left profound [marks] not only in the areas 
of authority, sexuality, knowledge and the economy, but on the general 
understanding of being as well” (242). From here, the coloniality of power 
                                                
4 This trial over whether the Indians were actually humans with souls is restaged in 
Rodolfo Usigli’s Corona de luz (1963), when a Bishop and a Soldier argue in front of King 
Charles V for the possession of the Indians of New Spain. For my discussion of Corona de 
luz and the coloniality of being established in the Valladolid trial, see chapter one, 
“Tragically Mexican: Rodolfo Usigli’s Racial Performativity.”  
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refers to forms of power establishing modernity from 1492 to the present, 
the coloniality of knowledge regards the impact of colonization on areas 
related to knowledge and its production, and “[the] coloniality of being 
would make primary reference to the lived experience of colonization and its 
impact on language” (242). Coloniality is a different historical experience 
than colonialism:   
Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which 
the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of 
another nation, which makes such nation an empire. 
Coloniality, instead, refers to long-standing patterns of power 
that emerged as a result of colonialism, but that define culture, 
labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well 
beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations. Thus, 
coloniality survives colonialism… Coloniality is not simply the 
aftermath or the residual form of any given form of colonial 
relation. Coloniality emerges in particular socio-historical 
setting, that of the discovery and conquest of the Americas 
(243). 
 
Maldonado-Torres is here understanding colonialism as a particular 
relationship of power: the political and economic dependency of one nation 
on another one. If colonialism is constituted through the relationship 
between the empire and the colony, the effects produced from this 
relationship outlast the colony’s dependence on the metropolis “well beyond 
the strict limits of colonial administrations”; coloniality rests on the effects 
produced by this particular relationship. What results after the formal 
undoing of colonialism is not a relationship of power, but a set of “long-
19 
standing patterns of power.” Coloniality is not a post- or neo-colonial 
relationship marking neither the beginning of life in the post-colonial period, 
nor a relationship without a formal colonial administration. Neither is 
coloniality a kind of colonial “residue,” a faint reminiscence of colonialism’s 
past life, but rather an imprint on all aspects of life left by the Conquest’s 
longevity.  
 Still, I think that his theorizing of colonialism is rooted outside of “the 
particular socio-historical setting… of the discovery and conquest of the 
Americas” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243). He defines colonialism as that 
relationship between two nations where one’s political and economic 
systems are dependent on the second; this makes the former a colony of the 
latter’s empire. The colony-empire relationship is founded at least on a 
formal recognition of the two entities involved as nations, one to be 
subservient or dependent on the other. However, if we take 1492 as the 
primary moment of discovery and conquest of the Americas, the concept of 
nation that he’s employing is incongruent with those times. At the end of the 
15th-century, Spain was primarily a monarchy consolidating Christian 
hegemony over the Jews and Muslims of Iberia, with the expulsion of the 
latter from power shortly before Columbus embarked on his first trip en 
route to India. The discovery and conquest of the Americas were not part of 
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a relationship of power between nations, but a mode of relationality that did 
not exist before 1492. After all, the idea of the coloniality of power sitting at 
the heart of decolonial arguments did not exist prior the America’s 
invention, which was itself produced from the relationship between an 
already existing empire and an entity that was neither nation nor colony (yet). 
The idea of nation at play in Maldonado-Torres is one that belongs to or at 
least originates in a historical period removed from the relationship begun in 
1492, and is a more recent modern invention than the invention of América 
begun with the Renaissance’s modernity. Colonialism, as he understands it, is 
incongruent with the historical experiences he invokes because it is more in 
tune with the second mode of European expansion into Africa and Asia 
than it is to the first of colonialism. 
Mignolo and others have followed the work of Anibal Quijano to 
theorize forms of power that emerged after the formal demise of Spain’s 
colonial control over the Americas,5 but their work has not adequately 
addressed the impact of these patterns of power on the question of 
                                                
5 Selecting a single point to mark the end of European control in the Americas is a 
dubious task indeed. For example, the War of 1898 could arguably be considered the 
“official” demise of Spain’s empire, as it lost its last colonies in the Americas to the 
United States. However, the rise of independent nations in the Américas begins much 
earlier in the 19th-century with Haiti’s expulsion of the French from Hispaniola in the 
Haitian Revolution, and México’s war of independence in 1810. 
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ontology. Maldonado-Torres cites Mignolo’s coining of the term 
“colonialidad del ser” or “the coloniality of being” in the following quote: 
“Science” (knowledge and wisdom) cannot be detached from 
language; languages are not just ‘cultural’ phenomena in which 
people find their ‘identity’; they are also the location where 
knowledge is inscribed. And, since languages are not something 
human beings have but rather something of what human 
beings are, coloniality of power and of knowledge engendered 
the coloniality of being (colonialidad del ser). 6 
 
Mignolo understands the coloniality of Being primarily on epistemological 
grounds and he sees the coloniality of Being as engendered by the coloniality 
of power and the coloniality of knowledge, but makes no reference to the 
lived experience of this subaltern ontology. He also emphasizes the centrality 
of knowledge in language when he states that, beyond an understanding of 
languages rooted in culture, languages themselves embed or inscribe 
knowledge. The claims to a study of language as epistemological relates to a 
larger argument that is not limited to the human sciences, but to humanity 
itself. For both Mignolo and Maldonado-Torres, language and knowledge 
                                                
6 Mignolo quoted in Maldonado-Torres 2007, page 242; emphasis in the original. This 
citation of Mignolo’s coining of the actual term “coloniality of being” dates to a 2003 
essay published in Portugal that I have not been able to get a hold of yet. Sylvia Wynter’s 
critical essay, “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the 
Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument,” appeared in that same year 
but it is not engaged in Maldonado-Torres’s essay. Maldonado-Torres cites Mignolo’s 
coining of the term, but Wynter’s is actually the first essay entirely devoted to the 
coloniality of being. The philosopher’s inclusion of Wynter’s ideas in “Unsettling the 
Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom” would perhaps have added a more 
thorough analysis of the category of the human that takes gender and sexuality as 
important components to understanding the racial subjectivity of the coloniality of being.  
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are not something that humans have, but are part of the very essence “of 
what [human] beings are.” The move here is from epistemology to ontology, 
from a possession of something tangible (“since languages are not something 
human beings have”) to that material thing itself (“rather something of what 
human beings are,” emphasis mine).  
I argue that the decolonialists’ ideological move from epistemology to 
ontology is a questionable framing of ontology and coloniality solely through 
linguistics. To reiterate Mignolo, if languages are part of something that 
human beings are, and knowledge is inscribed or rooted in language, then it 
logically follows that knowledge is also part of what human beings are. And 
if the coloniality of being is created by the collusion of the coloniality of 
power and the coloniality of knowledge, then ontology is equally determined 
by power and epistemology, both understood by way of language. What 
Mignolo leaves out in this definition of the coloniality of being is the 
existentialia created by these two determinants: the lived experience of 
colonization that Maldonado-Torres argues makes up the coloniality of 
being. The emphasis on language and knowledge as the determinants of 
what human beings are, thus, leaves out a different mode of being that is not 
wholly determined by language. More specifically, I would argue that the 
coloniality of power and the coloniality of knowledge constitute human 
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essence as created by these two axis, but these do not account for a way of 
being human through embodiment and action. Power and knowledge alone 
cannot account for ontology defined as that which human beings do. These 
two axis push towards a concept of the human solely through language-
knowledge —as that thing that human being is— , but not towards a 
humanity defined by what the human being does. Maldonado-Torres seems 
to sideline Mignolo’s linguistic emphasis when he says that “[the] emergence 
of the concept of ‘coloniality of Being’ responded to the need to thematize 
the question of the effects of coloniality in lived experience and not only in 
the mind” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 242).  He privileges Mignolo’s citation 
of the term, but does not address his limitation of lived experience to 
language. This theorization of the effects of coloniality on the lives of 
racialized subjects does not actually account for an ontology constituted 
through language and embodiment. Humanity is understood as an essence 
—an essence created and impacted by colonial relations of power and 
knowledge, but an essence nonetheless— and the body is left out, along with 
the actual lived experience of colonialism and its aftermath.  
 Maldonado-Torres says that Mignolo’s first mentioning of the 
coloniality of being allowed him to piece together his own thinking on the 
challenges to European philosophy posed by Heidegger and Lévinas. More 
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specifically, he credits Mignolo’s insights for propelling him to raise further 
questions regarding race and colonial experiences when he engaged 
Heidegger’s and Lévinas’ work on ontology. He begins his analysis of the 
human with Heidegger, not because “Heidegger’s conception of ontology 
and the primacy he gives to the question of being necessarily provide the 
best basis for the understanding of coloniality or decolonization, but 
[because] his analysis of being-in-the-world serve as a starting point to 
understanding some key elements of existential thought, a tradition that has 
made important insights into the lived experience of colonized and racialized 
peoples” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 249). Maldonado-Torres begins to 
summarize Heidegger’s philosophies by stating that the German philosopher 
believed that the use of Descartes’s “cogito ergo sum” within the Western 
philosophical tradition privileged the epistemological part of Cartesian 
equation (“I think”) and ignored the ontological (“I am”). Heidegger 
challenged this tradition by altogether getting rid of “Man” and similar terms 
used to reference human beings because of their relationship to divinity. He 
understood ontology as “the idea that Being is not a being, an entity or a 
thing, but the Being of beings, that is, something like the general horizon of 
understanding for all things” (249). “The concept that he uses to refer to 
human beings-qua-beings for whom their own being is in question is 
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Dasein,” whose subjectivity is mainly determined by “a collective figure: the 
One or the They,” and the Dasein can only “relate authentically to itself by 
projecting its ownmost possibilities —not those defined by the They [which] 
can only be achieved by resoluteness” (250). In turn, authenticity’s 
“resoluteness can only emerge in an encounter with the possibility which is 
inescapably one’s own, that is, death. In death one is fully irreplaceable: no 
one can die for one, or one for another. Death is the singular individualizing 
factor,” and only by facing it can the Dasein achieve authentic subjectivity 
and “detach herself from the They to determine her ownmost possibilities, 
and to resolutely define her own project of ek-sistence” (250). 
Maldonado-Torres critiques Heidegger for thinking of ontology 
mostly from “the point of view of the victor in war, [rather] than of the 
vanquished” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 250). The possibility of dying is what 
constitutes existence for Heidegger’s Dasein because only in the face of death 
can she achieve authenticity at the individual level. The thinking self 
emerging from the Enlightenment is, as Maldonado-Torres suggests, the 
perspective of the victor in that it sets itself up as the absolute thinking self. 
According to Enrique Dussel, also paraphrased by Maldonado-Torres, 
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“Hernán Cortés7 gave expression to an ideal of subjectivity that could be 
defined as the ego conquiro,” an ideal of “the self as a conqueror, of its tasks 
and missions [which] preceded Descartes’ certainty about the self as a 
thinking substance (res cogitans)” (245). The conquistador’s ideal of 
subjectivity predates the ego cogito historically, and this leads Dussel and 
Maldonado-Torres to argue that the skepticism that characterized the 
conquistador’s ego also preceded the skepticism of the thinking self. The 
conquistador’s certainty that he and his nature were not to be questioned, 
while the ones he conquered were “naturally” to be questioned on their 
ability to think and be, set up “the ground for the articulation of the ego 
cogito” centuries later. Before the invention of the self as a thinking 
substance, the ego conquiro created “the barbarian [as] a racialized self … 
characterized [by] a radical questioning or permanent suspicion regarding the 
humanity of [its] self in question” (245). It is because of this systematic 
suspicion of the colonized’s humanity that the Renaissance’s ego conquiro 
                                                
7 It is interesting that Cortés is taken the exemplary conquistador and his actions the 
foundation of the ego conquiro when he was not the first European to treat the natives with 
skepticism regarding their humanity. Christopher Columbus himself took natives captive 
back to Spain to put on display for everyone to see their difference from Europeans 
written all over their darker-skinned bodies. The Arawak bodies on display were there to 
exhibit their lack of humanity before the subjects categorizing themselves as legitimately 
human. Columbus staged the apparition of inhumanity through the bodies of peoples 
invented as Indians, and these were bodies taken to the metropolis as prisoners of 
colonialism. Cortés’ actions as conqueror were not the first practices of war against the 
natives, even if Columbus is historically regarded as the discoverer rather than 
conquistador extraordinaire.  
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predates the Enlightenment’s ego cogito and sets up “another kind of 
skepticism [before Cartesian methodic skepticism and] became constitutive 
of it” (245). This skepticism is “a form of questioning the very humanity of 
colonized peoples” rather than “the existence of the world or the normative 
status of logics” (245). Thus, for Heidegger to anchor his thinking in the 
cogito ergo sum and the ego cogito means that he’s anchoring ontology in the 
skepticism of the ego conquiro as well.  
Furthermore, the conquistador’s exercise of war tactics in his attitude 
towards the colonized without humanity also drive the self that Heidegger 
theorized. Following Dussel, Maldonado-Torres argues that the conquerors 
of the Américas arrived there and established a relationship with the native 
inhabitants based on the ego conquiro. The peoples encountered were not 
treated “with the kinds of actions shown at war [rather] than with the ethics 
that regulated [life] with other European Christians” (Maldonado-Torres 
2007, 247). The treatment of the natives “in the Americas is a 
transformation and naturalization of the non-ethics of war, which represented a 
sort of exception to the ethics that regulate normal conduct in Christian 
countries, to a more stable and long-standing reality of damnation. 
Damnation, life in hell, here refers to modern forms of colonialism which 
constitute a reality characterized by the naturalization of war by means of the 
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naturalization of slavery” (247, emphasis on the original). When the non-
ethics of war govern coloniality, death or the possibility of an encounter with 
“death is not so much an individualizing factor as [much as] a constitutive 
feature of [the] reality” of racialized subjects (251). Death constitutes 
existence for the colonized and it is not an encounter of sorts but a 
condition of existence. This experience with death cannot be the same one 
for Heideggerian ontology because for Heidegger death is an individual 
experience separating the One from the They. Death for the colonized and 
racialized subjects is not something they face in a particular event or 
moment, but a perpetual relationship that sets “death… already beside 
them.”  
If for Heidegger death constitutes authenticity, Maldonado-Torres 
sets his idea of death aside because it cannot account for a different 
relationship between the subject and her authentification.  He is suggesting 
that at the core of Heidegger’s concept of the Dasein lies his inability to 
account for such a difference. Heidegger emphasizes the relationship of the 
One with the They “or the mass of people” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 250), 
and the One can authenticate herself only by way of differentiating from the 
They. This presumes the recognition of the One by the They as one of “the 
people” as a priori, and hence the encounter with death must also presume 
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this recognition as a matter-of-fact. The condition of death or “damnation, 
life in hell” that the colonized face, however, not only presupposes the 
impossibility of such recognition of the subject as “the people,” it outright 
negates the racialized subject’s status as people from the beginning. The ego 
conquiro establishes the inhumanity and existence-in-death of racialized 
subjects, and their damnation precedes Heidegger’s ontology in its institution 
of death as a method of being. The colonized’s life-as-death or life-in-death 
surpasses the authentification of the self through death in that the damned’s 
encounter with death is magnified exponentially from the moment of birth: 
the They shapes the One’s existence prior to the One’s fate at the hands of 
death, but the colonized’s existence is always-already marked by death. For 
subjects marked by colonialism and coloniality and whose lives are 
structured by the non-ethics of war, “it is the encounter with daily forms of 
death, not the They, which afflicts them. The encounter with death always 
comes too late, as it were, since death is already beside them” (251). Thus, 
for Maldonado-Torres, Heidegger fails to recognize modernity’s darker side 
and “that in modernity Being has a colonial side… The colonial aspect of 
Being, that is, its tendency to submit everything to the light of understanding 
and signification, reaches an extreme pathological point in war and its 
naturalization through the idea of race in modernity” (251). Heidegger, in his 
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quest to privilege ontology, “forgot” that in modernity “what one finds is 
not a single model of human being, but relations of power that create a 
world with masters and slaves” (251).8 
 Maldonado-Torres critiques Heidegger for “[forgetting] that in 
modernity Being has a colonial side” and for “[losing] from view the 
particular predicament of subjects in the darker side of [the color-line] and 
the significance of their lived experience for the theorization of Being and 
the pathologies of modernity” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 251). This critique 
of the limits of modernity in Heidegger is on point in terms of bringing to 
the surface the “underside of modernity” (Maldonado-Torres 2008; Dussel 
1996). Heidegger’s modernity begins in a historical and philosophical 
                                                
8 “Masters and slaves” references Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1807/1979) and his 
dialectic as yet another point of departure for theorizing ontology and subjectivity. Hegel, 
like Heidegger, however, also locates himself and his thinking not in the ego conquiro and 
the coloniality of power. In Hegel, Haiti and Universal History (2009), Susan Buck-Morss 
writes of his relationship with Haiti in theorizing the dialectic, but this treatment of Haiti 
reduces Haiti and the Haitian Revolution as part of the same historical process as the 
Enlightenment rather than thinking through the revolutionary event as instantiating a 
different (but equal) process of liberation and modernity. Furthermore, the Haitian 
Revolution’s relationship to the Enlightenment and its creation of Man also entrenches 
modernity outside the ego conquiro that characterizes the coloniality of power. The 
experiences of slavery and the Haitian Revolution partake in coloniality through their 
relationship with colonialism —slavery results from Conquest and the Revolution aimed 
to reverse colonialism’s unmaking of Black peoples as human—, but the fin-de-siècle 
anti-colonial moment is not the 15th and 16th-century moment of discovery and conquest 
that is credited with giving way to coloniality. Hegel, the dialectic, and Maldonado-Torres’ 
“masters and slaves” do not offer us a more adequate conception of ontology because 
none take coloniality into consideration as Quijano, Mignolo, and others (including 
Maldonado-Torres) theorize it. Still, the attempt at negotiating ontology by way of 
relations of power allows for a more critically productive way of engaging the human than 
Heidegger does.  
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moment that clearly does not take the ego conquiro as foundational to the 
formation of either history or philosophy. Thus, his concept of death and 
the Being authenticated through an encounter with it are operating in a time 
that does not include conquest as a point of departure. His temporal location 
begins when the ego cogito and the “human” were made of a secular 
rationality, both of which ignore relationships of power as providing an axis 
on which the human makes itself.  
 In contrast to Heidegger’s limited understanding of ontology, 
Maldonado-Torres privileges Emmanuel Lévinas and Frantz Fanon as 
transgressors of Heideggerian ontology. He paraphrases Lévinas by stating 
that Lévinas believed that “ontology [is] equal […] to a philosophy of 
power” and he critiqued Heidegger for his involvement with the Nazi 
regime. The decolonial philosopher then centers on Fanon for his expansion 
of the master/slave dialectic from within the experience of colonialism 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007, 242). Lévinas’ theorizing of European philosophy 
through Jewish and Christian texts offers Maldonado-Torres an entry point 
into what Heidegger fails to understand. When Heidegger’s Being defines 
itself against that which is not a being, he leaves the non-beings out of his 
ontological framework. For Lévinas, this constitutes “the forgetting of the 
self-Other relation that characterizes the return of ontology as fundamental, 
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which can lead, not to lacking authenticity, but to a renunciation of 
responsibility and justice” (258). Heidegger’s privileging of the ontological 
side of the Cartesian equation also stands on a denial of ontology to those 
who are not the victors of war: the Being/Dasein produces itself against what 
lies outside of itself, “produc[ing] its contrary, not nothing, but a non-human 
or rather an inhuman world” in the process (257). This entails “the violation 
of the meaning of human alterity to the point where the alter-ego becomes 
sub-alter. Such a reality, typically approximated very closely in situations of 
war, is transformed into an ordinary affair through the idea of race, which 
serves as a crucial role in the naturalization of the non-ethics of war through 
practices of colonialism and (racial) slavery” (257). Heidegger’s exclusion of 
an ideology of power in his philosophy also ignores that “violation of the 
meaning of human alterity,” and the ontology that occupies his world does 
not take into consideration an account of modernity from within 
colonialism.  
  While Lévinas theorizes ontology based on a relationship of 
responsibility and justice between the Self and the Other, Fanon theorizes 
ontology from a particular encounter between the imperial Self and the 
Other it makes inhuman. Fanon, in other words, thinks of ontology as the 
relationship of the conqueror and the conquered. The point he uses as the 
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instantiation or hailing of the Black subject as the enslaved self —“Look a 
Negro!”— is what Maldonado-Torres states “is the point of departure for 
Fanon to begin to articulate what might be referred to as the existentialia of 
the ‘subject’ of the coloniality of Being” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243). 
Since Heidegger vanquishes from ontology those that cannot attain the 
ontological leverage of the Being, Maldonado-Torres borrows from Fanon 
to refer to these “colonized Dasein” as the damné as or condemned of the 
earth (251, 253). When Fanon argues for an understanding of the Black 
subject as that which “is not a being or simply nothingness [and that] the 
Black is something else” (253), he is providing a correlative to the being 
excluded from Heideggerian ontology. 
Hence, Fanon and the damné exist in a reality that is characterized by 
the everyday possibility of death because life under colonialism is “life in 
hell” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 247). For these subjects of colonialism, 
“modernity changed the way of achieving authenticity: they already live with 
death and are not even ‘people’” because their very humanity has been 
denied to them by their white masters (251). The damné’s life in hell –
damnation– cannot access authenticity in Heidegger because the possibility of 
facing death occurs on completely different experiences of modernity. 
Whereas the Dasien must face death as a way to constitute their individuation 
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from the lesser beings and the They, for Fanon the mortality of the damné is 
achieved not by choice: 
There is, first of all, the fact that the colonized person, who in 
this respect is like men in underdeveloped countries or the 
disinherited in all parts of the word, perceives life not as a 
flowering or a development of an essential productiveness, but 
as a permanent struggle against an omnipresent death. This 
ever-menacing death is experienced as endemic famine, 
unemployment, a high death rate, an inferiority complex and 
the absence of any hope for the future. All this gnawing at the 
existence of tends to make of life something resembling an 
incomplete death (Fanon 1965, 128; quoted in Maldonado-
Torres 2007, 254-255). 
 
The difference between Heidegger and Fanon rests on a question of choice 
and agency. While the self in Heidegger turns on an axis of agency as the 
One chooses to authenticate himself through death, the self in Fanon “lacks 
the opportunity to descend into Hell” because his life is already in hell and is 
not at all given the choice of death (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 255). The 
Black subject cannot turn towards death to constitute his reality, but this is 
not due to a lack of agency. The agency of Blackness is exercised as a turn 
away from death on an everyday basis rather than a turn towards it. If 
colonial subjects are damned to live everyday under the threat of death, their 
livelihood can only exist if they resist the everyday attempts at ending their 
life. It is “for this reason [that] decolonization, deracialization, and des-
gener-acción (in sum, decoloniality) emerge not through an encounter with 
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one’s own mortality, but from a desire to evade death, one’s own but even 
more fundamentally that of others” (251).  
 Maldonado-Torres argues that 
the ‘essence’ of Blackness in a colonial anti-black world is part 
of a larger context of meaning in which the non-ethics of war 
gradually becomes a constitutive part of an alleged normal 
world. In its racial and colonial connotations and uses, 
Blackness is an invention and a projection of a social body 
oriented by the non-ethics of war (2007, 255).  
 
In turn, he says, Fanon’s articulation of a subaltern ontology structured by 
war can be seen as a critique of the construction of modernity vis-a-vis the 
non-ethics of war: 
we can see now that when Fanon called for war against 
colonialism, what he was doing was to politicize social 
relocations which were already premised on war… [Fanon] was 
countering the force and legitimacy of a historical system 
(European modernity) which utilized racism and colonialism to 
naturalize the non-ethics of war. He was doing a war against 
war oriented by “love,” understood here as the desire to restore 
ethics and to give […] a proper place to trans-ontological and 
ontological differences (256). 
 
Fanon’s “love” as a decolonial project is where Maldonado-Torres sees the 
coloniality of being expressed in its utmost potential. Fanon’s war counters 
European modernity by way of an ideological warfare that is itself derived 
from within modernity, since his anticolonial war tactics result from 
modernity’s non-ethics of war. This pinning down of anti-colonial violence 
within modernity’s own trenches in a way restores the very center of 
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modernity’s established proper ontology: “I think, therefore I am.” 
Maldonado-Torres argues that the modality of love practiced by Fanon in his 
meta-war against the non-ethics of war is premised on a particular purpose: 
“to restore ethics and to give it a proper place to trans-ontological and 
ontological differences” within that which excluded them in the first place. 
In other words, love in Fanon’s Blackness seeks to change the center of 
ontological enunciation established by Heidegger’s rewriting of the modern 
Western philosophical tradition and modernity’s ontological self. This 
rethinking of modernity’s ontology from Fanon’s “first phenomenology of 
the Manichean colonial world, understood properly as a Manichean reality 
and not solely as ontological” (256), makes modernity and the modern 
condition in light of the colonial difference and restores the ethics excluded 
by the ego conquiro. 
 Fanon’s insertion of ethics and the experience of coloniality into the 
exclusionary equation of modernity’s ontology is a radical ideology in its own 
right. Fanonian love, however, also re-legitimates modernity as the modus 
operandi for those who occupy trans-ontological and ontological colonial 
difference, and does not allow for an-other Being that is not always-already 
based on exclusion from Western modernity’s ontology. The insertion of 
subaltern reality forces this Western process to account for the experiences 
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excluded from ontology through the non-ethics of war. Thus, the insertion 
of ethics, love and the questioning of modernity’s ontology have but one 
goal: “to restore ethics and to give it a proper place to trans-ontological and 
ontological differences” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 256). The use of “proper 
place” here assumes not only a “desire to restore ethics,” I see it as also 
assuming a sense of belonging to that place from where trans-ontological 
and ontological differences were originally expelled. Restoring these other 
ontologies to their proper place reconstitutes their recognition as part of 
humanity, but it also makes it difficult if not impossible to imagine a 
humanity that exists as a human altogether separate and different from that 
the human condition of modernity proper. Black in Fanon “is not a being or 
simply nothingness. The Black is something else. The enigma of blackness 
appears as the very radical starting point to think about the coloniality of 
Being” (253). Still, the war against war, driven by a desire or love to restore 
ethics and other modes of being into modernity’s Being, ends up betraying 
its own radicality.  
Blackness as that which is not a being nor nothingness abandons its 
radical stance from which to create the coloniality of Being when the goal of 
Fanon’s love is to wage a war against war. This battle has one outcome and 
one outcome only: restore modernity from within, not beside it otherwise. 
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While this move does indeed bring ethics into modernity’s non-ethics of 
war, it brings Blackness —the an-other something else— toward the center 
to be understood as part of the modern, inevitably restoring the whole to its 
part and vice-versa. Blackness, in other words, is no longer not being nor 
nothingness, and its “something else” is to be taken in by the modern. 
Touched and expelled by modernity, Fanonian ontology wants a more 
inclusive modernity by fighting a war to restore ethics by way of said war. In 
the end, Blackness’ desire for ethics is a desire to partake in modernity and 
become a constituent of modern ontology, one that understands Being as 
colonial and modern, but very modern nonetheless. There is no outside of 
modernity for the coloniality of Being if this mode of Blackness is taken as 
its starting point, because modernity is its end goal. Fanon’s war is a radical 
standpoint that forces modernity to remake its ontology with the colonial 
difference in mind, but I would question Maldonado-Torres’ privileging it as 
being the sole existentialia of the coloniality of being. Fanonian ontology is 
framed by coloniality, but it desires to be made of the same essence as the 
existentialia of the original subject of modernity. This ideology of subaltern 
ontology moves towards and seeks incorporation into the center, not to exist 
within and besides Western modernity.  
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Love as a decolonial project to counteract war with more war is 
theorized from the subjectivity of the damné, that is, the Black slave. This 
particular experience of colonialism and violence that Maldonado-Torres 
privileges as the starting point for his project theorizing the coloniality of 
being: “reflection on the coloniality of Being requires elucidation of the 
fundamental existential traits of the black and the colonized,” he says 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007, 253). Although as a starting point “black” and 
“colonized” are mentioned separately, the former’s ontological weight (or 
lack thereof) incorporates the latter’s when the philosopher uses the damné as 
equal to the colonized, and damnation as representative of the experience of 
colonialism for all colonized/racialized peoples. As with the problematic of 
projecting 19th and 20th-century notions of nation and colonialism onto the 
15th and 16th-century Conquest of the Americas, he uses a 20th-century 
Fanonian ontology to theorize a coloniality originating much earlier in the 
first mode of colonialism. Maldonado-Torres’ genealogy tracing Being from 
the ego conquiro to damnation links the two moments of conquest that created 
the Indian and the Black ontologies as subjects of imperial and racist 
projects. In a sense, I wonder to what extent this privileging a 20th-century 
Africana thought as a primary example of the “existentialia of the ‘subject’ of 
the coloniality of Being” impacts the first mode of colonialism. 
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Fanon’s point of departure speaks to a more recent mode of 
colonialism that although intimately connected to the first mode of 
conquest, but it is also far removed from it temporally. In his quote cited 
earlier, Fanon places himself and his ideologies of race and ontology within a 
20th-century mode of colonialism by placing his definition of man —and by 
extension the human— as the subject dwelling in underdeveloped countries 
and in discarded parts of the First World. He is not thinking of man, race or 
ontology within a different time period or an earlier experience of 
colonialism and damnation.   The Being that is hailed in “Look a Negro!” is 
a subject in Fanon’s historical reality, it is a subject born from the calling and 
recognition, and it is reminiscent of the Requerimiento’s scenes of subjection 
involving the conquerors of America and the natives. An ideal of humanity 
and inhumanity was created in the invention of Africa and the invention of 
America, as well as the Negro and barbarian subjects of such (in)humanities. 
Beyond their historical occurrence, what sets the two moments of colonial 
encounter apart is the manner in which recognition and calling are enacted in 
each one. In Fanon, the Black subject is hailed by the literal verbal utterance 
and the conscious recognition of the Being as that “Negro” being called 
forth; but in the first mode of colonialism/modernity, verbal communication 
and recognition were impossible on a common linguistic register between 
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the natives and the invading Europeans. The Indians and their conquerors 
practiced different if not opposing modes of speech, so their discovery and 
conquest set a record where language was incapable of constituting 
subjectivity proper as illustrated by Fanon’s thinking. What language’s 
inability to constitute subjectivity did create, however, was a measurement of 
humanity as the natives were reduced to pagans when colonizer and 
colonized first set eyes on each other. Instead of language, recognition and 
constitution of Being was an ontology created by human action (i.e. the 
ritualistic Requerimiento and Pizarro’s giving Atahualpa the Bible). That 
initial moment of communication made Europe’s linguistic speech and 
writing powerless to conjugate subjectivity through language alone. 
Subjection in the terrain of first mode of colonialism required engaging 
mobile bodies to make communication and relationality possible, and what 
resulted was an idea of humanity (or divinity, supra-human gods) based on 
the evaluation of the bodies and their behavior in question. The 15th and 
16th-century colonial encounter, and the incommensurable knowledges 
instantiated in that primary moment, displace Fanon “as the existentialia of 
the ‘subject’ of the coloniality of Being” in that these set language and 
consciousness as an improper way of constituting subjectivity. The 
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coloniality of Being, I would suggest, must also address these temporal and 
historical experiences when theorizing subjectivity and ontology. 
 Recall here that Maldonado-Torres begins his analysis of coloniality 
by locating it explicitly in the discovery and conquest of the Américas: 
“Coloniality emerges in a particular socio-historical setting, that of the 
discovery and conquest of the Americas... Coloniality refers, first and 
foremost, to the two axes of power that became operative and defined the 
spatio-temporal matrix of what was called America” (Maldonado-Torres 
2007, 243). Like his crediting of Mignolo for coining the term “coloniality of 
being,” he credits the sociologist Anibal Quijano for theorizing the two axes 
of power  
The codification of the differences between conqueror and 
conquered in the idea of ‘race’, a supposedly different biological 
structure that placed some in a natural situation of inferiority to 
the others. The conquistadors assumed this idea as the 
constitutive, founding element of the relations of domination 
that the conquest imposed… The other process was the 
constitution of a new structure of control of labor and its 
resources and slavery, serfdom, small independent commodity 
production and reciprocity, together around and upon the basis 
of capital and the world market (Quijano 2000, 533; quoted in 
Maldonado-Torres 2007, 243-344). 
 
For Quijano, race and a reconstruction of a capitalist system emerged in a 
very particular historical moment and constituted the coloniality of power. 
Building from his argument, Maldonado-Torres cites the 16th-century 
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discussion over the Indians’ possession of souls as the beginning of race in 
the modern/colonial world:  
Quijano locates [the coloniality of power] in discussions about 
whether the Indians has souls or not. New identities were 
created in the context of European colonization: European, 
white, Indian, black and mestizos. A characteristic feature of 
this type of social classification is that the relation between the 
subjects is not horizontal but vertical in character. That is, 
some identities depict superiority over others. And such 
superiority is premised on the degree of humanity attributed to 
the identities in question (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 244). 
 
The trial was animated by the coloniality of power in that the mode of 
relationality exercised in Valladolid was a social hierarchy that placed the 
Indians as inferior to the Spanish because of their biological make up. 
However, along with race and capitalism, the Americas’ experience with 
colonialism rests on a third, if not primary, axis of power that Quijano and 
Maldonado-Torres do not take into account here: “America” had to be 
invented in the process of discovering, conquering, and administrating it. 
European expansion into the New World territories and New World peoples 
likewise also extended the growth of capitalism, but European social 
relations were not organized around biological notions of racial difference. 
The origins of race as a hierarchy of humanity explicitly derive from the 
invention of America as well. The emphasis on conquest in Quijano and 
Maldonado-Torres is “the codification of the differences between 
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conquerors and conquered in the idea of ‘race,’” but the conquest began 
much earlier when Columbus first set eyes and feet on a world that could 
not be understood nor known in terms of the Old World (Rabasa 1993). The 
image of the conqueror that these two have in mind is the same one that 
characterizes Dussel’s ego conquiro: Cortés, not Columbus. Invention, race and 
world capitalism, of course, are undeniably the three axes that mark the 
discovery and conquest of the Americas as an exceptional moment in 
history.  
For Quijano and Maldonado-Torres, coloniality became the “darker 
side” of modernity when the question regarding the Indians’ humanity was 
proposed: Did the Indians have souls? Since the possession of a soul was the 
Christian measurement of human existence, the very proposition questioned 
the Indians’ level of humanity. According to Maldonado-Torres, when the 
soldier-philosopher Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Fray Bartolomé de las 
Casas argued over the right of the Spanish Crown to wage a war against the 
non-Christian natives, the very nature of the argument “was framed around 
the question of just war” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 246). In the argument, 
Sepúlveda believed that the Spaniards should engage in a just war against 
subjects who were too inferior to convert to a superior Christianity, which 
made them eligible for slavery and inhumanity. Although in 1537 the Vatican 
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declared that Indians were indeed human, “the outcome of the discussion is 
not as important as the question itself,” because by the time the actual 
question was asked, “the conquerors had already established a way of 
relating to the peoples that they encountered” (246). By the time the friar 
and the soldier were debating the legitimacy of Spain’s spiritual and bloody 
war with the natives, the actions of the conquerors “were [already] regulated 
by the ethics or rather non-ethnics of war” that did not govern their 
relationship with other Christian peoples (247). The conquistadors’ 
treatment of the Indians was always-already an exception to the rule of 
conviviality espoused among Christians, and their non-ethics of war 
transcended the legitimate enslavement of prisoners of war and vanquished 
enemies when employed in the Americas. The natives, in turn, were reduced 
to a life under the conditions of war and the permanent threat of death at 
the hands of their masters.  
Situating the birth of the coloniality of power within Sepúlveda’s just 
war argument with Las Casas leads Maldonado-Torres to argue for the 
simultaneous birth of the coloniality of being. The conquistador mentality 
espoused by the soldier-philosopher in his advancement for the enslavement 
of the natives is itself an exercise of the ego conquiro’s non-ethics of war. This 
mentality naturalizes the natives as the subjects of war and slavery, limiting 
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their existence to a life in hell, and the damné as the subject of the coloniality 
of being. Maldonado-Torres sees Fanon’s damnation originating with the 
conquistador’s conditioning the natives through “the naturalization of war 
by means of the naturalization of slavery, now justified in relation to the very 
physical and ontological constitution of peoples —by virtue of ‘race’— and 
not to their faith or belief” (Maldonado-Torres 2007, 247). When he 
privileges Fanon’s theorizing of life under slavery, however, Maldonado-
Torres sees an unbroken link between the experience of Fanonian ontology, 
on the one hand, and the experience of colonization and slavery established 
in the trial over the Indians’ humanity, on the other. It is in this 
unquestioned slippage between the experience of indigeneity and the 
experience of blackness that I see an incongruence in the philosopher’s logic. 
The slippage between Fanon and the Valladolid trial conflates two 
very different forms of colonialism carried out against indigenous and Black 
peoples: if the latter were enslaved or understood as naturally inhuman 
because of their skin color and biological make-up, the former were 
primarily seen as subhuman in their lack of Christianity, and then their racial 
status was determined by this absence of rationale. While the Requerimiento 
was that speech act that marked the encountered natives as pagan, inferior to 
Christians, and hence racially different, this racialization was derived from a 
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religiosity that controlled Western concepts and measurements of humanity. 
That both indigenous and Black peoples suffered from a common 
damnation as a result of colonialism in the Americas is not in question, but 
the experience of damnation in actuality was a different relationship with the 
process that naturalized the non-ethics of war for natives and Black peoples. 
Maldonado-Torres ignores this difference in his understanding of the 
experience of colonialism in the Américas, and the modality of the 
coloniality of being he chooses is incongruent with this experience. If at the 
heart of his argument with Heidegger is the latter’s ignorance regarding 
modernity’s invention of the human in the terrain of colonialism, 
Maldonado-Torres’ own understanding of racialized subjectivity is itself 
limited to Fanon’s particular ideology of blackness and damnation. My 
interest here is not to dismiss the common effects of power that produced 
blackness and indigeneity as inhuman, but to stress the difference between 
the experiences where racialized bodies live with death beside them, and the 
experiences of millions of lives lost when the white man came to invent 
indigenous peoples as death-ready at the start of the Spanish imperial 
project. Fanon does not at all address the discovery and conquest of the 
Américas, and although damnation and love are radical projects with which 
to redress the darker side of modernity, he does not provide a more 
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encompassing framework for the coloniality of being in the Américas that 
can account for an experience of indigeneity.9  
 
 
                                                
9 I expand on the relationship between Fanon’s damnation and the scenes of colonial 












RODOLFO USIGLI’S RACIAL PERFOMATIVITY 
 
 
The question about whether the indigenous peoples of the Americas had 
souls or not was framed around the question of just war. In the debates that 
took place in Valladolid in the sixteenth century, Sepúlveda argued against 
Las Casas that the Spanish had the obligation to engage in a just war against 
subjects who, in their inferiority, would not adopt by themselves the superior 
Christian religion and culture. Once more, just like it happens in respect to 
the question about the humanity of the so-called Amerindians, the outcome 
of the discussion is not as important as the question itself. 
— Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “On the Coloniality of Being” 
 
¿Dónde está la tragedia: en el destino personal o local de las tribus, que se 
destruyen unas a otras, o a sí mismas, o en la conquista? ¿En el choque del 
hombre antiguo con sus dioses o en el choque de los dioses contra otro 
dios?1 
— Rodolfo Usigli, Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana  
 
Tlamahuizolli es una voz nahoa que significa “hecho sorprendente” o “suceso 
maravilloso,” por consecuencia, milagro.2 
— Rodolfo Usigli, Corona de luz  
 
 
                                                
* All translations included in this chapter are my own unless otherwise noted. 
 
1 Rodolfo Usigli, “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana (1950)” in Rodolfo Usigli, 
Teatro completo, Vol. 5, Ed. Luis de Tavira and Alejandro Usigli. Mexico City: Fondo de 
cultura económica, 2005.   
* Translation: “Where is tragedy: in the personal or local destiny of the tribes, who destroy 
one another or themselves, or in the conquest? In the clash between ancient man and his 
gods or in the battle of the gods against another god?” (277). 
2 Rodolfo Usigli’s epigraph to Corona de luz: “Tlamahuizolli is a Nahuatl voice that means 
‘surprising act’ or ‘marvelous event,’ hence, miracle” (Usigli 1979, 841).  
* All Spanish citations from Corona de luz (1963) included in this chapter are from Usigli’s 
Teatro completo, Vol. 2. Mexico City: Fondo de cultura económica, 1979. English 
translations are my own.  
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FRAY JUAN: Porque hay que pensar y que tener presente que al retirarme yo, 
el Emperador mandará un nuevo Obispo, un obispo laico quizá, para 
cumplir sus órdenes, para que los rosales florezcan en el yermo y para que la 
Madre de Dios deje de ser la Madre de la humanidad y sea sólo el símbolo 
del indio condenado a perecer.3 




At first glance, Rodolfo Usigli’s reflection on Mexican theatre in 1950 
is incoherent with Nelson Maldonado-Torres’ claims regarding the 
ontological implications of the trial establishing that indigenous peoples had 
souls in 1550.4 While the latter is arguing that the coloniality of being was 
founded at the same time that race and racism were created through the 
non-ethics of war, the former’s treatise on tragedy centers on the clash 
between humans and the gods, and between humans alone; in Usigli, race 
and ontology do not yet enter the equation. Perhaps most importantly, the 
theatre that the playwright is theorizing for the 20th-century is four hundred 
years removed from the 16th-century of Bartolomé de las Casas and Juan 
Ginés de Sepúlveda. This temporal and ideological divergence between 
                                                
3 “FRAY JUAN: We also have to think about and keep in mind that once I retire, the 
Emperor will send a new Bishop, perhaps a secular one, to carry out his orders, to have 
the roses bushes bloom in the barren wasteland and so the Mother of God no longer be 
the Mother of humanity and become solely the symbol of the Indian doomed to perish” 
(Usigli Luz, 878). 
4 The epigraph by Nelson Maldonado-Torres included above is taken from his essay, “On 
the Coloniality of Being: Contributions to the Development of a Concept,” Cultural 
Studies Vol. 21, No. 2-3 (March/May 2007): 240-270. Quote on page 246. 
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theatre and decolonial theory, however, is not as incommensurable as it 
would seem: in order to understand their modern presents in the Americas, 
both Usigli and Maldonado-Torres look back to the same wars of Conquest 
where the God of the Christians came to kill the gods of the Indians.  
  Maldonado-Torres’s suggestion that the outcome of the 16th-century 
debate was not as important as the enunciation of the question itself points 
to the relationships of power established between the conquistadores and 
the peoples they claimed to discover: the natives were not their Christian 
neighbors and were henceforth eligible prisoners of a just and holy war. 
Before the Indians became legally human, they were dehumanized from the 
get-go. As part of his genealogy on the question of being, he suggests that as 
philosophers of the colonial difference, Walter Mignolo, Anibal Quijano, 
Enrique Dussel, and Frantz Fanon theorize what philosophers of Western 
modernity (Martin Heidegger, specifically) have missed in their 
understandings of ontology. He argues that taken together the decolonial 
philosophers provide a blueprint for a more libratory project “transforming 
the modern/colonial world into a transmodern world: that is a world where 
war does not become the norm or the rule, but the exception” (Maldonado-
Torres 2007, 263). Fanon’s experience with colonialism and his thinking 
from within the trenches of 20th-century colonialism become for 
Maldonado-Torres the place from which to begin to theorize the 
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“existentialia of the ‘subject’ of the coloniality of Being” (243), the subject 
created when the question over the Indians’ human condition was placed on 
trial.  
As I outline in my introductory chapter, however, the work of 
Fanonian ontology (damnation) in Maldonado-Torres (2007) does not account 
for an existentialia of subjectivity of the coloniality of Being that can 
adequately address the Américas’ experience of colonialism. The line of 
decolonial thinking that he employs takes the first mode of colonialism 
begun in the 15th and 16th-century, which is a different and distant experience 
of colonialism than the one he especially privileges in Fanon. Damnation 
addresses the experience of slavery and the (un)making of non-western 
peoples as nonhuman in the history of the modern/colonial world, but the 
making of the world through the non-ethics of war began, as Quijano and 
Maldonado-Torres himself state, with the construction of “race” as a social-
biological hierarchy in the Las-Casas-Sepúlveda trial. The invention of 
indigenous peoples as subhuman in this historical argument drops out of 
Maldonado-Torres’ logic to give way to Fanonian damnation as the modus 
operandi for the coloniality of being, and the experience of indigeneity —
from its initial invention in the conquest of the Américas to the present— is 
left as an impossible subjectivity of the coloniality of being.  
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Comparable to the decolonialist’s (mis)understanding of indigeneity 
and the first mode of colonialism, Usigli’s writing on race, colonialism and 
theatre offers us a place where we can begin to theorize ontology otherwise. 
Usigli is most often recognized as one of the founding fathers of 20th-
century Mexican theatre, particularly because of his rise to cultural 
prominence after the Mexican Revolution. The influence of Mexico’s 
“playwright of the Mexican Revolution” in the post-revolutionary period can 
be traced in the work of several renowned novelists and playwrights who 
have graced the Mexican stage, in particular his pupil, the novelist Jorge 
Ibarqüengoitia, his peer and Mexican-American playwright Josefina Niggli, 
and the novelist and poet Rosario Castellanos, who also wrote puppet 
theatre for Mexico’s Instituto Nacional Indigenista. One of his earliest 
theatrical successes was his 1938 play El gesticulador, which debuted at Mexico 
City’s Palacio de Bellas Artes in 1947. The play stages a critique of the 
Mexican Revolution as a failure due to the Partido Revolutionario 
Institucional (PRI), the political party that rose to power following the 
Revolution and which presided over the Mexican government for more than 
70 years.5 When the PRI cancelled El gesticulador’s performances, Usigli 
                                                
5 The PRI’s governance ended in the 2000 presidential elections, when Vicente Fox of the 
Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) won the elections.  
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became the first playwright to have his work censored by the Mexican 
government.  
Although Usigli’s El gesticulador is the most studied piece amongst his 
extensive oeuvre of plays and essays on theatre, the playwright also authored 
a trilogy of plays that is recognized as foundational to Mexican theatre 
history. His Coronas trilogy consists of three antihistorical plays, what the 
playwright calls coronas (“crowns”) staging three different points in Mexico’s 
experience with colonialism6: Corona de sombra (1943) dramatizes Maximilian’s 
and Carlota’s reign as the country’s last incarnation of imperial governance, 
and one that is haunted by México’s first indigenous president Benito Juárez; 
Corona de fuego (1960) is a play that centers on the last Aztec emperor, 
Cuauhtémoc, who is tortured by Hernán Cortés and his body in pain 
exhibited for the sake of legitimizing the conquistador’s hegemony; and 
Corona de luz (1963) is about the use of the Virgen de Guadalupe’s divine 
apparition in a plan to convert the Aztec Indians to Christianity. According 
to theatre historian Patricia Ybarra, the Coronas did not fare well either 
                                                
6 Usigli employs the concept of “antihistorical” to refer to the national mythologies 
resulting from historical events, so his plays were based more on the imagination and re-
imagination of history rather than history itself. Like his treatment of the Greek tragic 
tradition, where he is not interested in restaging the proper elements of tragedy but in 
creating tragedies inspired by the Greeks’ aesthetic form, he believed in the theatre’s 
potential for imagining the past rather than reproducing historical fact. See Usigli’s essay, 
“Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana” (1950) for the playwright’s discussion of 
theatre and history. For concise overviews of Usigli within theatre history and the Coronas 
trilogy, see Ybarra (2007) and Champagne (2007). 
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commercially or critically as his previous plays, and the trilogy’s valued 
“recognition stems from its contribution to Mexican national literature, 
rather than its success within the theatre” (Ybarra 2007, 292). The trilogy 
evidently failed as Usigli’s attempt at “forging a truly Mexican theater” 
because its production for a national audience did not create as great a social 
impact as the play that caused him censorship.7 Still, just as El gesticulador has 
been recognized as exemplary for marking “the beginning of the modern era 
of Mexican theater,” the trilogy itself also marks a turning point (Champagne 
2007, 1414). The modernity of the trilogy lies not in a critique of mid-20th-
                                                
7 Of the Coronas, Sombra is perhaps closest to El gesticulador’s subject matter in that both 
plays tackle issues of oppressive modes of governance. The former drops the stage 
curtain in 1927 and closes the play with Juárez’ reincarnation, Erasmo, predicting the fall 
(failure?) of both imperial and national governments:  
ERASMO (speaking to a lunatic CARLOTA): (Rising to his feet and speaking 
slowly and with a solemn simplicity.) My Lady, I am seeing things too late, 
but at last I see how they really are. Tell Maximilian of Habsburg that 
México sealed its independence in 1867 thanks to him. That thanks to 
him the world learned a great lesson in México, and that it respects him, 
weak as he was. Governments have fallen since then, my Lady, and have 
made a revolution that has yet to finish. But the Revolution too will end 
one day, and then Mexicans will understand what Maximilian’s death 
really means (Usigli 1963, 200). 
The play’s action is framed by a retelling of the failures of both conquest and revolution 
when Erasmo, the simple and solemn Indian, speaks behind a mask in the likeness of 
Juárez’ Zapotec face: Maximilian, the last European emperor of México, was executed in 
1867 by Benito Juárez, who was reinstated to the Presidency when Napoleon and his 
forces were defeated in the Franco-Mexican War; Juárez died in office in 1871 and 
General Porfirio Díaz took hold of the Presidency in 1876, beginning El Porfiriato, the 
30-year dictatorship defeated in the Revolution of 1910. Arguably, the cycles of war, 
revolution and conquest that Erasmo references here are evidences of a prophecy: the 
Revolution will end and governments will rise and fall. Seen from the eyes of an Indian 
man (Erasmo/Juárez), such is the nature of political power in Mexico from the colonial 
period to the present. El gesticulador, it seems, fulfills Corona de sombra’s prophecy as it 
stages a PRI government under rupture, even as the latter was written decades after the 
former was censored. 
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century Mexican governance, but in the playwright’s imagination of the 
coloniality of power and his dramatization of colonialism’s effects on the 
present. 
The precedence set by Usigli’s attempt at creating a uniquely Mexican 
stage is founded on his subject matter (Mexican colonial history) and theatre 
form (tragedy): he believed his native México was the only modern nation 
with a cultural tradition as rich and productive as the Ancient Greeks’. 
Therein lies the nature of his Mexican project: a notion of theatre rooted in a 
quest for antiquity to recuperate an Aztec performative as the inheritor of 
Greek tragedy. In his essay “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana” 
(1950), he argues that a performance original to the Americas can be found 
in the 16th-century cultural practices of the Aztecs, which should be taken as 
the foundation for building a modern Mexican theatre comparable to the 
Ancient Greeks.  The artist reaches back in time to understand his present 
vis-à-vis the indigenous peoples’ practices under Spanish rule, and to 
theorize the Conquest through a tragic lens. Usigli’s treatise on tragedy then 
relegates the indigeneity of indigenous peoples to a set of practices that can 
only exist in the colonial period, under Cortés’ presence, and completely 
outside the reach of the artist’s own time. The Coronas are a theatrics of 
México’s experience with colonialism, and I suggest that what traverses the 
trilogy is the indigenous subject created from this experience. His theorizing 
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and staging of a Mexican theatre, I argue, provides a theory of indigeneity 
whereby indigenous racial subjectivity is constituted through the 
performative. The subject born from Mexico’s experience with colonialism is 
created as a set of practices and behaviors under the auspices of the colonial 
gaze, a colonizing trick that the playwright rehearses in his Mexican theatre 
deriving from the Conquest.  
Imbedded in the coloniality/modernity of Mexican theatre is an 
understanding of indigeneity as an ideology of performance: the indigenous 
peoples in Corona de luz and Corona de fuego are made into beings when their 
difference is marked on the bodies acting out in native ritual processions and 
celebrations under the critical gaze of their conquerors.8 As I analyze in 
Corona de luz, indigeneity is first recognized as a difference from the natives’ 
Christian masters when these masters witness their forms of religious 
worship —their ceremonies deemed “pagan” and in need of extermination 
by way of conversion—, but when the plan to convert them fails and the 
                                                
8 Corona de luz is based on religious practices, both native and Christian. Corona de fuego, 
while not expressing a native or Christian religiosity per se, does include a critical scene 
comparing the way that the natives celebrate their reunion with the last leader of the 
Aztec empire, and the way the Spaniards’ taking a rest to drink and be festive. In this 
particular scene Marina accompanies one of Cortés’ soldiers to break up the native’s 
celebration for fear they are plotting against the conquistador. Corona de sombra does not at 
all address the significance of celebrations or festivals when staging indigenous peoples, 
but the threat that Cortés observes in the massive gathering of Indians around 
Cuauhtémoc is similar to Maximilian’s fear of Benito Juárez’ presence haunting his 
throne. A massive gathering of Indians, in turn, is what Fray Juan sees as the evidence of 
Guadalupe’s apparition in Corona de luz. 
59 
virginal apparition leads a massive procession and clamoring outside the 
Christian monastery, the Indians act out in ways that the conquerors cannot 
have imagined. The indigeneity created out of this performance exceeds the 
colonizers’ logic and creates a new subjectivity. The Indians act in a 
communal event resulting from the apparition of God made in the likeness 
of a brown and female goddess, and their own apparition in massive 
numbers becomes a performance of excess that the Christians simply fail to 
understand within their limited imagination. In Corona de luz, indigeneity is 
created in native terms when the Indians act out collectively, always in a 
plural subjectivity and in comparison to the Spaniards taking the leading 
roles in the play as individual subjectivities.9 The plurality of subjectivity 
made in (com)motion constitutes indigenous racial performativity, a 
                                                
9 There are only five Indian characters in Corona de luz, each with a very small amount of 
time on stage, while there are close to twenty Spaniards with major stage time; only in Act 
III do most of the indigenous men (the four incarnations of Juan Diego) come on stage 
at once, with Juan Darío speaking most of the lines. In Corona de sombra, although the 
presence of Benito Juárez lurks in the back of Maximiliano’s and Carlota’s lunacy, Juárez 
himself is never on stage and hence is forever physically absent; Erasmo Ramírez, the 
Mexican historian, replaces his absent presence by donning a Benito Juárez mask and 
appearing only at the opening and conclusion of the play. In Sombra’s case, an Indian 
frames the play’s action, but indigeneity appears solely as a mimetic apparition, never the 
original indigenous body of enunciation. Cuauhtémoc, on the other hand, takes center 
stage in Corona de fuego as the tragic hero par excellence of Usigli’s ideology of theatre, and 
he is only a protagonist because of his direct opposition to Cortés in defense of the 
Aztecs’ empire and their gods. In other words, Usigli understands indigeneity primarily as 
an undifferentiated and plural subjectivity acting out en mass and rarely as individual 
subjectivities, much like the apparition of Indians at the end of Luz creates indigeneity as 
a communal clamor in the face of spiritual conquest.  
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performance that the ego-driven European men find excessive, too loud to 
comprehend outside of the bonds of slavery. 
I cannot help but understand what Usigli calls “eternal México” —
referring to colonialism’s temporal imprint on Mexican cultural practices— 
as a constituent of both colonialism and coloniality. The playwright theorizes 
modernity through a mode of tragedy, and the eternal time of his theatre 
sees indigeneity as a set of practices that can only be understood from the 
postcolony after colonialism has already passed. He does not understand the 
experience of indigenous peoples whose colonial conditions have been in 
place since the 16th-century. “Primer ensayo” reconciles an “ancient” Aztec 
modality of tragedy with a Greek tragic tradition, and it outlines a theory of 
theatre keeping the past of ancient civilizations and the post-1910 present 
alive in a cycle of eternal time. This mode of tragedy, however, can only be 
animated through a catastrophic experience of colonialism that succinctly 
haunts the present: only Corona de fuego’s Cuauhtémoc, Usigli argues, can be 
modernity’s authentically tragic hero. Likewise, he believed that we can only 
find the foundation for modern tragedy in the demise of indigenous empires 
at the hands of white men. I argue that as an exercise of power relations 
deriving from the Conquest, Usigli’s New World tragedy hails Mexican 
Indians as subjects that cannot perform beyond the 16th-century scenes of 
colonial subjection. Even as this subaltern ontology haunts his present, his 
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theatre colonizes the living Indian by reducing her life to an ontology that is 
always-already dead in the past.  He puts us back in a world of modernity 
where coloniality’s purpose is to prove that Mexicans are more legitimate 
tragedians than the self-entitled European inheritors of Antiquity, not in the 
world where coloniality and modernity are two sides of the same coin. More 
importantly, the tragedy of Usigli’s theatre subsumes the Indians’ 
experiences with colonialism under a Mexican ethos that ironically has no 




Trag ical l y Mexican 
 
Usigli’s “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana” (1950) outlines 
the playwright’s ideas regarding the state of 20th-century Mexican theatre and 
situates Mexico as the modern inheritor of a form of theatre originating in 
classical antiquity. Since tragedy’s requirements are designed around 
communal ideals, he argues, the writing and rewriting of Greek tragedies to 
the present day offer a foundation for building a truly Mexican national 
theatre. His Mexican inheritors of a Greek tragedy prove to be as ancient as 
the Greeks when he states that the ancient Aztecs practiced a religiosity and 
produced a hero as tragic as any of classical antiquity.  The comparison 
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between the Greeks and the Aztecs allows Usigli to imagine an authentically 
modern Mexican theatre inspired by Greek tragedy without replicating its 
exact form and content, something he says that renowned European 
playwrights like William Shakespeare and Jean Racine failed to accomplish.  
I argue that Usigli’s theory of tragedy consciously employs an anti-
historical (tragic) and a-historical idea of indigeneity, one that binds 
indigenous peoples to the time of precolonial Indian empires and excludes 
them from modernity. While the theatre he theorizes for the nation is 
productive in its insistence on situating the experience of colonialism as the 
originator of modernity along with the Renaissance, the playwright’s 
provocation theorizes an indigeneity founded on a performative that was not 
coeval with his own time. Usigli finds proof of the Aztecs’ equivalence to the 
Greeks’ within Fray Juan de Zumárraga’s archival documentation of the 
Aztecs’ performances of gender, race and ontology. Instead of situating his 
Mexican tragic tradition within the terror that accompanied the friar’s 
genocidal reign as the first Bishop of New Spain, however, the playwright 
thoroughly sidelines the friar’s enterprise and highlights the Aztec 
performative written in Zumárraga’s notes as his indigenous inheritance. He 
cites the Indians’ performativity in four moments: the Aztec empire’s reign 
prior to its demise by Cortés, Cuauhtémoc’s tragic fall at the hands of the 
conquistador, Zumárraga’s observation of native performances, and the 
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Aztec dances performed in Veracruz in 1950. The ideology of indigeneity at 
play in Usigli’s arguments for a Mexican tragedy, in other words, only allows 
indigenous peoples access to the performative through antiquity and the 
Conquest. Only in the time of empires prior to their damnation by the 
conqueror can indigenous peoples create their own dramatic traditions. 
Although these traditions are indeed evidenced in the Aztec dances in 1950, 
Usigli cites them as a remnant of that precolonial time of indigenous empires 
and a simulacrum of the dances originally cited in the archive. In this sense, 
Usigli’s imperial Indian past is no different than the ideology of race 
projected onto the Tarahumara Indians by Antonin Artaud in the 1930s. For 
Artaud, the Tarahumara were a primitive race that had to be positioned back 
in time before Cortés, since only in the time of glorious Indian empires 
untouched by the Conquest could the Tarahumara be the primitives he 
wanted them to be. Artaud’s Theatre of Cruelty and Usigli’s Mexican tragedy 
sidelined the lives of indigenous peoples occupying the same present time as 
the dramatists, whose theories of race and performance limit indigenous 
performativity to a thing of Indian pasts.10 Without a precolonial world of 
ancient empires and without the friar’s colonial notes to supplement his 
theorization of tragedy, Mexico’s indigenous peoples in the 20th-century 
                                                
10 Please see chapter 3, “Spectacular Indians: Antonin Artaud and the Cruelty of Latino 
Performance,” for my discussion of Artaud’s relationship to Mexican Indians.  
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could not be tragedy’s creators or its tragic heroes. Absent from his archival 
citations and not recognized as sites of tragic art forms in Mexico’s present, 
the Indians living in 1950 were an impossible indigeneity in Usigli’s own 
time. 
Even though Usigli does not present his essay as a response to an 
immediate event or circumstance, he writes to address an artistic 
responsibility in the face of crisis.  
Corresponde a un momento del mundo en el que todo creador, 
tan involuntario como consciente y sincero —son las tres 
condiciones del creador—, se interroga sobre el papel, la 
función y la potencia del artista frente a las catástrofes recientes 
y a las catástrofes próximas… Un escritor se vuelve peligroso o 
inútil cuando deja de escribir literatura para escribir, es decir, 
para comunicar ideas que, o son muy viejas ya y están 
olvidadas, o no ha nacido a la forma todavía porque son parte 
de una embriaguez o de un ensueño y pueden, por eso, parecer 
tan viejas como un niño recién nacido.11 
 
The radicality of Usigli’s art is that it is a form of creation dedicated to social 
change in times of tragedy. In this mode, the aesthetics of tragedy coincide 
with tragic events and artists are called upon to redefine their purpose. The 
artist’s question here is not phenomenological (what is an artist) as much as it 
                                                
11 “There is a moment in the world in which every creator, who is selfless as he is 
conscious and sincere —these are the three conditions for the one who creates—, 
questions himself on the artist’s role, function and potential when he faces recent 
catastrophes and those catastrophes still to come… A writer becomes dangerous or 
useless when he stops writing literature to write, that is to say, to communicate ideas that 
are either too old or have been forgotten, or have not been given a form yet because they 
are part of a euphoria or daydream and as such can seem as old as a newborn child” 
(Usigli 1950, 256). 
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is existential: what is my purpose and who am I because of said purpose? 
This question is answered in a language that such times will more than likely 
not understand, however, because there is no form yet with which to express 
this purpose. The art forms created from tragic events put forth an aesthetic 
that is anachronistic: their innovation marks their very essence as art, but 
their newness born from tragic conditions make them unintelligible 
temporally and they will “appear as old as a newborn child.” The art form’s 
newness appears out of the tragedy, but tragedy’s persistence in history also 
contributes to their anachronism. Tragic events are repeated throughout 
history and are then left behind, but each time a tragic event occurs the 
process of reckoning with its aftermath relives itself. Hence, in tragedy’s 
aftermath, the art that is formed anew with each catastrophe partaking in this 
repetition brings back to life what has been thought of as “very old [or] 
already forgotten.” The livelihood of art is born from catastrophic events 
and its life is the artists’ creation. Thus, the answer to the artist’s existence is 
that he must rekindle the process of reckoning with tragedy’s cycle of 
repetition.  
Art transgresses time in the face of catastrophes because the tragic 
nature of the event demands that it repeat the healing process as catastrophe 
repeats itself. The “tragic” here references the sense of calamity, mourning 
and historical repetition of catastrophe, and the artist must respond 
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adequately to address these repetitions. Logically, Usigli seemingly suggests 
that the dramatic art form of playwrights draws inspiration from disastrous 
events. He also says that it is not necessary to have historically verifiable 
facts and dates for ancient tragedies to be appreciated, understood and be 
modeled after in today’s day. This lack of information “no impide, de hecho, 
su incorporación a la sangre nacional, su transcendencia en ella. Importa 
cómo escribe Sófocles la tragedia, o cómo la escribe Esquilo, porque cada 
uno representa la reunión del pasado supervivo con el presente en acción de 
vivir.”12 The lapse in years between the time of the Ancient Greeks and the 
present should not be an obstacle for incorporating tragedy into 
contemporary national blood. Rather, the temporal difference should be the 
very reason for superimposing or transcending tragedy onto the present. The 
time past between the origins and the present creation doesn’t matter 
because creating art itself is the function of tragedy. The tragic mode of art 
joins together the past with the present, and in this union the past is 
enunciated as living in the present. Tragedy’s livelihood and function in the 
present is conditioned by its insistence on tying the past with the present, 
creating a cycle to bind the time of the Ancients with the time of modernity. 
                                                
12 “[this] actually does not impede their incorporation into national blood, their 
transcendence into it. It matters how Sophocles writes tragedy, or how Aeschylus writes 
it, because each one represents the reunion of the past alive with the present in the act of 
living” (Usigli 1950, 260). 
67 
 Binding cyclical time makes modernity operate non-linearly, and this 
connection between the cyclical time of the ancients and the modern’s linear 
time is welded to what Usigli calls “tradition.”  
La tradición —influencia religiosa, política e histórica— y el 
público contemporáneo —entidad social— exigen de modo 
general que el dramaturgo trate un tema histórico o mitológico 
nativo, conocido de los espectadores así sea en la forma 
abstracta de una moneda o en la apolínea de una estatua.13 
 
The playwright’s duty is to enliven the present. He is to keep produce “the 
act of living” through his creation of plays that bring the historical and 
mythological to the stage of the present. Contemporary audiences demand to 
witness national histories and national mythologies being performed, and the 
artist must write plays for them to consume. The demand for theatre 
essentially links nationalism in the present with past historical events, and in 
the process creates an unbroken time between past and present. In choosing 
to write and stage tragedies, the playwrights continue with a tradition of 
leaving time unbroken and unbound, producing modernity’s present in a 
thoroughly tragic mode.  Indeed, these artists make cultural production a 
national entity when they choose a tragic form for tradition’s sake. Theirs is 
not an extension of Greek tragedy, but a mode of tragedy nonetheless.   
                                                
13 “Tradition (religious, political and historical influence) and the contemporary public (a 
social entity) demand that the dramaturge treat a native historical mythological issue 
known by the spectators either in the abstract form of a coin or in the godly one of a 
statue” (Usigli 1950, 260). 
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Las Troyanas, la Andrómaca, la Hécuba de Séneca están tan 
alejadas de lo griego –y es lo griego de la decadencia, lo griego 
del tendero Eurípides, que envolvía las tragedias con papel de 
dioses para poder venderlas–  como puedo estarlo el estilo 
arquitectónico español de California del colonial mexicano o 
éste de la pirámide. Pero Racine, pero Francia están tan lejos de 
Grecia como pueden estarlo del sarraceno o del tudesco y 
como lo están aún del suizo. Esto significa que, al atribuirse la 
obligación de divertir a un público no griego con temas 
esencialmente griegos, sin que ni ellos ni ese público tengan un 
solo glóbulo de sangre ática, realizan, cada uno a su manera, 
una falsificación inteligente y comerciable y postergan la razón 
de ser de su tragedia nacional.14 
 
While Usigli’s thinking can be narrowed down to the idea that one need not 
be Greek to write Greek tragedies, I believe he is pointing to something far 
more complicated regarding the ties between nationalism and cultural 
production. If tragedy can be incorporated and transcended by national 
blood, and tradition demands that playwrights create theatre that adequately 
tends to societies’ needs of connecting past and present, then the artistic turn 
towards the tragic form becomes their national theatre’s “the reason for 
being.” The transposition of an Ancient Greek art form to contemporary 
national cultures may also create an artifice of tragedy’s proper format, as he 
                                                
14 “Seneca’s Trojan Women are as distanced from the Greek –the Greek-ness of 
decadency and the Greek-ness of Euripides, the storekeeper who wrapped his tragedies in 
paper from the gods in order to sell them–  as California’s Spanish architectural style 
could be from the Mexican colonial style or the Mexican colonial style to the pyramid. 
But Racine, but France are as far from Greece as they could be from the Muslim or the 
German, let alone the Swiss. This means that, once taking upon himself the obligation of 
amusing a non-Greek public with essentially Greek themes, without these nor the public 
having a single drop of Attic blood, these create, each in their own way, an intelligent and 
marketable falsification and they delay their national tragedy’s reason for being” (260-
261). 
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says Racine does when the French dramaturge falsifies the essence of tragedy 
for the sake of his national theatre. Racine’s 17th-century replicas of 
Antiquity were further from the original Greek tragic essence (Seneca and 
Euripedes) than Racine himself was to his Muslim, German or Swiss 
neighbors. According to Usigli, Racine proved unable to create tragedy in a 
modern national form stemming from the original Antiquity because he 
imitated a reality that was so far from his own. Racine and his art failed to 
create the present for the sake of the present itself. Contrary to this, Usigli’s 
purpose is the contemporary reproduction of tragedy and its cyclical 
temporality, but with tradition’s emphasis on catering to a continuous 
reliving of the past as an enunciation in the nation’s present. Beyond creating 
a pathological connection between a past ended and a present that refuses to 
end the past, the temporality Usigli’s modern tragedy make national theatres 
part of a culture of creation surviving since the time of the ancients. 
 Usigli begs the quest for a Mexican understanding of tragedy because 
he has seen that tragedy’s sense is lost in modern times. He argues that both 
artist and society have “extinguish[ed] in themselves and their descendants 
[…] what Nietzsche called the pleasure or the delight of the tragic.”15 The 
                                                
15 Original: “El espectador y el autor por parejo han conspirado durante siglos para 
extinguir en ellos y en sus descendientes, junto con otras virtudes eternas, lo que 
Nietzsche llamaba el placer o el deleite de lo trágico.” Translation: “The spectator and the 
author have for centuries equally conspired to extinguish in themselves and their 
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artist’s responsibility —to address the public’s call for a connection with the 
past— has no reason to exist now. Since modern man no longer seeks that 
connection, “the delight of the tragic is lost” to us without this cycle of 
creation between artist and audience. Usigli suggests that in abandoning 
tragedy, modernity also abandons the understanding of the human that 
accompanies it: “la misma de Edipo, la misma que sólo los griegos han 
resuelto: ¿dónde está el hombre? ¿Qué país, qué cultura, qué impulso, qué 
industria, qué ciencia, qué bomba o arte destructiva puede contestar: el 
hombre está aquí?”16 The answer to man’s existential question is not to be 
found in countries like “China or India, [countries] which lose men like flies 
or fleas in a vague and everlasting battle for vague or everlasting things or 
ideas, countries whose destiny continues without solution.”17 Only in Mexico 
can modernity recuperate tragedy and its ontological ideal:  “la tragedia 
puede encontrar en México la tierra de su resurrección, así como encontró la 
de su destrucción en Colono al través de Edipo,”18 he says. 
                                                                                                                                       
descendents, along with other eternal virtues, what Nietzsche called the pleasure or the 
delight of the tragic” (Usigli 1950, 257). 
16 “… the same [question] as Oedipus, the same one that only the Greeks have solved: 
where is man? What country, what culture, what impulse, what industry, what science, 
what bomb or destructive art can answer: is man here?” (267). 
17 Original: “China o la India, que pierden hombres como moscas o pulgas en una vaga y 
sempiterna lucha por cosas o ideas sempiternas y vagas… países cuyo destino sigue sin 
solución” (266). 
18 “tragedy can find in México the land of its resurrection, just like it found its destruction 
in Colonus through Oedipus” (267). 
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  When Usigli asks himself the questions “¿dónde está la tragedia? 
¿Dónde está México?”,19 he initially answers his quest for the eternity of 
tragedy and the eternity of nationalism in the negative:  
El origen musical —a la vez melódico, armónico y rítmico, a la 
vez religioso y profano— que atribuye Nietzsche a la tragedia 
… me erizó y me hizo dudar… ¿tenían los antiguos mexicanos 
un sentido, un sentimiento de la música comparables a los de 
los áticos de hace 2,500 años? Los huehuetls, teponaxtles y 
demás instrumentos de percusión sobrevivos permiten dudarlo: 
no hay armonía …20 
 
Following his reading of Nietzsche’s treatise on The Birth of Tragedy Out of the 
Spirit of Music (1872), Usigli declares that the ancient Mexicans had no 
harmony that could be comparable to the ancient Greeks; his desire for 
Mexican tragedy fails for a moment. However, he also says that this lack of 
musical harmony between the Ancient Mexicans and the Ancient Greeks is 
not a measure of complete incommensurability. What crosses their 
incommensurable eternal essences is the ritualistic religiosity that 
characterized both antiquities. Greek tragedy and modern Mexico are made 
commensurable by inventing the Indians of Ancient Mexico as also eternal:  
En un sentido lato, quizás universal, el azteca… tiene puntos de 
contacto con el griego. Por ejemplo, en los festivales. Todavía 
                                                
19 “Where is tragedy now? Where is México?” (Usigli 1950, 270). 
20 “The musical origin —at once melodic, harmonious and rhythmic, at the same time 
religious and profane— that Nietzsche attributes to tragedy … shook me and made me 
ponder… did the ancient Mexicans have a sense, a sentiment of music comparable to 
those of the Greeks from 2,500 years ago? The huehuetls, teponaxtles and other 
percussion instruments that have survived make me question so [because] there is no 
harmony…” (270). 
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en la Colonia, cuando fray Juan de Zumárraga, el vasquísimo 
vasco, prohíbe las procesiones, las prohíbe porque el natural 
aprovecha la coyuntura para vestir de animal o de mujer y 
moverse “con meneos deshonestos y lascivos.” En 1950 puede 
comprobarse el episcopálico dicho en el carnaval de Veracruz. 
Hay aquí un paganismo inherente a la celebración, una 
abolición de las fronteras de familia, de sociedad y de sexo, 
comunes, por lo demás, a toda multitud en trance de regocijo, e 
idénticos a los que presiden los festivales de Dionisos en 
Atenas. Se trata de un estado necesario.21 
 
Tragic commensurability is made possible by an ancient grandeur of New 
World indigeneity that is “alive even in the colony” and under the friar’s 
colonizing gaze. Fray Juan de Zumárraga is the one who forbids the native 
festivals where their practices transgress his Christian ideals. The natives’ 
cultural particularity exhibited through the outlawed processions is an 
excessive visuality: their bodies “crossdress as animals and wom[en], they 
shake [their bodies] dishonestly and lasciviously,” and their pagan 
celebrations “abolish” the familial, gender and social norms of Christianity. 
The enslaved native, presumed to be male and masculine, transgresses the 
colonizer’s mindset when his body acts out of bounds, literally moving to a 
different musical rhythm than his masters. This excessive visuality displayed 
                                                
21 “In a broad sense, universal perhaps, the Aztec […] has points of contact with the 
Greek. For example, festivals. Alive even in the colony, when Fray Juan de Zumárra, the 
über-Basque priest, outlaws the processions, he forbids them because the native takes 
advantage of the situation to dress up as animal or a woman and to move [his body] ‘in 
dishonest and lascivious shakes.’ The priest’s observation can be proven in 1950 in the 
Veracruz carnival. There is a certain paganism inherent to the celebration, a disregard for 
the norms guarding the family, society and sex, common, perhaps, in every group in a 
pleasurable trance, and identical to those that prevail in the festivals of Dionysus in 
Athens. It is about a necessary state” (271), emphasis in the original). 
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in full affront to the prohibition of the processions centers the body as that 
which is both the agent and tool of transgression. The logic behind Fray 
Juan’s prohibition is to stop the processions from continuing the natives’ 
traditions as he leads the conversion of the practitioner towards Christianity. 
His target of illegal behavior, as Usigli puts it, is the site of transgression: the 
male body that alters gender and humanity by dressing as both animal and 
woman. At the heart of the problem of incomplete conversion is not a 
practice of religious processions, but the bodies that act out in them.22 The 
Indian constitutes his existence as indeed another way of being through 
these ritual processions-turned-acts of rebellion, performing an ontology that 
is incomprehensible as human by Christian logic.  
Usigli uses the subaltern ontology constituted through the Indians’ 
performance as starting point for finding a true Mexican Tragedy. What the 
Aztecs’ cultural performance had in common with the Greeks’, it seems, was 
the connection between the human body exhibiting-making itself in relation 
to the communal.  
En el estado dionisiaco, que es necesario, se pierden 
individualidades, individuación en todos los aspectos: el 
hombre retrocede para moverse en un cosmos caótico todavía, 
en tanto que en el estado apolíneo, igualmente necesario para la 
tragedia, la individuación y la individualidad se recobran y son 
                                                
22 The friar’s outlawing of religious processions and the exhibition of indigenous bodies 
moving out of bounds is repeated in Usigli’s Corona de luz, where Zumárraga takes 
center stage as a protagonist of the play.  
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tanto más superadas, tanto más superiores, cuanto que parten 
de una renovada experiencia del caos.23 
 
Usigli is thinking here of the category of the human in terms of transgressing 
the individual’s particularity for the sake of tragic chaos; individuality must 
be overcome for the sake of a “renewed experience of chaos,” he suggests. 
If tragedy must stage the communal’s desires, the “losing [of] individualities, 
individuation in every sense of the word” leads man to move towards an 
existence beyond himself. Tragic existentialia demands that man live not 
within himself but within the bounds of the communal. The Aztec, 
understood as that entity exhibiting himself in processions and carnivals, 
became for Usigli that undifferentiated individuality that could only be 
understood in relation to a set of communal practices. This overcoming of 
native particularity for the sake of the communal is the root of Usigli’s 
Mexican tragedy.  
Usigli erases the commensurability between Aztec and Greek, 
however, when he compares the formal aspects of both tragedies side by 
side. While Troy and Tenochtitlan, Agamemnon and Iphigenia, and 
Moctezuma and Cortés are all equally important, in México, “un pueblo 
saturado del complejo de Edipo en su peor aspecto, no tenemos 
                                                
23 “In the Dionysian state, which is necessary, individualities and individuation in all 
aspects is lost: man withdraws from himself to move within a cosmos that is still chaotic, 
so that in the Apollonian state, equally necessary for the tragedy, individuation and 
individuality are recuperated and are more overcome, more superior, so much so that 
they partake in a renewed experience of chaos” (Usigli 1950, 271). 
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antecedentes históricos o dinásticos en el orden incestuous, por lo cual la 
tragedia de Edipo no cabe en México.”24 The playwright that does continue 
with this tragedic tradition, he says, is William Shakespeare, “el único 
moderno dotado del sentimiento y del carácter de la tragedia.”25 Shakespeare 
is limited, however, because in not having lived a historical tragedy 
comparable to Mexico’s experience with colonialism, “deja de escribir la 
tragedia misma en su proporción… Tiene el carácter pero no la tragedia.”26 
The experience of colonialism is expressed in Usigli’s repetition of the Friar’s 
colonial gaze, and in his condemnation of the destruction of the Aztec 
empire at the hands of Cortés: “¿tenemos, como Shakespeare, héroes de 
tragedia sin posibilidad de una tragedia constituida, o tenemos, como 
Sófocles, tragedia y héroe fundidos en la fuerza, en la sangre, en el terror, en 
la destrucción, en el horror y la piedad?”27 The point of separation between 
Mexico’s and Shakespeare’s tragic heroes is that the Mexicans embodied 
                                                
24 “in a country saturated by the Oedipus complex in its worst aspect, we do not have 
historical or hereditary antecedents of the incestuous kind, which is why Oedipus’ tragedy 
does not fit [or does not belong] in México” (Usigli 1950, 274). 
25 Original: “Shakespeare es, claramente, el único moderno dotado del sentimiento y del 
carácter de la tragedia: pero a la vez que escribe al héroe trágico, deja de escribir la 
tragedia misma en su proporción… Tiene el carácter pero no la tragedia…” Translation: 
“Shakespeare is clearly the only modern [playwright] gifted with the sentiment and the 
character of tragedy: but at the same time that he writes the tragic hero, he stops writing 
tragedy in its full capacity… he has the character but not the tragic…” (258). 
26 See translation in footnote 24. 
27 “do we have, as Shakespeare does, tragic heroes without the possibility of a fully-
formed tragedy, or do we have, like Sophocles, tragedy and tragic hero founded on the 
strength, blood, terror, destruction, horror and piety?” (275). 
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both the essence of the tragic hero and the tragedy itself. Shakespearean 
tragic heroes do not have “the possibility of a fully-formed tragedy.”  
The tragic hero par excellence of Usigli’s tragedy is Cuauhtémoc, the 
emperor tortured and killed by Cortés in his destruction of the Aztec empire 
in the 16th-century. For the Mexican playwright, the Aztec emperor was a 
tragic hero because his death was unique:  
Que Cuauhtémoc era [héroe de tragedia], hiere también la vista 
en la interpretación del nombre, en la tortura, en el falso juicio, 
en la veraz ejecución… Cuauhtémoc representa el mundo que 
sólo se mezcla con el sufrimiento porque es parte de su destino 
y que, como el héroe trágico griego, dice: “Hágase tu 
voluntad,” pero no en un sentido resignativo, sino en el sentido 
de: “Aquí vengo yo a cumplir tu voluntad.” Esto es activo y no 
pasivo… y es esencialmente trágico.28 
 
Shakespeare may be credited as the only modern playwright to have written 
tragic heroes like the Greeks, but his heroes failed to experience tragedy to 
the same extent as the indigenous emperor enslaved and executed by his 
white master. Like the Aztec performative equivalent to the Greek, Mexican 
drama surpasses Shakespearean tragedy, and it makes México the only 
country eligible to continue in the tradition of the Ancient Greeks. Usigli’s 
claims, I suggest, also point to something beyond the battle for a Greek 
                                                
28 “That Cuauhtémoc was [a tragic hero], it also hurts to see the interpretation of his 
name, his torturing, the false trial, the verifiable execution… Cuauhtémoc represents the 
world that only blends with suffering because it is part of his destiny and because, like 
Greek tragic hero, he says: ‘Let your will be done,’ but not in a sense of defeat, but in the 
sense of ‘Here I come to have your will be done.’ This is active and not passive… and it 
is essentially tragic” (Usigli 1950, 273). 
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inheritance, something oscillating between the Ancient and the Modern: the 
Renaissance Man and the Colonial Man all share in the making of modern 
tragedy. Shakespeare’s Renaissance theatre is leveled with the Aztecs’ tragic 
fall at the hands of yet another European man. Cortés’ war against the Aztec 
empire, his capture and enslavement of Moctezuma, and his torturing and 
exhibition of Cuauhtémoc’s body in pain are what lay behind Cuauhtémoc’s 
construction as the “Fallen Eagle,” the only authentically tragic hero. The 
Renaissance’s conquering man and artist-man partake in the making of a 
Renaissance modernity, but the darker side of this modernity created by the 
former is where Usigli finds a tragedic tradition that exceeds the latter’s. The 
Renaissance artisan’s theatre, because it does not arise from the ashes 
“founded in strength, blood, terror, destruction, horror and pity” (275) 
experienced by the indigenous fallen by Cortés, is displaced as the only 
modern inheritor of Sophocles’ tragedy. 
 Usigli outlines a Mexican tragic tradition through a notion of eternal 
time: 
Cada pueblo posee una eternidad propia, que a menudo no se 
sabe de dónde emana. Y ay de aquel que no la posea. Me 
refiero al México eterno, medido con una cinta métrica ideal 
que puede aplicarse al mundo maya o al tolteca, al azteca o al 
colonial: al mundo porfiriano o al mundo de la revolución. No 
hablo del México que vive —y que vive tan mal y de un modo 
tan paupérrimo, artificial y abyecto en 1950—, sino del México 
que sobrevive con y pero sobre Chichén y Tollán; con y por 
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sobre Moctezuma y Cortés; con y más allá de Hidalgo y Díaz y 
Madero y Cárdenas y los demás.29 
 
The playwright is searching for a Mexican tragedy in 1950, but this search 
for theatre is bent on excluding the nation’s present condition because 
Mexico was undergoing catastrophic events. Mexico is living in such “bad 
condition and in such a poverty stricken, artificial and abject [times]” that 
this present cannot address the real tragedy without turning to the aesthetic. 
The turn to tragedy here is the Usigli’s answering a call to address the tragic 
nature of his catastrophic present. The Mexico that he is creating here is one 
that exists outside of time, or if not outside of time, it is a Mexico that 
transcends a linear time from the precolonial period and the colony to the 
postcolonial. “México” is an eternal essence that encompasses both the 
indigenous and the non-indigenous: the Maya, Toltec, Aztec, Chichén and 
                                                
29 “Every country posses its own eternity, its origin most often unknown. And I’m sorry 
for that one which does not posses it. I am talking about eternal México, measured with 
an ideal metric tape applicable to the Mayan world or the Toltec, Aztec or colonial one: 
the world of Porfirio Díaz or the world of the Revolution. I am not talking about the 
México that lives —and that lives in such bad condition and in such a poverty-stricken, 
artificial and abject year of 1950—, but about the México that survives with and over 
Chichén and Tollán; with and over Moctezuma and Cortés; with and beyond Hidalgo and 
Díaz and Madero and Cardenas and the rest of them” (Usigli 1950, 267). 
 
The historical names and places referenced here span centuries if not millennia of 
Mesoamerican history. “Al mundo porfiriano” refers to Porfirio Díaz’s presidency of 
México, which lasted from 1876 to 1911. Chichen Itza and Tollán are pre-colombian 
cities, the latter being part of the Toltec empire and the former belonging to the Maya. 
Moctezuma was the Aztec emperor defeated by Cortés, the Spanish conquistador. Miguel 
Hidalgo was the Catholic priest who partook in leading the Mexican war of independence 
from Spain in 1810. Francisco Madero began the Mexican Revolution to oust Díaz from 
power in 1910, and Lázaro Cárdenas served as México’s president 1834-1840. 
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Tollán, Moctezuma, Cortés, Hidalgo, Díaz, Madero, and Cárdenas can be 
organized temporally based on their historical time periods, existing together 
at once and forever in Usigli’s present.30 Usigli’s writing in the 1950s stands 
on the Mexico created by these peopless and places past, and this Mexico 
survives them and their historical existence. México’s eternal essence exceeds 
the particularity of these peopless, places and histories, but the nation’s 
excess is itself derived from particularities that existed with a limited time.  
The playwright’s tragedy marks the historical peopless within a different 
temporal scale than Mexico’s own because the nation supersedes them all. In 
superseding them, national time endows them with a lifespan that 
extinguishes to give life to Mexico’s eternity. 
In turn, Mexico’s eternity is derived from historical time broken up 
into periods: precolonial, colonial, postcolonial, and revolutionary. While the 
former two are invented by formal colonial projects —the precolonial ends 
where the colonial one begins—, the latter two are historical experiences of 
coloniality after the demise of the former. The indigenous and the colonial 
names that Usigli uses are all employed as a result of the Conquest, as it is 
this system of events that marks the turning point between the pre-colonial 
                                                
30 Notice that the iconography of historical peoples and places making up Usigli’s 
Mexican time excludes women and post-Colombian places, México being the exception 
to the latter as it became a space and place carved from the Conquest. Mexico’s eternity is 
thoroughly masculine and pre-Colombian, which makes the playwright’s search for a truly 
Mexican theatre itself derived from an eternal masculinity and indigeneity. 
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and the colonial periods. The historical moment encompassing the 
encounter, discovery and colonization of the Americas was an invention of 
sorts, from “América” to the Indian native, and so it also marks the 
beginning of knowing-inventing the native inhabitants as either “el mundo 
maya o al tolteca, al azteca” for the European worlds who did not know of 
Chichén y Tollán. The worlds that became these worlds of indigenous 
empires in the post-discovery colonial world did not exist before the colony. 
Furthermore, the inhabitants who lived in the lands invaded by the Spaniards 
did not exist as “Indians” before Columbus called them by a name he 
invented form them. In the postcolonial world of the 20th-century, the 
names that occupy Usigli’s Mexican imagination are those of the Mexican 
Revolution: Díaz, Madero, Cárdenas. But between the colonial and the 
postcolonial, what Usigli strategically skips over in his Mexican temporal 
scale is the anti-colonial 19th-century that resisted the colonial regimes of 
Spain, France and the United States. He names the Catholic priest credited 
as one of the first to rise up against Spanish control of Mexico in 1810, but 
Hidalgo’s is one name compared to the multiple ones of the Mexican 
Revolution. Not surprisingly, his preference is clear and the Revolution takes 
precedence.  
Usigli’s essay does include the colonial and postcolonial on the same 
temporal scale, and given the linear connection between these two historical 
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periods  —the latter follows the former in a linearly-progressive order—, the 
former’s end marks the beginning of the latter, and it impacts it in the 
process. That Usigli is theorizing a theatre for his Mexican present anchored 
in both the colonial condition and the postcolonial revolution suggests that 
his theory rests on an effect of formal colonial projects. The long anti-
colonial 19th-century that bridges the gap between the Conquest, the colonial 
world, and the postcolonial revolution also marks the end of formal 
colonization from Europe and the beginning of national/postcolonial 
history for non-natives in the Américas. Its absence in his theory and its 
exclusion from a Mexican eternal time makes the jump from the colonial to 
the postcolonial a troubling move. The emphasis on including pre-colonial 
indigenous history alongside the colonial period, but excluding the anti-
colonial as the logical step between them and the postcolonial, is telling of 
the playwright’s unwillingness to address indigeneity and the present without 
an attachment to a Conquest past.  
The tragic temporality of Mexican theatre, I argue, reveals a certain 
discomfort when it comes to addressing indigenous peoples as part of 
Usigli’s nationalism. When he first employs the term “antiguos mexicanos” 
he expresses a silence as to the identity of these ancient Mexicans and does 
not name. Then, when he refers to Mexico’s eternal time, he now names 
them as Chichen, Tollán, Moctezuma, and the natives playing instruments 
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and dancing in the festivals, without recognizing the role colonialism played 
in what he knows about them. The imperial cities existed as part of the 
Aztec and Mayan indigenous empires before the arrival of the Spanish; 
Moctezuma was an emperor waiting for the god who came and destroyed 
him and his Aztec empire; and the Indians of the processions and festivals 
were under the rule of a white man. Usigli, however, makes no 
acknowledgement of the colonial projects that circumscribed these Indians. 
He does cite Zumárraga’s observation, but this citation does not reference 
the friar’s genocide. The Veracruz festival is one of two moments in his 
essay where Usigli mentions the year 1950, and it is the one point in the 
essay where he addresses indigeneity in the present. Ironically, the Indian 
appears in the 20th-century only as evidence of an observation of indigenous 
peoples being exercised by the colonial authorities centuries earlier. As with 
the jump from the colony to the postcolony, Usigli’s understanding of the 
carnival is also a derivate of conquest because he observes the dancing 
brown bodies as the embodiment of a performative cited in Zumárraga’s 
notes. His observation rehearses the friar’s colonial voyeurism by seeing the 
Veracruz dancers rehearse an Aztec performative, and not understanding 
that their brown bodies were producers of a 20th-century theatre that was all 
their own. His colonial gaze doesn’t see their dances as a repertoire of the 
present, but as the survivor of a performative ontology cited in the archive.  
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When questioned about the archeological nature of this work —is he 
digging up the past?—, Usigli answers that he is not looking for false traces 
of something from which he is far removed. On the contrary, he says that 
Mi comprobación cotidiana durante muchos años me alienta a 
creer que todos los viejos mitos —continuados en al 
arquitectura colonial, en la adaptación al rito católico, y en un 
indefinible sentimiento que nos traiciona cuando pretendemos 
pasar por europeos— son parte viva, globular, del mexicano de 
hoy.31 
 
His search for a Mexican tragedy situated in the time of the Ancient Aztecs 
is not a search for an ancient grandeur, but a search for what is already here, 
alive and now. The ancient myths are the continuous link between a 
particular past and the present, and their unbroken continuity becomes the 
foundation for Usigli’s Mexican present. The playwright’s relationship to 
archeology is similar to his take on history: their proper form is denied, if not 
outright negated, in his take on a Mexican tragedic tradition. His rejection of 
archeology and history are bent on a denial of linear time because these 
would presume a definitive end and beginning, thus invalidating the cyclical 
time of tragedy and the form of tragedy itself. Likewise, denying linear time, 
history and archeology as proper measurements and vehicles for accessing 
indigeneity allows Usigli to think of a Mexican present where indigeneity is 
                                                
31 “My daily verification for many years helps me believe that all of the old myths —
continued in colonial architecture, in their adaptation to Catholic rites, and in an 
indefinable emotion that betrays us when we pretend to pass for European— are a part 
of the living DNA of the Mexican today” (Usigli 1950, 275). 
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relegated to ahistorical myths. His Mexican present makes indigeneity 
survive from the time of the Ancients to the time of his present, and it 
survives colonial terror through DNA, architecture and Catholic rituals 
displaying the time of the colony. Even though he dismisses his turn to the 
past as a search for an ancient grandeur of Indian empires, the Mexican body 
exhibits an indigeneity that does not exist in the present but in a very 
particular past of Aztec emperors and ancient myths. The only indigenous 
peoples he includes in the temporal scale of tragedy are those whose past he 
can enunciate in the present, not the Indians enunciated as a present under a 
colonialism not already past.  
If the Conquest and its colonial aftermath quite literally forced the 
natives into a hellish existence, the undoing of Spanish colonization in the 
19th-century never comes to liberate the indigenous peoples because Usigli 
does not at all account for anticolonial liberation. Since Mexican eternal time 
supercedes the time of the colonial and the postcolonial, I am left to assume 
that the natives’ temporal relations to the Conquest, the colony, the 
postcolony, and the revolutionary are equally overridden by Mexican time. 
Usigli’s turn to tragedy in a catastrophic 1950 excludes indigenous peoples 
from the present when he chooses to address the modern tragic event solely 
through the past. The Indian survives in Mexico’s present as a faint 
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reminiscence of a dead imperial grandeur, one that Usigli invents through 
ahistorical plays and the eternal time of tragedy. 
Usigli fails to account for anticolonialism in his temporal scale and his 
theatre henceforth also rests on an effect of colonization, leaving indigeneity 
always-already in colonial chains. It is logical, then, that his ideal tragic hero 
is the last Aztec emperor because he faced the Conquest, “algo que no 
previó ningún tragediante griego.”32 The destruction of the Indian gods sets 
Mexican tragedy apart from the Greeks, and this experience of colonialism 
changes tragedy from a Western aesthetic to a Mexican one. Unlike Oedipus’ 
tragic heroics, Cuauhtémoc’s tragic essence was not born from a prophecy 
foretelling his killing of his father and the impregnation of his mother. The 
Aztec emperor is a tragic hero because even under deadly torture he 
continues to threaten Cortés power:  “[él] no ceja un instante en la idea de 
defender y proteger a su pueblo a su patria. Hasta el momento final es el 
único peligro verdadero para el dominio de Cortés.”33 In transferring the 
time and space of tragedy from Greek Antiquity to the Conquest of Mexico, 
Usigli’s also effectively displaces the original essence of its hero: 
Cuauhtémoc is tragic because his death was in the service of conserving his 
                                                
32 “something that no Greek tragedian foretold” (Usigli 1950, 277). 
33 “[because] never for an instant does he stop believing in the idea of defending and 
protecting his peoples. Until the final moment he is the only real threat to Cortés’ 
dominion” (277). 
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gods from extinction at the hands of the god Cortés-Quetzalcoatl.  The hero 
of Mexican tragedy does not fulfill divine prophecies; he rejects them 
because they make Indian life the subject of damnation. 
Since his death is not a fall from grace but a condition of hellish 
existence, Cuauhtémoc’s tragic essence constitutes the birth of race in the 
Americas. As is with the case of the Indian processions threatening 
Zumárraga’s ontology, Cuauhtémoc’s tragedy lies in a performance that 
subrverts Cortés’ divinity.34 He denies the god’s divine nature and treats him 
as his equal when he defies his claim to godhood legitimized by the Aztec’s 
prophecy of Quetzalcoatl’s return. Refusing the conqueror’s godhood makes 
him as human as the Indian, who equally makes himself just as human as the 
conqueror.  Cuauhtémoc’s humanity is performed within the matrix of 
coloniality of power: 
Es particularmente este héroe —Cuauhtémoc—, es 
particularmente este episodio de la historia del mundo: la 
Conquista de México; es particularmente esta mezcla de una 
profecía antigua con una realidad moderna —que me perdonen 
Atahualpa y el Perú, cuya escala es otra— lo que me mueve a 
pensar que en México, de todo el continente, es donde existe la 
posibilidad de recrear la tragedia como género… 35 
                                                
34 This performance of resistance makes the fallen Indian the hero of 19th-century 
anticolonialism that Usigli does not address in his temporal scale of tragedy. For a brief 
discussion of Cuauhtémoc’s place as a hero of anticolonialism in Mexican theatre, see 
Ybarra (2008). 
35 “It this hero in particular —Cuauhtémoc—, it is this episode of world history in 
particular: the Conquest of México; it is this particular blending of an ancient prophecy 
with a modern reality —[and] may Atahualpa and Perú forgive me, for their’s is a 
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The playwright sets the Conquest of Mexico as the authentic stage for the 
tragedy of modernity because it was these events of conquest that 
established a new world order in the 16th-century. Cuauhtémoc’s war with 
Cortés sets a record where social relations are not organized as a result of 
man’s fight with the gods, but where a man claiming to be God can enslave 
another man. The emperor’s humanity is conditioned through a system of 
power where the white man came to kill the Indian and his gods.  
Mexico’s exceptionality is derived from Cuauhtémoc's Aztec 
performative that Usigli theorizes from the place of war, and his particular 
experience sets the grounds for linking conquest with modernity by way of 
performance. The creation of the emperor’s humanity in direct defiance of 
divinity is exceptional, since even a different experience with colonial 
projects in the Americas cannot satisfy Usigli’s search. Atahualpa also lives in 
imperial Indian pasts, but the Mexican playwright apologizes to the Incan 
emperor because his Andean modernity belongs to a different temporal scale 
than the Aztecs’. Evidently, his Mexican theatre is the only dramatic tradition 
that legitimately derives from the tragedy of Conquest, and the only one 
eligible to produce an adequately tragic modernity.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
different experience— that moves me to think that in México, from the entire continent, 
is where the possibility of recreating tragedy as a genre exists…” (Usigli 1950, 279). 
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Rac ial l y Divine  
 
I turn now to a different point in Usigli’s oeuvre where we find an 
interpretation of the argument between Las Casas and Sepúlveda concerning 
the human condition of the damned, an interpretation of the trial that is 
more productive than the one offered by Nelson Maldonado-Torres. The 
philosopher’s decolonial project is invested in an experience of coloniality 
that is intimately related to a mode of colonialism that is more recent than 
the one that invented the Americas. In contrast, Corona de luz (1963), the final 
installment of the Coronas trilogy, reenacts the debate and stages its invention 
of the Indian as human in the first mode of colonialism that began in the 
16th-century. I argue that as a performance of the colonial underside of 
modernity, Luz’s debate theorizes the coloniality of being as a historical 
tragedy of Conquest and serves as a correlative to Maldonado-Torres’ silence 
on indigeneity. Although the Valladolid trial is credited with establishing the 
human condition of the natives, and Sepúlveda’s arguments establish the 
Christians’ divine right to conquer, the trial’s subject of address was entirely 
left out of the discussion in 1550 and this subject’s ontological leverage has 
been inadequately theorized thus far. The indigenous peoples themselves 
were excluded from Valladolid’s discussion of their bodies and souls, and 
henceforth lacked self-representation within any Western imagination of the 
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human. This disappearance of the Indians is a colonizing trick: the trial all at 
once hailed the Indians as possible subjects of address (What are they? Can 
they be human?) and endowed them with a soul (they are human) capable of 
receiving God, the same god who came to make their own gods extinguish. 
In reproducing the trial’s question and its resulting ontology, Luz questions 
the ideology of impossible indigeneity espoused by the debate and the 
decolonialists’ thinking through the same event. Usigli makes no direct 
mention of 1550 or its importance to his theory of tragedy, but he was no 
stranger to the archive containing the documents of 16th-century colonialism 
written by Las Casas, Sepúlveda and Fray Zumárraga. Indeed, as Fray Juan’s 
epigraph reveals, the playwright draws from the bishop, the friar and the 
soldier to stage a moment where divinity and conquest perform an invention 
of the human by way of race.  
Usigli’s simulation of the Valladolid trial offers his audiences, 
particularly the Mexican ones, the materializing of a rebellious subjectivity 
codified as indigenous. While Carlos V, his Ministro and the Cardenal speak 
of the Indians and determine their future without knowing quite what they 
actually are, evidently leaving the Indians out of the arguments regarding 
their lives and level of humanity. The Spaniards decide that the question of 
the Indian’s nature can be solved through a man-made divine apparition, but 
the planned miracle backfires on the Christians when the Indians are visited 
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by a goddess brown and indigenous like themselves. The Indians make 
themselves massively visible and with a loudness that challenges the masters 
in charge of creating divinity, and much like Cuauhtémoc’s negation of the 
Cortés’ godhood, they produce themselves as their master’s human equals 
when they demand to be heard and seen. The Indians’ procession as the play 
comes to an end humanizes them to the point that the Bishop relinquishes 
his power over them, leaving their lives to the miraculous brown goddess. 
Usigli establishes the human condition of indigenous peoples under 
conquest, and, in so doing, he provides us with an experience of the subject 
of coloniality that compliments the one privileged by the decolonialists. 
The curtain rises in Corona de luz in the year 1529 with a Minister 
searching for Carlos V inside a monastery in Extremadura. The King, it 
seems, was passing off as a nobleman seeking refuge inside the monastery, 
without telling the Cardinal and his servants that they were in the presence 
of a “señor del mundo.”36 When discovered by his Ministro, the façade ends 
and the King finds no refuge from the world he rules over: 
CARLOS: ¿Algo nuevo bajo el sol al fin? 
MINISTRO: Señor Rey, se trata de América. 
CARLOS: ¿De qué? 
MINISTRO: De América, señor. 
                                                
36 “MINISTRO: ¿Es culpa mía si sois señor del mundo?”/ “Is it my fault that you are Lord 
of the World?” (Usigli Luz 847; further citations from Corona de luz will cited by page 
number). 
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CARLOS: ¿Y qué puede ser eso? ¿Qué es América? Eso no  
   existe.  
MINISTRO: Decid más bien que no existía, señor. No existía 
 siquiera cuando fue descubierta. Pero ahora, gracias a los 
 cosmógrafos alemanes y holandeses, vuestros súbditos, 
 no sólo existe América, bautizada por el nombre de 
 Américo Vespucio, sino que existen la América 
 Septentrional y la América Meridional, en vez de lo que 
 llamábamos el Nuevo Mundo.37 
 
Carlos is hailed to at once resume his duties as señor del mundo and to 
recognize that world he does not want to name. The lack of recognition of 
his subjectivity and that world that calls him trivializes both as he suspends 
their existence: “Eso [América] no existe” and “is anything new?” His 
attention span with regards to his imperial duties and America’s very 
existence reduces both to nothing. Indeed, neither one exists because he 
refuses to name the latter. The signifier “América” means nothing to him 
because such a thing does not exist, and as it does not exist, it holds no 
value. It means nothing to the Lord of the World because it is not part of his 
being, even as the Ministro comes to remind him that America beckons him, 
defying his negation in the process: “Decid más bien que no existía, señor.” 
                                                
37 “CARLOS: Something new under the Sun, finally? 
MINISTRO: My King, it’s about América. 
CARLOS: About what? 
MINISTRO: América, my lord. 
CARLOS: And what could that be? What is América? That does not exist. 
MINISTRO: You mean it did not exist before, my lord. It did not exist even when it was 
discovered. But now, thanks to the German and Dutch cosmographers, your royal 
subjects, not only does América exist, baptized in Américo Vespucci’s name, there exist 
as well a North America and South America, in place of what we used to call the New 
World” (847). 
92 
Contrary to his wishes to deny América’s existence, the colonies come back 
to him double-fold: it may not have existed before, but it exists now that it 
has been discovered. The so-called-discovery denies any existence prior to 
Columbus’ arrival on lands and peopless he did not know. The Ministro’s 
denial also replaces Carlos’ value of negation with a value of meaning: it was 
nothing before, but it is something now, and this being exists beyond the 
King’s negation. As the Ministro’s words to the King suggest, the post-
discovery period created an América as a thing of linguistic value when it 
was given a name. It also invented America as a being of political ontology 
through the advancements in cosmographic technology, replacing the so-
called-New World with Vespucci’s American name. The post-discovery New 
World went from being an empty signifier without value to a political entity 
packed-full of meaning, and peoples are fighting over it.  
 In this opening scene, Usigli stages the process literally inventing a 
thing called by many names: América, el Nuevo Mundo, las Indias. The 
staging of this invention demonstrates the intricate ways in which language 
and conquest share the same semantic space: 
CARLOS: ¡América! Disparate. No existe más que el Nuevo 
 Mundo, que  no es más que la Nueva España, pese a ese 
 charlatán de Vespucio a quien Dios confunda como él 
 ha confundido la cosmografía. Me siento tentado a veces 
 a escuchar a mis adultadores cosmógrafos y llamar a esa 
 tierra Carolandia, Carolia o Carólica. Después de todo, es 
 obra mía. 
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… 
MINISTRO: … Ni hay que olvidar al ignorante Colón, que creía 
 seguir a Marco Polo y siguió a otro polo.  
CARLOS: ¿Colón? Descubrir un continente es poco: lo difícil es 
 administrarlo. ¿Qué sería del Nuevo Continente sin mis 
 capitanes Cortés y Pizarro y Alvarado, y sin mis justicias, 
 adelantados y obispos?  
… 
CARLOS: … Me gustan los mapas, pero los verdaderos.   
MINISTRO: Es igual. Ya podemos desgañitarnos hablando de la 
 Nueva España, de las Indias Occidentales y del Nuevo 
 Mundo, que por cierto es bastante más Viejo que éste: 
 América es más corto, más engañoso, más vago, y por 
 ello más susceptible de generalizarse. Quizá se hablará 
 un día de la América española, para diferenciarla de la 
 francesa o de la sajona, porque ni Francia ni Inglaterra 
 van a abstenerse de efectuar exploraciones, ni a quedarse 
 con las ganas de arrebatarnos aunque sea unas migajas de 
 territorio y de poder en  … (Ante la mirada severa de 
 Carlos, se detiene.) 
CARLOS: ¿En dónde?  
MINISTRO: En … en las Indias.38 
                                                
38 “CARLOS: América! How foolish. There is nothing but the New World, which is no 
more than New Spain, much to the charlatan Vespucci, whom God will confuse for 
someone else just like he has confused cosmography. I am sometimes tempted to listen 
to my cheating cosmographers and call this land Carlandia, Carolia or Carólica. After all, 
it is my creation. 
… 
MINISTRO: Let us not forget the ignorant Columbus, who believed he was following 
Marco Polo and followed a different pole [instead]. 
CARLOS: Columbus? Discovering a continent is hardly anything: administering it is what’s 
difficult. What would be of the New World without my captains Cortés, Pizarro and 
Alvarado, and without my ministers, governors, and bishops? 
… 
CARLOS: … I like maps, but the truthful ones. 
MINISTRO: It’s the same. We could exhaust our voices talking about New Spain, of the 
West Indies and the New World, which, by the way, is vastly older than this one: 
“América” is shorter, trickier, more vague, and hence more susceptible to be generalized. 
Perhaps one day peoples will talk about the Spanish América, to differentiate it from the 
French or the English one, because neither France nor England will keep themselves 
from carrying out expeditions, nor will they avoid trying to steal from us even the tiniest 
scrap of territory and power in …. (He stops before Carlos’ stern stare.) 
CARLOS: In… where? 
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The invention of the Americas takes center stage and dismisses the 
significance of discovery in one sweep. What matters is not how nor what 
Columbus discovered, but what and how it will have to administer in order 
to make the discovery a thing of value. The Americas, according to Carlos V, 
had to be invented and then administered and controlled. America did not 
exist because it had not yet been brought into a language that he as supreme 
imperial ruler could understand, and it was impossible for him to know what 
it was. As owner of the world, el mundo was precisely what was his to name: 
“Me siento tentado a veces a escuchar a mis adultadores cosmógrafos y 
llamar a esa tierra Carolandia, Carolia o Carólica. Después de todo, es obra 
mía” (emphasis mine). The measurement of the land, and thus its 
containment within the language and units of measure belonging to the 
cosmographers, takes second place to his imperial right to name that act of 
measurement as his own: America is his own creation. The cosmographers 
legitimate America’s existence by measuring its massive space, but the King 
takes universal ownership of its mass over anyone else. The land as 
geographic space can also be named a particular place by the king who owns 
and gives it meaning, but even he is not capable enough of controlling it 
directly and must send out his vassals to administer his power over that land 
                                                                                                                                       
MINISTRO: In… in the Indies” (848-849). 
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in his name. Power must be distributed among his agents and make them 
extensions of Carlos’ own imperial legitimacy to rule the world discovered, 
conquered, and then invented in the process of administering it. The 
administration of the New World goes hand-in-hand with its invention 
because it takes an imperial order of governance to properly create an 
America as a being made to be controlled: “América es más corto, más 
engañoso, más vago, y por ello más susceptible de generalizarse.” That 
nameless entity that once did not exist in Carlos’ imagination is given a name 
that reduces the hemisphere to an act of linguistic and political creation, and 
then also named if it was to be controlled by Spain before it could be carved 
and divided into the hands of the other kings and queens in search of an 
empire.  
 Having convinced the King to recognize America —or by any other 
name, the same reference point—, the Ministro reveals that the reason for 
his seeking him out of the monastery was indeed a question of 
administration. Now that it has been named, how will we control it 
politically? 
MINISTRO: … América es el otro extremo del mundo, señor. 
 Los informes que recibimos de las autoridades, y las 
 cartas  mismas de Cortés, no bastan a ilustrarnos. Y no 
 sabemos hasta qué punto es possible aplicar idénticas 
 leyes ni imponer igual conducta a los indios que a los 
 españoles... El español mismo, una vez allá, parece sufrir 
 un cambio, cobrar una idea excesiva de su propia 
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 importancia, conferirse un rango divino, y trata de reinar 
 sobre el indio, a juzgar por los informes.39 
 
If earlier Carlos declared the question over America an issue of governance 
and administration, the Ministro’s words express the failure of a system of 
trickling down the monarch’s power from the metropolis to the colony. The 
issue again becomes a question of management, but not how the monarch 
views it because “América es el otro extremo del mundo” and “[el] señor” 
still cannot understand it. What escapes Carlos’ earlier logic of colonial 
administration was the actual exercise of power in his name by the 
conquistadors over the Indians. Cortés’ letters to the King are enough to 
exhibit this critical overlook: Carlos sees his royal agents in the colony as 
extensions of his power, but the conquistadors have proven themselves a 
questionable bunch who take it upon themselves to not only interpret, but to 
reinvent and then carry out the King’s orders in their own hands. The 
Ministro’s words are inherently a denunciation of the King’s agents as both 
colonial administrators and egotistical beings. The conquistador espouses 
“una idea excesiva de su propia importancia, conferirse un rango divino, y 
trata de reinar sobre el indio.” Holding Cortés’ letters as evidence of his 
                                                
39 “MINISTRO: … América is the other side of the world, my Lord. The reports that we 
receive from the authorities, and Cortés’ own letters, do not tell us enough. And we do 
not know to what extent it is possible to apply identical laws nor impose the same 
conduct to the Indians as we do the Spanish… The Spaniard himself, once there, seems 
to suffer a change, claiming an excessive idea of its own importance, lending himself a 
divine rank, and tries to reign over the Indian, according to the reports” (850). 
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arguments, the Ministro reneges on his Majesty’s logic and offers a more 
valid one.  
MINISTRO: Que Dios perdone, pero tengo noticias de que 
Cortés se siente. Adán, señor rey, y se unió a esa India, la 
Malinche o doña Marina, lengua y Eva de Tabasco, 
como para fundar un nuevo paraíso. … Pero cada 
soldado español, cada miembro del cabildo, cada 
encomendero, cada pequeño funcionario, cada 
comerciante, cada miembro de cada gremio, se atribuye 
esa situación cuasi divina —y esto es más ridículo que 
sacrílego, señor— con relación al esclavo indio.40 
 
The Ministro’s and Carlos’ views on the power exercised by his agents in the 
colony are expressed in a language of divinity, and Cortés’ actions are 
privileged for providing the model followed by the rest. Cortés’ expeditions 
and conquering of Indian empires in the New World, paired with his union 
with a maligned Indian woman, are explained within the Bible’s creation 
story of Adam and Eve:  the reincarnation of Man’s original parents, Cortés 
and Marina are also the original sinners come to instantiate the fall of Carlos’ 
empire. The fall of Man as the fall of the Crown is what is being staged in 
                                                
40 “MINISTRO: May God forgive me, but I have news that Cortés feels himself to be 
Adam, my King, and has gotten together with that Indian woman, Malinche or Doña 
Marina, translator and an Eve from Tabasco, as if to begin a new paradise… But every 
soldier, every member of the cabildo, every encomendero, every small royal official, ever 
merchant, every member of every guild, attributes onto himself that quasi-divine situation 
—and this is more ridiculous than it is sacrilegious, my Lord— in relation to the Indian 
slave” (850-851). 
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this particular scenario of conquest, as Cortés-Adán-rey and Marina-Eva-
lengua are set up to recreate a divine paradise that would rival the King’s. 41  
Cortés’ access to divinity through the natives’ gods and Marina’s 
linguistic abilities replicates itself in each of the King’s agents, who then take 
on god-like qualities and take ownership of the natives and their lands. With 
the conquistador as example, his divine entity grants every agent the power 
to enslave the Indian, Marina included. Their extension of the King’s 
dominion over the enslaved Indians becomes a thing that is god-like because 
their actions make them more than a mere extension of the King; they 
become power itself, surpassing the King in the process because it is they 
who directly enslave the Indian. Essentially, the Ministro is asking the King 
to recognize the potential problem in this, but Carlos retaliates by merely 
acknowledging and then endorsing the enactment of violence as a necessary 
thing:  
CARLOS: Ni sacrílego ni ridículo... Es natural del soldado usar la 
fuerza; es natural del juez usar la ley, valerse de 
instrumentos sin los cuales parecerían hombres como los 
demás y serían destruidos, a la vez que el buen gobierno, 
                                                
41 It is interesting to note that as Cortés is being recognized as conquistador-Father of 
Man-king, Marina is recognized as conquered-Mother of Man-translator. Unlike the story 
of Adam and Eve where Eve is understood as God’s creation who became the original 
sinner because she listened to the snake and ate the forbidden apple, and thus secured 
their expulsion from God’s paradise, Marina is not sin-ful as she did not start out from 
Adam’s rib: she’s the conquered, not part of the conqueror, and she’s not his queen, she’s 
his tool of conquest. Marina, in other words, is not Eve’s equal, even as they share the 
same place of vilified mother, because her origin story is entrenched in slavery from the 
start. 
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por ellos. Pero contra la violencia necessaria, contra la 
justica inevitable, Dios nos ha dado la bondad y la fe, 
que son las armas del misionero. Las armas, justamente, 
que, igualándolo a todos los hombres, dan el triunfo a su 
causa divina…  
…. 
MINISTRO: Desgraciadamente, señor, la cuestión de América no 
  es una cuestión teológica: es una cuestión política, y  
  afecta intereses que son vitales para España.42 
 
Indeed, he suggests, it is weapons who make men equal and bring success to 
his divine cause. Man’s divine power lies in their ability to carry out a holy 
war; the conquistadors’ divinity lies in their very existence as extensions of 
the King. The Ministro insists on the political nature of the war waged 
against the enslaved, not on the theological ideals that Carlos uses to 
legitimize the violence suffered by those inhabiting the lands he has just 
finished naming.  
It is at this moment in their argument that the Ministro’s language of 
politics and Carlos’ language of theology prove incommensurable. 
Regardless of their discussion of power in the metropolis and the colony, 
neither one has knowledge of those subjected by colonial power. The 
                                                
42 “CARLOS: Neither sacrilegious nor ridiculous… It is natural for the soldier to use force; 
it is natural for the judge to use the law, for them to make use of the instruments without 
which they would seem like ordinary men and would be destroyed, along with good 
governance, by them. But against the necessary violence, against the inevitable justice, 
God has given us kindness and faith, which are the weapons of the missionary. The 
weapons which, justifiably, bring triumph to his divine cause by making all men equal [in 
the process]… 
… 
MINISTRO: Unfortunately, my Lord, the question of América is not a theological 
question: it is a political question, and it affects interests which are vital for Spain” (851). 
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enslaved Indians are what is missing here, since the argument over the 
power relations in the colony considers the conquistadors and the King, but 
it does not at all address the Indians created by both politics and theology. 
Man and his divine right refer back to the colonial agents of the Crown who 
have come to conquer, save, kill and enslave the inhabitants of the New 
World. The terms of their argument do not signify the natives who appear 
merely as one more linguistic invention alongside America. Likewise, 
without a proper language with which to name the subject of their conquest, 
the natives are the absent blank slates onto which Man projects his divine 
right. Their absence is a reflection of what the Spaniards do not understand 
and so invent in the process of carrying out the politics of the conquest. 
 Just as the Ministro finishes his discussion of America as a political 
issue, not a question of divinity, the Cardinal comes on stage to remind them 
both that divinity and dominion come hand-in-hand when it comes to 
Mexico, even if the King holds no knowledge of the area and its peoples. 
CARLOS: ¿Qué es lo que os ha hecho venir, Cardenal? 
CARDENAL: La obra del demonio, señor, que continúa sin 
 freno  en México.  
CARLOS: (Sorprendido.) ¿Mé … xi … co? 
MINISTRO: La Nueva España, señor. Aparentemente los 
 bárbaros naturales llaman a la cuidad capital, a más de 
 Tenochtitlan, Méshico, o Mécsico, o Méjico, o cosa 
 parecida.  
CARDENAL: Se me habla de incidentes sangrientos en México, 
 en Tlacopan, en Tlaxcallan, en Tlatelolco, en 
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 Atzcapotzálcotl, en Cuyuacan mismo, donde Cortés ha 
 fijado su residencia; en Teotihuacan y …  
CARLOS: Habría que simplificar esos nombres. 
CARDENAL: No he venido aquí para hablar al Rey de cuestiones 
 de lenguaje, señor ministro. Los informes que recibo me 
 prueban que  los infelices naturales de la Nueva España 
 se encuentran en peligro mortal, y nuestro deber 
 cristiano es salvarlos.43 
 
Mexico’s origins are thoroughly indigenous here as the Spanish are unable to 
pronounce nor understand how Tenochtitlan becomes a completely 
different thing when named in the indigenous language. The linguistic 
violence enacted by the Spanish when they mispronounce the name and 
then simplify it to “cosa parecida” is accompanied by a spiritual and bloody 
violence suffered by the natives. The Cardinal comes not to discuss the 
former, but to bring news of the Devil’s work and their Christian duty to 
save the natives from their mortal dangers. These dangers, however, become 
more than matters of the spirit as the Cardinal and Ministro fight it out for 
possession of the Indian: 
                                                
43 “CARLOS: What brings you here, Cardenal? 
CARDENAL: The Devil’s work, my lord, that is unstoppable in México. 
CARLOS: (Surprised.) Mé…xi…co? 
MINISTRO: New Spain, my lord. Apparently the barbaric natives call the capital city 
something like Tenochtitlan, Méshico, o Mécsico, o Méjico, or something like that. 
CARDENAL: I have been told of bloody incidents in México, in Tlacopan, in Tlaxcallan, in 
Tlatelolco, in Atzcapotzálcotl, in Cuyuacan itself, where Cortés has set up residence; in 
Teotihuacan and … 
CARLOS: Those names would have to be simplified. 
CARDENAL: I have not come here to speak to the King of questions of language, Sir 
Minister. The reports I receive prove to me that those damned natives of New Spain are 
in mortal danger, and our Christian duty is to save them” (851-852). 
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MINISTRO: Por una vez, Majestad, Su Eminencia y yo estamos 
 de acuerdo: hay que salvar a los naturales de Nueva 
 España… ¿Qué haríamos sin ellos? Si los indios llegaran 
 a extinguirse… 
CARDENAL: Sería una mancha imborrable la que caería sobre la 
 cristiana Majestad de Carlos V.  
MINISTRO: Eso sería lo de menos.  
CARLOS: ¿Cómo? 
MINISTRO: Si los indios desparecieran, ¿quién bajaría a lo 
 profundo de las minas en busca de metales, quién 
 acarrearía los bloques de piedra para levantar iglesias, 
 conventos y palacios y casa habitables; quién cultivaría la 
 tierra? No serían seguramente los españoles, que han ido 
 a América para conquistarlo todo menos el trabajo, 
 puesto que han ido como héroes y como aventureros. Y 
 entonces todos nuestros proyectos para acrecer el 
 poderío y la riqueza españoles caerían por tierra. 
CARDENAL: Ya sabía yo que no podíamos estar de acuerdo. No 
 puedo tolerar más el tono ligero con que tratáis estas 
 cosas. Yo hablo de las almas de esos infelices y de su 
 salud eterna.  
MINISTRO: Y yo, Eminencia, hablo de sus cuerpos, y de la salud 
 de España.  
CARDENAL: ¿Y qué podréis hacer con sus cuerpos si perdéis 
 sus almas? 
MINISTRO: Sed práctico: ¿qué diantres podréis hacer con sus 
 almas si perdéis sus cuerpos? 
CARDENAL: ¡Sacrilegio! ¡Blasfemia! Sólo el alma da vida al 
 cuerpo. 
MINISTRO: Cebad las almas, Eminencia, engordadlas, y si no 
 tienen cuerpo que habitar, no servirán más que para el 
 paraíso, el purgatorio o el infierno, según su inclinación. 
 Ayudad a vivir al cuerpo, y salvaréis el alma.44 
                                                
44 “MINISTRO: For once, Your Majesty [Referring to the Emisario], Your Eminence and I 
are in agreement: the lives of the natives of New Spain must be saved… What would we 
do without them? If the Indians were to extinguish… 
CARDENAL: It would be a permanent stain on Carlos V’s Christian majesty. 
MINISTRO: That would be the least. 
CARLOS: How so? 
MINISTRO: If the Indians were to disappear, who would go down to the deepest parts of 
the mines in search of metals? Who would move the blocks of stone to build churches, 
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Unlike the terms “América” and “México,” “Indian” appears here already as 
a Spanish term (Indio). In the earlier part of the dialogue between Carlos and 
his Ministro, “Indio” appears as signifying something they both know exists, 
which suggests that the term’s significance and its point of reference have 
already been established as common knowledge between the King and his 
agent. The Cardinal’s entrance into their dialogue disrupts their language, 
however, by questioning what the word’s referent and its (in)human nature: 
just what exactly is the Indian? The conversation moves from a question of 
phenomenology answered through language to one answered through 
commerce and divinity: the Indian soul and Indian body, both designed for 
matters of labor and both in need of imperial salvation at the hands of the 
King. The Cardinal’s entrance disrupts the dialogue between Carlos and the 
                                                                                                                                       
convents and palaces and houses to live in? Who would cultivate the soil? It certainly 
would not be the Spanish, who have gone to América to conquer everything except 
manual labor because they have gone there as heroes and adventurers. And then all of our 
projects to increase our Spanish power and riches would tumble on land.  
CARDENAL: I already knew that we could not agree. I can no longer tolerate the 
lighthearted tone with which you speak of these things. I am speaking of the souls of 
those infidels and their eternal health.  
MINISTRO: And I, your Eminence, speak of their bodies, and Spain’s health. 
CARDENAL: And what could you do with their bodies if you lose their souls? 
MINISTRO: Be practical: what could you possible do with their souls if you lose their 
bodies? 
CARDENAL: Sacrilege! Blasphemy! Only the soul gives the body life. 
MINISTRO: Feed their souls, Eminency, fatten them up, and if they do not have a body to 
inhabit, they will serve only for paradise, purgatory or inferno, whatever they prefer. Help 
the body live and you shall save its soul”  (852-853). 
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Ministro as it brings religious matters into their discussion of the Indians, 
which sees them solely in terms of politics.  
Religiosity makes the discourse over the Indians turn on a question of 
phenomenon and ontology: what is this living thing that is not yet 
understood and must nonetheless be saved? For the Cardinal, on the one 
hand, what must be saved are the souls of the damned so they may reach 
heaven. The Indians must be saved from extinction because their deaths and 
disappearance from the physical world prior to their spiritual salvation would 
be “a permanent stain on Carlos V’s Christian majesty.”  Their physical 
bodies matter to him only insofar as their death is concerned, because the 
purity of his royal Christian existence would be sullied if the heathens would 
die prior to their cleansing. As God’s representative, Carlos must come to 
save the infidels and purify their spirits on Earth so their souls may rest in 
heaven after death. For the Ministro, on the other hand, it is the bodies of 
the damned that are of critical importance. Without Indian bodies there 
would be nobody to carry out the manual labor required to build a world 
over the New World. Divinity, souls, spirits and heavens are of no 
importance to the administrator if the bodies that supposedly embody such 
ideas cannot produce. The natives’ participation in the empire’s economy 
not only determines their economic value in the project of building the 
empire, it also determines their very existence. Without their participation in 
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the empire’s economy, the Indians have no reason to exist and would go 
extinct. At the same time that the Ministro states that América’s problem is a 
political and not a theological one, he also only mentions the Indian as a 
sideline to his critique of the conquistadors who believe themselves gods and 
enslave the natives to their bidding. This makes the problem economic as 
much as political and theological, for the enslavement of the natives is the 
foundation to building the empire’s riches. The Ministro is wrong: “the 
question regarding América is not [just] a theological issue[, nor] a political 
question,” it is a question of Indian life and death in every sense of the word.  
The argument between the Cardinal and the Ministro makes it clear 
that the King’s dominion extends to the earthly existence as much as it does 
the heavenly one. Each one presents their case before their king so he can 
choose which one to save: the soul or the body, and their debate presents 
the Indian to the King as yet another entity needing to be defined. The two 
are speaking two different languages (spirit versus body, religion versus 
labor), but they are both equally trafficking in a discourse working towards 
the demise of indigeneity. While the former invokes divinity in order to undo 
their pagan ways and destroy their spiritual beliefs in the name of God, the 
latter defines them entirely as beasts of burden necessary to build the world 
anew, even if they perish in the process. The rhetoric of destruction at play 
in their arguments is concerned solely with what the Indians’ death would 
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mean to the king; should the natives extinguish, the King will be at fault for 
their deaths and their lack of labor production will be the of end of his 
empire. The natives, the subjects of their discourse, remain absent and yet 
ever-so-present. Indians are undefined, without a proper language to 
understand them and without an image to attach to them outside of slavery, 
but still they occupy a central position in the arguments between the King 
and his colonial administration. 
America was named after the Italian Vespucci, Mexico is a Nahuatl-
derived term, and Indian is derived from Columbus’s mistaking of the New 
World with India. While none of these three terms are particularly Spanish-
derived in origin (two are Italian-derived and one taken from Nahautl), I am 
suggesting that in this particular play staging the invention of these three 
terms, Indio appears already as a Spanish term without a discussion of where 
the term actually originates. The dialogue that displays Carlos’ ignorance of 
America and Mexico also provides an overview of how both terms were 
invented and demand his royal attention. The same scene incorporates the 
natives of the New World into the language of their colonial imaginary as a 
matter-of-fact process, skipping over the explanation of its incorporation. 
Up to this point in the play the only concrete images provided to understand 
what the Indian is are those of Doña Marina and the enslaved Indians 
mentioned by the Ministro. While labor, politics and commerce provide a 
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language with which to understand the natives, this language does not 
provide the terminology with which to understand what indigenous peoples 
are in terms of subjectivity. Thus far they are only slaves, inhuman objects 
made for labor (manual and otherwise) with a monetary and political value 
attached to them; they are not subjects fully brought into language yet 
(Marina is the exception). Since both agents of the King insist on the need to 
save the Indian if Spain is to succeed as an empire, they design a plan to 
convert them by making God appear to them not as a Christian, but as an 
Indian goddess. The first time that the Spaniards decide to give human 
meaning to the term originally absent in their language is through 
Guadalupe-Tonantzin’s divine apparition. A man-made miracle incorporates 
the Indian into the colonizers’ language, and it does so by rendering him a 
human being. Although Corona de luz stages the colonizers’ silence on their 
invention of indigeneity, I argue that the play itself also betrays the power of 
language to constitute human subjectivity by centering on the performative 
as in fact constituting a different mode of subjectivity. The Christians’ plan is 
carried out as they planned, but the Indians are invented as human when 
they gather en mass and claim the recognition of their goddess’ divine 
apparition, not God’s. When their bodies materialize and the friars recognize 
their humanity, their performance replaces the invention linguistic of race 
and stages the Indian’s invention by other means. 
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The Cardinal and the Ministro each summon a messenger who has 
lived in the New World to provide direct evidence of their arguments, but 
what these messengers bring are news of a violent chaos that discards the 
debate between politics and theology: 
EMISARIO: Señor, vuestro ejército sufre en el Nuevo Mundo 
 porque ha sido engañado, traicionado y vendido. Se nos 
 hizo creer que iríamos como heroes empeñandos en un 
 lucha titánica y gloriosa, y se nos convierte todos los días 
 en violadores, en asesinos y verdugos. Se nos ha 
 enfrentado a un enemigo que, aunque mayor en 
 número… estaba vencido de antemano por el rayo de 
 nuestros arcabuces y morteros…45 
 
Far from the promise of a “lucha titánica y gloriosa,” what the 
conquistadors, soldiers and explorers of the New World received upon 
arrival was a fantasy-turned-nightmare that made them into the “violadores, 
en asesinos y verdugos” of a peoples “[que] estaba vencido de antemano por 
el rayo de [sus] arcabuces y morteros.” The agents of Carlo’s war became 
just as he intended them to: “against the necessary violence, against the 
inevitable justice, God has given us kindness and faith, which are the 
missionary’s weapons. Weapons that, justifiably, bring triumph to their 
divine cause by making all men equal” (851). What Carlos leaves out in his 
diatribe sanctioning a bloody violence in the name of a holy war are the 
                                                
45 “EMISARIO: Sir, your army suffers in the New World because it has been betrayed, 
defeated and lied to. We were led to believe that we would go as heroes firmly invested in 
a titanic and glorious battle, and instead we are made everyday into rapists, murders and 
executioners. We have been forced to face an enemy that, although larger in number… 
was defeated beforehand by the fire from our guns...” (856). 
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actual details and experience of carrying out a war made holy. On the 
ground, the soldiers carry out a destruction that is indeed religious in nature, 
but the details of this religious destruction act on a different notion of 
holiness than Carlos’ un-described holy war. 
EMISARIO :…Pero los hombres de la Iglesia han derribado sus 
 pirámides y sus templos; han abolido sus placeres, sus 
 juegos y sus tradiciones; han apagado sus estrellas y su 
 luna, han detenido su sol y su viento, han escampado su 
 lluvia, han dispersado su fuego, que ellos adoraban como 
 a dioses, y los han hecho bajar a las minas y subir a las 
 canteras obligándolos, en castigo de su paganidad, a 
 construir la iglesia de Cristo con el oro y la plata y el 
 tezontle; y los han privado de su lenguaje y su comercio 
 naturales y de sus fiestas y regocijos; les han quitado 
 todas  las armas que tenían para luchar como hombres, y 
 los han hecho volverse contra nosotros y atacarnos con 
 la celada y la sorpresa, que son las armas de los débiles y 
 cobardes…46 
 
Carlos only understands the physical weapons of war necessary to carry out 
the violence in the name of God, so his understanding of holiness is limited 
to the physical implications of a spiritual war. What matters is that God be 
worshipped, not the modes of worship and methods of making his following 
                                                
46 “EMISARIO:… But the priests have tumbled their temples, forbidden their everyday 
pleasures, their games and their traditions; they have turned off their stars and their 
moon, they have stopped their Sun and wind, they’ve cleared the rain, they’ve broken up 
their fire, which they adored like they did their gods, and they have made them go down 
to the mines and climb up to the stonemasons forcing them, as punishment for their 
paganism, to build the Church of Christ with the gold and silver and tezontle; and they 
have deprived them of their language and their natural forms of commerce and of their 
festivals and delights; they’ve taken away from them every weapon they had with which 
to fight as men, and have made them turn against us and attack us with treachery and 
surprise, which are the weapons of the weak and cowardly…” (856-857). 
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possible. The Emisario’s testimony as a soldier of God’s war illustrates a 
different side to his majesty’s divine sentiments: on the ground they are 
destroying other gods and the peopless whose spirit is dependent on the 
divinities they are sent to eradicate. These peopless and their human spirit, 
dependent as they are on worshipping the Sun, the moon, the stars, fire, 
water and winds, are essentially in opposition to the modes of worship that 
Carlos and his God demand. If these demand a violent submission to their 
will and worshipping, the soldier ordered to bring the natives into 
submission expresses a complaint and an outright sadness against such a 
destructive method of fighting a holy war. The priests destroy the natives’ 
gods and their spirituality, and they enslave the natives whose gods they have 
destroyed so they can “build the Church of Christ with gold and silver” 
taken from their mines. The destruction by the priests is multiple: annihilate 
their gods and religiosity, destroy their commerce by taking their precious 
minerals, and then enslave their bodies to create a new world over the one 
they’ve just destroyed. The soldier’s testimony provides the details Carlos is 
unable to imagine, and his words illustrate the actions and effects of the war. 
The battle may be won, but the result is not the creation but the reduction of 
men. The message is clear: take away the natives’ livelihood and weapons 
and they are no longer men, they are something else altogether. 
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 In turn, the Cardinal’s messenger, the Friar, discusses the effects of 
the war on the natives’ livelihood as matters of spirituality:    
FRAILE: … ¿Cómo vamos a enseñar la piedad y la fe cristianas a 
  los pobrecitos indios, si los soldados quieren   
  convencerlos de que son héroes, como dice éste, para 
  poder parecerlo ellos? ¿Si tus administradores quieren 
  convencerlos de que son bestias de carga o topos en las 
  minas? ¿Cómo persuadirlos entonces de que son hijos de 
  Dios y hermanos nuestros? … Nosotros no queremos al 
  indio sino la fe que salva, el Dios que es nuestro gozo y 
  nuestra esperanza, en vez de sus ídolos y de su animal 
  impiedad.47 
 
The Fraile provides a similar testament as the Emisario’s: Carlos’ 
endorsement of weapons and bloodshed destroys the very thing that they are 
meant to save and convert. The Indians cannot be “taught mercy and the 
Christian faith,” nor that “they are God’s children and [their] brothers,” if 
the King’s administrators “wish to convince them that they are beasts of 
burden or moles in a mine.” The holy war cannot be won in the terms 
provided by the King because his terms evade their practicality, and the 
messengers’ practices offset what the king has told them.  
 Nevertheless, even as the messengers and the King are not in 
agreement as to how the holy war is to be carried out, they are thoroughly in 
                                                
47 “FRAILE: … How are we going to teach mercy and the Christian faith to the poor 
Indians if the soldiers want to convince them that they are heroes, according to this one, 
so that they become so? If your administrators want to convince them that they are beasts 
of burden or moles in a mine? How can we then persuade them into believing that they 
are God’s children and our brothers?... We do not want to give the Indian anything but 
the saving faith, the God that is our joy and our hope, instead of his idols and their 
ungodliness” (859). 
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agreement as to the war’s outcome: “We do not want to give the Indian 
anything but the saving faith, the God that is our joy and our hope, instead 
of his idols and their ungodliness.” Their goals are the same and the Indians’ 
gods must disappear: 
  FRAILE: No hay más que un Dios, y cuando Ése llega, todos los 
   que se dicen dioses desaparecen. Queremos que Dios 
   llegue hasta el indio y que el indio levante la casa de  
   Dios, para que la ame como a su obra.48 
 
The appearance of “God” may bring about the disappearance of the other 
so-called gods, but that Fraile wants him to appear implies that God’s point 
of arrival is unfinished in the Americas. God has not reached the Indian and 
without his arrival the natives have been unable to worship him or build a 
sacred temple in his name.  
  CARDENAL: Es menester, señor, que esos infelices vean a Dios.  
EMISARIO: Eso sí—pero un dios suyo, un dios mexicano. De 
  otro modo, jamás volverán a ser hombres.49 
 
Politics and theology join in a rhetoric of visuality here: it is necessary that 
God appear and make himself visible to the infidels, but God must not 
appear as the Christian’s god but as “a god of theirs, a Mexican god. 
Otherwise they shall never again be men.” The politics of conquest by way 
                                                
48 “FRAILE: There is only one God, and when that One arrives, all the other ones who call 
themselves gods will disappear. We want God to reach the Indian and that the Indian 
raise the house of God, so that he may love/adore him like his creation” (859). 
49 “CARDENAL: It is necessary, my lord, that those infidels see God. 
EMISARIO: That is true —but a god of theirs, a Mexican god. Otherwise, they will never 
be men again” (860). 
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of spirituality/religiosity are inherently dependent on an exhibition of divine 
quality. God’s divine essence must be made tangible through icons and idols 
that the Indians may recognize on their own terms. If earlier the Emisario’s 
words spoke of the dehumanizing effects of war on the natives —call it the 
unmaking of men—, he is now on the side of the Cardinal and his 
messenger in placing an urgent call for the re-humanizing of the natives by 
way of exhibition. After observing the natives in their natural habitat, both 
the Fraile and Emisario conclude that the Indian finds himself in his true 
essence amidst festivals, rituals and “processions”: 
FRAILE: El indio es de buena pasta: guarda las fiestas de los  
  Reyes y de Corpus y de San Hipólito, patrono de la  
  Nueva España, y goza en las procesiones… 
EMISARIO: Yo lo he visto en las procesiones: goza porque se 
 viste con plumas o se disfraza de mujer y danza sus 
 viejas  danzas y se embriaga. Y los he visto dejar en las 
 raza.50  
 
The performance, in other words, define what the Indian is, and it is to the 
advantage of the Spanish King and his administrators to manage this mode 
of being if they are to succeed in fully conquering the natives. If he finds 
himself in his practices of religious worship, and displays his belief by leaving 
“the signs of his gods and his race/peoples” at their “temples and houses,” 
                                                
50 “FRAILE: The Indian is of good breed: he observes the feasts of the Three Kings and 
Corpus Christi and San Hipólito, patron of New Spain, and he finds pleasure in the 
processions… 
EMISARIO: I have seen him in the processions: he is happy because he wears feathers and 
dresses like women and dance his old dances and he drinks. And I have seen them leave 
the signs of their gods and their race/peoples in the temples and houses” (860). 
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then his ways of worship must be manipulated if he is to build the 
Christian’s god similar temple where God can reveal himself. 
 This linguistic and political creation of América is not unlike the 
miracle the King and his administrators wish to stage in México. Just as 
America must be made from nothing because it wasn’t yet part of Carlos’ 
imaginary, God must also be made to appear from nothing so the Indians 
would believe. While the invention of América as an extension of Spain’s 
central power precedes the invention of Guadalupe as a critical component 
of Carlos’ spiritual conquest, these different forms of invention are the two 
faces of the same coin of exchange. The Conquest here partakes in divine, 
gender and racial markets as it allows the King a holy right to make and 
unmake the world as he pleases, and he decides to create a world and a 
divine miracle through God painted with a brown female face.  
The Spaniards decide that God’s exhibition in front of the natives is 
necessary to save them, but this act of salvation also makes the natives’ 
religious difference into something that did not exist before:  
ISABEL: Todos ellos tienen razón: hay que dejar que los  
  idólatras vean a Dios. (861) 
… 
MINISTRO: … Tenéis razón: no está en nuestro poder ocultar o 
 exhibir a Dios; pero está en nuestro deber salvar al 
 Nuevo Mundo.51 
                                                




An exhibition of divinity would make the natives into humans by way of 
Christianity, turning them away from their pagan rituals; saving the New 
World from hell is the Christians’ duty, they believe. What is ironic is that 
the (un)making of indigenous peoples into humans through a strategic 
pairing of vision and performance is entirely dependent on the natives’ own 
performativity. The natives’ difference from the Christians is understood 
through their ritualistic performances, festivals and creation of idols in honor 
of their gods. This performance of religiosity creates a difference that the 
Christians only code as pagan: they act unlike them, therefore they are unlike 
them.52 If the Indians are to recognize him as a god of their performances, 
then Carlos and his minions decide that he must be given a body that can 
move and act like the Indians of the festivals.  
The difference between the Christians and the natives turns on an axis 
of race because the Virgin must have dark skin if she is to be properly divine. 
                                                                                                                                       
MINISTRO: … You are right: it is not in our power to hide or exhibit/display God; but it 
is our duty to save the New World” (862). 
52 That Christianity (Catholicism) also practice their worship through masses and other 
sacred rites in a similar manner does not escape the characters in the play; some of the 
friars in Act II highlight this commonality between them and the Indians, but only so far 
as to compare themselves far away from paganism and savagery because they only 
worship one god without human sacrifices. Christ’s self-sacrifice to save humanity does 
not enter into their understanding of divinity and human sacrifice, but even if it did, 
Usigli’s essay on tragedy dismisses Christ as a tragic hero because God’s child is 
resurrected and tragic heroes do not come back to life. Christianity, he says, cannot 
produce tragedies like the Greeks did. 
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FRAY JUAN: … ¿Qué me ordena Carlos V…? Que haga yo un 
  milagro… Que me sustituya a Dios Nuestro Señor y que 
  haga aparecerse a una virgen que tenga una apariencia 
  mexicana… me ha ordenado que prepare un milagro… 
  un falso milagro, un acto de herejía como ningún otro, 
  un fraude contra la fe… Así, ese seglar, jardinero venido 
  de Murcia, tiene órdenes de hacer florecer Rosales en un 
  lugar yermo. Así, esa infeliz hermana clarisa, que oye  
  voces y que tiene visiones y que está enferma o loca  
  —Dios la ampare—, debe representar el papel de virgen, 
  de una virgen mexica, morena de tez como el indio, y 
  aparecerse en día solemne a uno de estos pobres  
  naturales y hacerle creer que es la Madre de Dios y de 
  indios para que se consume al fin la conquista material 
  estas tierras y sus hombres, y quede bien establecida la 
  superioridad del español. 53 
 
The fake miracle is not so much a divine act as much as it is “a fraud against 
the faith” reduced to a series of manipulated events: a gardener from Murcia 
must grow roses on barren soil and a dark-skinned nun from the Order of 
Saint Claire must act in the role of a Mexica Virgin. Herein lies the central 
                                                
 53 “Fray Juan” is Fray Juan de Zumárraga, whose politics outlawing native rituals is 
rehearsed by the Fraile and the Emisario in the previous scene. In Corona de luz, the 
Zumárraga that Usigli finds in the archives of Mexican colonial history takes center stage 
as the main protagonist of a play about tragic modernity.  
 
Translation: “FRAY JUAN: What does Carlos V order me to do…? That I make a miracle. 
That I substitute God, Our Lord, and that I make a Virgin appear with a Mexican 
appearance… he has ordered me to prepare a miracle… a false miracle, an act of heresy 
like no other, a fraud against the faith… As such, that layman, that gardener from Murcia, 
has orders to make beds of roses grow on barren soil. And as such, that unfortunate sister 
from the Order of Saint Claire, who hears voices and has visions and is ill or crazy —
God help her—, must play the role of a Virgin, a Mexica Virgin, with dark skin like the 
Indian, and make herself appear on a solemn day to one of those poor natives make him 
believe that she is the Mother of God and the Indians so that the conquest of these lands 




point of the King’s ordered miracle: the Virgin must be “dark-skinned like 
the Indian and make herself appear … to one of these poor natives and 
make him believe that she is the Mother of God and the Indians so that the 
conquest of these lands and its peoples may be finalized.” On the one hand, 
the miracle makes a gardener the creator or natural life where such should 
not exist, and it endows a mad woman with divine attributes –she is now a 
Virgin Goddess in both the Christian and Mexica sense. On the other hand, 
the miracle codes the nature of the Indians in terms of a religiosity gone 
brown like the color of their skin. Whereas earlier the Christians in Spain 
could not understand the phenomenon of the Indians because they did not 
exist in their language, the miracle solves the problem by inventing the 
Indian’s dark skin as a signifier of humanity. Most importantly, the miracle’s 
creation of humans is a political project because the brown virgin must 
appear so that the Conquest will establish the Spaniards’ human superiority. 
The miracle does not measure the lives of the natives based on codes of 
religious difference, but it measures their human essence based on a notion 
of ontology where the color of their bodies places them as the Spaniards’ 
inferiors. This human scale shifts the ordering of the social world from a 
relationality between Christians and barbarians to a relationality between 
human and homunculi of a different skin color. It is at this moment in the 
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first mode of colonialism that race is brought into language, and through a 
brown female body that is racially divine.    
The apparition of the brown Virgin ends up up-staging the Christian 
miracle. While they intend on making an Indian goddess appear to one 
Indian, news of an apparition of different sorts spread throughout the 
empire and the natives turn up at the monastery’s doors en mass. 
Historically the Virgin is said to have appeared to one Indian man (Juan 
Diego) in the hills of Tepeyac, and she orders him to go and tell the bishop 
of New Spain to build a temple in her honor. In Corona de luz, the figure of 
this witnessing Indian comes on stage divided into four: Juan I, Juan II, Juan 
III (“Juan Felipe”), and Juan IV (“Juan Darío”), and each one provides a 
different side of the story of her divine appearance. One by one the four 
incarnations of Juan Diego appear before Fray Juan to give an account of 
the apparition of a brown goddess surrounded by a bed full of roses. 
Although the friar dismisses each of their stories as effects of their lack of 
rationality —these only have visions but cannot produce actual  
knowledge—, the repetition of the details by the four Indian men end up 
producing the same apparition he was ordered to stage. When Juan Felipe 
brings Tata Obispo the “xóchitl que hace sangre,”54 the thorny flower 
throws the Father Bishop into a confused frenzy at the sight of the Indian’s 
                                                
54 “Father Bishop… a flower that bleeds” (901). 
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possession of a rose that did not grow in Tenochtitlan. The production of 
the rose in the hands of an irrational Indian questions the friar’s dismissal 
supposedly based on rationality. Succinctly, Fray Juan admits to having 
ordered a Spanish gardener to plant roses  
en un lugar yermo, hacia el sur, que nombramos el pedregal de 
San Ángel —donde hace quizá siglos las fuerzas naturals de un 
volcán, movidas por los divinos designios, destruyeron la vida 
de incontables infieles… Y donde la piedra volcánica hace 
superflua toda posibilidad de siembra. Pero el jardinero se 
comprometió a lograrlo. Bien. Tengo aquí una minuta precisa y 
clara (La exhibe.) —y en esta otra mano, Toribio de Benavente, 
tengo una rosa cortada hacia el norte, del lado del Tepeyáctl. 
¿Qué puedo pensar?55 
 
Nothing can grow on volcanic rock, and yet Fray Juan now holds in his 
hands a rose grown where it was not planted. The rose appeared when it 
wasn’t supposed to be possible: it grew in Tepeyáctl, where it wasn’t planted, 
and it did not grow on volcanic rock precisely because it wasn’t designed to. 
The rose appeared by exquisite design to defy the planned reality of the 
events. Since its originally planned soil was a region where a volcanic 
eruption had centuries before ended the lives of “countless infidels,” the 
rose defies reality and redeems the lives of those countless souls lost to the 
                                                
55 “in a barren wasteland, towards the south, that we named the San Angel’s Sacred 
Ground —where, perhaps centuries ago, a volcano’s natural forces, moved by divine 
orders, destroyed the lives of countless infidels… And where the volcanic rock makes it 
impossible for anything to grow there. But the gardener promised to make it possible. 
Now, fine, I have here a precise and clear proof (He exhibits it [the rose]) —and in my 
other hand, Toribio de Benavente, I have a rose cut from the northern region next to the 
Tepeyáctl hills. What can I think now?” (902). 
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volcano. The birth of the rose breathes life back into these infidels by 
defying the Christian’s faith and re-centering the infidels outside of their 
man-made divine creation. 
 Besides himself and without reason, the friar summons the gardener 
ordered to make possible the impossible bed of roses grow on a volcanic 
rock. Although he first says that he did as he was told, he also admits to 
having planted roses in a different place that was far away from Tepeyáctl. 
ALONSO: (Derrotado.) Muy bien entonces, Ilustrísima. Soy 
hombre —soy criatura de Dios y del diablo. Sirvo altars 
y tengo apetitos. Mis apetitos me llevaron hasta un 
doncella India que habita más allá del Tepeyácatl, a dos 
leguas quizás. Una India que cree aún que los españoles 
somos como dioses, y que me pidió un a modo de 
milagro para entregarse. En la puerta de su jacal sembré 
un rosal muy pequeño que floreció al mismo tiempo que 
florecía su vientre56 
 
The sowing of a “flower that bleeds” in an infertile native land produces an 
inverse parallel in the native woman’s body impregnated by the same hand 
planting the rose. What’s more, beyond this story of sexual conquest-cum-
sinful story, this Indian woman producing the illegitimate mestizos taunts 
the Indian goddess: unlike the brown Virgin, this woman embodies entirely 
the opposite of virginity since she not only had sex with the conqueror, she 
                                                
56 “ALONSO: (Defeated.) Very well, your Illustriousness. I am a man —I am God’s 
creature and the Devil’s. I serve in altars and I have appetites. My appetites took me to a 
virgin Indian woman who lives beyond the Tepeyáctl, perhaps to leagues from there. An 
Indian woman who still believes that we Spaniards are like gods, and who asked me for a 
miracle if she was to give herself over me. In front of her hut I planted a very small rose 
bush that bloomed at the same time as her womb grew” (905). 
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has produced him a child. Her story is all too reminiscent of Malintzin’s 
relationship to Cortés, because just as Cortés played at being god and 
Malintzin as the symbolic mother of the first mestizo, this Indian woman’s 
treatment of the Spaniard as a god recalls the arrival of the conquistador 
who destroyed the Aztec empire. Malintzin and this nameless woman also 
partake in relationships with gods even as they question their divinity; this 
Indian woman demanded a miracle to validate his divine condition and 
Malintzin is credited with having helped Cortés maintain his god-like image 
in Corona de fuego. Both Malintzin and Alonso’s lover become the anti-thesis 
to the Virgin Mary because their production of mestizo children through the 
hands of gods trivializes the nature of Mary’s sex-less impregnation by God. 
Divine intervention plays a part in each of these women’s lives, and in Corona 
de luz, divinity and Indian women go hand-in-hand even as the three never 
set foot on the same stage.57 
The visions of a brown goddess covered in light and the bed of roses 
growing on Tepeyac follow these four Indian men and also reach beyond 
Tenochtitlan: 
ALFÉREZ: El Capitán General sabe todo lo que ocurre en sus 
 dominios. Llegó a sus oídos muy temprano esta mañana 
 que ocurren cosas en Tenochtitlan. Nubes de indios, que 
 es como decir de moscas inficionantes, han rodeado su 
                                                
57 Usigli does not include a single female indigenous character in Corona de luz. The only 
female character to come on stage is the Spanish nun set to play the Virgen. 
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 palacio para hablarle de qué sé yo qué cuento o fibula de 
 una mujer que se aparece ante los naturales para sacar 
 más diezmos para la Iglesia. 
… 
MARTINCILLO: Id al balcón, señor Obispo. Ved esa formación 
  de indios allá abajo, que es cosa nunca vista, y si lo  
  italianos y los franceses y los andaluces la vieran  
  pensarían que es cosa de procession o de tumulto y  
  holgaran de verla.58 
 
Cortés himself, “el Capitán General,” has been surrounded by “clouds of 
Indians, which is the same as saying infectious flies,” and they are speaking 
of “some story or fable of a woman who appears before the natives to ask 
for more money for the Church.” Guadalupe’s request to have a temple built 
in her honor sends the Indians in search of answers from the conquistador, 
but he sees them as a swarm of poisonous threats. Likewise, the Bishop 
must witness the natives’ gathering as “a thing never seen before,” and 
possibly “a procession or commotion” of some sort. Luz’s concluding scene 
reveals that Guadalupe’s story and the plans for the apparition have spread 
far and wide, culminating in a massive gathering of Indians outside Fray 
Juan’s monastery and Cortés’ quarters. The experience of the apparition and 
                                                
58 “ALFÉREZ: The General knows everything that happens in his dominion. News of 
things happening in Tenochtitlan reached his ears early this morning. Clouds of Indians, 
which is the same as saying infectious flies, have surrounded his palace to speak to him of 
I don’t know what story or fable of a woman who appears before the natives to ask for 
more money for the Church (911). 
… 
MARTINCILLO: Go to the balcony, Sir Bishop. Watch that formation of Indians down 
below, which is a thing never seen before, and if the Italians and the French and the 
Andalucians would see it they would think that it is some thing like a procession or 
commotion and they would be stunned by it” (913). 
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the knowledge associated with Guadalupe-Tonantzin are now thoroughly a 
communal experience (still) among men. Unlike the stories of Juan Diego 
dismissed by Fray Juan, the massive presence of the Indians surrounding the 
Spaniards presents a danger that they cannot escape. The natives demand an 
answer: the miracle has happened, Guadalupe has spoken and a temple must 
be built. Their massive presence is disturbing and threatens the wellbeing of 
the Bishop and Cortés, who must address the Goddess’ request even if they 
did not account for her in the original plans for the miracle: 
Fray Juan abre el balcón. El tumultuo crece abajo sin que sea posible 
distinguir lo que dicen las voces en nahoa. Poco a poco se precisa, repetida 
en ascenso, la palabra Tlamahuizolli.59 
 
The details of the apparition spread and grow, coalescing into a presence 
that is different from the one originally planned by the friars. Guadalupe has 
appeared to the Indians as they planned, and in the process invented the 
Indian who find himself to be among religious rites. Still, the massive 
presence clamoring “miracle” is none of the above. The natives voices 
clamoring repeatedly in Nahautl cannot be differentiated, they cannot be 
narrowed down to a single entity that can then be understood by Cortés or 
the Bishop. As an individual idea or voice the Indian can be understood, 
either as Juan Diego, one of his four reincarnations, or a generalized Indian 
                                                
59 Fray Juan goes to the balcony. The commotion rises below, making it impossible to 
distinguish what the voices are speaking in Nahuatl. Little by little it becomes clear, 
increasingly repeated, the word Tlamahuizolli (916). 
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of the processions and idols, but as a massive commotion the natives are 
ungeneralizable because they can’t be “distinguish[ed]” as individuals. This is 
perhaps the threat to the Spaniards: the miracle produced what they cannot 
contain, and outside the bounds of a staged divinity, the Indian appears in 
excess. The communal makes itself present on their own, even as the Virgin 
told them to ask for a temple of worship, because it is they who make their 
way towards the center of power and make their voices be heard.  
After hearing the King’s orders, Sahagún, the 16th-century Franciscan 
friar and ethnographer of Aztec culture, explodes at the thought of his God 
being made an Indian female goddess. 
SAHAGÚN: No es posible. ¡Una Tonantzin, ay! El retroceso de 
 la historia.60 
 
Sahagún’s retort suggests that to bring Tonantzin as part of the miracle 
would run against its purpose to evangelize the Indians. In his logic, if the 
Christians wish to bring them into God’s faith, they must not “move back” 
towards their pagan deities. The friar’s words assume history as a forward-
moving progress, one that must be inherently Spanish/Western-based in 
order to continue moving forward. If it were to be imagined with an Indian 
face, it would no longer be history because, for Sahagún, the staging of 
History via Tonantzin would make it stop and move backwards. Tonantzin 
                                                
60 “SAHAGÚN: It is not possible. A Tonantzin! The reversal of history” (879). 
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is the key to rearticulating Sahagún’s imagination of history because her 
indigenous essence makes evident the colonial nature of History. A history 
with an indigenous face places indigeneity as an active participant in the 
making of the world, and leads history to question the inherent move 
towards a futurity of progress and look elsewhere instead. The move to see 
indigenous goddesses with their faces painted in the image of a Christian 
God as anti-historical or anti-progressive, as Sahagún does, leaves the 
indigenous unable to progress with History proper. Sahagún’s language fails 
to grasp the possibilities of indigeneity’s production and active participation 
in this same history progressing towards the future, not the past. The famous 
friar ignores that Tonantzin exists in the same temporal location as his own, 
albeit the indigenous peoples experience her temporality in a different 
manner than Sahagún’s own. Luz stages the miracle of race and Tonantzin 
makes her appearance before the Indians, very much against Sahagún’s 
tainted history.   
Sahagún’s retort recalls Maldonado-Torres’ use of the damné:  
Following Fanon, I will use a concept that refers to the colonial 
subject, equivalent in some way to Dasein but marking the 
aspects of the coloniality of Being: the damné or condemned of 
the earth. The damné is for the coloniality of Being what Dasein 
is for fundamental ontology, but, as it were, in reverse. The 
Damné is for European Dasein the being who is ‘not there.’ 
(Maldonado-Torres 2007, 253). 
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Maldonado-Torres’ coloniality of being uses the existential of the damné to 
theorize modernity’s ontology in reverse, so to think of the being who is 
“not there” is also a similar turn to “move backwards.” By considering the 
coloniality of Being as a correlative to the philosophical tradition following 
Descartes and Heidegger, his coloniality of Being argues against the 
exclusion of the colonized from ontology and introduces ethics and love to 
bring an end to damnation. The radicality of his decolonial ontology is that it 
can propel philosophy forward to produce coloniality as not excluded from 
philosophy’s modernity proper. In his decolonial future of modernity, the 
trans-modern world is made without the non-ethics of war that invented 
coloniality in the first place. A decolonial future, in other words, is designed 
to bring an end to the damné’s life in hell and lead to a time without 
coloniality. Maldonado-Torres’s ontology makes modernity from the 
margins, but his alternative to damnation (Fanon’s Love) returns subaltern 
ontology to the center of a modernity where subalternity would no longer 
exist. While this is indeed a libratory project, it also erases the difference 
between a History of the human originating within modernity and an 
alternative history of humanity existing beside Western modernity.  He 
theorizes from the ontological exclusion of the colonized, but he does not 
theorize time and ontology from an experience of the damné that could also 
exist as alternatively modern from that which originally excluded it. His 
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decolonial option does not make it possible to create a future world where 
coloniality and modernity exist besides each other in alterity; they can only 
exist as part of a universal history of the future. An ontology of the damné 
beside modernity and Tonantzin’s divine apparition, I suggest, are operating 
on a similar mode of existentialism. Tonantzin would stage Sahagún’s linear 
history in a different order by displacing the Christians’ God from the center 
of the post-1492 world. The indigeneity created by a Christian god painted 
brown and female is a massive clamoring that speaks directly to the friars, 
and demands to be acknowledged in their alterity. In turn, the Christians are 
forced to recognize that the result of their miracle is embodied in the Indians 
outside the monastery. Their act of recognition produces the Indians as 
humans through a brown goddess coming back from the past, so the 
Christians’ move backwards does not undo a linear progressive history as 
much as it makes a present tied to the past.61 After all, the miracle does not 
result in the writing of history from the front to the back, but in an 
imagination of history with indigeneity as an active participant in the 
                                                
61 Since Luz takes place at the height of conversion projects that pushed the Indians away 
from their deities, Sahagún’s words assume that these gods are of a thing of the past. 
Their deities no longer exist in the present because his God came to came to mark the 
beginning of a future where the time of the gods is no more. The time of the gods 
belongs to a past before the time of History, which began in the New World with the 
Requerimiento’s love/hate speech act and its war of spiritual conquests. For Sahagún, 
God’s going Indian would bind the time of the gods past with the time of History 
present. For discussions of time and conquest, see Rabasa (2000, 2005), Maldonado-
Torres (2006) and Mignolo (2009, 2012). 
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present’s future. The Indians’ performative ontology propels indigeneity 
forward into conversion —the modernity of Sahagún’s History—, and into 
Usigli’s present and the future of race itself —coloniality. Guadalupe-
Tonantzin creates an ideology of the human within the terrain of 
colonialism, and while this world is governed by Sahagún’s wars of spiritual 
conquest, indigenous ontology performs a livelihood that exceeds the logic 
of the conquerors. They invent a future world from an ontological colonial 
difference that does not bring an end to damnation, but nor does it leave it 
in tact. The last word is theirs: “Tlamahuizolli,” and the last word is in 
Nahuatl, not in Spanish.  
 
 
Performance  Anxie ty ,  Performance  On tology  
 
Rodolfo Usigli’s implicit theorizing of what I have called the “Aztec 
performative” is exemplified in his privileging of an ahistorical Indian 
imperial grandeur, in his misrecognition of indigenous peoples’s experience 
with colonialism and México’s eternity, and in his staging of an indigeneity 
within the colonial matrix of power. While I doubt that the Mexican 
playwright consciously staged the Indians acting out of bounds as a radical 
project addressing the coloniality of being, I argue that Corona de luz provides 
a framework with which to theorize a subject of the coloniality of being that 
neither Usigli or Nelson Maldonado-Torres fully understand. On the one 
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hand, the playwright ignores indigeneity in his present as something other 
than a colonizer’s citation of a rebellious performance from centuries before, 
but his misrecognition is to a certain extent redeemed when his play stages 
the creation of a new being born within colonialism. For his part, the 
philosopher fails to account for the creation of this being as something more 
than a site of the birth of the coloniality of power and does not see the 
indigenous being as a subject parallel to Frantz Fanon’s. Both offer few 
productive spaces for indigenous peoples to exist as agentic subjects of 
modernity/coloniality, and the ideologies of indigeneity they espouse turn on 
an axis of impossibility. Usigli theorizes indigenous performativity solely for 
the sake of linking a Mexican eternity with an ancient past alive in the 
present as past, and Maldonado-Torres displaces the Sepúlveda-Las Casas 
argument as originating a subject of the coloniality of being because he sees 
Fanon’s damné and damnation as providing it. The ideology of indigeneity 
transgressing both their projects has an impossible subject in mind: in their 
ideas of modernity/coloniality, indigenous peoples are always-already not 
producers of the present.  
The last scene in Corona de luz offers us a moment where their 
impossible Indians lead a resistance to impossibility. Usigli’s citation from 
Fray Juan de Zumárraga’s colonial archive surfaces in Luz when the friars 
design plans for a divine apparition based on the Indian processions. His 
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archive cites their performance as rebellious and pagan, providing enough 
evidence for the playwright to claim the Indians as essentially tragic and to 
write a play where these behave according to the friar’s observation. 
However, since the archive cited by Usigli makes no mention of the Indians 
speaking to the friar, the brown bodies the play’s manuscript leap from the 
friar’s notes to address him directly produce a racialized subject that he was 
unable to comprehend in his notes. Luz’s Indian bodies, I would argue, 
exhibit a cultural politics that indigenous peoples performed under 
Zumárraga’s gaze, and a cultural politics escapes the logic of the archive 
(almost) completely.   
The goddess that embodies divinity, gender and race, gives way to an 
apparition that threatens rather than silently accept imposed conversion. The 
mass of Indians in excessive motion causes disrupts the order of everyday 
life in New Spain, and in this commotion indigeneity makes itself present in 
terms that the natives’ own. The clamoring of “tlamahuizolli” vocalizes the 
Indian in a different performance that cannot be registered by the one staged 
by their colonizers. While the latter wish to reduce the natives’ being not to 
language but to rituals of worship by  deciding to stage divinity to contain 
their difference by way of religion, the Indians end up acting-being outside 
the bounds of a staged miracle when the performance of divinity happens.  
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The Indians outside the monastery move with the purpose to demand 
recognition beyond colonial voyeurism. 
MOTOLINÍA: … Gritan, Fray Juan, tlamahuizolli, esto es, hecho 
sorprendente o suceso maravilloso. (Fray Juan retrocede y se 
aparta del balcón llevándose las dos manos a la frente. La luz 
aumenta.) ¿Qué os ocurre, Fray Juan? 
FRAY JUAN: (Después de agitar las manos un instante.) … ahora lo 
veo todo como si mi cabeza se hubiera abierto en dos 
para dejar pasar la luz, Benavente.62 
 
At the sound of the Indians’ loudness and the sight of their massive 
numbers, Fray Juan growing anxiety literally splits his head in two. The 
anxiety caused by the performance forces him to deny the miracle’s creation 
as either staged (by the Spaniards) or fantasy (the Indian witnesses have no 
reason): the divinely racial apparition was real. The miracle is legitimized not 
by the theatrical or the imaginative, but by a loud presence challenging its 
conqueror to listen to its “growing light.” The absent subject of Carlos’ 
debate with the Cardinal and the Ministro materializes in this scene to 
displace their dialogue as constituting their existence. Indigenous peoples 
produce themselves in direct opposition to the Crown’s denial of their 
existence as human beings, and against its reduction of their humanity to a 
discourse of souls and bodies in need of salvation. In contrast to the 16th-
                                                
62 “MOTOLINÍA: … They are screaming, Fray Juan, tlamahuizolli, this is, an amazing act or 
marvelous event. (Fray Juan moves away from the balcony, raising both hands to his 
forehead. The light increases.) 
FRAY JUAN (After waving his hands for an instant.) … I now see everything as if my head 
had been split in two to let the light shine through, Benavente” (916). 
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century religious processions observed by Zumárraga where their bodies 
were policed by the colonial order, their bodies in Luz act out in a religious 
procession that is much more productive. Rather than serving as a cite of 
subversion, the Indians’ performance produces a site of humanity. The 
brown goddess has come to claim the natives as her progeny and they are 
not the Indian damned to perish under the guise of Christianity. On the 
contrary, “the Mother of God[,] the Mother of Humanity” propels them to 
claim their existence. The visions of “clouds of Indians” and “infectious 
flies” are an observation from a colonial gaze sensing a threat made tangible. 
Employing the divine apparition, the indigenous materialize outside the 
monastery to make their bodies be seen by the colonial gaze like it had never 
before seen them. Neither souls nor bodies in need of salvation, the Indian 
presence is now something completely new from what Carlos, the Cardinal, 
the friars, the soldiers, and Cortés himself believed it as.  Their presence 
creates a new being when they understand their lives born not from God but 
from a goddess gone brown like the color of their own skin, a racially divine 
apparition producing them as beings within and besides the colonial order’s 
limited imagination of history. This performance of excess is indigeneity.  
Outside of his colonial reason, the Indians’ performance of 
indigeneity drive Fray Juan mad and lead him to recognize the procession as 
something altogether new from before. 
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FRAY JUAN: No diremos nada, Benavente. Dejaremos que la 
orgullosa corona española piense que todo pasó como 
ella lo había dispuesto. Dejaremos que España crea que 
inventó el milagro… Hay que ocultar la verdad a Carlos 
y a todos, hermano, porque a partir de este momento 
México deja de pertenecer a España. Para siempre. Y eso 
es un milagro de Dios.63 
 
The presence seen from the balcony materializes the fabrication of a 
Christian miracle and the truthfulness of a miracle of a brown goddess. The 
racial character of the apparition denounces the Christian intent on falsifying 
divinity for the sake of a one-sided conversion, and the visuality of 
Guadalupe-Tonantzin displays the hybrid nature of the relationship between 
conqueror and conquered. Instead of lending credit to the Spanish Crown’s 
purpose, the apparition turns the fabricated miracle against its original intent 
and reveals that God did not appear by choice. Guadalupe-Tonantzin’s 
miraculous visions lead to the creation of the indigenous as peoples with 
agency, and the rebellious performance makes the miracle through their own 
hands. This exercise of native agency outstands the friar’s reason to the point 
that he disowns it altogether: the indigenous presence “no longer belongs to 
Spain” because its existence changes things forever.  
                                                
63 “FRAY JUAN: We will not say anything, Benavente. We will let the arrogant Spanish 
crown that everything passed as it had ordered. We will let Spain believe it invented the 
miracle… We must hide the truth from Carlos and from everyone, brother, because as of 
this moment México no longer belongs to Spain. Forever. And that is a miracle of God” 
(916). 
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Fray Juan’s words as the curtain drops on Corona de luz renounce his 
place of privilege cited by Usigli’s treatise on tragedy a decade earlier, but his 
reformed colonial gaze still paves the road towards an authentically Mexican 
theatre. The presence outside his monastery exhibits indigeneity in 
indigenous terms, but in a very Mexican moment: 
Crece el tumulto de voces. Una luz cenital parece echar abajo las paredes e 
inundarlo todo. Juan IV, pausadamente, tiene un movimiento como para 
volverse al público y mostrar su tilma. Algo lo detiene y como bañado por 
un pueril diluvio de bienestar, se dirige al balcón donde Fray Juan se 
prepara a bendecir al pueblo. 
FRAY JUAN: (A Motolinía.) Veo de pronto a este pueblo 
  coronado de luz, de fe. Veo que la fe corre ya por 
  todo México como un río sin riberas. Ése es el 
  milagro, hermano.64 
 
Mexico enters into the space of the theatre through the tragedy of Conquest 
and the performative produced under its guise. The growing crowd of voices 
disturbs Fray Juan to the point of denouncing his reign over the Indians’ 
souls because the divinity they witnessed was not the one he planned for. 
Their utterance of faith may be an allegiance to a goddess that is not his 
God, but their belief in divinity nevertheless legitimates the natives’ 
humanity in the process. The native bodies are made indistinguishable from 
                                                
64 “The crowd of voices grows. A zenith light seems to tumble the walls and flood 
everything. Slowly and deliberately, Juan IV moves as if to turn to the audience and 
display his tilma/cape. Something stops him and as if taken over by a naïve sense of 
happiness, he turns towards the balcony where Fray Juan is preparing himself to bless the 
peoples.  
FRAY JUAN: (To Motolinía.) I suddenly see this place crowned in light, in faith. I see that 
faith runs through all of México like an endless river. That is the miracle, brother” (917). 
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each other in the procession and allow the friar to imagine them as the 
embodiment of a Mexican nation. Just like the communal experience of 
Guadalupe’s apparition consolidated the humanity of the Indians in the eyes 
of the Christians, the Indians appearing in mass lead to an imagined 
community in the eyes of the friar. The friar understands the natives’ faith as 
proof of a México independent from Spain, an entity that did not exist prior 
to the procession.  
Much like Cuauhtémoc’s resistance to his master’s godhood, the 
performative ontology of Luz’s Indians is a heroics of tragedy, because it 
supercedes God’s plan to kill their own gods. The Indians’ spiritual 
conquerors and genocidal masters simply cannot see them as willing 
converts because they are not the silent and solemn subjects they originally 
thought them to be.  When the friars see the results of a miracle they did not 
stage, they recognize the Indians’ call as a miracle of alterity and their 
humanity as created not by their white God, but by a brown goddess. Even 
though these massive Indians do not posses Cuauhtémoc’s imperial 
subjectivity, they too fight the same war fought by the playwright’s 
authentically tragic hero. Usigli’s Mexican nationalism cannot escape the 
tragedy of modernity because he theorizes and creates a theatre vis-à-vis an 
indigenous ontology originally performed in the terrain of conquest. He 
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AGAINST KNOWLEDGE:  




I will tell you how hungry my body is to know something beyond the colony. 
— Cherríe Moraga, An Irrevocable Promise: Staging the Story Xicana 
 
DAYKEEPER: This is the root de la palabra anciana, in a place named Quiché. 
Es la raíz de un pueblo of earth and sky that we shall plant here in the hearts 
of its descendants. This is the story of how light was born from darkness y la 
luz shadowed again by the hands of the gods. We shall tell our cuento en voz 
alta for there is no place to read it… Five hundred years ago, the bearded 
ones arrived in floating palacios, in search of the sun’s golden secretions. 
They came armed with flechas of melded steel and a black book decrying 
their devil. Today our children know fewer and fewer Indian prayers; they 
put on the Ladino cloth of soldier and seller. And our book and its author 
keep their faces hidden.  
— Cherríe Moraga, Heart of Earth: A Popol Vuh Story 
 
PILMAMA: ¡Ay, pronto llegarán hombres del más allá del mar fabricados del 
más duro metal, sin corazón ni escrúpulos… y de todo esto harán campo de 
ruinas de polvo, sin pasado ni ayer. ¡Ay pobrecitos pueblos míos de Rabinal, 
los de Ux y Pocoman! Seremos aventados al horizonte, como flore de un 
árbol que tumbó el huracán del tiempo. La vida es un instante prestado por 
los dioses. Lo demás es el tiempo.1 
—  Sergio Magaña, Los Enemigos 
                                                
*All translations included in this chapter are my own unless otherwise noted. 
 
1 Sergio Magaña, Los Enemigos. Mexico, DF: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, S.A., 1990. 
* Translation: “PILMAMA: Oh, men will soon be arriving from beyond the sea, men made 
of the heaviest metal, heartless and unscrupulous… and from all that surrounds us they 
will make a camp of ruins and dust, without a past and without a yesterday. Oh, my poor 
peoples of Rabinal, of Ux and Pocoman! We will be thrown to the horizon, like the leaves 
of a tree knocked down by the hurricane of time. Life is but a moment lent to us by the 
gods. The rest is time itself” (90). 
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¿Tenemos, como Shakespeare, héroes de tragedia sin posibilidad de una 
tragedia constituida, o tenemos, como Sófocles, tragedia y héroe fundidos en 
la fuerza, en la sangre, en el terror, en la destrucción, en el horror y la 
piedad? … Como los griegos, tenemos un gran pasado de sufrimiento y de 
tortura que se ha limitado a transformarse y que, transformado, es siempre 
nuestro presente.2 




What is most provocative about Rodolfo Usigli’s insistence that 
Mexico is the rightful inheritor of the Ancient Greeks’ tragedic tradition is 
not his dismissal of William Shakespeare and Jean Racine, but rather his 
claims to an erotics of dramatic creation born from “the strength, blood, 
terror, destruction, horror, and piety” lived by the Americas well before the 
Renaissance could lay claim to the likes of Sophocles. As agents of the 
Renaissance ideals of modernity, Shakespeare and Racine limit themselves to 
reproducing the content and the form of Greek tragedy and its heroes, but 
never tragedy itself. These two tragedians missed the very reality and essence 
of the tragedy occurring in their own time: the horrifying experiences of a 
colonial terror that destroyed indigenous worlds, spilled the blood of 
                                                
2 Rodolfo Usigli, “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana (1950)” in Rodolfo Usigli, 
Teatro completo, Vol. 5, Ed. Luis de Tavira and Alejandro Usigli. Mexico City: Fondo de 
cultura económica, 2005. 
* Translation: “Do we have, as Shakespeare does, tragic heroes without the possibility of a 
fully-formed tragedy, or do we have, like Sophocles, tragedy and tragic hero founded on 
strength, blood, terror, destruction, horror and piety?... Like the Greeks, we have a great 
past of suffering and torture that has limited itself to transforming [itself] and that, once 
transformed, is always our present” (275-276). 
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countless native peoples, and made our bodies the stuff of disposable life.3 
Theirs was an act of mimicry “without the possibility of a [truly] constituted 
tragedy,” he says. In short, only in the invention of the Americas and with 
the subjects damned by the Conquest can tragedy “transform itself” from 
the time of the ancients to “always [be] our present.” Colonial terror 
circumscribes the space of tragedy to the Americas, and Usigli insists that 
our modern time is still of tragic proportions without salvation from a life 
marked by terror. His is the culture of colonial modernity at its worst: 
damnation.  
My first chapter argues that the playwright’s theorization of tragedy by 
way of indigenous performativity also hinges on its own tragic flaw. By not 
lending credence to native peoples’ ability to perform in their living present, 
Usigli actively relegates the lives of the Indians in 1950 to the stuff of 
archival citations or the remnants of an imperial time making up his Aztec 
performative. The indigeneity of his Mexican theatre belongs in the time of 
precolonial pasts instead of Indian presents, and the only subjects 
legitimately endowed with his ideal of performativity are the non-indigenous 
                                                
3 Throughout “Primer ensayo hacia una tragedia mexicana” (1950), Usigli always speaks 
to his intended Mexican audience in the communal “we” the nation, and “our” history 
past and present. There are also moments where he speaks about all Mexicans, regardless 
of race and ethnicity, as the contemporary survivors of colonial terror and as native 
peoples, even as he holds himself forever distant from indigenous people living in his 
time. 
140 
Mexicans whose past experiences of Conquest can be mediated through 
Western theatre. Furthermore, he does not account for the ways in which his 
knowledge of indigenous peoples derives from an ethnographic gaze and 
archeological search studying them from the margins of both time and 
theatre. He reads the 16th-century notes of the colonial voyeur citing the 
Indians’ religious performance, and then reproduces Fray Zumárraga’s 
ethnographic gaze by theorizing and staging this brand of performativity 
four centuries later. In both his and Fray Zumárraga’s scenarios of conquest, 
the observer and the scholar of indigenous performativity hold themselves 
physically and ontologically distant from the Indians. These, in turn, are 
written into the manuscript of a set of plays and an essay staging their 
performance. The playwright’s turn to the archive theorizes and performs 
race in the 20th-century, and produces his oeuvre within the coloniality of 
power. In recovering the natives as a thing of the past, however, Usigli’s 
coloniality also enunciates the Indians as always-already dead in Mexico’s 
present. Since the Indians cannot perform themselves beyond the colonial 
archive and the manuscripts of his Coronas, the coloniality of his Mexican 
theatre reveals that colonialism still frames the relational field of race.  
Decolonial arguments differentiate between systems governed by 
formal colonial relations (colonialism), on the one hand, and the patterns of 
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power set in place after colonialism’s end (coloniality), on the other.4  
Contrary to these, Usigli’s engagement with race and Conquest reveals a 
more intricate temporal relationship between both systems. The Conquest of 
Mexico ended so that he could write and theorize tragedy in the postcolonial 
period that followed, but his treatment of the Indians via his forms of art is 
clear evidence that the end of colonialism did not mean freedom from 
colonial relations for indigenous peoples living under Mexico’s postcolony. 
His turn towards tragedy assumes that colonialism had a definite end prior 
to his postcolonial present, but makes no mention of the anticolonial 
transition that marked the end of former and the beginning of the latter. 
Combined with his overlooking of the indigenous, I suggest that Usigli’s 
blind spot with respect to anticolonialism has as much to do with race as it 
does with time. His work bears the mark of a past Conquest because he 
wrote and produced his theatre in the terrain of the postcolony, but this 
brand of coloniality sees contemporary indigenous peoples’ experiences with 
colonialism solely as a thing of the past and unproductive in his present. 
Usigli effectively denies these peoples a coeval existence with his own time 
when he excises them from the stage. It is because of this performative and 
ideological move that the playwright’s relationship to indigeneity is a residual 
                                                
4 See my introductory chapter for a discussion of this differentiation. 
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form of the 16th-century mode of colonialism: his tragedy framed by the 
Conquest in actuality colonizes Indians in the 20th-century. As a result, this 
colonial residue produces an incongruence between the present time of 
Indian peoples and Mexican theatre’s time of race. For the playwright, the 
Indians are alive in the past because the archive says they could perform, and 
they can therefore only live prior to and during the Conquest. For the 
Indians living in the 20th-century, these ideologies of race and time are 
incongruent with their own reality.  
The logic of this second chapter follows my first one by tracing the 
colonial residue of Usigli’s dramatic tradition in the theatre of Cherríe 
Moraga and Sergio Magaña.  In their attempts to understand the effects of 
the Conquest on the 20th-century’s present, both Moraga and Magaña create 
plays inspired by Mayan practices that have existed since before the 16th-
century arrival of the European men and the invention of what is now 
Guatemala. Moraga negotiates her relationship to indigeneity as a Xicana 
through a series essays as well as her puppet theatre, Hearth of Earth: A Popol 
Vuh Story (2001a), where she stages a narrative and a ceremony taken from 
the Popol Vuh itself. Magaña’s Los Enemigos (1990) is a Mexican play inspired 
by the Rabinal Achí, the Mayan drama that has been performed in the 
Guatemalan town of Rabinal since the century before the European 
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invasion. Given that Heart of Earth and Los Enemigos are based on the 
playwrights’ research into the archives containing the written forms of both 
Mayan performative practices, I suggest that Moraga and Magaña invent an 
ideology of indigeneity that is rooted in the colonial archive as much as 
Usigli’s own version of racial performativity. Neither of these two 
playwrights is a Mayan indigenous practitioner of the Popol Vuh or a dancer 
in the Rabinal Achí, and they can only access the “Mayan book of the dawn 
of life and the glories of Gods and Kings” and the “Mayan drama of war and 
sacrifice” through the multiple transcriptions, translations and publications 
of these sets of practices. Still, Moraga and Magaña make no 
acknowledgement of the relationship between their plays and the archival 
knowledge they employed in creating them. Their ideological blind spot not 
only ignores each artist’s strategic invention of Indians for the sake of 
Mexican and Xicana theatre, it also limits their understanding of indigenous 
performativity to the archival documents written by the Lords of Quiché and 
Rabinal at the height of the Maya’s imperial reign. In Moraga’s case, her 
theory of writing as ceremony and embodiment is based on the elite class of 
Aztec men in charge of keeping, divining and transferring the divine word of 
the gods before the time of Cortés; her indigeneity is made up of both pre-
Columbian Aztec and Mayan imperial times. Even though the playwrights 
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rewrite the Popol Vuh and the Rabinal Achí for their respective national 
stages, their imagination of indigeneity thinks of Indians in terms of myths 
and archives.  Their ideologies of race do not see the Mayans in their Indian 
presents, but as the subjects of tragedy (antihistorical) and without a possible 
history of the present (both anti-historical and a-historical).  
Usigli’s archive is limited to a colonizer’s notes about indigenous 
religiosity and performativity, but the archive that inspires Moraga and 
Magaña belongs to a different time and a different Indian brought together 
by the Conquest of the Americas. Moraga is most clear in staking a claim to 
indigeneity for her own ideological purposes: she says she turns to the Popol 
Vuh as a myth that can give her access to the past eradicated through the 
Conquest. What’s more, she wants access to that indigeneity untouched by 
colonialism so she can preserve it now for the sake of a future of race 
beyond the colony.5 The manuscript of Magaña’s play opens by announcing 
that Los Enemigos is a tragedy loosely based on the original Mayan drama 
staging the defeat and eventual decapitation of the Man of Rabinal. This 
warning may be as much as the playwright says about his play’s relationship 
to the original, but that he rewrites the Rabinal Achí through a Western form 
                                                
5 The first epigraph by Moraga is taken from her essay, “An Irrevocable Promise: Staging 
the Story Xicana,” in Radical Acts: Theatre and Feminist Pedagogies of Change, Ed. Ann 
Elizabeth Armstrong and Kathleen Juhl. San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 2007a. Quote 
on page 54. 
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of art derived from the Ancient Greeks more than speaks for itself: Los 
Enemigos is a mimicry of the Rabinal Achí, but it is strategically placed far 
removed from the original ceremony. Magaña too espouses an ideology of 
race that places indigeneity solely in the time of antiquity documented in the 
archive.  
I argue that Los Enemigos and Heart of Earth establish a temporal and 
racial incongruence between coloniality and colonialism when their authors 
introduce the historical experience of the Conquest into the plays. The 
Popol Vuh was originally set to writing in the K’iche’ language using the 
Latin alphabet under the auspices of Christian officials in the early 16th-
century, and the narrative only briefly references the colonization of Mayan 
peoples in its opening and closing remarks. The Rabinal Achí made no 
mention at all of the Conquest when it was originally performed in the 
century prior to the arrival of the Spanish. The pre-Columbian Mayan 
performers did not reference the Conquest because it did not exist yet, and 
their contemporary performances of the Rabinal Achí make no mention of it 
now whenever the ceremony is performed in this day and age. As the 
epigraphs above evidence, however, the playwrights rewriting the Popol Vuh 
and the Rabinal Achí deliberately give colonialism center stage even when 
the originals consciously choose to do otherwise. My point here is not to 
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simply compare the rewrites to the originals, nor to dismiss them for not 
doing justice to these. Rather, I wish to highlight each playwright’s 
investment in knowing the Indian for the sake of the present through a 
means that actually sidelines indigenous peoples’ historical experiences with 
colonialism.  
Moraga’s most recent essays articulate a desire to know a history 
before Spanish colonialism came to eradicate a peoples whose cultural 
practices are now lost to her. Ironically, her invention of indigenous 
ceremonies untouched by the Conquest reifies colonialism’s effects on the 
lives of today’s Mayan peoples. As the Daykeeper of Moraga’s Xicana play 
states, the action in Heart of Earth takes place 500 years after the Spanish 
arrived with swords and Bibles ready to wage war on the Mayans.6 In efforts 
to keep alive the prayers that indigenous children are today slowly forgetting 
as a result of this arrival, the playwright situates her Popol Vuh as a 20th-
century a-historical and pre-modern “myth,” right alongside her 
contemporary Mayan peoples whose Popol Vuh is a world-making practice 
of the present. Unlike the narrators of the play and the original book, 
however, these contemporary Indians are not the Lords and Kings of the 
                                                
6 The second epigraph by Moraga is taken from her play, “Heart of Earth: A Popol Vuh 
Story” in The Hungry Woman, Cherríe Moraga. Albuquerque: West End Press, 2001a. 
Quote on page 107. 
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Mayan empire devastated by the Conquest. The Mayans who today make 
their world following the Popol Vuh do so not out of a belief in a-historical 
myth nor to divine a creation story through Western antihistorical tragedies, 
but as a practice of everyday life in their Mayan presents. Much to their 
detriment, Moraga relegates these living Mayans to the myths of an ancient 
past damned by the arrival of the Spanish. 
In Magaña’s play, not only does the playwright take artist freedom to 
write characters and plots that are completely absent in the Rabinal Achí, he 
introduces the Conquest into a Mayan drama whose performances are not 
invested in either race or the Spanish invasion. The contemporary 
performances have weathered the effects of 500 years of colonialism on the 
town of Rabinal and the lives of its peoples, but the performances and their 
transcription focus on the battles between Rabinal and Quiché, not the 
colonization of the Mayans. The Pilmama warns the two warriors 
representing each town to worry not about their internal differences, but 
about the upcoming wars of the Spanish conquest that will turn their present 
and past lives into dust. Since at no other point in the play does Magaña 
reference the Conquest, nor the difference between the Spanish and the 
indigenous peoples established in it, I suggest that this moment emerges as 
exemplary of the author’s desire to know the Indian produced from the 
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original tragedy of the Americas. Emilio Carballido (1990) writes in his 
introduction to Los Enemigos that the 1989 production of the play wrongfully 
attached the phrase “the invention of America” to its title because the play is 
not about invention at all. The Pilmama’s words prove otherwise, since her 
discreet introduction into Magaña’s tragic play privileges the invention of 
race and the Americas over the Mayan drama of war and sacrifice. Even 
though the indigeneity of Los Enemigos belongs to a precolonial imperial 
history, her prediction of the fall of this imperial culture hints at the 
invention of the Indian that went hand-in-hand with the invention of 
America.  
Moraga and Magaña do not acknowledge in their rewriting of Mayan 
performances that their plays stem from their own desire to know the Indian 
for the sake of the present. Both playwrights are inspired by Mayan practices 
that existed before and without a Western modernity that was put in place in 
the 16th-century, but the Popul Vuh and the Rabinal Achí are Mayan 
practices that also continue to be performed within and beside the West today. 
The rewrites of the Rabinal Achí and the Popol Vuh set aside the Mayan 
peoples’ experiences with a history of colonialism that has yet to reach its 
conclusion. The Xicana writes that she looks to a mythological pre-
Columbian past to secure the future of indigeneity without colonialism, but 
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the indigeneity she performs now is still framed by an imperial Indian that is 
incongruent with the Mayans whose histories of the present are performed 
under the guises of colonialism. A similar ideal of indigeneity is found in the 
Mexican dramatization of a battle between the Lord of Quiche and the 
Rabinal invader: the Indians of Magaña’s play live in the time of Mayan gods 
and Mayan lords about to be overshadowed by the time of Conquest. 
Instead of producing an art form in relation to the Mayan peoples living 
beside them as coeval in the present, these artists’ desire to know indigenous 
peoples in the 20th-century leads them to invent an anti-historical ideology of 
indigeneity that places the Indian outside of history itself.  
“Against Knowledge” stems from this dilemma of desiring to know 
the Indian without accounting for the coloniality of modernity. As a result of 
this, the native that Moraga and Magaña stage is the one that lived prior to 
the West. Their collusion in making indigenous peoples unaccountable of 
the colony, I argue, frames Heart of Earth and Los Enemigos within a colonial 
residue that excises Indian presents from their 20th-century stage. Like 
Usigli’s tragedies, the coloniality of their MeXicana theatres erase the Indians 




Xicana Inventi ons  Be yond the  Colony 
 
Cherríe Moraga has continuously insisted that she writes theatre and 
prose as a kind of ceremonial ritual with which to resist colonization. The 
purpose of her anticolonial projects, she says, is to prevent the erasure of the 
indigenous heritage of Chicanas/os and to recuperate an indigenous ancient 
knowledge that she claims was killed in the Conquest of the Americas. The 
playwright argues that Aztlán, the mythical homeland of Chicana/o 
revolutionaries, failed as a revolutionary project because Chicanas/os looked 
to mestizaje without recognizing that mestizaje is a centuries-long genocidal 
project erasing the indigenous peoples and their practices (Moraga 2007b). 
She also says that since it is her right to know what she has lost, she has the 
right to pick and choose what she feels is necessary to invent her indigeneity 
and to reclaim her lost connection to the precolonial time of the ancients 
(2001b, 2007b). One of the most essential elements that make up her 
indigenous ideal are the elite indigenous scribes of the Aztec and Mayan 
precolonial empires, whose epistemic and ceremonial practices she wishes to 
replicate with her “indígena" that existed before colonialism. Thus, the 
Indian of Moraga's Xicana theatre of liberation lives in the time of myth and 
outside of history, what she calls a future time “beyond the colony” (2007a).  
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Moraga centers on indigenous peoples as her theatre’s subjects of 
address through a mode that is essentially tragic. Her antihistorical 
indigeneity seemingly derives from the same precolonial temporality as 
Usigli's because both playwrights believe that their access to precolonial 
pasts is virtually inconsequential of colonialism. After all, neither Moraga or 
Usigli acknowledge that what and how they know about the peoples of the 
pre-Columbian period is made possible through colonial projects. Unlike the 
Mexican brand of tragedy that sees colonialism as a thing of the past, 
however, she does not at all follow Usigli’s temporal scale to believe that the 
Conquest has already ended.  For Moraga, Indians are still colonized and she 
makes it her ideological and artistic project to find something untouched by 
the Conquest so indigenous peoples can no longer be erased from history. 
She insists on owning an indigeneity and a past she claims has been lost to 
her as a result of colonization, and she writes as a method for bringing back 
what she has lost. The radical potential of her theatre of liberation lies not 
only in articulating the dire need to make a world where colonial relations do 
not organize the order of everyday life, she also has a project in mind with 
which to invent a future beyond the colony.  
The ideology of indigeneity at play in Moraga’s Xicana theatre of 
liberation, however, is founded on a set of contradictions that makes it 
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difficult to embrace and reflect on her anticolonial project as indeed 
providing a viable path towards decolonial freedom for indigenous peoples. 
On the one hand, the playwright is rightfully unapologetic in her desire to 
bring about a different history of the present for the Americas, one where 
colonization does not effectively succeed in killing off the indigenous 
peoples of this hemisphere. On the other hand, Moraga first articulates a 
project of liberation and its ideal subject of address fashioned after her own 
experiences with indigeneity and colonialism, and then employs her 
indigeneity to stand in for all indigenous peoples. Therein lies my ideological 
conundrum: she invents an Indian subject whose life was thoroughly 
destroyed with the coming of the colony, but this eternal Indian does not 
actually reflect the existence of those indigenous histories of the present that 
did not die along with their precolonial empires. She seeks a future for race 
beyond the colony and a time where colonialism is no longer the order of 
the day, but she very consciously refuses to account for the actual ways in 
which colonial relations frame the reality of her colonial present.  
  Moraga’s temporality of race is nevertheless taking place in the terrain 
of colonialism. When she picks and chooses what elements and ideas she 
needs to project race onto a future beyond the colony, her ideologies of race 
and time prove incongruent with the lives of the indigenous whose reality 
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inspire her theatre. Her prose and her theatre beg questions regarding her 
understanding of liberation:  whose liberation is she articulating? Liberation 
from what and for whom? How is her theatre articulating both the subject of 
liberation and the process of liberation itself? My intentions behind this set 
of questions are not to dismiss the artist’s identification with indigeneity, nor 
to challenge her desire to fill a tragic history of loss with something else, but 
to interrogate the terms with which she envisions a future time for racialized 
subjects. My engagement with Moraga is two-fold. I first argue that her 
indigeneity is not only antihistorical in the tragic sense, it is also anti-
historical in that it makes Indians belong to the time of ancient myths and 
outside a history of the present. In seeking to bring an end to tragedy, she 
decides to place indigenous peoples outside of history itself. I then trace 
Moraga’s tragic and a-historical Indian in Heart of Earth: A Popol Vuh Story 
(2001a). My analysis of the play argues that, as part of the Xicana’s oeuvre, 
the play excises contemporary Mayan peoples from her theatre of liberation 
because they are not living through a Popol Vuh in the antihistorical time of 
myth, but in the historical 20th-century present now. The “irrevocable 
promise” of Moraga’s Xicana inventions beyond the colony is detrimental to 
Mayan peoples because she relegates their lives to precolonial pasts (2007b). 
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Indeed, as with Usigli’s indigenous performative, Xicana theatre colonizes 
the Indian subjects that Moraga claims to liberate. 
In “An Irrevocable Promise: Staging the Story Xicana,” Moraga states 
that her “writing is an act prompted by intuition, a whispered voice, a 
tightening of the gut. It is an irrevocable promise to not forget what the 
body holds as memory” (Moraga 2007a, 45). As a playwright, her ceremonial 
act of writing takes on an explicitly political purpose to prevent the erasure 
of embodied memory:  
Writing for the stage is the reenactment of this ceremony of 
remembering. Experience first generated through the body 
returns to the body in the flesh of the staged performance. In 
this sense, for me, it is as close to direct political activism as I 
can get as an artist, for theater requires the body to make 
testimony and requires other bodies to bear witness to it. The 
question remains: bear witness to what? It is a question all artists, 
the survivor-children of Amerikan genocide, must ask. And so 
I, too, ask myself most simply: what is the story Xicana? (45, 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Moraga’s point to think of writing as a ritual endows the practice of writing 
with a life beyond the pen and paper. Rather than thinking of writing solely 
as a linguistic practice, she compliments language with a theatre and a theory 
of embodiment. The staged performances of her plays produce the written 
word as living body with a history of experiences, experiences that 
regenerate themselves in the flesh of this body when it acts on the stage. 
Combined with spoken and written language, the performance modality of 
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embodiment produces a living language that remembers histories past and 
present. Embodiment also depends on a relational space to exist because it 
“requires other bodies to bear witness to it” and partake in the making of 
testimony to these histories. This need for relationality imbedded in her 
theatre is especially necessary for the “survivors-children of Amerikan 
genocide” remembering this tragic experience. The spelling of “Amerikan” 
with a “k” instead of a “c” does not reference either the America of U.S. 
nationalism or the Latin American accented América. Amerika is both and 
neither of these entities because it refuses their geopolitical borders 
flattening out and dividing the cultural geography of the hemisphere. 
Moraga’s strategy in inventing this word is to oppose both America and 
América and remind us of a common experience of genocide uniting the 
hemisphere. Since she is simultaneously invoking genocide, embodiment and 
Amerika, the first experience that generated these three terms relates back to 
a very particular body in mind. The story Xicana that Moraga is asking for is 
the history of indigenous peoples, and the point of origin for the 
embodiment she is theorizing are those bodies that perished in the post-
Columbian period. 
The task at hand for Moraga is to reflect back on and locate the 
stories embodied in Xicana survivors and children of the genocide that took 
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place in the terrain of the colony. As one of these survivor-children, 
however, Moraga also faces the challenge of not having the tools with which 
her embodiment can articulate the indigenous lives, experiences, 
knowledges, and worlds that were killed under Spain’s genocidal conquest.  
I have never questioned the revolutionary potential in bringing 
the Xicana experience full-bodied to the center of the stage 
(and page). What I do question are the forms, the shapes in 
which that staged story-telling might be rendered. What 
languages do we use? What physical action? What objects are 
called forth? What voices? Help me remember, I ask of my 
dioses, what I never read and may never have witnessed, but 
somehow know. This is the mantra of my own writing process. 
Help me believe I have the right to remember and know what at 
times only my troubled heart tells me to be true (Moraga 2007a, 
46; emphasis in the original).  
 
If the colony came to kill her ancestors, and with them what she has “never 
read and never have witnessed,” then the revolutionary potential of Xicana 
stories is not only to make embodiment possible, but to “somehow know” 
what genocide destroyed to make it unknowable ever after. Moraga is not 
interested in producing these indigenous stories and their embodiment 
through her theatre without being questionable of the manners in which 
these are made knowable for her. Even though Xicanas rightfully know they 
have stories that are historically denied to them, Xicanas’ revolutionary 
potential can only be fulfilled if they are held accountable for how they 
actually come to remember the performance forms employed to represent 
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the past. The logic of her argument is complicated, perhaps even circular: 
Xicanas have stories they can represent on stage, but they can be 
revolutionary only if they hold themselves accountable for the way in which 
they access and know the forms through which they represent. I suggest that 
this complexity is itself derived from the unimaginable experience of 
genocide that Moraga has survived as a child of Amerika. How can she know 
and recover that which is no longer knowable or recoverable because it was 
killed? The impossible scenario produces in her an epistemic anxiety over 
what and how she remembers, but she finds an answer to impossibility in 
her gods. Unlike the Indians’ exterminated human bodies, the Indians’ gods 
have survived genocide to Moraga’s present day. Divinity legitimates her 
rightful desire to know and remember what colonialism tells her she does 
not. The colony killed both her peoples and their gods, but she survived and 
so did her gods with her.  
 The manner in which the Xicana playwright articulates her theory of 
performance –both theatre as playwriting and as embodiment– is based on a 
need to survive the physical and epistemic violence carried out against 
indigenous peoples. Moraga understands indigenous peoples’ history with 
colonial terror as an experience that did not end when the Amerikan 
hemisphere claimed its independence from European empires. Since the 
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effects of genocide are still being experienced, it cannot be said yet that 
genocide has reached its conclusion. The Conquest of the Americas may be 
over for non-indigenous peoples relinquished from Spanish rule, but 
indigenous peoples still cannot claim their world without colonialism and 
without its lasting aftermath. Moraga doesn’t directly name “colonialism” per 
se, so it can be argued that she is not referencing a specific historical 
experience. However, she is expressing the reality that she is being denied 
access to knowledge and world-making practices as a result of indigenous 
genocide, which in an of itself is not a singular historical moment but a 
historical process that began with the arrival of the Spanish centuries ago. 
Even if she does not literally name colonialism when she expresses her 
body’s desire to know what is denied to her, the experiences she is 
regenerating through her theatre are deriving from conquest. The history of 
Amerikan genocide cannot be denied and the surviving indigenous peoples 
are still living its consequences well after the formal project of the Conquest 
ended.  
 Moraga’s embodiment can be thought about as a refusal to see 
coloniality as an adequate descriptor of indigenous peoples’ experiences with 
colonialism, hers included. Coloniality reflects the effects of formal 
colonialism well after its demise, and in this sense it has little to say to the 
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peoples whose lives take place under colonial relations everyday. The way 
Moraga articulates colonialism as an unending project reneges coloniality 
because anticolonialism and decolonization never came to liberate 
indigenous peoples of either America or América. The colonial difference 
more adequately describes the modern indigenous peoples, because without 
liberation at hand, today’s Indian peoples have been experiencing modernity 
through its colonial underside since its invention 500 years ago. Still in the 
colony, Moraga’s theatre wants to bring about its end and liberate the 
colonized: 
Only a truly liberationist teatro could house an uncompromised 
story of dissent, one where the axis upon which freedom is 
imagined spins freely from an alternate world view… It is a 
theatre generated not from neo-liberal Latin American notion 
of mestizaje nor corporate-conspired definition of 
multiculturalism nor academic-inspired discourse on hybridity 
nor New Age fantasy of indigeneity; but one conceived by 
those who have been erased by the official narrative of 
colonization. It is our liberationist theory assuming flesh on the 
América stage. It is our work of resistance. It is a living art, 
requiring tools of our making, our own objects, our sacred and 
profane practices; or maybe for us lost mestizos, it is just some 
clumsy grasping at a pre-colonial language and a history almost 
forgotten (Moraga 2007a, 52; emphasis in the original). 
 
Xicana theatre is a decolonial project envisioning a future world that rotates 
otherwise from the colony.  Its subjects of address are also its artists and 
performers, those whose lives have been erased from colonialism’s official 
narratives and are making their impossible histories the tools which they 
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create art. The decolonial imaginary of Xicana theatre breathes life back onto 
those bodies who genocide did not predict would live to tell the tale. As an 
essayist, dramatist, performer, Indian and mestiza, Moraga’s subjectivity is 
constituted through the communal: “our liberationist theory assumes flesh on 
the América stage. It is our work of resistance. It is a living art, requiring tools 
of our making, our own objects, our sacred and profane practices,” she 
insists.7 Plural subjectivity speaks not as an individual, nor for an individual, 
but for and as a group who refuses to compromise their practices for the sake 
of freedom. Colonial subjects themselves will determine the terms under 
which their liberation will be achieved, and they will require that freedom be 
exercised through the sacred and profane practices that colonialism says it 
has erased. The alternate worldview of liberationist theatre is the view of the 
colony from the bodies of colonial subjects, those who create the art of the 
stage through their colonial difference of the modern world. 
 The agents and subjects of address of Moraga’s theatre also slip from 
the path of liberation, if only for a moment: for those mestizo bodies “lost” 
from their biologically indigenous parents and their indigenous practices, 
making art with Indian tools and on Indian terms may just be “some clumsy 
                                                
7 As with “Amerika,” Moraga is using “América” to unite both Latin America’s and the 
U.S.’ definition of the term. I would also argue that Amerika and América can encompass 
Canada and the Caribbean, since these regions are as much a part of the hemisphere as 
are Latin America and the U.S. 
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grasping at a pre-colonial language and a history almost forgotten” (Moraga 
2007b, 52). Although a communal practice, the liberation that Moraga has in 
mind is not universally attainable and mestizos have to be especially 
worrisome of the ways in which they lay claims to indigeneity. Evidently, not 
everyone can claim an indigenous ethos for the sake of radical projects of art 
and liberation, and she is critical of mestizos recovering what they do not 
know. On the hand, I think that Moraga’s critique is pointing back to the 
complex, if not contradictory, desires to recover what colonial history has 
told her has already been killed. In being biologically and culturally removed 
from the Indians killed by genocide and the Indians that survived, how will 
mestizos claim what they have been twice removed from? Moraga’s words 
suggest that unlike the indigenous subjects of colonial violence, the mestizos’ 
experiences of colonialism is not the same as Indian peoples and they must 
not be clumsy when laying claims to anything indigenous. The colonial 
experience is not the same for everyone in the colony, and in not being a 
universal experience, it becomes that much more difficult to establish a 
concrete system from which all colonial subjects must be liberated from. On 
the other hand, Moraga is establishing the difference between what mestizos 
can claim as indigenous –the precolonial worlds that have been almost 
forgotten– and what indigenous peoples can claim as their own indigeneity –
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both the precolonial worlds and their own present lives. Just like experiences 
of colonialism varied between colonial subjects, the colonial difference is 
equally not universal and racialized subjects do not experience the modern 
world in the same ways.  
With these understandings of colonial difference and colonialism in 
mind, just who can create “a truly liberationist teatro” and whose/what 
scared and profane practices can assume “flesh on the América stage” 
(Moraga 2007b, 52)?  If not all colonial subjects experience colonialism in 
the same way, then it follows that a Xicana theatre of liberation must be 
aware of who is eligible for freedom. It also follows that, in identifying the 
subjects of liberation, the indigeneity these lay claims to must also be 
questioned because the indigeneity of mestizos is not the same indigeneity of 
indigenous peoples. Since the mestizos of the colony are the ones she brings 
in for questioning, their indigenous subjectivity cannot be as eligible for 
liberation as the indigenous peoples whose genes have not been tainted. 
Even if she does not say that mestizos cannot be liberated, her 
differentiation between the indigenous subjectivity of mestizos and that of 
indigenous peoples makes it almost explicit that the former can actually be 
excluded from freedom altogether. This logic of embodiment and selection 
of liberation-eligible indigenous subjects, I suggest, runs the risk of 
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trafficking in the language of racial purity and ethnic authenticity. The 
playwright avoids accounting for these colonialist arguments of race and 
ethnicity by not explicitly naming the referent of her ideal indigenous. Still, I 
ask, just who is the Xicana’s Indian and just what are her sacred and profane 
stories? 
 Moraga defines her indigeneity not as a romantic ideal but as strategic 
invention:  
I have no nostalgia about some idealized original tongue we, 
the thousands of tribes that make up the Xicano nation, once 
had… I am both the freed slave and the enslaved. I am talking 
out of both sides of my mouth. I contradict and speak to you in 
their language, which is my language. And is not. I am the 
mestiza: the Indian and white, more white than Indian. I have 
forgotten almost everything. I pick and borrow what I can to 
try and find my way to a manner of expression that will, from 
the simple vantage of an eight year old, stop greed. I want to 
turn the sign around (Moraga 2007a, 52-53). 
 
She defines indigeneity in two ways. First, she describes indigeneity as 
spoken language, tribalism and ethnic nationalism. The tribes of Aztlán are 
not at all nostalgic for the language they originally had, but they are slaves to 
a world that wants them to “[forget] almost everything.”  Secondly, 
indigeneity is also a set of practices with an ideological purpose in mind: 
Moraga picks and chooses what she can “to turn the sign around” from 
language that is and is not hers, and towards a language expressed through 
her own body. If colonial history tells her that she has no original language 
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and she does not exist, then her ideology of indigeneity produces an origin 
both “before and beyond the colony”:  
Sometimes, as a writer, I feel my task comes down to the 
simply fact of declaring, Sí existimos. We exist and have always 
been here…. Maybe this is the same refrain in all of my work: 
an insistence on a presence where the world perceives absence. 
Maybe this is fundamentally the product of all Xicana work: to 
announce our presence to one another and the world, but in 
our own tongue, on our own ground, brandishing our own 
homegrown instruments of naming. This is where the project 
of revolutionary Teatro occurs –self-defined, self-determined, 
employing words and images before and beyond the colony 
(53). 
 
She flat out refuses the romantic ideals of nostalgia, but lost origins do 
animate her desire to know what existed before the colony’s arrival. Whereas 
the world believes Xicano Indians are non-existent, her work insists that they 
do, in fact, exist. Xicano Indians materialize their worldly existence through 
a revolutionary means that is all their own, and their mode of performance 
(“teatro”) is reminiscent of the Aztecs of Corona de luz’ closing scene: they 
too validate their existence through words and mobile images that exist 
beyond the logic of colonial authorities. Not interested in origins that the 
world says are absent, Moraga’s theatre liberates the sign by inventing what 
she needs to know. In an “effort to uncover what [she and other Xicano 
Indians] don’t remember,” her theory of embodiment means “to use the 
body as a way to dig up the dirt, [and] to find something of what is left of 
165 
[Indians]” (54). She is telling us just “how hungry [her] body is to know 
something beyond the colony” (54), that she picks and chooses the necessary 
elements to bring about the time of freedom from slavery.  
The theatre of liberation is the vehicle through which Moraga –and by 
extension all other indigenous peoples– can put an end to colonialism. In 
knowing something beyond the colony, the colony itself is abandoned and 
another world is created without colonial relations organizing the new 
world’s order. Nevertheless, her outlining of a theory of liberation and 
embodiment does not yet give a body to the subject of address that all 
indigenous peoples can own. Besides declaring that she is a Xicana writing 
about the need for Xicano tribal members to insist on self-definition and 
self-determination through her theatre, she does not explain how or why her 
mestizaje makes her eligible for freedom and makes other mestizos ineligible 
for the same. She identifies herself as a mestiza who is more white than she 
is Indian, not as a mestiza who clumsily implores a precolonial origin that no 
longer exists. Nevertheless, the irrevocable promise of her theatre –to not let 
the body forget and to create a world beyond the colony– does not give the 
signifying Indian a racialized body that remembers outside of genetics and 
ideology. Moraga is a Xicana mestiza who consciously fashions her body to 
signify Indian, but she keeps strategically silent as to how she embodies her 
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ideology of indigeneity that all Indians and mestizo Indians of the Xicano 
nation are to make flesh through her stage. Without a viable body, all other 
kind of Indians besides Moraga that are living on the colony must find their 
own paths to self-identification and self-determination with hers as a model. 
She, however, leaves these Indians outside of embodied signification, 
hollering for freedom still. 
What is Moraga’s Indian body beyond the colony? Where is this 
future time located? “The (W)rite to Remember: Indígena as Scribe, 2004-5 
(an excerpt)” (Moraga 2007b), an essay published the same year as “An 
Irrevocable Promise” (Moraga 2007a), addresses these questions more 
succinctly than does her outline of a Xicana theatre of liberation. In “An 
Irrevocable Promise,” the playwright employs the terms “Xicana” (2007a, 
45), “Mechicano”  (51) and “the Xicano nation” (52) to reference the 
Chicano civil rights movement, its intended revolutionary subjects of 
address, and their indigenous homeland of Aztlán. The spelling of these 
terms with an “X” interchangeably with “Ch” locates her language in neither 
the Spanish of English alphabets, but in the language of Aztec/Mexica 
peoples. Chicana/o spelled with an “X” interpolates all the members of the 
Movimiento as indigenous peoples of the Americas, which is yet another 
move in which Moraga refuses the modern world’s denial of their presence. 
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“An Irrevocable Promise” addresses the Chicanas/os identified with the 
Chicano Movement as “the thousands of tribes that make up the Xicano 
nation” (52). In a radically different mode of address, however, “The (W)rite 
to Remember” does not hail Aztlán and its tribes as always-already 
indigenous. She says that Aztlán was “resurrected by the poets of El 
Movimiento” to “[assert] our indigenous entitlement to the land [of the U.S. 
Southwest] as descendants of its aboriginal inhabitants,” but “by 1970, 
Chicanos unwittingly resurrected the banner of ‘La Raza Cósmica’” and 
“what [they] didn’t fully comprehend at that time was the degree to which 
we were oppressed as Indians” (2007b, 383; emphasis in the original). The 
Chicano revolutionaries may have claimed land as “descendants of its 
aboriginal inhabitants,” but they identified themselves with José 
Vasconcelos’ mestizo as “a kind of ‘cosmic race,’ which would supercede the 
races of the past” (383). The Aztlán of the 1960s and 1970s was not 
indigenous because its mestizo revolutionaries identified with “what was an 
ethnocidal project already hundreds of years in the making and one of 
seemingly irreversible consequences” (383). As a mestizo nation, Aztlán 
thought indigenous peoples a race of the past, not its own present. “The 
measure of the political efficacy of a metaphor,” says Moraga, “is if a radical 
living practices emerges from it” (385). Thus, with Chicana/o mestizos 
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making indigenous peoples dead in the past, Aztlán failed as a revolution 
because no radical praxis of the living emerged from it. 
Moraga is equally critical of her contemporary Chicano writers who, 
similar to Aztlán's misidentification with indigeneity, refuse to identify 
themselves as indigenous peoples.  
I believe Chicano writers’ fear of claiming herencia as 
indigenous people not as nostalgia, but as a commitment to the 
recuperation of indigenous principles in our daily life has 
created a half-literature at best and not the insurgent work we 
are truly capable of producing. At worst, it is a minstrel-like 
fakery of who we are, served up for the consumption of Euro-
America (Moraga 2007b, 380). 
 
The playwright’s claims are a bit convoluted and difficult to read literarily. If 
I understand her, Moraga is saying that today’s Chicano writers are not 
laying claims to an indigenous heritage not because of they are nostalgic for 
their lost origins, but because they are not committed to recuperating 
indigenous principles under erasure by colonialism. If I am indeed correct in 
my reading, then Moraga is posing a grave assault on her contemporaries 
and calling other Chicano writers complicit with colonialism by not 
partaking in her indigenous heritage recovery project. Their writings, she 
says, are an underdeveloped literature that is consumed as a brownface 
performance, because even if the writers themselves do not identify as 
indigenous, they do not recognize that their Euro-American consumers read 
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them as racially different.  Her own writings, on the other hand, are not a 
minstrel show because she is recuperating what colonialism tells her does 
not exist. 
So, as people of color, if we are willing to go through the 
broken places first, to our own acts of self-sabotage and 
amnesia, we will find our authentic way home. We may have to 
borrow or invent, along the way, but we have the right to 
remember. And I can no longer let the colonizer nor colonized 
tell me we don’t (380). 
 
These Chicano writers can only “find [their] authentic way home” by 
following her theatre of liberation and denying the colonial logic telling them 
they do not “have the right to remember” that they are Indians. If they are 
to live through genocide and survive life in the colony, their writings have to 
identify with their indigenous heritage and invent or borrow what they need 
to survive life in hell.  
 With regards to her own indigeneity, Moraga says she “[first] went 
south, as other Chicanos had before [her], in search of [her] ‘raíces’ and a 
cultural connection with a contemporary México,” only to find “[a] daily, 
and often painful reminder of my own cultural outsiderhood as a US-born 
Mexican of mixed parentage” (Moraga 2007b, 387-388). Moraga did not find 
her indigenous roots in the Mexicans of a different race and ethnicity than 
her own, but in the architecture dating back to the time before the colony: 
“the templos of México –Monte Albán, Palenque, Tulum, Teotihuacán– [led 
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me] into the visceral experience of a collective racial memory that everything 
about my personal biography rejected, but one that my writer’s soul 
irrefutably embraced,” she says (388). Like Usigli before her, she embarks on 
an archeological recuperation of pre-Columbian peoples by way of ancient 
imperial cities. Temples and “natural landscape” generated the racial memory 
her body was searching for: 
It was as much the natural landscape in which these templos 
were placed, as the buried history contained with the structures, 
that brought a shudder of recognition to the surface of my skin: 
the green moss carpet on the steps of del Templo de la Cruz en 
Palenque; the crash of the Caribe against the walls of Tulum; 
the splice of sun illuminating the jewel colored turquoise and 
jade of a Quetzalcóatl relief in Teotihuacán. Those templos to 
the gods were the edification of a history lost to me. Thus 
began my (re)education process and my (re)turn to Mito in 
search of a true god and a true story of a people (388).  
 
Her racial memory, personal biography, writer’s soul, and the skin of her 
body are all generated equally by fauna and stones designed to venerate the 
gods. The mere touch of temple moss and temple stones reminds her that 
she does have an undeniable history, and it is buried in them. All she needed 
to begin her process of recovering her lost indigenous history, was to visit 
these places of worship and begin her way back towards myth where she 
find her true gods and her true people. Racial memory and embodiment is 
the stuff of myth, she concludes.  
Moraga herself is the ideal subject of her theatre of liberation: 
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I need my ancestors or courage: storytellers who understand 
that their work is not wholly theirs, but at its best is divinely 
inspired by history and mythic memory… For me, the old 
myths provide me the source, the grounding for the acts of 
transgression my writing commits. I am not Mexica, but the 
herencia was gifted to me through the Chicano Movement. 
Without my gods […] without these icons of collective 
meXicana resistance, my criminal acts, as a Chicana dyke writer 
would have no precedent, no history, and no consequence. 
They would be individual and indulgent actions without a 
shared calling (387).  
 
When she theorizes embodiment she says the body can only remember if a 
witness is there to share in the process of endowing histories with flesh. The 
stage of her theatre demands a communal presence to legitimate the body’s 
right to remember, or, at least, the body can only remember if it relates 
beyond itself and with a larger social body that shared its past. The 
playwright’s ideal communal body is that of her ancestral storytellers who 
call upon the gods to divine both history and mythic memory. Earlier she 
critiqued the Chicano Movement for addressing themselves as genocidal 
mestizos and not oppressed Indian peoples, but she is also praising Aztlán 
because it did pave the way for her to claim indigenous heritage as a mestiza. 
Her claims to Aztlán are contradictory: she critiques its racial project because 
it leaves the Indians as dead in the past, but she also celebrates it for telling 
her that she did have Indian ancestors now dead in the past. Moraga chooses 
to sideline contemporary indigenous peoples for the sake of their ancestral 
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peoples that are now dead, much like Aztlán’s mestizaje refused to see the 
Indians as living in the 1960s and 1970s. These ancestral storytellers divine 
the life and the will of the gods, but they are not in the world of the living 
because the colony came and killed them. Moraga’s indigenous embodiment 
is not the body of indigenous peoples who divine the gods today, but the 
body who died centuries ago.  
 In contrast to a mestizo Aztlán, “the risk” that the artists of Moraga’s 
indigenous-identified Xicano nation “are willing to take to speak [their] 
truth” is the emergence of radical living practices (Moraga 2007, 388). Hers is 
a praxis whose truth’s “justification may be nothing more than intuition, a 
simple cellular knowing it is so.” However, the strategies that Moraga 
employs to invent a Xicana theatre of liberation are engaging with dead 
Indians and their mythological gods, and erasing of today’s living Indians 
and their world-making religiosities. If the successful death and erasure of 
both Indians and gods are her measurements of true radical praxis, then I 
would argue that Moraga’s articulation of her Indian ideals and the 
measuring tools of her artwork are detrimental to the subjects she intends to 
liberate. Not only will non-indigenous mestizos not be liberated from the 
colony because they can’t adequately claim indigeneity, neither will the 
Indians who did not die with genocide and whose gods have not perished. 
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The only subjects who do posses indigenous bodies –and henceforth eligible 
for liberation– are the ones who can prove an undeniable truth that their 
DNA descends from the Indians dead in the past. The indigenous 
embodiment that Moraga is calling for has more to do with the body’s 
human cells than it does with its cultural memory. Her theory is the stuff of 
genetics and blood tests, performed in a medical lab to measure the blood 
quantum required by the U.S. government to recognize indigenous peoples’ 
rights based on biological ancestry. Indeed, genetics is Moraga’s path 
towards liberation because her body intuitively knows the truth of her 
indigeneity. Some things her DNA “just” knows, and she chooses to know 
her living cells are the same as those of her dead Indians.  
Moraga invents and borrows her indigenous heritage from peoples 
living in the time of pre-Columbian empires: 
Writing, too, is one of these [sacred rituals]. The best of 
creative writing, so grand in its particulars, is able to traverse 
great borders of mind and matter. The distinctions disappears. 
Our present moment becomes history. History is myth. Myth is 
story. Story makes medicine. I am in daily search of these acts 
of remembrance of who we once were because I believe they 
will save our pueblos from extinction. I believe our pre-
conquest imaginations offer strategies for building self-
sustaining societies today, societies that can disrupt the mass 
suicide of global consumption, engineered by the Empire of 
the United States. I believe the United States intends to 




The irrevocable promise to not let the body forget “this way of knowing” 
leads her to think of writing as embodied knowledge, through a theatre 
where language is made flesh. The same irrevocable promise also locates the 
body’s episteme in the pre-conquest world where the history, myth and story 
of the present were made of the same essence. Moraga’s writing and 
embodiment are organized in a circular order: the present can avoid 
genocidal extinction by writing a history of the past that can generate a myth 
where a story of the present can be written so the body’s memory will not 
forget what it knows it knows. As a radical living praxis, this circularity’s 
revolutionary potential is bringing forth salvation from extinction and saving 
indigenous communities from genocide. Circularity’s potential for revolution 
also lies in its opposition to the order of the colony, which I am left to 
assume is a linear order where myth and story are not the same as time and 
history.  In that case, the order of the colony places time and history within a 
linear framework, and the circularity of Moraga’s arguments places time 
within a framework that is also cyclical.  Her indigeneity operates around a 
circuit of time rather than a linear model of race where the colony’s present 
is built on the erasure of the stories, myths, histories, and present worlds that 
existed before the conquest.  
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The promise of Moraga’s Xicana story and theatre of liberation is to 
not let the body forget, and her theatre’s story-myth-history-present fulfills 
this irrevocable promise by returning itself and its subject of address to the 
time before the colony arrived.  
The world comes together, crossing borders of topography and 
tongue. We borrow from one another’s traditions. We. But the 
profound project of transgression is only achieved by return. We know more 
than we know we know: the aboriginal mind at work. I make no claims 
to it. I only collect broken shards of memory and try to shape a 
bowl that can hold the full promise of my want… Yes, going 
way way backwards and our writing, our art, can take us there if 
we require the most of it and ask it the right questions. Our 
journey of return is not romantic; it is ordinary. It is the dusty 
road of our own pitiful colonized preoccupations, which I have 
come to call “mundane.” The marvelous mundane of our lives, 
where the hardest truths and the sweetest dreams are revealed 
(Moraga 2007b, 381; emphasis in the original).  
 
The theatre of liberation turns backwards and writes against the grain of 
colonialism’s linear order. This anticolonial experience is not a romantic 
move back along a line to an original point before the present moment. 
Moraga’s anticolonialism is a move around time itself: to return to their own 
time before the colony existed, indigenous-identified artists must perform 
with a circular temporality in mind that is altogether different than the 
colony’s. These artists must transgress the limits of the colony to enforce the 
indigenous peoples’ right to “pick and choose and continue to collect, create, 
and invent [a] cultura” that colonialism came to kill. Indigenous theatre 
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artists turn to the time of the ancients and the time of the gods to connect 
their present’s art forms with the praxis of their communal ancestors, all in a 
move to imagine an exit from historical tragedy through the colonial 
difference of modernity. Moraga’s theatre of liberation is tragic in every 
sense of the word. 
The temporality of her theatre is anticolonialism at its best because it 
resists the colonial order and makes the present time before and beyond the 
colony. Tragic temporality, however, is also anticolonialism at its worst: 
Moraga does not just theorize race, art and time before and after the colony, 
she theorizes without the colonial underside of modernity. Even though she 
is theorizing from the colonial difference of her “own pitiful colonized 
preoccupations,” she frees indigenous peoples from damnation by theorizing 
the world as if the colony did not exist at all in the “marvelous mundane of 
[aboriginal] lives” (Moraga 2007b, 381). She does not actually account for 
the colonial world when she places the exit from tragedy in the time of the 
ancient Aztecs: 
In many ways, I see the project of educating my Chicano 
students in the trajectory of the Aztec Calmécac, those 
institutes of advanced study afforded the privileged classes of 
Pre-Columbian México. Although the children of farm, 
domestic, and service workers, they are the spirit-descendants 
of those ancestor-scribes, who five hundred years ago studied 
the how and why of our existence (381).  
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She may reprimand Chicano writers, but she educates her Chicano students 
in the proper ways of being indigenous. The proper way of claiming 
indigenous heritage is to look to the elite religious officials of the Aztec 
empire and study the nature of their indigenous existence through an Aztec 
Calmécac’s spirituality. Moraga’s claims are taking place on contradictory 
terms: her Xicano students’ mundane reality of colonial existence today is 
legitimately indigenous because they are the spiritual descendants of specific 
elite imperial Aztecs, and they must learn to divine the world as their 
ancestral scribes.  
On the one hand, the move to see Xicano students live in a time 
where they are not mundane beings identifies their cellular ancestors as the 
elite class of an empire, but it does not identify them with the cellular 
ancestors who were not living elite nor sacred lives under that same empire. 
As Walter Mignolo’s (1995) and José Rabasa’s (2000) exhaustive studies of 
the colonial period have argued, this elite class of Aztecs was among the first 
to be targeted for suppression/extermination when the Spanish arrived. 
Since the members of this class were the ones in charge of producing, 
interpreting, keeping, and transferring the Aztecs’ knowledge throughout the 
empire’s history, their death meant that their bodies of knowledge also 
extinguished along with their physical ones. Their immediate relation and 
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importance to indigenous knowledge makes the Aztec scribes the ideal 
ancestors that Moraga requires to know “the aboriginal mind at work” 
beyond the colony (381). She does not see the non-elite Aztecs as ideal 
ancestors because they did not produce the same knowledge as the holy 
scribes.  
On the other hand, this strategic selection of the Xicana’s genetic 
ancestors privileges a very particular mode of knowledge production that 
may not be as congruent with the pre-Columbian period as Moraga sets it 
out to be. The ideal Xicano ancestors were not farmers, domestic workers or 
service workers, but the elite class of Indians in charge of writing. “Writing” 
in the pre-Columbian period, however, did not mean the Western modes of 
knowledge production instituted by the Conquest. And yet, Moraga does not 
differentiate between the modes of writing of the post-Cortesian period —
where she herself is writing about writing Indian knowledges— and those of 
the Aztec scribes making knowledge before Cortés arrived. Her desire to 
teach her students to be Indians carefully selects the kind of knowledge and 
the kind of ancestors these need to reach liberation, and she chooses to place 
their genetic origins in the bodies of an elite class whose ruling knowledge 
posed the most immediate threat to their Christian masters. She does not 
choose the non-sacred, common Aztec indigenous person whose practices 
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of everyday life were not made of the same divine essence as the scribes 
reflecting on their existential crisis, and whose everyday knowledge was 
further away than the scribes were from the center of the colonial order. 
Moraga does not reflect on the colonialist logic informing her selection of 
indigeneity, but the ways in which she articulates freedom are nevertheless 
built on her lack of accountability for the ways in which colonialism 
organizes what she does not know as much as it informs what she does. Her 
colonial difference does not just look before and beyond the colonialism, her 
freedom means to return back to a time before Cortés as if the colony is not 
real and does not affect what she knows of indigenous peoples.  
Refusing to acknowledge that colonialism makes it possible for her to 
know the dead Indian of the past and regenerate this past’s knowledge in her 
present, she writes:  
In my lengthening middle age, I am beginning to understand 
that writing is a rite, a kind of ceremony. And that rite, 
ceremonial practice, is fundamental to my writer’s way. They 
hold a reciprocal relationship. Each one, equally earnest in its 
efforts to return. They depend one upon the other; each act 
keeps the other honest. In a society hell-bent on forgetting, 
ritual and ceremony reflect our effort to put ourselves in the 
position of remembering. The act of writing, like ceremony, is 
the practice to arrive at something beyond itself: that antiguo 
infinite “we” that can sustain us (Moraga 2007b, 386).  
 
Moraga’s theatre is tragic in that she is speaking of writing as a practice that 
can keep the time of the ancients alive in her own time, and her mode of 
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writing is animated by tragic ideas where individuality is transgressed for the 
sake of the communal. The Indian she entitles herself to invent as a Xicana 
playwright is not only the elite ancient indigenous scribe, but Indian most 
close to the sacred of her gods. Divinity compliments the embodiment of 
her writing by helping her “understand that writing is a rite, a kind of 
ceremony,” and since she went to Mexico to find her indigenous roots in the 
fauna and temples of the gods, it also helps her identify her indigenous 
subject of address in the scenes of Aztec ceremonial practices and rituals. To 
build the story Xicana beyond the colony, Moraga chooses to think of the 
ancient imperial Indians as the true knowledge of her DNA and their 
epistemes in terms of Western modes of knowledge production. The people 
of the pre-Columbian period did not “write” in the ways that she is 
theorizing writing here. Ceremony, rituals and other religious practices were 
indeed Aztec modes of producing and transferring knowledge, but these acts 
made their world when they did not know Spanish colonialism. How did 
they continue to make the world anew after the invention of the colony? 
What kinds of writings did they perform then? By not accounting for ideas 
that would push her right to self-definition and self-determination back to 
her terrain in the colony, Moraga is able to project an ideology of indigeneity 
onto the peoples of the pre-Columbian period and the Indians alive today. 
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The indigeneity she wants is the dead past of Indian ceremonies, rituals, 
scribes, gods, and temples, but that may not be the same indigeneity of those 
Indians living in damnation and performing ceremonies that write the living 
world anew. The only subjects that her theatre of liberation can set free from 
the bonds of slavery are those indigenous and indigenous mestizos who 
identify with the Indians whose life and practices were definitely 
extinguished. Her theatre does not come to liberate the indigenous and the 
indigenous mestizos who lived through genocide and whose practices of 
everyday life are not the dead stuff of the pre-Columbian ceremonies. If the 
irrevocable promise of Moraga’s Xicana story is help the body remember 
that freedom beyond the colony is possible, this same promise excludes the 
indigeneity of bodies who did not in fact die with the Conquest and are still 
living in the colony as Indians.  
 In her “Foreword” to The Hungry Woman, her latest collection of plays 
where she includes Heart of Earth: A Popol Vuh Story, Moraga writes that: 
In recent years, I’ve come to understand myth as a similarly 
divine(d) gift, an opening into the past, told in character and 
image, that can provide a kind of road map to our future. I am 
reminded here of the symbol for journeying employed by 
Meso-American scribes: little “patitas negras,” black-inked and 
human-shaped footprints, marking out the road taken, 
traversing thousands of miles of desierto and montaña. This 
preoccupation with the past as a foretelling of our future may 
be the reason why I have lately begun to write stories placed in 
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an imagined future. Like “a dream waiting to happen,” I have 
written elsewhere (Moraga 2001b, ix).  
 
The Aztec scribes that she is inspired by in “The (W)rite to Remember” are 
now also Mayan, as are the tragedies she is staging. The present time of race 
is a divine gift from the gods, and it allows her to turn back towards to the 
ancient time of these gods and imagine a possible future for indigenous 
peoples. As with the linear time of the colony, the circular time of tragedy 
propels race both backwards towards the past and foreword into a future 
where colonial relations will no longer be in place. In this circular mode, the 
racial temporality of Moraga’s theatre reproduces the ways in which her 
indigenous ancestors viewed the world and divined the history of time. The 
scribes were preoccupied with the past because the past determined both 
their present and their future. Likewise, since the future of racialized subjects 
is what is preoccupying Moraga’s theatre, she too must look back to the past 
and build a future from the time before her ancestors died. The future 
beyond the colony she outlines in her more recent essays is built on the 
Aztecs, but the future she writes in Heart of Earth stems from the ceremony 
divining Mayan peoples’ history of the present.  
In the case of the Mayan peoples and their Popol Vuh, I argue that 
Moraga’s Heart of Earth is not an irrevocable promise of a better future as 
much as it is a promise of damnation and betrayal. According to Dennis 
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Tedlock’s “Introduction” to the Popul Vuh: The Definitive Edition of the Mayan 
Book of the Dawn of Life and the Gods and Kings (Tedlock 1996), the authors of 
the alphabetic Popol Vuh did not write their book as a manuscript to be 
performed but as a transcription of a divine performance:  
When the ancient readers of the Popol Vuh took the roles of 
diviners and astronomers, seeking the proper date for a 
ceremony or a momentous political act, we may guess that they 
looked up specific passages, pondered their meanings, and 
rendered an opinion. But the authors of the alphabetic Popol 
Vuh tell us that there were also occasions on which the readers 
offered “a long performance and account” whose subject was 
the lighting of the whole kajulew or “sky-earth,” which is the 
Quiché way of saying “world.” If a divinatory reading of 
pondering was a way of recovering the depth of vision enjoyed 
by the first four humans, a long performance, in which readers 
may well have covered every major subject in the entire book, 
was a way of recovering the full cosmic sweep of that vision. 
If the authors of the alphabetic Popol Vuh had 
transposed the ancient Popol Vuh directly, on glyph-by-glyph 
basis, they might have produced a text that would have little 
sense to anyone but a fully trained diviner and performer. What 
they did instead was to quote what readers of the ancient book 
would say when they gave long performances, telling the full 
story that lay behind the charts, pictures, and plot outlines of 
the ancient book… At one point they themselves become 
performers, speaking directly to us as if we were members of a live 
audience rather than mere readers (1996, 29-30; emphasis in the 
original). 
 
Tedlock’s description of the Popol Vuh crosses two different temporalities: 
the pre-colonial time of the ancients where their ceremony was not a book 
but a set of practices performed by diviners, and the colonial time of the 
diviners who set their ceremony to writing using the Latin alphabet of the 
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colony. The anthropologist-translator places the two temporalities along a 
singular linear continuum when he differentiates between “the ancient 
readers” and “the authors of the alphabetic Popol Vuh”: the latter come 
after the former because the colony followed the pre-colonial. He also places 
the two in a circular continuity: the latter’s alphabetic writing could not 
divine in the way of the ancients –ceremony did not divine the post-
Columbian mode of writing–, so the authors alter the divination ceremony 
and transcribe what the ancients said and did.  
The sacred practices of the ancient Mayans recall the ancestors-scribes 
of the Xicano students and their modes of producing knowledge: 
knowledge, writing and divinity are in the ceremonial hands of elite imperial 
subjects. Moraga’s scriptural practices and the alphabetic writing of the 
Popol Vuh are also different, however. The authors of the book produced in 
the colony did not write a text meant to be read, they transcribed a 
performance so those Mayans in the colony reading the book after them 
would learn to divine in the way of the ancient ceremony outlawed by the 
colony. Moraga’s writing is a ceremonial act that divines the world assuming 
that the colony exists but it cannot be engaged because it outlaws her right 
to know. The Mayan authors writing in the colony divine in a time that is 
within and beyond the colony’s reach; Moraga writing in the colony divines 
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in the time that was before, beyond and without the colonial order. Most 
importantly, the Mayan diviners tell their readers how to divine by 
implicating themselves as ceremonial speakers and listeners, thereby owning 
their privileged place of knowledge but choosing to disseminate divine 
knowledge and praxis among subjects not organized by class. They give their 
readers knowledge of their creation story without dictating that their 
ceremony must be performed in a singular modality. The person in charge of 
divining the Popol Vuh is called a “Master of Ceremonies” and his purpose 
is to share the story of the world with other Mayans who listen to his 
narrative voice. However, the narrative voice in the Popol is always in the 
plural “we” and “they,” never the “I” of authorial writing. Although a 
singular diving body, the Master of Ceremonies’ narrative voice introjects the 
larger social body and then projects this plurality onto the audience of his 
ceremony. The creation story is the same as their ancients and they do not 
provide instructions for selecting authentically Mayan subjects of address. 
Their communal knowledge was as communal as possible. After all, both the 
authors and their Mayan readers were living under the same genocidal gaze, 
not a different colonial world. Moraga’s writing is not communal but 
imperially elite, even when she teaches non-elite students at elite universities.  
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Moraga’s play is a transcription of a ceremony that was not originally a 
script nor a narrative voice divided into character parts. Heart of Earth is a 
based on a transcription of a performance that she reproduces on the stage 
of liberation, so like the authors of the Popol Vuh, she also divines the world 
through her play and shares the knowledge of divination with her actors and 
audience members.  The format of the play transgresses the ceremonial form 
of the Mayans’ Popol Vuh by splitting the Master of Ceremonies’ voice and 
body into multiple personas. Even though singular voice that divines the 
world in the Popol Vuh implicates itself in the narrative, it never claims 
singular authority. The Mayan book begins in a communal “we”:  
This is the beginning of the Ancient Word, here in this place 
called Quiché. Here we shall inscribe, we shall implant the 
Ancient Word, the potential and source for everything done in 
the citadel of Quiché, in the nation of Quiché people… [The 
words of Quiché] accounted for everything –and did it, too– as 
enlightened beings, in enlightened words. We shall write about 
this now amid the preaching of God, in Christendom now. We 
shall bring it out because there is no longer  
  a place to see it, a Council Book, 
  a place to see “The Light That Came from 
   Beside the Sea,” 
  the account of “Our Place in the Shadows,” 
  a place to see “The Dawn of Life,” 
as it is called. There is the original book and ancient writing, 
but the one who reads and assesses it has a hidden identity. It 
takes a long performance and account to complete the lighting 
of the sky-earth … (Popol Vuh 63).  
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It is impossible to name the voice of Mayan reading and divining the ancient 
word of the Quiché peoples because it is refusing its readers its identity. The 
Master of Ceremonies does not wish to give us their face nor their name 
because Christendom threatens their physical life. They disappear both the 
original book and ancient writing to keep these knowledges safely hidden 
from the Christian’s murderous God, and reference these points of origin 
only to tell us that they do exist and are enlightened as the divine gods they 
tell us about. Their silence is a strategy of survival, both physical and 
epistemic, and they address themselves, their gods, and their audiences as 
one Quiché body of plural subjectivity.  
 The shaman of Heart of Earth is a character named Daykeeper: 
DAYKEEPER: This is the root de la palabra anciana, in a place 
 named Quiché. Es la raíz de un pueblo of earth and sky 
 that we shall plant here in the hearts of its descendants. 
 This is the story of how light was born from darkness y 
 la luz shadowed again by the hands of the gods. We shall 
 tell our cuento en voz alta for there is no place to read it. 
[Music: “Conquistadores.”] 
Five hundred years ago, the bearded ones arrived in 
floating palacios, in search of the sun’s golden secretions. 
They came armed with flechas of melded steel and a 
black book decrying their devil. Today our children 
know fewer and fewer Indian prayers; they put on the 
Ladino cloth of soldier and seller. And our book and its 
author keep their faces hidden (Moraga 2001a, 107).  
 
The play begins in the same tragic temporality as the time of the ancients 
enunciated in the Popol Vuh. Like the authors of the book, Moraga’s 
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Daykeeper is telling the audiences that the story of creation they are about 
see performed is the story of the gods and the ancient word. He peaks in the 
communal “we” as well, but this communal voice is not telling the same 
story nor performing the same ceremony of the Mayan Daykeepers.  The 
Popol Vuh only makes reference to the Conquest when the ceremony opens 
“now amid the preaching of God, in Christendom now,” and right before 
the ceremony closes (Popul Vuh 63). The Popol Vuh’s Master of Ceremonies 
tell us,  
Three Deer and Nine Dog, in the twelfth generation of lords. 
And they were ruling when Tonatiuh arrived. They were 
tortured by the Castilian people (195) 
 
Daykeeper narrates the arrival of the Spaniards in a scenario of conquest that 
may or may not have anything to do with the Mayans. The story that Moraga 
is telling here is indeed her own invention to join the details of Columbus’ 
arrival on three ships, the Aztecs’ thinking of Cortés ships as palaces floating 
on water, the conquistadors search for precious metals, and the wars of 
exterminations where the Spanish fought with divine (the Bible) and man-
made (arrows, swords) technology not known on native lands. She makes no 
mention of Pedro de Alvarado’s torturing of Three Deer and Nine God, the 
Lords of Quiché at the time of the conquistador’s invasion. Just like with the 
genetic make-up of her ideal indigenous body, the history of the Mayan 
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peoples she chooses to stage is one that she invents for the purpose of 
saving a future generation of Indians.  
By excluding the historical accounts of Alvarado’s colonial terror and 
replacing it with what can be considered a generic account of the Conquest, 
however, the Xicana story that her future’s Indian children will know will 
have little to do with the authors of the Popol Vuh. Along with the exclusion 
of Mayan colonial history and the transgression of Mayan creation story, 
Moraga introduces race into her story when the Popol Vuh does not name 
humans in the same racialized terms:  
 TECOLOTE: Yes. You have the distinct honor of being  
   summoned by the Lords [of Xibalba] to a [ballgame]. 
 … 
 HUNAHPU: Yeah. This is going to be great! A real game! No 
   more of this kid’s pretend-stuff! 
VOCUB: I don’t know, hum, I hear those güeros are a ghostly 
  color down there. Pale people with all the blood sucked 
  out of ‘em. That’s probably why they want us… for  
  fresh blood. 
HUNAHPU: They’re thirsty for blood and we’re thirsty for a  
  good challenge. Anyway, they ain’t all pasties down  
  there. Papá told me stories of how some of the women 
  are a beautiful blood red color (Moraga 2001a, 114-115). 
 
The authors of the Popol Vuh make no mention at all of the Spaniard’s skin 
color, even when they reference Alvarado the word they use (“Tonatiuh”) is 
not a reference to his body but to his destructive actions. “Güeros,” “pale 
people” and “women [who] are a beautiful blood red color” are the stuff of 
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Moraga’s cellular memory, what her DNA just knows. The whiteness of the 
conquistadors’ skin color is projected onto the Lords of the Xibalba, the 
world of the dead where living bodies are depleted of their life essence. In 
turn, the brownness or redness of indigenous peoples is projected onto the 
indigenous peoples. White skin is oppressive, dead, non-indigenous, male, 
and inhuman; blood red skin is oppressed, living, indigenous, female, 
human, sexually desirable, and aesthetically beautiful. Since Hunahpu and 
Vocub impregnate Ixquic, the only woman to give birth in the play, they also 
make blood red skin a maternal essence embodied by indigenous woman. 
The racial politics espoused in the employment of these terms divide the 
world neatly into an order of power based on genetics. Embodiment, in this 
case, does not liberate anyone from colonial relations.  
 Moraga authorizes herself to self-identify and self-determine what 
Mayan indigeneity looks like, and then invent a “popul vuh story” that does 
not emerge from the Popol Vuh. Heart of Earth is not a rewrite of the 
original because she transgresses both the form and the content of the book. 
Her Xicana story is an antihistorical in the tragic sense espoused by Usigli: 
her play does not reproduce historical accounts but is inspired by them to 
create modern art in the present derived from the past. It is also anti-
historical in that she refuses to account for the validity of the Popol Vuh as a 
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historical record of the atrocities experienced by Quiché people in the 16th-
century. She writes that she is staging a ceremony that Quiché people still 
practice today, and like theirs, her is as a “myth” and “similarly divined gift” 
from the gods (Moraga 2001b, ix). If Heart of Earth stages a mythological 
world, then the ceremony it stages has nothing to do with the colony 
because, in the colony, myth and story are not the same as time and history. 
The circular temporal logic of Moraga’s tragedy succeeds in performing a 
future world before and beyond linear time, but this future world exists 
without historical tragedy and denies its effects altogether in the favor of an 
imperial time where myth reigns supreme. As a result, the Quiché living in 
the colony as the damned of the modern colonial world do not fit into the 
eternal time of Moraga’s myth. She relinquishes their lives from the world as 
they know it, never minding that their Popol Vuh is a ceremony whose 
temporality accounts for the time of the ancients, the time of the book’s 
authors in the colony, and their own time also bound by colonial relations of 
power.    
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Trag ic  Mexican Brownface  
  
 Sergio Magaña’s Los Enemigos (1990) is the Mexican playwright’s 
“versión libre del Rabinal Achí,” a Mayan ceremonial drama that was first 
performed in the 15th-century and is still performed in Guatemala today. 
Magaña, like Usigli and Moraga, says his work’s theme is “épico” because it 
relates back to a pre-modern ancient time, and his characters “son heróicos” 
because their sacrifice their individual subjectivities for the sake of the 
communal.8 The Mayan performance, whose title Dennis Tedlock translates 
as Rabinal Achi: A Mayan Drama of War and Sacrifice (2003), stages the defeat 
of the Man from Rabinal at the hands of the Man from Quiché, and the 
defeated warrior’s demands before he is beheaded. Stepping away from 
original’s plot and form, Magaña’s version stages the sword battle between 
the warriors, Man from Rabinal’s seduction of the woman betrothed to the 
Man from Quiché, the defeat of the former and his eventual heart sacrifice 
to the gods. The Mexican version of the Mayan drama also includes a pivotal 
moment where its transgression of the original is most evident. While the 
Rabinal Achí that has been performed for centuries does not reference the 
Conquest, even as it has changed forms from an indigenous ceremony to a 
                                                
8 The full title of Magaña’s play is “Los Enemigos – Tragedia ballet – Versión Libre del 
Rabinal Achí.”* The playwright includes this note at the bottom of his play’s cover page:  
 “Nota: El tema de la obra es épico. Los personajes son heróicos.”**  
* Translation: “The Enemies – Tragedy Ballet – Based on the Rabinal Achí.” 
** “Note: The play’s theme is epic. The characters are heroic.” 
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play modeled after Western theatre, Los Enemigos slips from a tragedy 
without conquest to the time of the colony. In the same way that Moraga’s 
Daykeeper projects a conquest onto the Popol Vuh, the Pilmamá’s prophecy 
equally projects a conquest into the Rabinal Achi. I argue that Magaña’s 
staging of the Mayan drama is dependent on the exclusion of the Mayan 
peoples of Rabinal Achí because they do not cut out the warrior’s heart as a 
sacrificial ritual –like the Aztecs did–, the Rabinal does not include words in 
Nahuatl (“pilmama”), and their ceremony and play did not prophesize the 
coming of the white men. Los Enemigos is less a tragic rewrite of the Rabinal 
Achí than it is an invention of Mexican Indians in Mayan brownface.  
 Magaña introduces two characters into the story of the Rabinal Achí 
that are not part of the original: Yamanic Mun, a Quiché princess about to 
marry Varon de Queché (Man of Quiché), and Pilmama,9 Mun’s nanny. 
Soon after the Man of Rabinal is defeated and is being prepared for sacrifice, 
Mun declares her love for the warrior but not her fiancé. She intends to bury 
the Man of Rabinal against the Quiché emperor’s orders denying the 
vanquished traitor a proper burial:    
                                                
9 “Pilmama” is a Spanish word derived from Nahuatl and means caretaker or nanny. 
Although the speaker is a Mayan, her name belongs to the language of the Aztecs, not the 
Mayans of the performance. 
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  MUN (to PILMAMA): Vete, anciana de mal agüero. Ve y prepara 
   las telas más  preciosas que ha tejido mi madre. Si él va a 
   morir, lo vestiré yo misma.10 
  
The burial is an act of mourning and an act of love, both designed to redeem 
the defeated warrior’s honor as a prince of Rabinal. Sophocles’ Antigone sets 
the stage for this tragic scene, since Mun’s desire to honor the man she loves 
against her father’s law recalls Antigone’s similar claims to kinship and 
citizenship. Like the heroine of Greek tragedy, Mun’s love for the 
vanquished Indian sends her down a path to challenge the markers of 
Quiché citizenship.  
 Mun’s slippage into Greek tragedy is also telling of the play’s slippage 
into the colonial difference and the coloniality of power. Her retort to her 
nanny’s dismissal of the warrior’s importance:  
PILMAMA: ¡Ay, pronto llegarán hombres del más allá del mar 
 fabricados del más duro metal, sin corazón ni 
 escrúpulos… y de todo esto harán campo de ruinas de 
 polvo, sin pasado ni ayer. ¡Ay pobrecitos pueblos míos 
 de Rabinal, los de Ux y Pocoman! Seremos aventados al 
 horizonte, como flore de un árbol que tumbó el huracán 
 del tiempo. La vida es un instante prestado por los 
 dioses. Lo demás es el tiempo.11 
 
                                                
10 “MUN: Leave, you old crone who only brings bad omens. Go and prepare the most 
precious robes that my mother has knitted. If he is going to die, I will dress him for burial 
myself” (Magaña 1990, 93). 
 11 Translation on footnote #1 of this chapter.   
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The Pilmama downplays the significance of the Indians’s fight because a 
more catastrophic event is quickly approaching their horizon, and it will 
destroy all that know. The scene of violence between Indians will be 
overshadowed by the coming of the white men from beyond the sea, 
heartless men who will reduce their Quiché, Rabinal, Ux, Pocoman worlds 
to dust. More importantly, the white men’s warfare will erase their histories 
past, present and future, and with these histories gone, so will their gods.  
The Pilmama’s omen is exceptional, since at no other point do white men 
and their war against the Indians surface in Los Enemigos.  
 Magaña’s slippages into tragedy and conquest are telling of a temporal 
logic of both race and theatre. Even though the playwright does not 
reference the Conquest after the Pilmama’s lines, I suggest that the omen is 
not inconsequential. He turns to the time of tragedy as a way of engaging 
with the Conquest and the effects it had both on the worlds it devastated 
and the worlds that came after it. He is able to recuperate ancient myths of 
war and human sacrifice, but the gods of these ancient peoples are about to 
meet their end with the coming men armed to kill them. When his play 
recuperates them, it also recuperates these peoples’ temporality that was in 
place before the white men arrived. The ancient Mayans come back to life in 
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20th-century Mexico, dressed as warriors about to be defeated by heartless 
men. 
The Pilmama’s omen foretells the battles between men, but she is also 
narrating the events in terms of divinity and time. For her, the battle 
between the Man of Rabinal and the Man of Quiché is not that important 
because its outcome will not impact the future as much as the battle between 
the Indians and the men who will come to kill them and their gods. The 
battles between warriors relates to divinity because the sacrificial hearts will 
feed the gods’ hunger, but they will not be sufficient to prolong the time lent 
to them. Her vision is not only tragic, it is fatalistic because she sees the end 
of time as unavoidable and the Indians as useless to do anything to change it. 
A fatalistic Indian is what Emilio Carballido celebrates as Magaña’s 
most important creation: 
¿Los Enemigos qué es? La más rara resurrección de un sacrificio 
humano, de cómo y por qué, de normas de vida y conductas 
conforme a escalas de valores primitivas que, extrañamente, 
Sergio nos vuelve inmediatas… Todo el texto tiene brío, 
elegancia, algo que casi da arrobamiento ante la habilidad para 
llenar el lenguaje con palabras indígenas que suenan con timbre 
de oro. Un triunfo literario. La progresión, la esencia, vienen de 
la antigua obra quiché.12  
                                                
12 Emilio Carballido, “Prologo: Nosotros, los de entonces.” Los Enemigos, Sergio Magaña. 
Mexico, DF: Editores Mexicanos Unidos, S.A., 1990. 
* Translation: “What is Los Enemigos? The rarest resurrection of a human sacrifice, of the 
how and why, of norms of life and behaviors according to primitive scales of morals that, 
strangely enough, Sergio makes like our own… The entire text has great spirit, elegance, 
something that almost makes one blush with its ability to fill language with indigenous 
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Carballido does not celebrate Magaña’s tragic heroes because they link his 
present with Sophocles’ ancient tragedies, but because Los Enemigos brings 
back to life the primitive knowledges he thought were dead. The play makes 
the language of Mexican theatre anew by filling it “con palabras indígenas 
que suenan con timbre de oro,” an aesthetic both Mexican playwrights 
thought was lost to them. Apocalyptic omens ring with golden timber when 
pronounced by characters with indigenous names, characters whose words 
tell a tale that survived the apocalypse itself.  
Carballido’s celebratory review of the play ignores that Magaña was 
inspired to create a fatalistic and primitive Indian aesthetic through his 
encounter with indigenous peoples who live in his own modern time, not the 
primitivism of his aesthetic. He writes in his “Prólogo” that Magaña wrote a 
series of plays on the pre-hispanic Aztecs after he conducted extensive 
archival research on these peoples’ history. The plays he names –Moctezuma 
II and Cortés y Malinche–, however, were inspired by historical peoples who 
lived in the colony and not the pre-colonial period. Both playwrights first 
conflate vastly different and opposing historical periods and then project this 
a-historical ideology of indigeneity onto the Mayans of the Rabinal Achí. 
                                                                                                                                       
words that ring with a golden timber. A literary triumph. Its progression, its essence, 
come from the ancient Quiché masterpiece” (34). 
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Carballido also says that Magaña spent time in Central America, an 
experience I conclude also complimented his archival research on indigenous 
peoples by allowing him opportunities to meet the Mayan peoples who lived 
in the region. The playwright, however, says that Magaña’s search and the 
resulting plays about indigenous peoples “no [son] algo arqueológico,” but 
una interpreatación política y humana de un texto ritual 
prehispánico; una proposición formal y visual creada a partir de 
la idea de drama bailado que proponen “Rabinal Achí” y 
nuestro teatro de danzantes.13 
 
Los Enemigos is not archeological because it synthesizes the forms of dance 
performed in the Mayan drama and the Mexican theatre troupe. It is also a 
contradiction because the Rabinal Achí that Magaña must have witnessed 
performed in the department of Quiché does not include the Aztec 
sacrificial scenes where the defeated warrior’s hearts are cut out of their 
living bodies and then offered to the gods. Nor do the Maya of Rabinal 
perform their Rabinal Achí as a Western tragic play with female characters 
named after Aztec words. The synthesis that Carballido sees in Magaña’s 
                                                
13 Quote: “¿Qué es ‘Los Enemigos’? Una interpreatación política y humana de un texto 
ritual prehispánico; una proposición formal y visual creada a partir de la idea de drama 
bailado que proponen ‘Rabinal Achí’ y nuestro teatro de danzantes. No es algo 
arqueológico. Hace Magaña el enfrentamiento de un pueblo dominante, imperialista 
diremos hoy, y un pueblo sometido y explotado, el de los quechés.” (Carballido 1990, 41).  
* Translation: “What is Los Enemigos? It is humane and political interpretation of a pre-
Hispanic ritualistic text; a visual and formal proposition created from the idea of dance 
drama that ‘Rabinal Achí’ and our own dance troupe. It is not archeological. Magaña 
makes possible the confrontation between an oppressive people, what today we would 
call imperialist, and an oppressed and exploited people, that of the Quiché.”  
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primitive and aesthetic Indian is an invention of sorts that is far removed 
from the Mayans that Magaña met in the time he spent in Central America. 
In not reflecting at all the reality that they say inspire them, the implications 
of Carballido’s oversight and Magaña’s primitivism effectively exclude the 




Agains t Knowledge  
 
 I did not originally begin writing this chapter with Rodolfo Usigli’s 
theory of tragedy, nor the rewrites of Mayan dramas and ceremonies by 
Cherríe Moraga or Sergio Magaña, on my mind. Instead, I started writing 
“Against Knowledge” with a personal anecdote detailing a memory from 
many years ago, and in that memory I first begin to reflect on an almost 
innate desire to know indigenous peoples without an attachment to 
colonialism.  
Writing this chapter took me back to my undergraduate days at 
Brown University, where in 2005 I took one my most memorable courses 
taught by a historian of Colonial Latin America on “Maya in the Modern 
World.” The course was originally designed as a senior seminar on colonial 
history, but given the time frame in which he developed the syllabus, he said 
his students asked for more readings on contemporary Mayan peoples and 
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less on colonial historiography. The early and mid-1990s saw public figures 
like Rigoberta Menchú and EZLN’s Subcomandante Marcos rise to the 
international spotlight for their efforts in bringing justice to indigenous 
peoples living under oppressive, neoliberal and military governments in both 
Guatemala and Mexico. Just as the decades-long armed struggle between 
Guatemala’s military states and peasant and guerrilla groups –i.e. the Ejército 
Guerrillero de los Pobres– came to a halt, the Ejército Zapatista de 
Liberación Nacional (EZLN) went public against Mexico’s self-proclaimed 
democratic government in 1994 and called for the recognition of a plural 
state and civil society on the eve of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’s effective date. For my professor and his students, these events 
taking place in the Lacandon jungle and Guatemala, and resonating in their 
own livelihood, made the present lives of Mayan peoples a more urgent case 
study than these peoples’ colonial and precolonial histories. The end result 
was a syllabus that addressed the contemporary moment of the Maya 
through a historical and anthropological lens, and included a vast array of 
accounts of the events leading up to the Zapatista insurrection, Menchú’s 
Nobel Prize, and the Guatemalan civil war where hundreds of thousands of 
indigenous lives were massacred.  
201 
 In a class discussion on the Popol Vuh that concluded with my peers 
dubbing me “Modernity Boy,” the professor began by asking us an open-
ended question: How many of us thought that the book we had in our hands 
was the same Popol Vuh being divined in Guatemala by the Maya? 
Assuming that the question was a statement meant to incite their positive 
agreement rather than critical inquiry, the majority of my peers raised their 
hands. Yes, they agreed, our books were made of the same divine essence 
divined by Mayan peoples. Meanwhile, a few of us sat in our chairs, hands 
on desk, not in agreement with those holding their hands up.  
Earlier in the semester I had raised questions regarding the truth 
claims and translation of Rigoberta Menchú’s testimonio –from Me llamo 
Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia to I, Rigoberta Menchú: An Indian 
Woman in Guatemala–, and argued that the very act of reading her in 
translation positioned English readers one step removed from the original 
speech act in Spanish. Before delving into David Stoll’s arguments on the 
truth-value of Menchú’s testimonio, I urged us to not forget that the Spanish 
book had been first transcribed and heavily edited into a chronologically 
ordered narrative by Elizabeth Burgos. That distancing of Menchú’s voice 
had to be taken into account when we contested the truth and fiction of her 
narrative authority that had been elided from the start. Could any 
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questioning of Menchú’s native authority and experiences with terror take 
place without engaging with the displacement of the native through the 
transcription, editing, publication, and translation of her persona? 
Similarly, with regards to the Popol Vuh, I insisted that the book’s 
multiple writing, publication and translation history in K’iche’, Spanish, 
French, and English, from the pre-Columbian period to the present, could 
not make our copies of Dennis Tedlock’s translation the same as the 
ceremonial divinations that Mayan peoples held in their hands in Guatemala. 
I posed the professor’s question differently: Were Mayan peoples who 
practiced the Popul Vuh in Guatemala and elsewhere reading the translation 
that the anthropologist had made of the earliest surviving copy of the book 
now archived at the Newberry Library? I suggested that the book we were 
holding in our hands in that classroom at Brown University was a derivate of 
conquest in that the Popol Vuh had survived the tragedy of Columbus’ 
arrival through a series of non-native interventions into native life lasting to 
our modern day. Most of my peers, however, rejected my questions on the 
grounds that the book we were holding was a version of the Popol Vuh, 
which, even if it was not the original and we were not its indigenous 
practitioners, was still a copy of the original indigenous knowledge. I argued 
that the processes through which our copies came into being were colonialist 
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because of the imposition of Western modes of knowledge production 
imposed on Mayan peoples since the 16th-century. The text we were reading 
as evidence of the Mayan life in the modern world was equally evident of a 
history of colonialism that was making possible our knowledge of Mayan 
texts and religiosities that originated well before Columbus set foot on native 
soil. My intent in asking these sets of questions was not to interrogate the 
indigenous authenticity of Tedlock’s book. I wanted to push our engagement 
with the book and see it as a representation of indigeneity that had more to 
do with the colonial project of modernity that made it possible to invent 
indigenous peoples, and less to do with the world-making practices of Mayan 
peoples themselves. Colonialism aside, my peers insisted, our copies of the 
book were not less indigenous than the indigenous peoples not holding a 
translated printed copy. And so it was that our Popol Vuh was the same as 
the K’iche’ Mayans’.   
 I reflect back on this anecdote to attempt to understand the ways in 
which my peers articulated their desires to access native epistemologies 
through non-native means, an articulation that left their epistemic desires 
unquestioned. Those days in the classroom were pedagogical and 
epistemological moments where, at least for a few of my peers and I, the 
moves to know the modern condition of indigenous peoples in reality 
204 
imagined native life as timeless and seemingly untouched by colonialism. 
Allow me to play devil’s advocate here and agree with the arguments by Stoll 
that were discussed in the class. In Menchú’s case, the Indian lied in her 
testimonio, Stoll has told us how and why she lied, the knowledge Menchú 
has given us is a farce, and her non-Mayan readers are entitled to know the 
real story. Leaving the historical tragedy suffered by indigenous peoples 
aside, what matters most to Stoll and his supporters is knowing just what 
truthful knowledge she was keeping from us and why. The Indian remained 
silent in parts of her testimonio and we, being the modern and Western 
readers that we are, desire to possess the Indian’s knowledge. The same 
epistemic desire to access native episteme underlined my peers’ insistence on 
the native authenticity of our copies of the Popol Vuh: we had true 
indigenous knowledge in our hands, regardless of how many languages, 
published editions, translators, and centuries had passed since the sacred 
book was (perhaps) put into a K’iche’ codice in the department of Quiché 
before the Spanish invaded.  
The emphasis on authentic native knowledge untouched by 
colonialism is what was most perplexing to me, since in their goals to know 
the Maya in the modern world my peers were thinking of modernity without 
coloniality, as if our modern time and the modern time of the Indians were 
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partaking along the same temporal frame without its accompanying historical 
tragedy. And yet, I believe that any attempts by Western readers to claim 
access to an original truth about native peoples’ lives and epistemes as 
unmediated by colonial projects are undeniably questionable. The burning of 
the Mayan codices during the Conquest, the writing of the oral tradition into 
K’iche’ using the Latin alphabet in 1558, the multiple translations of the 
native book into Western languages since its discovery by Jesuit friars in 
1701, and the Newberry’s acquisition of the earliest available copy of the 
written Popol Vuh that was originally stolen by Charles Etienne Brasseur de 
Bourbourg in the 19th-century– these are the modes in which Western 
modernity effectively colonized but did not eradicate indigenous peoples and 
their bodies of knowledge. Sidelining this tragic cycle of colonial terror holds 
on to the possibility of further repeating centuries of colonialism.  
Usigli, Moraga and Magaña also hinge on this tragic potential to 
reproduce epistemic violence when their art traffics in a time without 
colonialism. Magaña’s projection of the Conquest of Mexico onto a Mayan 
history of colonialism betrays the original drama of war and sacrifice by 
imposing a narrative and a tragic form of theatre that are incongruent with 
Mayan Indians. Similarly, Moraga’s decolonial project to find an Indian 
without colonialism does not account for the reality of the colonial present 
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occupied by indigenous peoples and the artist herself. These playwrights’ 
predecessor is no different. Even if Usigli produces a postcolonial theatre for 
a Mexico living beyond the colony, he too binds Indians to a time of 
colonialism where they are forever damned to live under the colonial gaze, 
and never to perform in the present. The artists’ desire to find an exit from 
the terrain of the colony leads to them to desire an Indian knowledge and a 
subject capable of transgressing the tragic temporalities and histories of 
colonialism. As I have suggested, however, their turn towards tragedy 
produces art from an experience of coloniality that is framed by the residue 
of the first mode of colonialism that took place in the Americas. The result 
of their ideological and artistic projects is double-fold:  their futures for race 
are productive in staging a time beyond the colony, but this time without 
formal colonial relations is itself dependent on the exclusion of 
contemporary Indians altogether.  
While the colonial residue of MeXican theatre makes indigenous 
peoples the impossible subjects of a decolonial history of the present, my 
next set of chapters takes head-on a different form of art explicitly 
addressing the present derived from colonialism. My first two chapters study 
Usigli, Moraga and Magaña as three dramatists whose desire to know 
indigenous knowledge situates Indian peoples in the archive documenting 
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the scenes of colonial terror. In theorizing modern art, time, and history 
from the archives organized by colonial projects, their theatre does not 
acknowledge its collusion in relegating contemporary indigenous peoples to 
a time that no longer exists.  To compliment their archival theatre, my next 
chapters –“Spectacular Indians: Antonin Artaud and the Cruelty of Latino 
Performance” and “Rehearsals of the Damned: Damnation, Freedom, 
Salvation”– study a set of dramatic art forms by playwrights, performance 
theorist and performance artists that theorize native subjects without turning 
to an archive of historical documents. Together, these next chapters argue 
that the time of performance art can articulate an indigenous subject that 
seeks to exceed the time of the archive and the tragedy of 
coloniality/modernity in the Americas. Sometimes performance also repeats 
the time of the archive and represents indigenous peoples as the impossible 
subjects of decolonial imaginaries. In other instances, performance art 
succeeds in transgressing the tragic time of damnation, and it does so 











SPECTACULAR INDIANS:  




To visit the Tarahumara is to enter a world which is incredibly anachronistic 
and exists in defiance of this age. As far as I am concerned, this is so much 
the worse for this age. So it is that the Tarahumara call themselves, feel 
themselves, believe themselves to be a Primeval Race, and they prove this to 
be true in every possible way. A Primeval Race: today no one remembers 
what this is, and if I had not seen the Tarahumara, I might well have 
believed that the expression contains a Myth. But in the Tarahumara Sierra 
many of the Great Ancient Myths come back to life. 
— Antonin Artaud, The Peyote Dance 
 
One Pueblo elder from Arizona who saw us in the Smithsonian went so far 
as to say that our display was more “real” than any other statement about the 
condition of Native peoples in the museum. “I see the faces of my 
grandchildren in that cage,” he told a museum representative. 
… 
In Spain there were many complaints that our skin was not dark enough for 
us to be “real” primitives. 
— Coco Fusco, English is Broken Here 
 
Sadly, over 40 percent of our audience, no matter where we were, believed 
that the exhibit was real, and did not feel compelled to do anything about it. 






Two different imaginations of indigeneity were at play in the art of 
Antonin Artaud, Coco Fusco and Guillermo Gómez-Peña, three of the most 
influential artists of 20th-century modern art. In the former, Artaud’s words 
express a nostalgia for a lost indigeneity that he (and the West) originally 
created for himself to rescue; after all, the world of the Tarahumara contains 
a Primeval Race that comes back to life and sets Artaud’s modern time in 
anachronistic disarray. 1 In sharp contrast to this supposed anachronicity, the 
Latino performers’ Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit… (1992) was a critique 
of the persistent denial of indigenous peoples’ coeval existence in the 
modern world: the Pueblo Indian sees his life and that of his progeny 
realistically reflected in the Latinos’ exhibitions of race as spectacular 
displays of conquest, much to the detriment of the Spaniards who saw 
through the spectacularity of the staged event and called the brownface 
performance a farce.2 The indigenous person witnessed the exhibition of 
bodies of color under captivity and saw his contemporary existence reflected 
back at him as one of unending colonialism; the Spaniards did not: the 
Indians in the cage were not real, colonialism had already ended. 
Nevertheless, for Artaud writing in the early 20th-century about modern 
                                                
1 The epigraph by Antonin Artaud is from The Peyote Dance, Trans. Helen Weaver. New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1976. Quote on page 7. Further citations from this text 
will be cited as PD.  
2 The epigraph by Coco Fusco is from English is Broken Here: Notes on Cultural Fusion in the 
Americas. New York: The New Press, 1995. Quote on page 56. 
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Mexico as it was emerging from the remnants of its 1910 Revolution, and 
for the Latinos performing at the turn of the same century, colonialism is 
not dead: it is alive and well, and it keeps coming back to our life since 1492.    
What is first evident between Artaud and the Latino performers is 
that the artists were thinking of indigeneity in opposing temporal terms: 
Artaud thought the Indians were living in a lost past and needed to be re-
discovered now, and the Latinos knew the Indians had already been 
discovered and were living in public displays in the present. Their temporal 
divergence, however, does converge in their common enunciation of the 15th 
and 16th-century Conquest of the Americas in the 20th-century presents 
occupied by the artists and their work. Although the discourse surrounding 
both the author of Cruelty and the Latino performers has not addressed this 
ideological collusion, I suggest that these artists’ places in the history of art 
are equally indebted to the colonial invention of indigenous people. In the 
early 1990s, Fusco and Gómez-Peña critiqued the Quincentenary 
celebrations by reproducing the 19th-century colonial exhibitions of people 
of color and displaying themselves inside a golden cage as “newly discovered 
Amerindians” in museums throughout the world. And for his part, Artaud 
credited the conquest of Mexico as the first act of his Theatre of Cruelty, his 
performance theory originally inspired by Balinese bodies under colonial rule 
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and afterwards tested out among Mexico’s “Primeval Race” of the 
Tarahumara Indians in the 1930s. Artaud’s writings from this period are also 
a serious critique of Europe’s sense of modern exceptionality and its 
metaphysical sensibility dying during the interwar period. His critique came 
after the 1931 Colonial Exhibition in Paris, where he witnessed a 
performance with which to revive a dying Occident: the dancing “Asiatics” 
he claimed were uncontaminated by the ills of Western modernity. The art 
forms practiced by Artaud and the Latino performers, I argue, explicitly 
reveal the underside of modernity by exhibiting bodies of color for colonial 
consumption. 
This ideological overlap in their performance art practices hinges on a 
cruelty of its own: when these artists create art inspired by conquest, 
Artaud’s anti-colonial gaze and the Latinos’ exhibition reveal an ideology of 
indigeneity that in actuality performs an erasure of indigenous’ particular 
experience of colonialism. Two Undiscovered Amerindians attempted to induce 
the Latinos’ mostly white audience groups to partake in their critique of the 
Quincentenary celebration of the indigenous genocide begun with the 1492 
arrival of Christopher Columbus. “Sadly,” as Gómez-Peña puts it, the 
majority of their audiences chose to not let them out of their cage and the 
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brown artists remained as the Indians literally bound by the Conquest. 3 The 
performers were able to construct an indigenous ethos for their audiences, 
much like the anthropologists and non-native artists that the Latino 
performers critique had done earlier to their consumers of culture and racial 
difference. When their illusion was able to pass for reality, Fusco and 
Gómez-Peña became a mimicry of these non-native and European “cultural 
transvestites” (Fusco’s term for these other artists) who appropriated the 
culture of the Other for the sake of performance. Similar to Artaud’s 
insistence on seeing the artifice as endowed with life, the Latinos’ illusion of 
authentic indigeneity was created to critique the colonial tragedy affecting the 
lives of native people since 1492. When the illusion became conflated with 
the living human beings, their artifice of race erased the “real” Indian once 
again. In turn, Artaud and the theorists of his theatre of cruelty that came 
after he initially published The Theatre and its Double (1938) do not 
acknowledge nor adequately theorize his complicity with the colonization of 
the Balinese and the Tarahumara. Theatre of Cruelty was originally theorized 
after he became disillusioned with Europe’s traditional theatre and following 
his encounter with Balinese dancers at the 1931 Colonial Exhibition, and yet 
in his writings on the exhibition he is hardly aware of his subjectivity as one 
                                                
3 The epigraph by Guillermo Gómez-Peña is from The New World Border: Prophesies, Poems 
& Loqueras For the End of the Century. San Francisco: City Lights, 1996.  Quote on page 98. 
214 
more consumer of the colonial spectacle. After encountering the Balinese, he 
then travels to Mexico in search of an original subject of his theater among 
the Tarahumara, and his “first spectacle of the Theater of Cruelty [was] 
entitled The Conquest of Mexico.”4 Artaud’s play was an uncritical reenactment 
of the fall of indigenous empires, and he rehearses this primitivistic view 
during his visit to the Primeval Race in the Land of the Tarahumara, the 
same race he wishes to bring back to life in the present. Artaud’s cruelty and 
the cruelty of the Latinos’ performance reach the same conclusion when 
their performances of race make Indians into an essence of spectacularity 
ready to be consumed by their audiences.  
My chapter studies the ways in which these iterations of performance 
art inspired by the Conquest fail to adequately account for this own collusion 
in reproducing indigenous people’s experiences with colonialism as framed 
within a tragic temporality: indigenous people live in the non-native artists’ 
own time but their lives are contingent on a past that cannot be overcome. I 
argue that as a result of this temporal incongruence, the art of cruelty makes 
evident an ideology of indigeneity that runs counter to what Artaud, Fusco 
and Gómez-Peña expressed as their ideals in critically staging and 
                                                
4 Antonin Artaud, The Theater and Its Double, Trans. Mary Caroline Richards. New York: 
Grove Press, Inc., 1958. Quote on page 126. Further citations from this text will be cited 
as TD. 
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performing cultural difference. The ideals of indigeneity espoused in their 
modern art are an impossible indigeneity because race in the present, as they 
attach it to an experience of colonialism originating in the 15th-century, 
cannot produce a decolonial future where racism and conquest are not the 
order of things. I contend that as events and ideologies falsifying indigeneity 
for the sake of art, Artaud’s theatre of cruelty and the cruelty of Latino 
performance leave the living indigenous subjects frozen inside the cage of 
stereotypes and representations, always-already captive even by the 




Colonizing  Crue l ty  
 
Artaud’s “Preface” to the 1938 first edition of The Theater and Its 
Double begins with a clear denunciation of European culture: 
Never before, when it is life itself that is in question, has there 
been so much talk of civilization and culture. And there is a 
curious parallel between this generalized collapse of life at the 
root of our present demoralization and our concern for a 
culture which has never been coincident with life, which in fact 
has been devised to tyrannize over life (TD 7). 
 
He presents this discussion of civilization and culture as a type of crisis 
because he sees the “present demoralization and [their] concern for a 
culture” to be growing out of a  “generalized collapse of life.” In a matter of 
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few of words Artaud moves from discussing life in relation to “civilization 
and culture,” to talking of “life” and “culture” as the two central concerns. 
Civilization as a social construct is replaced by human life, endowing the 
social and cultural with a live and living ability. The questions he wishes to 
address with The Theater and Its Double, then, are phenomenological in nature: 
what are culture and life if they “have] never been coincident[ial]” with each 
other? The crisis of the European man is based on a division between 
culture and life that sees the former as the tyrant of the latter, and the answer 
to this crisis lies in a reconfiguration of semantics: the social and the natural, 
culture and life, are to be resignified as identical. As he suggests, this solution 
lies in a redefinition of culture that is based not on “philosophical systems” 
(7) but on “a presence of mind”:  
We must insist upon the idea of culture-in-action, of culture 
growing within us like a new organ, a sort of second breath; 
and on civilization as an applied culture controlling even our 
subtlest actions, a presence of mind; the distinction between 
culture and civilization is an artificial one, providing two words 
to signify an identical function (8, italics in the original). 
 
Culture is to be understood as equated with life as much as civilization is, 
and “the distinction between culture and civilization is an artificial one” 
because the two “signify an identical function”: life-as-action. Artaud’s 
rhetorical move to resignify the meaning of life under a semantics of culture-
in-action and civilization forces us to rethink our connection with everyday 
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sociality as a living form endowed with human consciousness. Culture as a 
conscious act is the answer to the problem with the philosophical systems 
leading people to “[think] in forms, signs [and] representations” empty of 
actual life (8).  
 The solution to the European crisis, however, turns radically critical 
when its initial demoralization and concern for culture are diagnosed as a 
type of colonizing illness. His diagnosis of the illness is worthy of full 
citation: 
Hence our confirmed lack of culture is astonished by certain 
grandiose anomalies; for example, on an island without any 
contact with modern civilization, the mere passage of a ship 
carrying only health passengers may provoke the sudden 
outbreak of diseases unknown on that island but a specialty of 
nations like our own: shingles, influenza, grippe, rheumatism, 
sinusitis, polyneuritis, etc. 
Similarly, if we think Negroes smell bad, we are ignorant 
of the fact that anywhere but in Europe it is we white who 
“smell bad.” And I would even say that we give off an odor as 
white as the gathering of pus in an infected wound. 
As iron can be heated until it turns white, so it can be 
said that everything excessive is white; for Asiatics white has 
become the mark of extreme decomposition (TD 9). 
 
Artaud’s anticolonial best is a serious re-presentation of Europeans as 
disease-infested bodies lacking culture, and as bodies that “may provoke the 
sudden outbreak of [their] diseases” when they encounter people otherwise 
left untouched by Europe. His “island without any contact with modern 
civilization,” on the other hand, is imagined as a (perhaps) pure body 
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precisely because it has been out of contact with what he names as 
modernity: “shingles, influenza, grippe, rheumatism, sinusitis, polyneuritis, 
etc.” Modernity, for Artaud, is a disease that non-European countries are to 
avoid at all costs if they do not want contamination by “the gathering of pus 
in an infected wound” of all Europeans. The crisis of the European man also 
includes the ignorance “that anywhere but in Europe it is [he] who ‘smell[s] 
bad,” not “the Negroes” he has already encountered and, I am left to 
assume, already infected. These “Negroes [who] smell bad” became the 
subjects on whose bodies modernity was built as a result of the deadly 
colonial encounter between Africa and Europe. If this forsaken meeting 
made the Africans slaves to the masters of the Transatlantic trade, then their 
rotten bodies on board the slave ships smelled of the racial stench originally 
given off by their white masters. The latter did not realize that their 
European bodies were culturally dying before they came to infect the 
formers’ bodies with their Western modernity. Of course, Artaud himself is 
partaking in the trade’s discourse when he reproduces these Black subjects as 
the Negroes carrying a stench rather than writing of them outside of the 
discourse of racism, even if he does point his finger back on himself and his 
fellow European men.   
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 The most interesting aspect of Artaud’s words is the singularity he 
attributes to “Asiatics” who have learned “that everything excessive is 
white,” and that “white has become the mark of extreme decomposition” 
(TD 9). Presumably, these Asiatics have learned to recognize “the gathering 
of pus in an infected wound” when they see it, avoiding contamination with 
European men and their modernity in the process. The physical survival of 
these Asiatics —if Europe is a body, so is Asia— lies in their relinquishing 
of a desire to encounter modernity, and staying out of modernity’s way for 
the sake of preserving their own health. Artaud seems to suggest that, lest 
they want to end up smelling like black corpses, the Asiatics should resist 
cultural decomposition as the defining element of the West’s dying 
whiteness. He privileges Asia’s racial difference, itself created in opposition 
to the Occident, and insists that Asia holds the key to resisting the expansion 
of the infected wound.  
 It is in this anticolonial and Orientalist context that Artaud begins to 
theorize his Theater of Cruelty centered around the ideas of culture-as-act 
and that “everything that acts is a cruelty” (TD 85). His essay on “The 
Theater and Cruelty” argues that the development of theater has lagged 
behind that of the film industry and other sources of entertainment for the 
public, such as “the music hall or the circus” (84). While he acknowledges 
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that these new cultural outlets exceed the impact of theater, he also states 
that these outlets have failed to fully engage the audience: “At this point of 
deterioration which our sensibility has reached, it is certain that we need 
above all a theater that wakes us up: nerves and heart” (84). Theater 
production for Artaud is a process that should convert the viewing public 
from simple consumers of culture, who attend those other outlets out of a 
desire for pure entertainment, into subjects fully embedded and awakened 
from those outlets deteriorating their senses. If the philosophical systems of 
the European man’s dying modernity rotated around notions of logic versus 
reason, psychology versus spirituality, and mind over body, cruelty was 
reversing the order of these equations to situate the metaphysical as equal to 
the physical. Life as he wanted it was entirely made up of both nerves and 
heart, the very things culture was to access through theater if it were to affect 
social change. 
The importance of this new type of theater is rooted in the historical 
specificity giving rise to the audiences’ affective sphere:  
In the anguished, catastrophic period we live in, we feel an 
urgent need for a theater which events do not exceed, whose 
resonance is deep within, dominating the instability of the times 
(TD 84). 
 
Like the need to fully engage the audiences through their nerves and heart, 
what seemed to be most innovative in his revamping of theater then was a 
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turn towards the audiences’ emotions: theater must now “resona[te] deep 
within [them].” The turn towards emotional responses to the stage is meant 
as a way to engage what is going on outside of the stage, since his theater 
must be that “which events do not exceed” and which “dominat[es] the 
instability of the time.” The theater that Artaud is proposing is meant to 
exist at the same level of reality as the happenings of human life events, and 
this is because he is calling for a theater that engages the audience as part of 
the production as much as they are participants in the everyday: “Everything 
that acts is a cruelty. It is upon this idea of extreme action, pushed beyond all 
limits, that theater must be rebuilt” (85). Theatre of Cruelty is anchored “the 
anguished, catastrophic period we live in,” but when real life tragedies are 
staged, the art of cruelty exceeds the value of historical location.  Cruelty is 
completely undivided from reality, and with both the real life events and the 
theatrical productions made of the same human life essence, anything and 
“everything that [is action] is a cruelty” (85). While this is an innovative 
revolution for theater practices, it can become a devaluation of the real for 
the sake of the artifice: acts of cruelty or violence may (or may not) be 
engaged willingly, as in, say, oppressive regimes disappearing innocent or 
subversive victims or leaving newly discovered indigenous people trapped 
inside a cage. In short, since the art of cruelty is meant to be part of same 
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order as human life, Artaud’s theater erases any ethical responsibility from 
the part of the producers and performers to question or explain the social 
order naturalizing histories of violence. 
 What is at stake in the Theatre of Cruelty is the recreation of a 
particular life and reality through the theatrical stage, since “it is in this 
spectacle of temptation [that] life has everything to lose and the mind 
everything to gain” (TD 87). The mind has everything to gain through the 
production of this new theater that takes material from real life. To achieve 
this mode of being, the spectator and her emotions must be mobilized: 
It is in order to attack the spectators’ sensibility on all sides that 
we advocate a revolving spectacle which, instead of making the 
stage and auditorium two closed worlds, without possible 
communication, spreads its visual and sonorous outbursts over 
the entire mass of the spectators… Words say little to the 
mind; extent and objects speak; new images speak, even new 
images made with words. But space thundering with images 
and crammed with sounds speaks too, if one knows how to 
intersperse from time to time sufficient extent of space stocked 
with silence and mobility (86-87). 
 
The traditional proscenium stage creates a rigid division between the actors 
and the spectators of the performances, and this prevents any sort of 
dialogue between the actors, their actions, and their audiences. As a result, 
the audience is left to engage the act only at the individual level without the 
need for the performance to affect it deliberately. The stage of Theatre of 
Cruelty invades the privacy of the audience’s reality by erasing the barrier of 
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the traditional stage. “In order to attack the spectator’s sensibility on all 
sides” and prevent it from deterioration, the space where spectator and actor 
meet must be constructed with a different idea in mind (84). The traditional 
stage creates a vertical division with the audience looking down or up at the 
actors, but to enclose the spectator within a reality of her own, this division 
of space must give way to a new one where the space of interaction allows 
for dialogue and communication. The space of the stage in theater of cruelty 
is what creates the conditions for replicating a cruel performance that usurps 
the place of the real. By embedding the theater space with new symbols and 
objects —in short, with a new a language—, the stage of cruelty becomes a 
semantic space “thundering with images and crammed with sounds,” unlike 
the traditional one where meaning is left to float above the spectator. The 
space of the stage, like real life, contains a language for communication and 
the dissemination of messages with spectators as subjects of address. 
 The origin of Theater of Cruelty and its take on the spectators’ 
affective responses to performance does not lay in its reworking of space or 
emotions, but in the bodies of the a particular group of non-European 
dancers he watched perform at the 1931 Colonial Exposition held in Paris. 
In his incisive study on Artaud and the Balinese dancers, Nicola Savarese 
(2001) highlights the history of the artist’s review of the performance, 
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rewritten several times before it was published in its final form as “On the 
Balinese Theater.” His review of the 1931 exhibition of the Balinese was the 
first essay to be written for The Theater and Its Double, with “Oriental and 
Western Theater” as the last essay written shortly before he went to Mexico 
in 1936. However, the subsequent publications and translations of the book 
include the essay on the Balinese dancers in a different non-chronological 
order. Mary Caroline Richard’s 1958 translation of the book, for example, 
includes “On the Balinese Theater” as the fourth essay in The Theater and Its 
Double, before “Oriental and Western Theater” and the series of essays and 
letters on his Theater of Cruelty. Savarese suggests that “without even taking 
into consideration the chronological order of the writing of the texts in 
Theater and Its Double, it is not difficult to understand that Artaud’s 
contribution to the development of a theatrical language of Occidental 
theatre as it was then understood, is synthetically contained in that first 
review of Balinese theater” (52). Artaudian cruelty begins as an act of cruelty 
of his own: he positively reviews the exhibition of colonized peoples when 
he begins by applauding the Balinese and their form of dance, so different 
from the one he was used to seeing in Europe: 
The spectacle of the Balinese theater, which draws upon dance, 
song, pantomine—and a little of the theater as we understand it 
in the Occident—restores the theater, by means of ceremonies 
of indubitable age and well-tried efficacy, to its original destiny 
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which it presents as a combination of all these elements fused 
together in a perspective of hallucination. 
… 
Here indeed situations are only a pretext. The drama does not 
develop as a conflict of feelings but as a conflict of spiritual 
states, themselves ossified and transformed into gestures—
diagrams (TD 53). 
 
What attracted Artaud to this Balinese form of dance was the actors’ ability 
to transform “a conflict of spiritual states” into bodily “gestures—diagrams,” 
a performance that produced meaning on the stage by translating the 
metaphysical into the physical realm. He saw in their performance the key to 
solving the crisis of the European man, because in their cultural practices the 
Balinese were able to create a diagram “where everything, conception and 
realization alike, has value, has existence only in proportion to its degree of 
objectification on the stage” (53, emphasis in the original). If the European 
man had not encountered the Asiatics who managed to avoid contagion, 
Artaud found the cure for Western modernity’s sickly body in the cultural 
forms he thought were untouched by modernity.  
 The medicine for a dying Europe that Artaud found in the Balinese 
dancers was dependent on the exhibition of the Balinese as colonial subjects 
of the very body he thought they could cure. Artaud had to encounter Bali 
and Balinese culture as objects made for exhibition, but this form of colonial 
exchange was lost on him. According to Günter Ahrends, when Artaud 
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attended the Balinese show he decided that “from that performance… 
derived the deep conviction that the theatre was able not only to conjure up 
the magic potency Western Culture had lost in the course of time, but also to 
create myths capable of releasing the irrational powers of man which had 
been suppressed by the forces of civilization” (1994, 4). Indeed, as Savarese 
suggests, the question that is hardly addressed concerning this colonial 
exchange is: “what did this first exposure to the Balinese dancers, obliged to 
exhibit themselves to please their Dutch masters who had transformed the 
Sunda Islands into a “nation of coolies,’ mean to [Artaud]?” (Savarese 2001, 
53). Following the work of I Made Bandem and Frederick E. De Boer’s 
work on Balinese dance, he states that “the dances of the Bali can in fact be 
classified according to the ‘hierarchy of the places’ where they are 
performed, a value scale which does not have to do with the techniques or 
contents of the dances but rather starts with dances performed in the ‘most 
sacred’ place and descends to those dances performed furthest from the 
‘most sacred’ place and hence ‘lower’” (68). The sacred dances start out in 
the innermost courtyard of the temple and conclude with the dances 
performed for tourists. When this order of sanctity and public ritual is 
applied to the dances in the Balinese performed in 1931, we can see that the 
repertoire of their dances in Paris did not include those that took place 
227 
inside their temples. Following the description of the dance that Artaud 
provides in the opening of his essay “On the Balinese Theater,” the dance 
that he witnessed was the janger,5 one of the least sacred of Balinese 
repertoire. The first dance he saw so impressed him that he opens his review 
essay by referencing it, but this dance  was in fact not the most sacred nor 
was it “part of a great tradition of ancient dances and [was] purely 
‘recreational’” (68). It wasn’t the religious or cultural value that made an 
impression on Artaud, but rather “the dancers themselves… the art of the 
performers, their powerful scenic presence” (68). When the actors’ 
manipulated their physical energy in their dancing displays, Artaud saw “the 
source of the life of the theatre” (68). 
 Savarese argues that Artaud’s anticolonial intentions be seen in his 
insistence “to renew Occidental theatre but also to change completely the 
                                                
5 Although there is no factual evidence with which to decipher what dance Artaud saw, 
Savarese compares his description of the event with the actual dances performed by the 
Balinese Theater to figure out what exactly it was that he saw at the Exposition. Artaud 
describes the dance as: “It is very remarkable that the first of the little plays which 
compose this spectacle, in which we are shown a father’s remonstrances to his tradition-
flouting daughter, begins with an entrance of phantoms; the male and female characters 
who will develop a dramatic but familiar subject appear to us first in their aspect and are 
seen in that hallucinatory perspective appropriate to every theatrical character” (TD 53). 
Savarese describes the janger as “composed by a group of young dancers at the beginning 
of the '20s and performed by them for many years, is a kind of danced and spoken drama 
that takes the form of a square made up of two lines of female dancers and two lines of 
male dancers, facing each other. This square is the chorus, which surrounds the other 
actors. In the center of the square is the dagg, a master of ceremonies who recites the 
story while the younger dancers around him sing the refrain. The story told can be one of 
many types, according to the village or the group that is performing it” (Savarese 2001, 
68). 
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culture on which it was based,” and that his ambition drove “[his] return to 
the sources, to magical and primitive thought, to myths distant from 
Occidental rationality that separates words from things” (Savarese 2001, 71). 
Furthermore, he says, “for Artaud, exoticism no longer represented, as it had 
done for 19th-century artists, a moment of friction with the familiar order but 
provided a way to react against the beautiful, the normal, of the Occident. 
Thus, even by means of the exoticism of Balinese dances seen in the 
pavilions of a colonial exhibition, the idea of a different kind of theatre could 
grow… And [that] a lost theatre is discovered.” Indeed, Artaud himself was 
positioned as the ideal subject for his own theatre at that 1931 Paris Colonial 
Exposition: the Balinese stage made him a spectator of a performance that 
moved him by striking at his nerves and heart. His response was to resist 
colonialism’s and modernity’s illnesses by appropriating the exhibition of 
colonial subjects as his own.  
I would suggest, however, that the link enacted between affect, 
performance and colonialism at that exact moment in history is overlooked 
in Savarese’s argument. Even if Artaud wasn’t repeating the 19th-century 
exoticism practiced by European artists, his theory is still derived from his 
observation of a non-European art form and a people whose bodies were 
put on display for the sake of colonial consumption. He may not have 
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consciously reproduced this colonialism, but he was driven by an almost 
innate desire to posses the exotic otherness of those he watched as one more 
spectator in the crowd. Their bodies under exhibition excited his colonizing 
gaze and inspired him to theorize a different theatre to re-innervate what was 
no longer beautiful or normal in the West. And while the ideal spectator of 
cruelty is not meant to be a mindless consumer, Artaud evidently made no 
mental note of the Asian bodies as colonial subjects forced to dance on stage 
for him. His own subjectivity consisted of a consumption made possible 
through a project of colonialism.  
Artaud distorted what he saw on the Balinese stage, and his distortion 
actually gave the theatre he felt Europe needed to revive its dying culture a 
new healthy living body. As European empires moved closer to the eve of 
their demise with World War II, Artaud saw in the residues of colonialism 
(the Exposition) and its peoples subjugated to perform for their dying 
masters the very essence needed to revive European culture. The theater that 
he believed Europe had lost in the process of becoming modern was 
discovered in the essence of the Asiatic he himself invented, and its essence 
was made a body and religious practice by the Exposition.  Indeed, “the 
Balinese performances represented for Artaud something very different 
from what they actually were, but something nevertheless necessary to him” 
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(Savarese 2001, 71). To the Balinese, however, this particular essence of 
theater was not lost at all; they had no theatre to rediscover because it was 
they who were creating art —did they call it “theatre,” as Savarese and 
Artaud do?— right then and there.  
In the end, Savarese concludes that Balinese culture resists 
ethnocentric and colonial visions of what Balinese culture is or ought to be. 
To quote at him at length, he says that  
Balinese dance is a living form that grows and changes as those 
who are its interpreters live and change. Thus the Balinese 
world, which seemed to Artaud to be remote and archaic, a 
kind of quintessence of primitivism, was in fact not at all 
isolated from the cultural flow of the time and was, on the 
contrary, alive and active, preserving its traditions but also 
open, more than is generally thought, to change… 
Far from being, as some scholars claim, an attack on 
cultural authenticity or signs of a collapse of Balinese culture, 
these exchanges… reveal instead the profound vitality of the 
Balinese culture, which did not, and does not, accept either a 
‘reservation’ mentality nor the limits of white colonization 
attempted to impose on it—a resistance similar to Artaud’s 
resistance in Paris to the spread of a conformist theatre. It is 
therefore strange that today, just as in years past, in the name of 
a purity inconsistent with the alchemy of cultural processes—
from behind flag-waving sincerity peeks ethnocentrism, once 
again—it is precisely the main scholars and admirers of Bali 
who lament the loss of a paradise. Artaud put it well: the 
Occident is the land of white tombs.  
In 1931, the Balinese in Bali, Artaud in Paris—weaving 
the threads of change for a theatre of the future, not the 
impossible tapestry of a lost paradise (Savarese 2001, 74-85). 
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Following Savarese, Artaud’s inspiration resulting from the primitivism he 
projected onto the Balinese dancers did not mean much in terms of the 
actual “alive and active” Balinese world that “was not at all isolated from the 
cultural flow of the time.” The temporal-scape of primitivism in which 
Artaud situated the Balinese sacred dances put them beyond the time of the 
West, regardless of the cultural flow of time shared by both Artaud and the 
Balinese colonial subjects. Artaud’s temporal vision was an ideology of time 
that divided the time of the dying modernity from the time of an un-modern 
East not yet contaminated by the West, never mind colonialism. Savarese 
isn’t critical of Artaud for his colonizing tendencies, and his is an attempt to 
understand how these actually aided him in the process of theorizing Theatre 
of Cruelty for the sake of the future. Even if he is very conscious of these 
colonial fetishes, it’s almost as if any attempt at critiquing Artaud for 
partaking in the colonization of the Balinese would run the risk of being 
labeled as ethnocentric as  “the main scholars and admirers of Bali who 
lament the loss of a paradise.” I agree that it is indeed very possible to turn 
towards ethnocentrism to recreate yet another “pure” essence of the 
Balinese untouched by the West, and that such ethnocentrism would not 
provide us with a more productive lens to understand “the alchemy of 
cultural processes.” Still, I would argue that our studies of theatre in the East 
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and West also cannot ignore the overlap in Artaud and other anti-colonial 
ethnocentrics in using the rhetoric of loss. Artaud turns to the Balinese to 
find Europe’s lost cultural life in Bali’s sacred arts, precisely the same sacred 
practices that Balinese ethnocentrics could see as potentially lost under 
colonialism. Granted that each of these losses mean a different essence for 
both parties, the same questions apply: what is the purpose of creating a 
Balinese essence (un)touched by Western modernity, and what happens to 
the Balinese in each of their projects? For Artaud, the answer was clear: 
“even by means of the exoticism of Balinese dances seen in the pavilions of 
a colonial exhibition, the idea of a different kind of theatre could grow: 
theatre replaces dance, words are replaced by living hieroglyphs. And a lost 
theatre is discovered” (71).  For the Balinese dancers under the colonizing 
artist’s gaze, their bodies were turned into living objects imbued with new 
signification. 
 As part of the 1931 Colonial Exposition, the Balinese performers 
rarely left their “exhibition grounds[,] rendering them prisoners,” and when 
they did leave their staged habitat, their publics made them walking 
protagonists of the colonial show (Savarese 2001, 63). The Balinese 
performers, regardless of their specific location at the exposition, could not 
escape the colonial status written all over their bodies made a spectacle for 
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the Parisian public’s consumption. Just as they couldn’t count on being 
recognized as something other than a walking show by their European 
spectators, “the one thing upon which they could always count, on the other 
hand, was the obedience they were required to show toward their white 
masters” (63). They were also “not only required to perform at the Paris 
Exposition but, as representatives of the Dutch East Indies, they were 
requested to travel first to the Netherlands, to pay their respects to their 
sovereign, as part of a tour which included Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The 
Hague” (65). The colonial power of the Dutch was written on the Balinese 
human bodies, which were needed to be provided as proof and 
representation of the extent of such power; there would be no colonialism 
without the bodies there to materialize the signification of Dutch imperial 
sovereignty. The very essence that Artaud needed to bring a new theater to 
life was embodied in the colonized, the very embodiment that Theatre of 
Cruelty seeks to create itself around. Like its erasure of material life for the 
sake of living art forms, the aesthetic of Artaud’s cruelty also erased the 
colonization of Asian bodies performing in chains of bondage right before 
the artist’s eyes. In 1931, the Balinese exhibited for Artaud in colonial Paris 
were not being weaved into a tapestry of a lost paradise, but into the theatre 
of a future where colonialism is till the practice of everyday life.  
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The Crue l ty  of  Latin idad 
 
This exploitation of bodies of color, made into collections of living 
objects for the sake of Western art forms, is at the center of the cruelty 
enacted by Latino performance art.  When Coco Fusco and Guillermo 
Gómez-Peña first decided to create a performance that critiqued the 1992 
celebrations, they turned to a centuries-old practice that made use of a 
particular space to educate European and Euro-American audiences 
encountering bodies of a different race and ethnicity for the first time: the 
cages holding the natives of Africa, Asia and the Américas as objects to be 
exhibited. For Fusco, this began in the 16th-century, when “an Arawak [was] 
brought back from the Caribbean by Columbus [and] left on display in the 
Spanish Court for two year until he [died] of sadness,” and when 
“‘aboriginal samples’ of people from [world parts outside of Europe] were 
brought to Europe [and the United States] for aesthetic contemplation, 
scientific analysis, and entertainment” throughout the 19th-century (Fusco 
1995, 41). The experiences of those people on display were left out of the 
pages of history other than the notes of individuals, anthropologists and 
show-goers who wrote down their data of the objects under study. Their 
experiences under colonial subjugation and scientific analysis are reduced to 
an archive of erasure: they simply do not exist as part of the written record 
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because they weren’t meant to read, write or speak themselves, rather their 
bodies were there to be seen, read, written and spoken for. It was against 
this archive of silence and the archive of the colonial order of things that the 
Latino artists willingly “perform[ed] the role of a noble savage behind the 
bars of a golden cage” (37).  
Fusco and Gómez-Peña first came to the international public 
spotlight in the early 1990s with Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit… (1992), 
their performance that critiqued the centuries-old tradition of exhibiting 
non-western peoples at events like the 1931 Colonial Exposition.6 As part of 
their Guatinaui World Tour, they exhibited themselves in museums 
pretending to be the last survivors of an indigenous tribe “from an island in 
the Gulf of Mexico that had somehow been overlooked by Europeans for 
five centuries. [They] called [their] homeland Guatinau, and [themselves] 
Guatinauis” (Fusco 1995, 39).7 The performance itself was a moving 
museum exhibit and part of the Edge Foundation’s 1992 Biennial 
celebrations taking place in cities from London and Sydney to the 
                                                
6 It should be noted that both Fusco and Gómez-Peña had created other performance art 
pieces and published works before this particular performance began to receive such 
wide-ranching attention. For example, Gómez-Peña’s 1991 video-performance, Border 
Brujo, is by now considered a classic of Latina/o art, and Fusco’s career began in the late 
1980s, having directed and produced the video documentary Havana Postmodern: The New 
Cuban Art for public television broadcasting in 1987. 
7 For Gómez-Peña, the term “Guatinau” is the “Spanglishization of ‘what now’” 
(Gómez-Peña 1996, 39, 97).  
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Smithsonian in Washington, D.C. As previous studies of the performance 
and the performers themselves have stated, Two Undiscovered Amerindians 
aimed at calling into question the commemoration of the 1492 discovery of 
the Americas.8 While in 1992 Christopher Columbus’ discovery was being 
honored with parades, Hollywood films and documentaries, it was 
simultaneously redeemed for having begun the genocide of indigenous 
peoples the moment the European eye encountered that of the natives’. In 
direct contestation to this uncritical reception of colonialism, the artists 
decided to mimic these public spectacles by restaging the Conquest as a 
reminder of the racist politics behind the Quincentenary Celebrations: if 
these spectacles in honor of Columbus took joy in remembering the 
Encounter only as the moment when the Old World came to civilize this 
New World without giving credence to the annihilation of the majority of 
this area’s inhabitants, then through their traveling cage the Latino 
performers brought to life the figure of the native produced and silenced at 
this initial moment of violence.   
 However, the original concept of the Latinos’ counter-Quincentenary 
project did not foretell that “a substantial portion of the public believed that 
                                                
8 Diana Taylor’s “A Savage Performance: Guillermo Gómez-Peña and Coco Fusco’s 
‘Couple in Cage’” (1998), her essay on the documentary video of the performance, was 
perhaps the first extensive critical study on this performance. See Taylor (1998, 2003) and 
Kelly (1999). 
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[their] fictional identities were real ones” (Fusco 1995, 37). Fusco and 
Gómez-Peña pretended to be real indigenous people in order to make their 
audiences recognize the continuous colonization of racialized bodies, but as 
they carried out the performance their subversive message simply became 
part of the very ideals they were aiming to critique. As Gómez-Peña’s words 
suggest, ideally the artists wanted someone to free them from the cage and 
let those being exhibited take their place among the spectators as subjects 
not made for observation. Instead, a large number of their non-native 
audiences failed to understand the satirical nature of their politicized 
performance and left the Indians imprisoned behind bars. When they 
displayed themselves in Spain, the brownface performance presented as 
truthful failed because the stereotype of dark-skinned natives did fit the 
caged light-skinned Indians who did not pass the authenticity test. In 
contrast, the response from the native peoples in their U.S. audiences largely 
departed from that of their white counterparts. The Pueblo elder’s remark in 
the epigraph speaks to the message of the performance: indigenous people 
are still being objectified and dehumanized 500 years after the Encounter, so 
the majority of the audiences of color got the message while others did not. 
In the end, the answer remained the same: the Indians were left behind bars 
and people of color were further sequestered into the role of the colonized 
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their audiences were seeing act as natives. With the two left imprisoned as 
their exhibition/exposition ended, their performance became not so much a 
reversal of a colonizing practice as much as an iteration of multiple projects 
ultimately working against the native produced at the original moment of 
cruelty and violence in the Américas. The Latino performance, I argue, 
ended up reenacting the indigenous racial subject enslaved in the Conquest 
and frozen in a time inaccessible outside of the modern present.  
Faced with the spread of multiculturalism in the 1980s and 1990s as 
the answer to “the race problem” in the United States, as well as the 1992 
celebration of the first intercultural relation, they became “intrigued by this 
legacy of performing an identity of an Other for a white audience, sensing 
its implications for [them] as performance artists dealing with cultural 
identity in the present” (Fusco 1995, 37). Much like Artaud’s claim to situate 
theater of cruelty within a historical reality, the Latino performers also locate 
the need for their performance as an answer to the political turmoil 
affecting them. The answer to their problems could be sought out using 
performance as tools to create social change:  
We looked to Latin America, where consciousness of the 
repressive limits on public expression is far more acute than it 
is here, and found many examples of how popular opposition 
has for centuries been expressed through the use of satiric 
spectacle. Our cage became a metaphor for our condition, 
linking the racism implicit in ethnographic paradigms of 
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discovery with the exoticizing rhetoric of ‘world beat’ 
multiculturalism. (39).  
 
The performers looked to the Américas in order to critically “examine the 
limits of the ‘happy multiculturalism’ that reigned in cultural institutions” 
throughout the U.S., where “formalists and cultural relativists [rejected] the 
proposition that racial difference is absolutely fundamental to aesthetic 
interpretation” (39). In situating their performance within a framework that 
imagines the Américas as a hemisphere marked by colonialism, the artists 
also position their work as part a theatre and performance tradition 
belonging strictly in and to the hemisphere. It is the historical use of the 
spectacle-as-satire to express popular opposition that Fusco and Gómez-
Peña re-engage as two more members and practitioners of performance art 
for the sake of radical politics of social change. Tapping into the history of 
colonialism and the history of performance strategically positioned their 
politics of performance and the performance itself within a genealogy of 
popular resistance. These U.S. Latinos, by their gesture of looking outside 
the U.S. and into Latin America for the possibility of using performance art 
as a tool for change, become imbedded within a cultural politics imagining 
the body of the hemispheric Américas as a moving stage. 
When Columbus first brought a native of the Américas to Europe as 
an object of exhibition and as evidence of the lack of civilization of the 
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ontologically inferior being, he marked the beginning of a process 
representing the Américas as a place that could be imagined as a 
homogenous and categorical entity. The Américas as a hemisphere was 
reduced to the body of the Arawak native, who himself was reduced to a 
thing that was below the humanity of his capturers. Fusco and Gómez-Peña, 
in turning to Latin America for inspiration, engage this legacy of 
dehumanization through their performance and reveal the underbelly of the 
Quincentenary celebrations of Columbus’ acts of cruelty. As part of the 
performance, “[Gómez-Peña] was dressed as a kind of Aztec wrestler from 
Las Vegas, and Coco as a Taina straight out of Gilligan’s Island. [The two] 
were hand-fed by fake museum docents, and taken to the bathroom on 
leashes. Taxonomic plates describing [their] costumes and physical 
characteristics were displayed next to the cage” (Gómez-Peña 1996, 97). 
Mixing objects stereotypically representing modern and pre-modern times, 
their costumes and stage settings were aimed at creating a satire of the 
Quincentenary: “[They] performed [their] ‘traditional tasks,’ which ranged 
from sewing voodoo dolls and lifting weights to watching television and 
working on a laptop… for a small fee, [Fusco] would dance (to rap music), 
Guillermo would tell authentic Amerindian stories (in a nonsensical 
language), and we would pose for Polaroids with visitors” (Fusco 1995, 39). 
241 
The performance was a parody contrasting stereotypical images of what 
indigenous people did —make voodoo dolls and speak in nonsensical non-
European language— with images of what “everyone else” did —use 
modern technology and listen to modern-day music. The performers’ act of 
mimicry brought to the forefront the inherent contradiction in celebrating 
indigenous people as existing in a time far distant from ours regardless of the 
fact that the indigenous do indeed exist in the present. 
The purpose of the performance was also to attempt to locate the 
moment where the discovery of the New World, and the clash of cultures 
this entailed, was made synonymous with multiculturalism then and now: 
“Our project concentrated on the ‘zero degree’ of intercultural relations in 
an attempt to define a point of origin for the debates that link ‘discovery’ 
and ‘otherness’” (Fusco 1995, 39). Fusco’s words suggest that the 
intercultural relations at play in 1992 were in actuality rehearsing the earlier 
mode of relationality where non-natives first dismissed the indigenous from 
the realm of human relations. When the white audiences refused to see the 
Latinos’ spectacular performance as a political critique, fed them bananas 
and left them imprisoned, the audiences’ behavior towards the brown artists 
was a mode of anti-relationality. Rather than recognizing the Indians in the 
cage as humans who ought to be free, their anti-relational behavior rehearsed 
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the colonial encounter that first invented the Indians’ ontological difference. 
In turn, by denying human relationality to the Indians in the cage, the 
audiences’ treated the performance as simply one more Quincentenary 
celebration resurrecting Christopher Columbus’ colonial violence. The 
discoverer’s violence was unconsciously celebrated the moment that the 
audiences cognitively recognized the artists as inhuman, since his 1492 
initiation of indigenous genocide also sparked the inspiration for audiences’ 
spectacular event. The encounter between Columbus and the natives became 
a spectacle through the celebrations, films, parades, etc., staged throughout 
the U.S. and Spain, but the encounter also became spectacular as a form of 
entertainment designed to override the memory of violence with distraction. 
The audiences of these celebratory performances were distracted from the 
significance of that original spectacle, and were distanced from feeling any 
remorse for being actively participant in their dissemination of colonialism. 
As audience members consuming the Quincentenary events, these people 
were active participants of a project of intercultural relations haunted by that 
first moment of anti-relationality in the Américas, so their collusion with 
colonialism makes their participation in any intercultural project a derivative 
of conquest.  
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For Fusco and Gómez-Peña, then, the distancing of the audience and 
the spectacle from a political understanding of performance-as-conquest 
necessitates critical attention that can attempt to understand the move from 
discovery and its multiple iterations to the Otherness produced from these 
repetitions. The Quincentenary celebrations, as Artaud would put it, were 
theatres actively deteriorating the audiences’ political consciousness of the 
colonial practices they rehearsed when they celebrated 1492/1992. In order 
to understand their audiences’ drive to enact conquest when encountering 
the body of racial and ethnic difference, Fusco and Gómez-Peña recreated 
the conditions whereby the audiences encountered this body, but with a 
twist: the white audiences were the ones being observed now. The Latino 
performers were not mimicking their and 16th and 19th-century counterparts 
when they resurrected their experiences from the grave of the 
ethnographers’ notes; rather, their strategic caging of difference reversed the 
role of the body being manipulated by the exhibitors of museums. It is the 
European and white audiences who are now on display, and their 
ethnographers tracking their behavior and racial and ethnic difference are 
now the non-white bodies making a spectacle out of their fear of the non-
white.   
In essence, Two Undiscovered Amerindians was a spectacle of whiteness:  
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The performance was interactive, focusing less on what we did 
than on how people interacted with us and interpreted our  
actions… we chose not to announce the event through prior 
publicity or any other means, when it was possible to exert 
such control; we intended to create a surprise or “uncanny” 
encounter, one in which audiences had to undergo their own 
process of reflection as to what they were seeing… In such 
encounters with the unexpected, peoples’ defense mechanisms 
are less likely to operate with their normal efficiency; caught off 
guard, their beliefs are more likely to rise to the surface (Fusco 
1995, 40). 
 
By creating an environment where they could no longer differentiate fantasy 
from reality, the spectacle of whiteness was created by tapping into the fears 
of the non-native spectators. What Fusco and Gómez-Peña “want[ed] [was] 
to make out of theater a believable reality which gives the heart and the 
senses that kind of concrete bite which all true sensation requires” (TD 85). 
For these spectators, the theater they were witnessing and consuming was 
now a reality that included them as well, and that reality, this theater of 
cruelty, was strictly rooted in colonialism. The performers were able to 
manipulate them so as to force them into thinking critically about their 
position as consumers of an oppressive culture rooted in colonial practices, 
and as potential colonizers-in-the-making. However, the defense 
mechanisms confronted by the artists did not lead to the audiences’ 
accepting their gift of critical self-consciousness. The audiences left them in 
their cage out of a fear spanning from the first moment of anti-relationality, 
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which was the only option that the Latinos gave them as an example of a 
social order. After all, the artists did not tell them they wanted to be let out, 
but their performance did consciously put them in a position of power: to 
objectify what the human is in order to reduce their responsibility as ethical 
beings, and this allowed them as an audience to retreat into a place of power 
over the monstrous thing they feared so much. Since the actors were already 
presenting themselves as the inhuman beings objectified for the sake of 
observation, they were quite literally the monsters and beasts the non-natives 
thought the natives were in the 16th-century. The spectators reduced the 
human character of the caged people of color so their difference could be 
contained safely distant from their own space of reality, but because they 
were able to easily project their power onto the couple in the cage, this 
reality created by the performers lost its illusionary effect. While Fusco and 
Gómez-Peña wished to show their white audiences the violence inflicted on 
bodies of color to this day, educating them on their unethical participation in 
the spread of colonialism, what they ended up getting was an audience all 
too-ready to play the role of the colonizer. As Gómez-Peña “sadly” states, 
“over 40 percent of [their] audience, no matter where [they] were, believed 
that the exhibit was real, and did not feel compelled to do anything about it 
with” (Gómez-Peña 1996, 98). The performers themselves erase the 
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difference between spectacle and reality, much like Artaud desired, when 
they appeal to the fears of an audience empowered by the theater of cruelty 
to become part of the illusion. This relational distance between the non-
native humans and the non-human natives literalized by the golden cage is 
what constitutes the theater of cruelty.   
Cruelty for the Latino performers, however, unlike Artaud’s, did 
implicate a very real effect/affect because it also implicated the performers 
as subjected to the event: the white audiences’ negative emotions were 
theatricalized through the traveling cage where they were confronted with 
what they found most disturbing, and these disturbing performers were 
indeed also subjected to feeling made Other, even though their deliberate lies 
did not expect it. For the performers, or at least for Coco Fusco as the 
woman of color held captive behind the bars of the cage, they were made to 
feel different and inferior regardless of the lack of authenticity of their 
actions. Fusco’s body, as well as Gómez-Peña’s, became “the site of colonial 
desire and fantasy... entrenched in contemporary society, regardless of 
present-day multi-culturalism initiatives or the onslaught of global 
philosophies” proclaiming a post-racial era (Vercone 2000, 90). The cruelty 
behind the objectification of non-Western and non-white human beings is 
alive and well even through the aestheticized and surreal event. The 
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performance made the dehumanization of brown bodies a very real effect 
not only through the white spectators who all too easily stepped into the role 
of the colonizing audiences of the previous centuries, but also because the 
performers themselves were unable to break out of the cage as metaphor for 
the containment of difference.  
 
 
Rac ial  Speech Acts  
 
 For Fusco and Gómez-Peña, the exhibitions of non-white bodies 
taking place throughout the last five centuries was a racial and racist practice 
lasting from medieval times to the present: 
Those people from other parts of the world were forced first to 
take the place that Europeans had already created for the 
savages of their own Medieval mythology; later with the 
emergence of scientific rationalism, the “aborigines” on display 
served as proof of the natural superiority of European 
civilization, of its ability to exert control over and extract 
knowledge from the “primitive” world, and ultimately of the 
genetic inferiority of non-European races (Fusco 1995, 41). 
 
Fusco’s argument parallels what Walter Mignolo (1995) has theorized as the 
darker side of the Renaissance: behind Medieval ideals of world cartography 
and the Renaissance’s cultural rebirth, there was a colonial underbelly 
dehumanizing those people inhabiting the places beyond European 
imagination. This darker side makes itself present today as the experience of 
coloniality that Fusco theorizes. The exhibitions created a number of speech 
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acts leading to the creation of various events that were part of a larger social 
system spreading well beyond the boundaries of the cages holding non-
native bodies captive. In the first iteration establishing the ethnographic 
practices that accompanied the spread of colonialism, the exhibitions 
themselves actively participated in reflecting and helping spread the 
evolution of racial thought in both Europe and the United States from 
Medieval mythology to Darwinism. And in the second iteration with the 
Latino performance, the exhibitions of Coco Fusco and Gómez-Peña reflect 
back the lasting effects of these racial ideologies on the contemporary 
moment.  
The most important or relevant act produced by the exhibitions was 
the clarification that 500 years after 1492, the spectacles of whiteness and 
racial difference produced during the event of the Conquest were still alive 
and well. The Latinos’ exhibitions created a speech act through their 
constructions of race-as-visual: while formal racist projects seeking to give 
credence to the idea that non-whites are inferior to whites have ended (ie. 
eugenics movements), non-white bodies are continuously looked upon as 
less than human. For the audiences, this particular speech act consolidated 
their belief in whites’ racial superiority over the non-white and non-
Europeans; and, subsequently, it reduced native audiences to mere spectacles 
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of barbarity and events to be consumed. In essence, the Latinos on 
exhibition were an event replicated the speech act of the Conquest: the 
Requerimiento establishing the right of the conquistadors to tell the natives 
they were heathens in need of conversion and enslavement, dehumanizing 
them in the name of Christ and European imperial expansion. If the spread 
of Christianity through colonialism systematically spread the construction of 
whiteness each time the Requerimiento was pronounced and the natives 
turned into monstrous pagans, then this dynamic was reiterated each time 
the non-natives caged the other for the sake of “[giving] credence to white 
supremacist worldviews by representing nonwhite peoples and cultures as 
being in need of discipline, civilization, and industry” (Fusco 1995, 41). Like 
the original moment of encounter, the Latinos’ tapping into that zero degree 
of relationality was consolidated through the act of colonizing speech 
dictating the caged natives as uncivilized barbarians. As products of their 
performance’s racial speech act, the experiences of Fusco and Gómez-Peña 
as people of color are what crossed the line between 1492/1992 and a 
contemporary U.S. that was inherently tied to that original moment of 
multiculturalism.  
In his critical essay on the work of Guillermo Gómez-Peña, Juan 
Velasco (2002) argues that the artist’s performance history goes “as far back 
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as the colonial past when the notion of ‘Indian’ was created as an empty 
signifier… [but] the particularities of [his work with Fusco] shape also the 
reenactments of the ‘modern’ Other: ‘the dangerous border crossers’” (209).  
The performance serves to critique the 1992 celebrations, but also the 
treatment of migrants as a dangerous threat to U.S. national cohesion. 
Jennifer Drake (2001) also makes a direct connection between the Latino 
performance piece and the U.S.’ racial landscape when she suggests a 
comparison to Anna Deavere Smith’s Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992: “Smith’s 
interest in performing the eloquent stutters and missteps that together create 
American character(s) offers one democratic alternative to the performance 
history of ethnographic display that [the Latinos’] piece so effectively 
theorizes and enacts” (161). People of color are still racialized as beasts and 
monsters necessarily caged into stereotypical categories for the safeguarding 
of the white audience members, but the cage simultaneously served as a safe-
keeping of the natives from the acts of anger and fear by these same 
audiences felt threatened by them. Gómez-Peña has written about the 
skinheads who tried to get into their cage and attack the artists, and both he 
and Fusco remember the moment a spectator threw acid at his leg (Taylor 
2003; Fusco 1995; Gómez-Peña 1996).  In her final reflection on her 
experience being inside a cage, Fusco reveals a fear, a cruelty of her own: 
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“[There] are moments when I am glad that there are real bars. [There] are 
also times when, even though, I know I can get out of the cage, I can never 
quite escape” (Fusco 1995, 59). Her reflection is in direct response to her 
feeling threatened as a woman of color who is always metaphorically caged 
into the stereotype whites and non-natives may have of her as a hyper-sexual 
being. The fear of being faced with one’s monstrous other is not one that 
belongs strictly to the white spectator who finds herself happy to see a body 
of color held captive so as to keep her safe; the fear of racial difference is 
also one that the person of color inside the golden cage may feel when she is 
the object of objectification. Objects may be easily destroyed, but as the 
artist tells us, human life too can be destroyed when life itself is displaced 
onto the art of cruelty.  The artists’ silence from the inside the cage partook 
in making her the monstrous other, so in a sense her silent speech created an 
act that spoke for her as the audiences projected a meaning onto her body. 
This racial speech act rooted in 1492/1992 makes racial ideologies in 1992 
derivates of the same practice. And as their critics agree, the cultures of 1492 
and 1992 are not so different. 
 What I see being excluded from the logic of these critics who see Two 
Undiscovered Amerindians as enacting a deliberate connection between the 
Indian of 1492 and the immigrant/racial minority in 1992 is an account of 
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the artists’ own racial subjectivity: neither one of them is actually indigenous. 
Velasco, for example, argues that the  
performance piece also aims at escaping the binary structure 
provided by colonial discourse in recasting cultural and racial 
differences of mestizo people in terms of positionality. The 
redefinition allows the audience to dismantle the notion of the 
Other, to open a new space from which to claim the 
historicized experience of Latinas/os from a position of 
“border crossing,” and to act accordingly (2002, 218-219). 
 
Like Alicia Arrizón’s (2006) calling for the theorizing of Latinidad with 
mestizaje at its center, Velasco also asks us to see mestizaje as the driving 
force behind the performers’ political project. Arrizón sees mestizaje as 
irrevocably linked to a history of conquest, so any epistemic project around 
Latinidad and mestizaje must engage with this colonial inheritance in the 
Américas; doing otherwise would disregard the colonial haunting of 
mestizaje. Velasco, however, suggests that the racial identity of the Latino 
performers allows them to escape the colonial dichotomy because they are 
mestizos, a type of synthesis of both colonizer and colonized. One the one 
hand, his mestizaje is an ideal that sees a new semantics of racial relations 
and biological mixture as the key to colonial resistance –to transgress the 
projects that produce colonial relation–, but on the other, his ideology of 
Latinidad is also based on the exclusion of the very Other the performers 
wanted out of the cage: the indigenous person. If Velasco is right in arguing 
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that mestizaje and the mestizos are the intended subjects of address of 
Gómez-Peña’s performance with Fusco, then what happens to the origins of 
mestizaje? The Indian, Spaniard, African and Asian of the “cosmic race” are 
reduced to the ashes and the remnants of a colonial nightmare, one that the 
mestizo Latino artists attempt to wake up from, unsuccessfully. The 
epistemology he attributes to Latinidad’s mestizaje fails to create a space 
where the non-mestizo and the indigenous can enunciate their existence. In 
the end, the Indian is left still as the fallen subject created in 1492, and this 
tragic fall haunts the performance’s racial performativity making a spectacle 
out of indigeneity. 
 
 
Spec tac l e s  of  a Conques t Past 
 
 The tragedy of conquest also frames Artaud’s spectacles of 
indigeneity, which he first performed in The Conquest of Mexico and then 
rehearsed in his ethnographies of the Tarahumara in the Sierra Madre. His 
desire to find a cure for Europe’s decadency led him to invent the Balinese 
performance as an alternative to modernity, but his writings on Mexico also 
reveal that he’d found a similar inspiration for this Theatre of Cruelty among 
the indigenous people there. After he wrote his play and the primary essays 
on cruelty, he delivered a series of lectures in Mexico City in the 1930s where 
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he spoke against the Surrealists’ affiliation with Marxism. The remarks he 
makes against Marx’s anti-metaphysical historical materialism recall his 
earlier ideas on the decline of European culture, since in both Paris and 
Mexico City he writes about the reasons why Europe and its modernity were 
dying. Likewise, even though his writings on Mexico make no mention of his 
encounter with the Balinese uncontaminated by modernity, his notes 
detailing how the Indians embody a new language of signification are all too 
reminiscent of his adoration for the mode of being that was performed in 
the Colonial Exposition. The lives of the contemporary Tarahumara, he 
believed, were made of the same essence as the Ancient Myths and existed in 
a time prior to Cortés’ destruction of Tenochtitlan. He invented a temporal 
incongruence between colonialism and modernity by wishing to cross back 
in time and set aside the Conquest in the past, a time travel that would allow 
him to displace the impact of this historic tragedy on the lives of Indians in 
the present. In this temporal and ideological move, his gaze shifted from the 
East to the New World and positioned the Tarahumara outside of a 
modernity that did in fact go hand-in-hand with colonialism. Much like he 
did to the Balinese, his fetishization hailed the Tarahumara as un-modern 
and non-Western because he thought they lived in a world where 
colonialism simply did not exist. Artaud’s art of cruelty, I argue, was a brand 
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of modern art that did not account for its own collusion with the invention 
of race in the terrain of conquest, inevitably reducing the Indian to a 
performative ontology that was not coeval with the artist’s own.  
Artaud first arrived in Mexico City in early 1936, when he gave his 
first lecture before the Mexican Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios 
at the Universidad Autónoma de México (UNAM).9 The lecture, “Man 
Against Destiny,” was a direct assault on Marxism as “a caricature of life 
[because] Marx wrestled with the image of fact, he tried to sense the meaning 
of history in its particular dynamism,” and “out of this true fact there came, 
also in history, a false ideology” (Artaud 1976a, 357; 358, italics in the original). 
By the time he delivered his first speech, Artaud had already been kicked out 
of the Surrealists on the grounds that his revolutionary project was devoid of 
a political and social implication (Ahrends 1994). In the speech, he states 
that “for [him], the essence of Surrealism was an affirmation of life against 
all caricatures, and the revolution invented by Marx is a caricature of life” 
(Artaud 1976a, 357). Furthermore, he says, “historical and dialectical 
materialism is an invention of European consciousness. Between the true 
                                                
9 In a letter to Jean Paulhan, dated March 26, 1936, Artaud informs his friend that “by 
now [he] must have received the text of the three lectures [he] gave at the University of 
Mexico” (Artaud 1976, 365). According to Silviano Santiago (1999), Artaud gave his first 
speech at the Bolívar Amphitheater of the Escuela Nacional Preparatoria, UNAM’s 
oldest institution housing murals by Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siqueiros and José 
Clemente Orozco.  
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movement of history and Marxism there is a kind of human dialectic which 
does not accord with the facts. And we think that for the last four hundred 
years European consciousness has been living on an enormous error of 
fact.” If the artist was intent on rewriting the world anew by leveling the 
metaphysical with the rational through his theatre of cruelty, Marx’s ideology 
of the human dialectic was a false one because the philosopher was “too 
fixated on fact [and] he refused himself any sort of metaphysics” (358). His 
characterization suggests that any affiliation of Surrealist art forms with a 
Marxist ideology would produce an artifice devoid of life, not the living 
essence he wanted art to be. For Artaud, Marx’s philosophy contributed to 
the demise of Western modernity by not producing a more viable human 
dialectic, and the artist’s theatre sought to remedy this limited imagination of 
ontology. For the Surrealists who took back Artaud’s membership card, 
theatre of cruelty was devoid of a political ideology as radical as the one they 
found in Marxism.   
After spending much time expressing his disgust at Europe, Artaud 
concludes his first speech by calling on Surrealists to find a possible 
alternative to its dying culture in the country where his first spectacle of 
cruelty took place: 
Anyone who claims today that there several cultures in 
Mexico—the culture of the Mayas, that of the Toltecs, the 
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Aztecs, the Chichimecs, the Zapotecs, the Totonacs, the 
Tarascans, the Otomis, etc.—does not know what culture is, he 
is confusing the multiplicity of forms with the synthesis of a 
single idea (Artaud 1976a, 364). 
 
This proposal for the Surrealists to consciously remake European culture in 
the likes of non-Western people exiled him from their group because it ran 
counter to the synthesis proposed by Marx. The human dialectic that escapes 
Marx’s ideology, he says, was a mode of life already practiced by Mexico’s 
Indians: “[theirs was] the last to be based on blood and the magnificence of 
a land whose magic only certain fanatical imitators of Europe can still be 
aware of” (364). Indians held the answer to Europe’s cultural wound because 
their life was framed around blood and magic, precisely that metaphysical 
world the Surrealists deemed an unviable revolution. 
 The Mexican Revolution takes precedence in his later lecture, titled 
“First Contact with the Mexican Revolution,” where he states  
I realized that the revolution in Mexico has a soul, a living soul, 
an exacting soul, and not even the Mexicans themselves can say 
how far it can lead them. This is what is so moving about the 
revolutionary movement in Mexico (Artaud 1976a, 366).  
 
His search for a new ontology took him to the New World to see if it really 
was true that in Mexico “people believe that the Mexican revolution is a 
revolution of the indigenous soul, a revolution to win back the indigenous soul 
as it was before Cortés” (372; 369, italics in the original). Ironically, assuming 
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that this form of indigeneity did in fact exist, Artaud had already completed 
his ontological search prior to his arrival: he went there to prove whether it 
was true that he could reach back in time to possess that purely Indian soul 
untouched by the conquistador. In essence, the ontology of cruelty he 
sought after was residing in a pre-colonial time where indigenous people 
lived “sacrificing to the sun on the steps of the pyramid of the Teotihuacán” 
with their beliefs in blood and magic (368). The Revolution’s purpose was to 
provide him access to that indigenous soul, that “new concept of Man which 
[would] serve to nourish, to feed with its magical life [the] ultimate form of 
humanism” Europe had lost (368).  
Before he delivered this lecture, however, he realized that President 
Lázaro Cárdenas was an inadequate nurturer for his new Man because his 
government was also overly preoccupied with ridding the indigenous of their 
metaphysical ideals. In a letter to his friend Jean Paulhan, he plans writes that 
he would  
speak against Marxism and in favor of the Indian Revolution, 
which everyone here forgets. This population of Whites 
(Creoles) and half-breeds would be very happy to hear no more 
about the Indians. Culturally speaking, they are behind America 
and Europe. It is heartbreaking to come all the way to Mexico 
only to find this (Artaud 1976, 365). 
 
Instead of an indigenous pre-colonial utopia, what Artaud found on his 
arrival was a non-indigenous population, including mestizos, who wished to 
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rid the country of their indigenous elements. This anti-indigenous ideology 
was the exact opposite of the Mexico he thought he knew, so he warned his 
audiences against further dissociating themselves from the secret of the 
Indians: 
By imposing the forms of white civilization on the Indians, one 
would also run the risk of destroying everything they might 
have preserved of their former culture, for a culture and 
civilization are connected… I am very much afraid that there 
may be in Mexico an anti-Indian movement. To be concerned 
about the body and not about the mind is to risk losing the 
body too (369). 
  
The true path towards a revolutionary understanding of humanity laid in the 
Indians who privileged mind and body in unison, not in opposition to each 
other. He concluded this speech by advising his Mexican audiences to stop 
“appropriating the forms of the mechanistic civilization of Europe and 
adopting them to [their] own spirit” (373), and to go back in time with him 
to find an eternal figure of the Indian.  
Artaud’s prescription for the Revolution’s anti-Indian agenda 
addresses Cárdenas’ indigenista politics, which espoused an ideology bent on 
treating Mexico’s indigenous people as remnants rather than the living agents 
of the pre-colonial indigenous empires the artist believed them to be.10 
Feeling betrayed, he called the Revolution a form of retrograde white 
                                                
10 For an exhaustive discussion of indigenista ideology under Mexico’s post-revolutionary 
state, see María Josefina Saldaña-Portillo (2001, 2003).  
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civilization because the Mexicans’ emphasis on mestizaje rather than 
indigeneity rejected his plan to find a timeless Indian. The Mexican 
revolutionaries wanted to eradicate his ideal Indians of the past still living in 
the present, and to keep the indigenous soul that existed prior to the 
Conquest (still) dead and in the past. He also calls the Mexicans “that 
precipitate of innumerable races [that] appears as the diffuser of history,” 
precisely because the indigenistas sought to subsume the particularity of 
indigenous groups under the nation’s homogenous mestizo culture (Artaud 
1976a, 371). What I see evidenced in the divergence between himself and 
indigenismo is a point of convergence rather than a site of betrayal: both 
cruelty and revolution turn on an axis of Indian antiquity. The Mexicans 
disillusioned Artaud when they focused on the dead Indian and erased the 
Indian in the present as an enunciation of that pre-Cortesian past. However, 
the indigenista agenda of the Mexican state is not entirely different from 
Artaud’s own fetishization of indigenous people’s pre-colonial imperial 
grandeur, since his dead imperial Indian is the same one the Mexican post-
revolutionary state revered in its national imaginary. Artaud may think that 
the Indian body belongs to a natural order and signification, but it is a new 
ontology only insofar as it too is reminiscent of the ancient Indian whose 
empire was killed by the Conquest. His dead Indian of the past in the 
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present excludes the living of the present now, and this erasure of the living 
for the sake of art is no different than the ideological erasure of indigenous 
populations under Cárdenas’ post-revolutionary state. Both reduce the 
Indian living in the present to a remnant of a glorious past, and collude in 
denying Mexican Indians access to a modern time equally framed by 
colonialism in the 1930s. 
 The artist leaves Mexico City soon after he arrived, claiming that 
Mexican artists, intellectuals and government officials had sent Cárdenas a 
petition to give him the funds necessary to  “carry out a Mission in 
connection with the old races of Indians.”11 He goes to the Sierra Madre to 
find his missed connection to Mexico’s rejected indigeneity: 
In northern Mexico, forty-eight hours from Mexico City, there 
is a race of pure red Indians called the Tarahumara. Forty 
thousand people are living there in a style that predates the 
Flood. They are a challenge to this world in which people talk 
so much about progress only because they despair of 
progressing (PD 3).  
 
The Indians existed exactly forty-eight hours north of Artaud’s location, but 
their style of living was further away from him since their culture was rooted 
                                                
11 Artaud, in a letter to Jean-Louis Barrault, dated July 10, 1936: 
 Since I last wrote you, the situation has changed. A petition signed by the most 
eminent intellectuals and artists of Mexico, and countersigned by several ministers and 
ministerial departments, has recently been sent to the President of the Republic, asking 
that I be given the means to carry out a Mission in connection with the old races of 
Indians (Artaud 1976, 374). 
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in a divinity before the Bible’s God gave Noah’s arc the gift of survival. The 
Tarahumara existed outside the temporal scale of the Bible story, so their 
very life posed a challenge to this world where development and progress are 
the order of the day. Their existence beyond the claims of the Mexican state 
distorted time as much as they threatened progress itself. 
 Artaud also finds the existence of a new language of embodiment in 
the time of the Great Ancient Myths: 
The Land of the Tarahumara is full of signs, forms, and natural 
effigies which in no way seem the result of chance—as if the 
gods themselves… had chosen to express their powers by 
means of these strange signatures … Of course, there are 
places on the earth where Nature, moved by a kind of 
intelligent whim, has sculptured human forms. But here the 
case is different, for it is over the whole geographic expanse of 
a race that Nature has chosen to speak (PD 12). 
 
In comparison to the key he found in the Balinese’s embodied essence, the 
Indians’ contribution to Cruelty is found in their existential connection as 
indigenous to their particular geography: Nature and the gods chose to speak 
not through unmediated signs, but through indigenous bodies who fell from 
the sky onto unmarked natural space. Artaud the opportunity to observe 
their performances of the Peyote Dance during his visit to the Tarahumara, 
and he partook in a ceremony where the natives consume the peyote plant as 
part of their dances and prayers for health and prosperity. His observations 
of the ritual treat the religiosity as a site holding the second key to unlocking 
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his Theatre of Cruelty, because as with the Balinese essence performed in 
the Colonial Exposition, the divine essence that Tarahumara performed in 
front of him was derived from the original powers of life. Unlike the 
Balinese dancers, however, the Tarahumara dancers’ divinity belonged to the 
natural geography of the natives’ land, not the theatre stage. 
According to Julie Stone Peters, the new aesthetic that Artaud created 
with Theater of Cruelty is what “also produced in him the need for the 
Mexican geography: the longing to identify a source and an objective cultural 
and spatial correlative—and a broader and more open landscape—for the 
metaphysics (manifest in primitive form and symbol) that the true theater 
was to reveal” (Stone Peters 2002, 230-231). Artaud’s journey to Mexico was 
indeed driven by his desire to rediscover the sacredness of the peyote dance, 
but to understand his journey as one ending in natural space serves to 
disavow the Tarahumara of their own making of place. The landscape of the 
mountains is space in its most natural condition and without a particular 
meaning and symbolism attached to it, but the place of the Land of the 
Tarahumara and the Sierra Madre has meaning that the natives imbue with 
their everyday lives. This signification of the place of the Tarahumara is 
reduced to a source of inspiration for Artaud to pursue his journey, an 
objective space not filled with Artaudian signification because he has not yet 
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rediscovered it. To see the journey as one that is “longing to identify a 
source and objective cultural and spatial correlative” for this theater, as 
Stone Peters does, would participate or collude in his objectification of the 
place of the Tarahumara and deplete these people of their subjectivity lived 
out on the land. She also implies that Artaud’s search for space was drawn to 
sacred indigenous practices that were only carried out in one particular 
space, but her emphasis on space rather than place reifies the Frenchman’s 
exotic gaze that invented these native practitioners into mere objects rather 
than conscious subjects. Artaud’s journey set these people as subjects 
unworthy of agentic signification because they exist in nature as part of 
natural space. The Indians remain as objects of study instead of partaking in 
the making of a place where they do worship and practice their beliefs. 
Unlike the Balinese dancers whose bodies he appreciated because they made 
meaning through movement, the agency he permits the Balinese he denies to 
the indigenous peoples. In Artaud, the Tarahumara are written on by the 
divine Nature of their Great Ancient Myth; they do not write themselves. 
Stone Peters also argues that Artaud’s task “was to help Mexico 
realize its unique civilization—to change the unconscious dreams of the 
primitive into reality” (Stone Peters 2002, 236). He went to the Sierra Madre 
in order to move the Tarahumara from their anachronistic condition back to 
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the mythical time before Cortés –the rightful time for their primitive dreams, 
as Stone Peters would put it. The journey to find a medicine for Europe 
became a project of self-invention when he made it his task to put the 
Tarahumara back in his reality of their un-modern primitivism, and not the 
place they occupied in the 1930s. Although the Tarahumara were very much 
alive and well in his current present where Artaud could encounter them, he 
observed the ritual and the ritual’s practitioners of objects in a case study of 
a temporality untouched by the Conquest. Even in his anticolonial projects 
to protect them from both Europe and the Mexican government, with their 
perpetual attempts at denying the Tarahumara their cultivation of peyote and 
their religious practices, he failed to recognize how his anticolonialism was 
itself a derivative of conquest. The only mode in which the Tarahumara 
could exist in the world-making Theater of Cruelty was as the carriers of the 
supernatural that Artaud wanted them to have; it was his projection of what 
indigenous people were-and-did (being-doing) that made the Tarahumara’s 
indigeneity a possibility. Much like the audiences of Fusco’s and Gómez-
Peña’s performance who failed to feel the pain and suffering of the 
indigenous oppressed by centuries of colonialism, leaving the performers 
and the Indians they were playing at being perpetually colonized, Artaud 
failed to understand the Tarahumara as existing as indigenous people in their 
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present irrevocably marked by Conquest. For the Tarahumara living in the 
1930s, that original indigeneity Artaud imagined for them was inaccessible 
without the ability move across time, and the artist’s impossible indigeneity 
unmarked by colonialism existed only in the theatre.   
The art of cruelty invented an ideology of indigeneity that exceeded 
Tarahumara lives. If terror in Artaudian cruelty is designed to imagine new 
modes of being, it is inherent that the European body’s old being (i.e. 
rationally signified) be destroyed for the sake of the new cruel modality (i.e. 
emotion, metaphysics). Artaud called on Europeans to treat human life as an 
artifice, to actively create the everyday into an aesthetic form no different 
than the reality it mimics. The experiences of the Balinese and the 
Tarahumara on display, however, suggest that the artist did not actually 
understand that human life itself was put on the line when he crossed their 
bodies from the real to the artificial. His theater allows for a practice of 
everyday life that is different from the space surrounding us, but to see the 
human body as part of natural space destroys human subjectivity because he 
subsumes it under an ideology of race and performance that will not account 
for the non-Western worlds of the living. Hence, when Artaud projects his 
ideas of indigeneity and the symbolism of Mexican landscape onto the 
Tarahumara Indians, he makes them a part of nature and into objects no 
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different than rocks. His spectacular ideology of indigeneity ends their lives 
as subjects of history for the sake of art.  
 
 
Spec tacu lar  Indians 
 
Artaud’s cruelty and the cruelty of Latino performance are both 
successes and failures. Artaud arguably succeeded in designing a radical 
political project to revamp European cultural practices through a new form 
of theatre that reimagined everyday life amidst a time of very real turmoil —
the interwar period in Europe and the beginning of the fall of European 
empires (Jannarone 2009). His theater fails as an anticolonial tactic precisely 
because it was not entirely anticolonial: he made up an indigeneity and an 
Oriental for himself to project onto a people who could not otherwise exist 
as indigenous or Balinese in his temporal present, but in an 
impossible/inaccessible time before Cortés’ arrival and Western modernity. 
While Artaud’s impossible indigeneity is rooted in the defeat of the Aztec 
empire, for Fusco and Gómez-Peña racial difference and indigeneity were 
first invented at the moment when an Arawak eye met a European one. The 
indigeneity of their performance was anchored in that primal moment of 
colonial invention that escapes Artaud’s imaginary. In a sense, the Latino 
performance was better able to historicize the making of indigenous people 
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as indigenous than Artaud was, because by placing 1492 at the heart of their 
critical performance, they attempted to dismantle the Conquest and the 
postcolonial trauma it produced right at the event of “discovery.” When 
compared to Two Undiscovered Amerindians, Artaud’s The Conquest of Mexico also 
fails as a viable critique of colonialism and the erasure of indigenous religious 
practices. His Conquest seeks to reproduce the Conquest of Mexico from the 
stage of affective cruelty rather than the theater previously used to stage it, 
but his theater does nothing more than reiterate and reconstruct these 
historical events intact: terror, genocide, colonialism and all remain in place. 
The radical potential of the Latino performance is precisely where Artaud’s 
theater could not go: he could offer no potential for a critique of colonialism 
because his theater is entirely dependent on the existence of these events 
exactly as recorded and with the same outcome; had there been no 
Conquest, Artaud would have no original theater of cruelty to theorize 
about.12  
 The two performances do converge on a similar methodological form 
when all three artists insist that performance art must terrorize the 
                                                
12 Artaud was revising the essays included in The Theater and Its Double at the same time 
that he was putting together his essays on Mexico. Although the Balinese dancers were 
first to embody his theory, in his journey from Europe to Mexico his theater transferred 
from the Orient to the New World. Mexico and Bali shared the coin of exchange as 
Artaud moved from the West to the Orient, the Orient to the New World, and finally 
ended up secluded in a mental institution in France.  
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audience’s emotions into feeling that reality can in fact be made anew. The 
“Second Manifesto for the Theater of Cruelty” begins by stating that Theatre 
of Cruelty is meant to create a spectacle of the events that will cause “the 
agitation and unrest characteristic of our epoch” in an effort to help “the 
public” reach that “poetic state [they are] seeking through love, crimes, 
drugs, war, or insurrection” (TD 122). These particular events must replicate 
the public’s violent and negative emotions because it is only in “this sense of 
violent rigor” that we can understand the cruelty driving “a passionate and 
convulsive conception of life.” In its first few sentences the Theater of 
Cruelty sets its goal to connect the audience’s emotional and political goals 
and Artaud’s theater can only exist if it is able to tap into the events that 
emotionally affect our time. Likewise, the Latino performers started out their 
traveling spectacle wanting to critique the racist ideologies behind 
contemporary multiculturalism by trapping themselves inside a cage in hopes 
of being set free. The indigeneity being projected from inside the cage was 
meant to naturally agitate the audiences’ emotions, so they were not 
informed that the Indians inside were not actually natives. Even if their 
original motives were not to be an authentic indigeneity, their audiences saw 
an Other so real that it caused them to feel fear, anger, sadness, or sexual 
arousal, when confronted by real Indians, and they left them inside their cage 
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regardless of their emotional responses. The spectacle of Two Undiscovered 
Amerindians in its live action form tapped into their audiences’ emotions very 
well by conjuring what they most feared or desired at that specific moment 
in time, and the artists were able to document their affective reaction from 
inside the cage.  
The Latinos’ artificial indigeneity was able to successfully affect the 
audience members and move them to feel a cruelty of their own. Artaud’s 
Conquest had the same intent: 
and just as there will no unoccupied point in space, there will 
be neither respite nor vacancy in the spectator’s mind or 
sensibility. That is, between life and the theater there will be no 
distinct division, but instead a continuity (TD 126). 
 
The indigeneity performed by the cage and created “in the spectator’s mind 
[and] sensibility” could arguably be seen as an example of what Artaud 
wanted to create. Montezuma, the central indigenous figure in his Conquest, is 
described as  
split in two, divided; with some parts of himself in half-light, 
others dazzling; with many hands coming out of his dress, with 
expressions painted on his body like a multiple portrait of 
consciousness, but from the consciousness of Montezuma all 
the questions pass forth into the crowd (130). 
 
The Indian’s internal struggles are to be projected onto the crowd witnessing 
the spectacle of his trauma. He seems almost unreal, but the very 
performance of this artifice on the actor’s body makes it very real indeed. If 
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the actor’s body does as Artaud instructs, then his body becomes what it is 
that it performs, and his performance of Montezuma’s internal drama 
transfers these emotions onto the crowd. The performance of Indian 
feelings makes them real and able to move the audience into an affective 
reaction to the brown emotions. In the Latinos’ performance the cage was 
center stage, but its place of exhibition in its entirety became part of the 
performance as audience members came to observe them. As the majority of 
the audiences believed their bodies’ performance of indigenous authenticity, 
they believed they really were Indians: “between life and the theater there 
[was] a continuity” in their “mind or sensibility,” and their spectacular Indian 
was the real thing.  
The cruelty the Latino performance also fails, even as it succeeds in 
using theater for the sake of radical social change —it was at least successful 
as Artaud would want it. Fusco and Gómez-Peña designed their 
performance art to denounce the prolonged consequences of 1492 that have 
proved beyond terrorizing and destructive for indigenous people, but the 
Indians were once again left to suffer the effects of colonialism when their 
audiences felt the need to keep them inside. The performance, in its critique 
of Conquest and its Quincentenary spectacles, could not escape acting out 
the scenarios of discovery that rotate on an axis of an indigeneity always-
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already framed by Conquest.  Velasco (2002) states that the film 
documenting the performance, The Couple in the Cage, 13  “is a metaphor to 
describe the Europeans’ and Americans’ inability to deal with the Indians’ 
difference. To the audience of the performance the Indians in the cage 
resemble the puzzling encounter with the Other because they do not know 
they are the audience, and they are unaware it is a performance” (211). There 
are two types of audiences: those watching the live performance, and those 
watching the audience in the film watching the live performance. Those of 
us watching the documentary are hence twice removed from experiencing 
the live event, and we can see the audience in the film not introject the 
performance’s intent when we watch the video. Still, I am not convinced this 
audience did not get that it was a performance, a show on display. Even if 
they did not feel it in themselves to let the performers out of the cage, the 
reality was that they were confronted with the cage being exhibited for them 
to see. The exhibition, in all of its golden absurdity, was to be consumed by 
them whether they knew it was an unreal show or not.  
It could be argued that the audience members who didn’t let them out 
of the cage did not do so because the performers were either simply putting 
                                                
13 The Couple in a Cage: A Guatianaui Odyssey (1993) is the film-documentary co-directed by 
Coco Fusco and Paula Heredia comparing footage from the performance with footage 
from 19th-Century exhibitions of non-Western peoples.  
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on a show—they did not need to be let out if they were there willingly 
behind bars—, or because they deserved to be imprisoned and kept at a 
distance. In either case, the result was the same: the Indians had to stay in 
their cage. For those who did know it was a show, and understood its 
particular political critique, but decided to not let them out, the result was 
identical to the former scenario: the caged remained locked. Also, to my 
knowledge, neither artist has written anywhere that non-white audiences 
who got their anticolonial message attempted to let them out either, and the 
white non-natives who did try to get them out wanted to hurt them. In this 
last scenario, the cage saved the performers’ lives, as Fusco’s earlier words 
demonstrate. No matter the audience, the scenario of discovery remained as 
it was scripted without change. 
The question then arises regarding this repetition: Did the Latino 
performers make up an indigeneity or did they unconsciously partake in the 
scenarios of discovery? They played at being Indian, an absurdly spectacular 
Indian, but Indian nonetheless, and in doing so they became indigenous 
through their performance. Their performance of indigeneity was an 
ideology with a very particular critique of the Quincentenary, and in making 
their denunciation they acted out the indigenous ethos they felt they needed 
for their critique to be successful. The spectacularity of their indigeneity, 
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with its use of computers, voodoo-doll-making, banana-feeding the female 
for $10, dances to rap-music, showing the male’s genitals for $5, sunglasses, 
etc., may have been designed to be as absurd and entertaining as any other 
Quincentenary spectacle, but their cruelty was asking their spectators to feel 
and to understand that genocide and colonialism should not be celebrated. 
Through their indigeneity they entered a framework where “we’ve seen it all 
before”: “the discoverer, conqueror, ‘savage,’ and native princess” who play 
a part in almost every script of colonialism (Taylor 2003, 28).  As Diana 
Taylor has argued in her exhaustive study on theater and performance, The 
Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas (2003), the 
scenario of discovery itself, like “all scenarios[,] ha[s] localized meaning” and 
“allows for many possible ‘endings’” (28). The end results of Theater of 
Cruelty and Latino performance provided the same outcome, and they 
(un)consciously “promote[d] certain views while helping to disappear 
others” where the Conquest may not be forced to repeat itself.  Artaud, 
Fusco, and Gómez-Peña may not have been able to stage a different 
conclusion to the scenarios of discovery, but perhaps the answer lies not in 
the performances and theories of non-natives playing at being anticolonial. If 
the Frenchman’s playing at being Indian and the Latino’s brownface 
performance were cruel ideologies of indigeneity, then a different type of 
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performance is necessary for indigenous people to no longer be relegated to 
the stuff of spectacularity. What art of cruelty needs to surpass the tragedy of 
coloniality/modernity is a decolonial form of performance art, one created 
by (an)other Indian whose racial performativity is not a relational mode 





REHEARSALS OF THE DAMNED:  
DAMNATION, FREEDOM, SALVATION 
 
 
I’d like to think of my performance not as audience participation so much as 
audience salvation. I like anyone here who spittles the guilt of the last 
500years to please report to the stage now. I’d like to ask any white men who 
would like to take the burden of the last 500yrs of guilt to report to the stage 
now. I’d like to offer you a bite of my burrito to absolve you of the sins of 
the last 500s years of repression of guilt. I’d like to ask now for any white 
men who’d like to participate in the ritual of purification to come up to the 
stage now.  
— Nao Bustamante, Indig/urrito 
 
MICHAEL: For a moment, I felt her hand in mine and when I touched her I 
felt happy… I mean, I imagined I touched her. Other people laughed –
looked at her and laughed. Her mother laughed the loudest. That’s when I 
knew… I had to save her. 
— Migdalia Cruz, Fur 
 
How will we choose to describe our past, now, at this moment, as an 
enunciation in the present? If “history shows that everything that has been 
thought will be thought again by a thought that does not yet exist,” then 
what will we choose to think again as our history, the history that we want to 
survive as we decolonize a historical imaginary that veils our thoughts, our 
words, our languages? 






Nao Bustamante’s Indig/urrito and Migdalia Cruz’s Fur are Latina 
theatres of terror staging the present within a tragic continuity of Conquest. 
Their stage, however, is not interested in uncritically rehearsing the mode of 
tragedy that haunts the earlier chapters of my Impossible Indians. The visions 
of tragedy espoused by Usigli, Moraga, Magaña, Fusco, and Gómez-Peña do 
not upstage the Indians of the Latina stage because these find an alternative 
to colonial modernity that theirs did not. Bustamante’s racist performance 
and Cruz’s absurd play, I argue, desire to perform a freedom and salvation 
from the tragic temporality that has plagued the damnation of racial subjects 
in the Americas since 1492. 
In Fur, the Nuyorican playwright creates a world of sideshow freaks 
with three characters at its center: Citrona, a young hirsute Latina; Nena, a 
hairless white Latina; and Michael, a white man. As the plot develops from 
the initial freak show scene, Michael buys Citrona and imprisons her in a 
cage because he desires her bestiality.1 Nena, hired by Michael to hunt for 
and feed the beast, falls in love with the white man and plays at seducing 
Citrona in hopes of being loved by her master. Citrona feels the pain of 
rejection when Nena refuses to love her back, and she rejects Michael’s love 
                                                
1 The epigraph by Migdalia Cruz is from “Fur: A Play in Nineteen Scenes.” Out of the 
Fringe: Contemporary Latina/Latino Theatre and Performance, Ed. Caridad Svich and María 
Teresa Marrero. New York: Theatre Communications Group, 2000. Quote on page 83. 
Further citations from Cruz’ play included in this chapter will be cited as “F.” 
278 
in return. The beast devours them both in the end, committing cannibalism 
when Michael sets her free from the cage.  
The racial order of Cruz’s play all too easily recalls Shakespeare’s 17th-
century play The Tempest and the anticolonial imaginary of Aimé Césaire’s 
rewrite, A Tempest.2 Fur’s protagonist, Citrona, is enslaved by her white 
master as the object of racialized desire made of purely sensory material 
without rationality. What sets Fur within this tragic tradition of dramatic 
creation is Cruz’s response to the primal scene of colonial terror and the 
invention of Caliban and “Caliban’s Woman” as the (im)possible native 
subjects of Shakespeare’s and Césaire’s stage. For the playwright of the 
Renaissance and the playwright of Anticolonialism, the white men’s 
immediate response to the discovery of Caliban is to capture and take him to 
Europe where he can be displayed for monarchs; this is a rehearsal both of 
Columbus and his Arawak man and the spectacular displays of non-white 
peoples thereafter. Césaire surpasses Shakespeare’s play by staging a Caliban 
that expresses a desire to reach racial freedom, but the curtain drops in A 
                                                
2 I recognize that there exist rich traditions of theoretical, cultural, political and historical 
engagements with Césaire’s and Shakespeare’s “Caliban” and their importance for the 
modern/colonial world. My chapter covers a vast geographic, idelogical and historical 
ground, but adequately engaging the traditions stemming from these two playwrights’ 
oeuvres is beyond the scope of my dissertation project and this chapter in particular. 
While I fully recognize that my lack of engagement with these traditions may limit my 
chapter’s ideological potential, I hope that my analysis of the plays in light of the ideas 
expressed throughout my dissertation may also generate a productive engagement with 
Caliban.  
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Tempest with Caliban and Prospero left to battle for each other’s existence 
forever. Césaire’s is indeed a tragic imaginary where the past enunciates itself 
in the present repeatedly without the end of time in sight. Neither the 
original Tempest nor its Caribbean rehearsal, in other words, allows for the 
possibility of Caliban’s freedom from slavery or his salvation from the tragic 
temporality that binds him to the Conquest.  
Caliban’s first entrance into coloniality/modernity is off stage. 
Prospero first refers to him in The Tempest as “the son that [Sycorax] did litter 
[on the island], a freckled whelp, hag-born not honored with a human 
shape… It was a torment to lay upon the damned, which Sycorax could not 
again undo.”3 The slave’s plot to regain his humanity then takes a step back 
as the play gives center stage to Prospero’s reconciliation with his Italian 
monarchical family; The Tempest closes with a silent Caliban led off the stage 
in chains. In his second entrance, Caliban’s silence is completely shattered 
when Césaire writes him as “a black slave” that chooses “death [rather] than 
humiliation and injustice” under Prospero’s reign; A Tempest closes with him 
forever awaiting war and revolution.4 Neither entrance into modernity offers 
                                                
3 William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Ed. Peter Hulme and William Sherman. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2004. Quote on pages 16-17. Further citations from The 
Tempest included in this chapter will be cited as “TT.”  
4 Aimé Césaire, A Tempest, Trans. Richard Miller. New York: TCG Translation, 2002. 
Quote on page 28. Further citations from A Tempest included in this chapter will be cited 
as “AT.” 
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the slave his freedom: the former cannot imagine it, and the latter imagines 
but cannot perform it. Sylvia Wynter (1990) has argued that Caribbean 
women writers respond to this limited dramatic imagination of the colonial 
difference by giving credence to the possibility of a “Caliban’s Woman” that 
can in fact exist, act and be beyond the limits of Postcolonialism and 
Eurocentrism. It is here where I argue that the ordering of Fur’s world poses 
a challenge to Caliban’s tragedy and surpasses the theatre that created him. 
Citrona is the female equal to Caliban’s monstrosity and racial subjection, 
but she transcends his fate in order to love, desire and create her own 
freedom from racial bondage through cannibalism. The world of Cruz’s play 
becomes the darker side of both Shakespeare and Césaire when Citrona acts 
out in response to her subordination by a white man: she is that silent beast 
kept safely at arm’s length, but she lashes out in a savage vengeance against 
her master when she is set free.  The cruel irony at the end of Fur is that 
although she is now free from racial bondage, Citrona is left as a cannibal 
living in a deep and silent blackness without access to salvation. Citrona is 
still Fanon’s damné.  
In contrast to this savage theatre, I suggest that Bustamante’s strap-on 
burrito gives us a more productive answer to the question of freedom and 
racial salvation. Bustamante’s Indig/urrito turns away from Caliban’s plan of 
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destruction and Citrona’s cannibalism in order to bring us a way out of 
tragedy that does not leave violence and complete darkness as the only viable 
solutions. When artists of color were told they had to create work 
commemorating the year 1492 in order to receive funding, Bustamante 
performed Indig/urrito to remind her audiences that this celebratory call for 
artistic creation was uncritical of its collusion with indigenous genocide 
begun that same year. Stepping practically nude on stage, she strapped on a 
burrito to her crotch and asked her audiences to “think about it as the 
representation of the modern indigenous peoples.”5 She then called on white 
men to come onstage, drop to their knees before her, open their mouths, 
and take a bite out of her burrito to rid themselves of five hundred years of 
colonial guilt. The performance was a “ritual of purification” carried out by a 
brown priestess who came to free lives from inheriting the first conqueror’s 
legacy of violence.  
I argue that as an act of freedom from colonial violence, the Chicana 
performance rehearses a pivotal scene of 16th-century colonial terror: the 
Requerimiento, the original speech act constituting the racial subjection of 
native peoples carried out under the name of salvation by the Spanish. When 
read properly, the Requerimiento authorized the speaking conquistador with 
                                                
5 Nao Bustamante, Indig/urrito. Performance video, 1992. 
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the right to wage war against the native inhabitants he discovered during his 
invasion of the Americas, and to enslave them should they not accept the 
terms of their submission. As part of the legalization of a systemic 
destruction of indigenous lives, the Requerimiento’s written document and 
performed speech created the grounds by which the inhabitants of the 
Americas became “natives”: without Christian reason, they were reduced to 
the same purely sensory materiality as Caliban. Savagery, cannibalism, 
barbarity and irrationality were all joined in the Requerimiento to reduce 
native subjects to the embodiment of everything that Europe claimed it was 
not, even as it cleared the way for the destruction of everyday life in the New 
World.  
Bustamante turns the native’s embodiment of damnation into a 
performance that undoes the effects of conquest by treating bodies of color 
as the site of enunciation rather than the citation of the tragic subject of 
coloniality. Her queer erotics exceed the limits of the archive when she 
rehearses an-other form of racial salvation to bring about a different future 
for racialized subjects. She stepped onto the stage of Theatre Artaud in 1992 
to perform a ritual of audience salvation and rid us of those ugly feelings 
reaching back five centuries. This is a performance of decoloniality because 
it wishes to produce a future not entrenched in damnation, a future that 
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Bustamante creates from within the coloniality of desire to save both 
colonizer and colonized. Indig/urrito gives us a way out of colonial terror 
where the future of race is not the darker side of the Americas.  
My earlier chapters outline the ways in which theatre and performance 
artists  have framed their experiences of coloniality within a cyclical time that 
either constricts or leaves no space for native subjects to end their 
subjectification under colonial projects in the present. In response to their 
tragic ideology of indigeneity, this chapter argues that Cruz’s and 
Bustamante’s Latina rehearsals of damnation push us towards salvation from 
the tragedies haunting the temporal incongruence of race. Rather than 
rehearsing or re-inscribing the acts of colonial terror contained in the archive 
–racial exhibition, mass murder, slavery–, Fur and Indig/urrito turn to the 
brown body conditioned by these acts of cruelty to make possible a future of 
race not entrenched in tragedy. Their imagination of a new temporality of 
race is the decolonial imaginary that Emma Pérez calls for when she asks us 
to “decolonize a historical imaginary that veils our thoughts, our words, our 
languages” so that a new future of freedom and salvation can be created 
(Pérez 27). The tragic mode of Latina theatres of terror continuously 
enunciates the past in the present, but their present seeks to enunciate itself 
differently now and into the future. Their imaginary of a time when race is 
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done differently, so we can finally move on, is decolonial performance at its 
best.  
 
1 st Rehearsal :  Damnati on 
 
The debate among decolonial theorists over the past two decades 
surrounding the invention of race in the Americas places it in the Valladolid 
trial between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda over the 
humanity of indigenous people.6 Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007) argues 
that the 16th-century trial over the Spanish legal right to war on the natives 
was a mode of behavior that was anti-relational. The Spaniards treated the 
natives as barbarians and prisoners of war well before their humanity was 
debated in court. As a result of their mistreatment of Indians as less than 
people, these were effectively denied a say in whether they wanted to have 
Christian souls or not. The decolonial philosopher bases his arguments on 
the question of ontology to claim, following Anibal Quijano, that this was a 
foundational moment in the history of race. In questioning their humanity, 
the anti-relational field of the trial also denied the natives access to reason, 
making them them eligible for slavery and a life in damnation. That was the 
                                                
6 I discuss the 16th-century debate and its implications for 20th-century theater in chapter 
one, “Tragically Mexican: Rodolfo Usigli’s Racial Performativity.”  I discuss of the 
invention of race in the modern/colonial world more at length in my introductory 
chapter, “Introducing the Impossible Indians: Race, Time, and Performance, Otherwise.” 
See Mignolo (2000), Maldonado-Torres (20007), Quijano (2000), and Wynter (1990, 
2003). 
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birth of race: condemning natives to a notion of being that was inferior to 
(European) human life forms.  
 I would push the decolonial frame in two different directions. First, I 
would like to think of the trial’s significance as indeed establishing a critical 
moment in the history of race, but also as one particular scene of subjection 
that was part of a larger set of scenarios of conquest that invented América. 
Before Las Casas and Sepúlveda, Christopher Columbus trapped, kidnapped 
and exhibited an Arawak man so European audiences could see physical 
evidence that in “India” he had found creatures different than human 
beings. Columbus’ anti-relationality established a hierarchy of being that 
made the Indian a thing that could be used as inhumanly as possible; the trial 
rehearsed this dehumanization by further questioning the Indians’ humanity. 
In between Columbus and the trial, I argue that the Requerimiento develops 
from Columbus’ treatment of the indigenous as inhuman bodies and 
predates the trial’s dismissal of native embodiment. The Spanish ritual and 
its conditioning of the native body for extermination animated the trial 
through its imagination of indigeneity and its materiality/irrationality; this 
groundwork has not been considered by the decolonialists to date. Secondly, 
I trace the rehearsal of these processes of damnation in two plays inspired by 
the Conquest and its invention of race. Shakespeare’s The Tempest and 
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Césaire’s A Tempest, I argue, are iterations of what the trial, Columbus’ 
exhibition, and the Spanish regime of law set out to do. The plays rehearse 
the making of race through praxis, quite literally by rehearsing the scenes of 
subjection theorized by the decolonialists.7 The relationality of Caliban’s 
epistemic and physical subordination interpellates the body of the damned as 
the site of slavery, but the play also hails Caliban’s body as the citation of a 
decolonial imaginary where freedom may be possible.  
Decolonial theorists have thought through the scene with Las Casas 
and Sepúlveda by way of epistemology –did the Indians have souls and were 
they rational?–, and they have largely ignored the performative qualities 
exercised when Casas faced off with Sepúlveda on the stage of the Spanish 
court in Valladolid. Their focus on the epistemic, as I analyze in my 
introductory chapter, ignores the bodies of those people deemed inferior to 
the Spanish because they were made of a materiality and essence so different 
from the Europeans who came to destroy them. While the very utterance of 
                                                
7 Usigli also performs a triple rehearsal of the damné: his essay on tragedy follows in detail 
Fray Juan de Zumárraga’s 16th-century citation of the Aztecs’ performativity; he gives 
Zumárraga center stage in his play Corona de luz (1963), where the friar’s notes are spoken 
verbatim by a different character; and this last installment of the Coronas Trilogy stages a 
trial in the metropolis between a Spanish friar, a soldier and a king fighting over the 
human nature of the Indians. In a sense, his rehearsals of the scenarios of conquest are 
evidence that the tragic Mexican plays very well alongside Shakespeare, whom he 
compliments for his limited attempt at being a true tragedian, and Césaire, whose 
anticolonial stage is situated at the limits of the Renaissance. The playwrights’ rehearsals 
compliment each other’s cultural politics of conquest.  
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the question was predicated on the assumption that it was possible the 
Indians may not posses human bodies with souls, the decolonialists focus on 
the nature of the question as a denial of cognitive potential. Walter Mignolo, 
for example, states that “languages are not something human beings have 
but rather something of what human beings are, coloniality of power and of 
knowledge engendered the coloniality of being (colonialidad del ser).”8 Both 
power and knowledge are joined to constitute the human being through 
language, establishing that ontological privilege can only be accessed through 
essence Ontology is made of language, not a material being capable of acting 
or being acted upon. The redemption of the Indians’ cognitive abilities takes 
precedence over the natives’ embodied knowledge, which was also denied to 
them when their humanity and rational abilities were put in question in 1550. 
Evidently, the native body disappears from our field of vision if we take Las 
Casas and Sepúlveda as the modus operandi for thinking about race and the 
coloniality of power, knowledge and being.  
Sylvia Wynter’s early essay, “Beyond Miranda’s Meanings: 
Un/silencing the ‘Demonic Ground’ of Caliban’s ‘Woman’” (1990), offers 
us a place where the coloniality of native ontology can be theorized 
differently. Predating the arguments most recently made by Mignolo, 
                                                
8 Mignolo quoted in Maldonado-Torres (2007, 242).  
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Quijano and Maldonado-Torres, Wynter stems from the experience of 
Caribbean women writers to argue that “the variable of race/racial difference 
[became] since the sixteenth-century even more primarily [the New World 
order of] destiny” (357). The coding of difference, she says, was a result of 
Western Europe’s post-medieval expansion into the New 
World (and earlier into Africa) and with its epochal shift out of 
primarily religious systems of legitimation and behavior [that 
allowed for] her peoples’ expropriation of the land/living space 
of the New World peoples … based on the secular concept of 
the “non-rational” inferior, “nature” of the peoples to be 
expropriated and governed; that is, of an ostensible difference 
in “natural” substance which, for the first time in history was 
no longer primarily encoded in the male/female gender division 
as it had been hitherto in the symbolic template of all 
traditional and religiously based human order, but now in the 
cultural-physiognomic variations between the dominant 
expanding European civilization and the non-Western peoples 
that, encountering, it would now stigmatize as “natives” (357-
358, emphasis in the original). 
 
For Wynter, it was in the shift from male/female to Western 
peoples/natives, from sexual difference to material/natural substance, that 
race came to determine a new order for the world. The European right to 
conquer the New World shifted the ordering of human life from a 
male/female division to a new order established by the “difference in 
‘natural’ substance” between Europe and its Others. New World peoples 
were made of a materiality so ostensibly different from the other peoples 
that they were treated as irrational and made of an inferior nature by those 
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who came to conquer them. Race and racial difference, in other words, were 
created when the natives’ difference in “cultural-physiognomy” placed them 
closer to the bottom of the scale of human reason and below that of their 
Old World counterparts. That Wynter situates the invention of race 
specifically with the invention of natives as bodies without reason cannot be 
overlooked here. This is the first moment in decolonial theory where it 
becomes evident that race, since its inception, has been a question of 
embodiment as well as epistemology and phenomenology.9  
Another scene of subjection took place in the terrain of colonialism 
well before the Valladolid trial and the epistemic turn in decoloniality, and it 
marks the space and time where race can be theorized alongside 
embodiment. Historian Patricia Seed, who studies the Requerimiento as 
ritual of conquest in her book, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the 
New World, 1492-1640 (1995), cites this version of the political protocol 
legalizing the Spaniards’ rule over indigenous people: 
Oh behalf of His Majesty,… I … his servant, messenger… 
notify and make known as best I can that God our Lord one 
and eternal created heaven and earth… God our Lord gave 
charge [of all peoples] to one man named Saint Peter, so that 
he was lord and superior of all the men of the world … and 
                                                
9 Wynter’s most recent essay, “Unsettling the Coloniality of 
Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its 
Overrepresentation—An Argument” (2003), shifts ideological gears to answer the 
question of ontology by turning to epistemology and the Valladolid trial. 
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gave him all the world for his lordship and jurisdiction (señorio y 
jurisdicción)… Of these Pontiffs… made a donation of these 
islands and mainland of the Ocean Sea to the Catholic kings of 
Spain … Almost all who have been notified [of this] have 
received His Majesty and obeyed and served him, and serve his 
as subjects … and turned Christian without reward or 
stipulation … and His Majesty received them … as … subjects 
and vassals … Therefore I and require you as best I can … 
[that] you recognize the church as lord and superior of the 
universal world, and the most elevated Pope… in its name, and 
His Majesty and I in his name will receive you … and will leave 
your women and children free, without servitude so that with 
them and with yourselves you can freely do what you wish … 
and we will not compel you to turn Christians. But if you do 
not do it … with the help of God, I will enter forcefully against 
you, and I will make war everywhere and however I can, and I 
will subject you to the yoke and obedience of the Church and 
His Majesty, and I will take your wives and children, and I will 
make them slaves… and I will take your goods, and I will do to 
you all the evil damages that a lord may do to vassals who do 
not obey or receive him. And I solemnly declare that the deaths 
and damages received from such will be your fault and not that 
of His Majesty, nor mine, nor of the gentlemen who came with 
me.10 
 
In 1550, the Valladolid trial established that Western notions of the human 
condition discarded the natives of their humanity and treated them as 
barbarians without the possibility of knowledge production. The correlation 
between epistemic and ontological terror in the colony, however, was carried 
out decades before the trial when each conquistador performed the ritual of 
                                                
10 Lewis Hanke’s translation of the Requerimiento, cited in Seed (1995, page 69). A Spanish 
version of the text from 1513 can be found here:  
<http://www.gabrielbernat.es/espana/leyes/requerimiento/r1513/r1513.html> 
Accessed on 1/17/2012. 
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Spanish law. As each conqueror first stepped onto the terrain of New World, 
he was legally bound to read aloud to the natives that infamous legal 
document created in 1511. The conqueror presented the natives with the 
rites by which they would be made to subordinate themselves to the law of 
the Spanish crown. The logic of the document was that if they did not agree 
with this required, they would legally face war, slavery and death. The power 
of the Requerimiento was derived in its written and illocutionary forms that 
could legally constraint race and freedom, both in the writing of the letter of 
violence and the conquerors’ performance of their human superiority 
derived from divine sources. First, the creation of the written document 
itself presumed the possibility of enslaving those new peoples that the 
Christian conquistadors would encounter in their invasion of América. If the 
Indians were to be treated as equal to the European men from the moment 
they saw each other, would there have been a need to write laws dictating the 
military right to conquer them? For Wynter and Maldonado-Torres, the 
Indians were legally treated as the defeated of war well before the white men 
set foot on native soil (Wynter 1990, 2003; Maldonado-Torres 2007). 
Secondly, the public readings of the document then created the scenarios 
where the Spaniards were legally endowed with the power to kill and enslave. 
The scenes were exemplary of colonial relations: the conqueror would create 
292 
an audience for his performance of superiority, and his audiences of native 
peoples would be unwilling participants in the play he set up for them to be 
his death-ready subordinates. The arrival of other conquistadors and their 
repetitions of the Requerimiento were thereafter predicated on this negation 
of human life.  Hence, these speeches rehearsed the rhetoric of war and 
brought the natives in the colony the gift of terror disguised as spiritual 
salvation, prior to the 1537 Papal decree declaring that the Indians were 
human and the 1550 trial establishing that they had souls. The trial 
dehumanized the Indians with the very utterance of the question. The 
speech act called them into being through an act of war.  
According to José Rabasa, “colonialism, at least in the version 
practiced by Spaniards in the Americas, was not just about dominating 
people by the force of arms but about transforming Indians into able bodies 
and obedient subjects” (Rabasa 2000, 20). He points to two moments where 
Bartolomé de las Casas questioned the “validity of summoning Indians to 
surrender their political sovereignty and recognize a new regime of law” (6): 
the first was the publication of his Brevissima relación de la destrucción de las 
Indias, and second was his legal debate with Sepúlveda. This “new regime of 
law” refers to the legislation establishing the proper way of evangelizing the 
Indians in the newly conquered territories, the so-called “peaceful 
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conquests” whereby the indigenous were called forth to accept the love of 
God through the blood of Christ, or reject it and be enslaved. As Rabasa 
argues, the offering of Christ bound by the implicit obligation of accepting 
the Christian gift of salvation was a speech act  
constitut[ing] a form of love speech in which threat on the 
Indians’ life and freedom (even when not explicit) always 
remains a possibility within the historical horizon if the 
summoning is not heeded… The interpellated subjects have no 
option but to [publicly] accept the terms of their subordination, 
the categories that define them as inferior, and institutions that 
reorganize their life (6).  
 
With the Indians’ lives and freedom under the threat of annihilation should 
Christ be rejected, the document’s love speech was equally an act of hate 
speech. 
In the Requerimiento we find the clearest example where love speech 
constitutes hate speech, and a set of performances of colonialism where we 
can begin to think of the process by which Indians were made into subjects 
through lawful warfare. The argument between the Las Casas and Sepúlveda 
that established the Crown’s peaceful conquests through a just and holy war 
is not new one, but the scenes of subjection where Rabasa theorizes the 
conjunction between writing and violence provide an entry point for 
thinking about the indigenous body as a primary site of colonial 
interpellation. To reiterate Rabasa: whereas the Althusserian classic scenario 
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of interpellation implies subordination by recognizing the policeman’s shout 
–“Hey, you there”–, the hailing of the native in the terrain of colonialism is a 
much different utterance: “Hey, you there, subordinate yourself to the 
Crown or I’ll kill you” (Rabasa 2000, 5). Althusser framed the calling of man 
into being through recognition and not through a deadly exercise of military 
power; he said “Hey, you there,” not “Hey, you there, stop or I will kill you.” 
Interpellation is indeed an exercise of a dominant ideology, but the terms 
under which Western man is hailed as a subject do not overtly make him the 
target of annihilation. In the New World, interpellation made the Indians 
ontologically inferior and hence eligible for death should they not heed the 
call to subordinate.  
Rabasa’s ideas propel scholars of the colonial period to think about 
the relationship between the ideological and physical interpellation of natives 
bodies by Spanish law. He is cautious to avoid using the term “race” when 
he discusses the relationship between writing and violence, but I suggest that 
his argument is pushing us to think of racialization in terms of embodiment 
more succinctly.11 Colonialism, he says, was as much as about “transforming 
Indians into able bodies” as much as it was about military domination 
                                                
11 Rabasa places the invention of “race” in the 18th-century Enlightenment, when the 
categories of Europe and its Others were put into place in the ordering of the world. This 
claim is part of his argument calling on scholars of the postcolonial period to avoid 
reproducing the Enlightenment’s creation of otherness, and to trace the production of 
otherness to an earlier time and space where difference was coded otherwise.  
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(Rabasa 2000, 20; emphasis mine). Colonial subjectivity was about reducing 
the Indians’ lives to bodies that could be made and manipulated as the 
conquerors saw fit.   The colonizer’s interpellation implied not the birth of 
consciousness through man’s subordination to a dominant ideology. Rather, 
it was dependent on a pre-conceived notion of corporeality that partnered a 
lack of rationality with a particular body that could be killed. While 
interpellation proper also assumes there is a body involved in the process of 
recognition, as man must physically recognize the law calling him down –
turning around, looking at the officer, etc.–, the centerpiece of Althusser’s 
ideas is the creation of a conscious subject, not a physical one. For 
indigenous people being forced to accept conquest peacefully or be killed, 
and being so-called-irrational and barbaric as they were, the creation of 
subjectivity came after they were discarded of consciousness, when they 
were treated as bodies eligible for physical death or enslavement. On the one 
hand, this process of subjectification, having already denied indigenous 
people human rationality and consciousness, in fact reduced them to the 
colonizers’ personal property. On the other hand, the Requerimiento and the 
laws dictating the Christian way of conversion hailed the natives as subjects 
of salvation: “we bring you the gift of Christ’s blood,” accept and be saved. 
Salvation also had a much a darker underside: negate the gift and your life 
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and freedom are no more. Other scenarios of conquest can be thought 
about as historical moments inventing the irrationality and inferiority of the 
Indians, but the scenes of the Requerimiento already presumed they were 
irrational and then made them inferior precisely because they were alive. 
What was primarily under threat was the physical life of the Indian when the 
native body became the target for murder in the name of Christ.  At the very 
moments when the invading Christians spoke to the natives on native land 
to give them the option of salvation or heathen destruction, their hate 
speech act masquerading as love speech made indigenous people the 
embodiment of Fanonian damnation.  
The pairing of irrationality with corporeality exemplifies Wynter’s 
arguments regarding the shift in the ordering of the world after Europe’s 
expansion into América.  If “the primacy of the anatomical model of sexual 
difference as the referential mode of mimetic ordering” shifted towards “that 
of the physiognomic model of racial/cultural difference,” then it becomes 
evident that after 1492 the racialized body became the centerpiece around 
which the world turns (Wynter 1990, 358; emphasis in the original). The 
shift in the body’s meaning from male/female to European/native, she says, 
is dramatized most clearly in a figure staged by Shakespeare’s play.  
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Theorizing the creation of Caliban as a native subject of the Americas, 
however, requires engaging with two mammoth-sized dramatic traditions 
that are intimately inclusive of each other: modernity and coloniality. In the 
tradition of modernity, Shakespeare’s The Tempest stages the discovery of a 
new world by Prospero and his dominion over the island’s native inhabitants 
–human, divine and magical alike. Prospero’s very own version of the 
Conquest of the New World ends on a good note: he forgives his 
monarchical family for turning him over to the Inquisition and robbing him 
of his royal titles, blesses his daughter’s marriage to his nephew, and 
continues to rule over Caliban and the island as his personal property. 
Forgiveness and a blessed marriage foreground the play’s last scene, where 
Prospero still owns Caliban as his slave. Rodolfo Usigli (1950) has already 
reminded us that Shakespeare was not set up to challenge Europe’s 
possession and enslavement of the New World, nor to offer critical insight 
into the very real catastrophes that propelled 17th-century Europe to reach 
political and cultural prominence.  In the tradition of coloniality, Aimé 
Césaire rewrites Caliban for the 20th-century stage in A Tempest, where the 
darker side of the Renaissance play takes precedence. The stage is set for a 
Black theatre of anticolonialism: Caliban is now a black slave who curses 
Prospero in his native language, denies his attempted rape of Miranda, and 
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re-negotiates his subjection to white men in exchange for Prospero’s death. 
Most importantly, Césaire’s Caliban is willing to sacrifice his own life if that 
is the price he must pay to be free from bondage. That is the key difference 
between the two plays: Shakespeare’s could not fathom the day where the 
slave would possess enough cognitive skills to think freely; Césaire’s takes 
the experience of slavery as the epistemic grounds where Caliban can push 
towards a humanity acting out a full-fledged freedom.  
Neither Shakespeare’s colonialism nor Césaire’s colonial difference, 
however, gives Caliban his freedom when both plays leave him to slavery. I 
see Caliban positioned at an impossible crux in these scenes staging the slave 
first as an irrational native under colonial rule and then as a rational agent of 
anticolonial freedom. If Shakespeare could not imagine a possible world 
without bondage, then this tragic flaw is reproduced when Césaire rehearses 
that same tragedy in an attempt to make Caliban fully human but is not able 
to actively create said freedom. The anticolonial impulse to revisit the 
archive and bring Caliban back to human life, I argue, is constricted by the 
very archive and theatrical tradition Césaire’s play wished to radicalize. 
Shakespeare and Césaire perform on the same stage of 
coloniality/modernity, a complicity that works to the detriment of the native 
left to live in damnation and forever desiring to be free.  
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The plays’ collusion in producing this ideology of native subjectivity is 
best understood by tracing the primal scenes of colonial invention that both 
Shakespeare and Césaire rehearse. In the first scene, Caliban becomes a slave 
with the help of the devil. He is, according to Prospero, “[a] poisonous slave, 
got by the devil himself” (TT 18). He is “not honored with a human shape” 
(16) because his mother’s involvement with the devil made him of a 
materiality far different from those beings who did have a human shape. 
Since his mother was a witch and his father the devil, his body cannot 
possibly be human. He is first condemned to slavery after he tried “to violate 
the honor of [Prospero’s] child” and “[people] this isle with Calibans” (19); 
his first threat laid in the biology of his human physique. Caliban’s body 
posed a threat in that he could procreate with the white man’s daughter and 
populate the island with creatures closer in material essence to him –and the 
devil– than to Prospero himself. Sex between Miranda and the devil’s child 
would people the island with more devil-like life forms and would eradicate 
any possibility of creating a world in the white man’s image of the human. 
Caliban’s failed attempt at raping Miranda occurs before both plays take 
place, and the encounters between the two characters thereafter only reify 
the girl’s disgust at the slave without Miranda ever saying anything about 
Caliban’s violence. Evidently, Prospero’s citations of his sexual transgression 
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and his inhuman nature are evidence enough to reduce Caliban “[to a] hard 
rock, whiles [keeping him] from the rest o’ th’ island” (19).  
Biology alone doesn’t determine Caliban’s ontological inferiority and 
sexual undesirability. The slave’s difference is also placed beyond the world 
of reason. Miranda doesn’t lash out in a defense of her honor as Prospero’s 
child after Caliban confesses his goals in wanting to rape her. Instead, her 
anger is directed at the nature of the slave’s “vile race”: 
MIRANDA:   Abhorrèd slave,  
 Which any print of goodness wilt not take, 
 Being capable of all ill. I pitied thee, 
 Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour 
 One thing or other. When thou didst not (savage) 
 Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like 
 A thing most brutish, I endowed thy purposes 
 With words that made them known. But thy vile race, 
 Though thou didst learn, had that in’t which good 
natures  
 Could not abide to be with; therefore was thou 
 Deservedly confined into this rock, 
 Who hadst deserved more than a prison.  
CALIBAN 
 You taught me language, and my profit on’t  
 Is, I know how to curse. The red plague rid you 
 For learning me your language! (TT 19). 
 
Miranda teaches Caliban how to speak, bringing him the gift of language 
because she pitied his “savage” and “brutish” existence where he could not 
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possibly “know thine own meaning.”12 Gifting Caliban with knowledge itself 
endowed him with the words necessary to find a purpose, which was not 
existent before Miranda because he was living a life that was ignorant of its 
own meaning. As a pedagogue, Miranda uses Caliban as the testing site for 
measuring the natives’ abilities to move in the direction of “goodness” and 
“good natures,” or to continue being that vile race “capable of all ill.” The 
underlying assumption behind her pedagogical project is that the natives are 
an ill-begotten race from the start, but they are acting brutishly out of an 
ignorance that could possibly be alleviated with the colonizers’ knowledge. 
Her words imply that the end result of her project was to prove whether or 
not the natives were capable of being good or were inherently evil. If they 
were able to be pitied upon, it meant they could be reached through her 
good nature. The natives’ will to accept the gift of language and speak their 
purpose in life would measure their abilities to recognize that the 
pedagogue’s way to goodness was logically the best way to not live a vile and 
evil existence. That moment of recognition –not rejecting the gift– would be 
evidence enough to prove that the natives were capable of reason and could 
follow in the likes of the good Christians.   
                                                
12 This scene changes in A Tempest, where it is Prospero who teaches Caliban his language, 
and Caliban completely denies the attempted rape. “Let me tell you something: I couldn’t 
care less about your daughter,” he tells Prospero (AT 19). 
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Caliban does learn and willingly accepts the gift of reason and 
salvation from his brutish existence, but his vile race overtakes the good 
natures that accompanied his teacher’s language. He fails the test. He learned 
the language of his masters not to play at being good-natured like them, but 
to curse the red plague upon them for having made him to learn their 
language. Now capable of speech, his vile race prevails at the cognitive level, 
and he refuses to be like them by consciously uttering words meant to 
destroy Miranda and Prospero. Caliban’s submission to colonial pedagogy 
was in reality a strategic acceptance of the gift of language and Christian 
reason. His life was already endowed with a purpose before they came to tell 
him he had no reason to live without them. His agenda was to rid himself of 
those who came to colonize his island and his life. In turn, his betrayal of the 
Christians’ reason proves to them that it is not possible for the native to 
possess a proper rationale. The attempted rape of the girl proves that 
Caliban was not capable of being good. Rather than allowing him to be free 
to destroy them, either through the red plague or by copulating with the girl, 
Prospero chains him to a rock where he can be watched and controlled at all 
times.  
 Prospero was able to keep his daughter’s sexual purity in tact when he 
prevented him from reproducing with his daughter. Miranda’s body, 
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uncontaminated by Caliban’s sex, still personifies the good that he could not 
achieve by measure of his savage nature. Thus, her pure and good Christian 
body becomes the tool used by Prospero to measure and inhibit Caliban’s 
access to humanity: sexually violating what is most pure and good on the 
island meant that he could go against the humanity of the Christians and 
destroy the very embodiment of reason and goodness. Since both The 
Tempest and A Tempest cite the attempted rape of the white woman as the last 
element used to determine the bonding of Caliban to a rock, Miranda’s 
sexual purity becomes the standard against which the slave’s humanity was 
measured. Had he not wished to violate her body, he would’ve remained a 
child-like creature on his way to adulthood endowed with reason and a 
purpose for good. When Miranda falls in love with Ferdinand, Prospero 
again uses her body to establish Caliban’s inferiority:  
PROSPERO:  Silence! One word more 
 Shall make me chide thee, if not hate thee. What, 
 An advocate for an imposter? Hush! 
 Thou think’st there is no more such shapes as he, 
 Having seen but him and Caliban. Foolish wench, 
 To th’ most of men this is a Caliban, 
 And they to him are angels (TT 24). 
 
He reprimands Miranda’s instant desire for Ferdinand, using his reprimand 
to express his animosity towards the prince for being of higher standing on 
the royal hierarchy. At the same time, the policing of the woman’s desire 
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serves a different purpose. Prospero’s denouncement also rejects her 
attraction for Ferdinand because he’s closer to Caliban in his beastly essence 
than he is to other European men in their angelic one. Ferdinand’s 
undesirability is akin to Caliban’s monstrosity and his status as a slave, 
making him unworthy of Prospero’s daughter. More importantly, Prospero’s 
comparison of the prince with the slave establishes Caliban’s absolute lack of 
access to humanity. Ferdinand is an average human being who is like a 
Caliban when he is compared to angels, and Caliban is even less than human 
and further away from angelic in his bestial essence. Woman’s sex is what 
Prospero uses to establish the racial make up and desirability of men, and 
Caliban is deemed to be less than an undesirable human for the white man’s 
daughter.  
 Caliban challenges his monstrosity and Prospero’s sovereignty over 
the island by making claims to a native sovereignty inherited from Sycorax, 
his mother. When his master summons him to the stage, he answers by 
dismissing Prospero’s very presence on his island: 
CALIBAN:    I must eat my dinner. 
 This island’s mine by Sycorax my mother, 
 Thou strok’st me and made much of me; wouldst give 
me 
 Water with berries in’t; and teach me how  
 To name the bigger light, and how the less, 
 That burn by day and night. And then I loved thee 
 And showed thee all the qualities o’ th’ isle, 
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 The fresh springs, brine-pits, barren place and fertile. 
 Cursèd be that I did so! All the charms  
 Of Sycorax –toads, beetles, bats– light on you! 
 For I am all the subjects that you have, 
 Which first was mine own king; and here you sty me 
 In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me 
 The rest o’ th’ island (TT 18). 
 
He establishes himself as a native subject and legitimate sovereign of the 
island in the same scene where the language of white pedagogy and sexuality 
instructs him to be a savage, a slave and the devil’s child of a vile race. The 
native’s language is entirely anti-white: he uses his mother’s language and her 
gods to curse the colonizers of his island for having enslaved him and taught 
him their language. Slavery makes Caliban no subject at all, so his claim to 
native subjectivity is inherited from the dead witch mother who is also the 
rightful ruler of the island. Laying claims to a maternal inheritance endows 
Caliban with yet another purpose: “Without [Prospero]? I’d be the king, 
that’s what I’d be, the King of the Island. The King of the Island given me 
by my mother, Sycorax” (AT 17). There are two opposing ideologies of 
power at play here: Prospero’s colonial domination that is legitimated 
through reason and goodness, and Caliban’s sovereignty over himself and 
the island that is legitimated through the mother’s access to both magic and 
nature. Prospero’s reign over reason goes against Sycorax’s reign over 
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nature, and only the latter’s will make Caliban a sovereign native subject of 
freedom not bound to a hard rock. 
 Caliban tries to regain his freedom from prospero by negotiating his 
subordination to two other white men: Trinculo, the jester, and Stephano, 
the drunken butler. Trinculo first encounters the slave under a cloak, hiding 
from the rain in The Tempest: 
TRINCULO: What have we here? A man or a fish? Dead or 
 alive? A fish: he smells like a fish; a very ancient and 
 fishlike smell… A strange fish. Were I in England now 
 (as once I was) and had but this fish painted, not a 
 holiday fool there but would give a piece of silver. There 
 would this monster make a man; any strange beast 
 there makes a man. When they will give a do it to relieve 
 a lame beggar, they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian. 
 Legged like a man, and his fins like arms… this is no 
 fish, but an islander… (TT 37). 
 
Moments later, Caliban awakes scared by Stephano and asks him to not 
torment him. Stephano, for his part, becomes stupefied when the monster 
talks to him in his language. 
STEPHANO: What’s the matter? Have we devils here? Do you 
 put tricks upon’s with savages and men of Ind? I have 
 not scaped drowning to be afeard now of your four legs; 
 for it hath been said, “As proper a man as ever went on 
 four legs, cannot make him give ground”… This is some 
 monster of the isle with four legs, who hath got, as I take 
 it, an ague. Where the devil should he learn our 
 language? I will give him some relief if it be but for that. 
 If I can recover him, and keep him tame, and get to 
 Naples with him, he’s a present for any emperor that 
 ever trod on neat’s leather (TT 38). 
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Thinking Caliban dead, Trinculo’s first instinct is to make a profit by 
capturing him and selling him in a land where “they will lay out ten [pieces 
of silver] to see a dead Indian.” Thinking Caliban is a four-legged monster 
and a savage man of India, Stephano wants to capture him and take him 
back to Italy where he can gift him to an emperor. The discovery of the 
Indian reduces the islander to a monstrosity that is ready to be captured, 
tamed and sold on a market where his difference will make his European 
capturers a profit. The Indian’s difference is given a monetary value based 
on the visuality of his body: Trinculo wants to earn ten pieces of silver in 
exchange for letting the English see a dead Indian, and Stephano wants to 
make good with an emperor by giving him a four-legged monster from the 
island as a present. His exhibition is even more prevalent in Césaire’s play, 
where Trinculo is more explicit in stating his plan to “make him [his] 
prisoner and take him back to Europe [and] sell him to a carnival, [maybe] 
show him at fairs.” Stephano, for his part, finds “an authentic Nindian from 
the Caribbean” that can make him a fortune “if [he] showed him at a 
carnival” (AT 40-42). Difference is coded only as far as the European men 
can see, and what their eyes can’t comprehend they deem a spectacular 
monstrosity. Race is again constituted through exhibition for the sake of 
exhibition itself when Caliban is made a spectacular Indian. His indigeneity is 
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of a monstrous essence and a materiality/visuality beyond the white men’s 
human reason. 
 The white men see him and call him a “moon-calf,” “a howling 
monster” and “a drunken monster,” but what Caliban sees in them are 
beings “dropped from heaven” itself: 
CALIBAN: Hast thou not dropped from heaven?...   
 I’ll kiss thy foot. I’ll swear myself thy subject…  
I’ll show you thee the best springs; I’ll pluck thee berries; 
 I’ll fish for thee, and get thee wood enough.  
 A plague upon the tyrant that I serve! 
 I’ll bear him no more sticks, but follow thee,  
 Thou wondrous man. 
 … 
 No more dams I’ll make for fish, 
 Nor fetch in firing 
 At requiring, 
 Nor scrape trencher, nor wash dish, 
  Ban, ban, Ca-caliban 
 Has a new master: get a new man. 
 Freedom, high-day, high-day freedom, freedom high-
 day, freedom (TT 40, 41). 
 
Beastiality, the desire between the essence of humanity (whiteness) and the 
materiality of the subhuman (beast/native subject), is entirely at play when 
the native subject negotiates his access to freedom under the system of racial 
slavery that in actuality denies him ontological privilege. The scene of 
subjection establishes the racial difference as a mode of exotic gaze and 
colonial exhibition: he’s closer to fish and deformed cow fetuses and they 
closer to divine forms. Always beyond what the white men can access and 
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comprehend as a part of themselves, Caliban is beyond humanity. He is an 
animal they see in his natural habitat, so they decide they can capture him 
and sell his body at carnivals, freak shows and royal audiences abroad. This 
doubling of exhibition, first on the island and then in the continent of 
Europe, makes Caliban twice removed from the ontological spheres 
inhabited by his white masters. Ironically, Caliban sees freedom and 
salvation from Prospero’s oppression in this possibility of double exhibition. 
He positions himself as the servant of these two men dropped from heaven 
in exchange for his freedom from bondage under Prospero’s tyranny of 
magic. The option for a different kind of subjection under their plans to 
exhibit him turns into an opportunity for Caliban to negotiate his 
enslavement on his own terms. In A Tempest he goes as far as telling his new 
masters that he wishes to completely destroy Prospero. Freedom from his 
first master requires the slave’s submission to another one, so in reality his 
plan of action was not freedom at all. Caliban would still remain bound to a 
hard rock, only the chains binding him would change.   
 The visualization of the native’s embodied racial difference makes him 
eligible for exposition as well as salvation from his demonic condition. 
Césaire rehearses the Requerimiento when he writes a scene that is entirely 
absent in the original Tempest. In the scene, King Alonso and his royal 
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counselor come to celebrate the Miranda’s union with Ferdinand, but when 
they see “the strangest creature [they’ve both] ever seen,” the celebration 
turns into the damnation of Caliban by way of a failed conversion.  
ALONSO (Indicating Caliban): That is the strangest creature I’ve 
 ever seen! 
PROSPERO: And the most devilish too! 
GONZALO: What’s that? Devilish! You’ve reprimanded him, 
 preached at  him, you’ve ordered and made him obey 
 and you say he is still indomitable! 
PROSPERO: Honest Gonzalo, it is as I have said. 
GONZALO: Well –and forgive me, counselor, if I give counsel– 
 on the basis of my long experience the only thing left is 
 exorcism. “Begone, unclean spirit, in the name of the 
 Father, of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.” That’s all 
 there is to it.  
  (Caliban bursts out laughing.) 
 You were absolutely right! And more so than you 
 thought… He’s not just a rebel, he’s a real tough 
 customer! (To Caliban.) So much the worse for you, my 
 friend. I have tried to save you. I give up. I leave you to 
 the secular arm! (AT 60). 
 
Caliban is the devil’s child who must be saved, and if not saved, then 
enslaved or destroyed. Prospero orders Ariel to bring Caliban to him after he 
foils the plans to kill him and place Stephano on the throne. The slave’s 
rebellion is another citation of Caliban’s betrayal, since Prospero tells him 
that he only wished to make a man out of the monster and failed. Rebellion 
is grounds for further punishment, because Prospero has failed to contain 
Caliban’s savagery and turn him into a human being. The monster’s body is 
exhibited as proof of his disobedience and his inhuman nature, two things 
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which Alonso and Gonzalo are astonished to see materialize in front of 
them. Gonzalo’s immediate response to his vision of the devil incarnate 
takes punishment to where Prospero has not succeeded: conquering the 
slave’s indomitable spirit who wishes to be free. Gonzalo’s and Prospero’s 
exorcism is essentially a reenactment of the Requerimiento: the latter 
preached reason to Caliban in the name of humanity’s goodness, the former 
tries to bring the gift of spiritual salvation by exorcising him of the devil 
inside. The attempt to save Caliban’s spirit through religious rites proves that 
not only is Caliban irrational because he rejects the gift, he’s also damned in 
spirit. In the eyes of the European religious saviors, the beast is beyond 
salvation. This denial of spiritual salvation goes on par with their denial of 
Caliban’s life and freedom. Gonzalo’s love speech offering the black slave 
the gift of the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit quickly turns into hate speech 
when the offer is rejected. He leaves the native “to the secular arm” when 
his attempted exorcism fails, suggesting that he cannot be saved in spirit nor 
in physical life, which can now be ended under military law. Racial 
subjection, in Caliban’s case, encompasses both spiritual and embodied 
damnation.  
Caliban rejects Gonzalo’s brand of salvation is rejected because it was 
no salvation at all and it would nevertheless leave the black Caliban enslaved 
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even if his exorcism had succeeded. Beyond the reach of both racial 
salvation and freedom, however, Caliban still very much desires freedom. He 
explains the terms under which he can achieve this in yet another scene that 
is absent in the original manuscript. In A Tempest, before the black slave 
rejects the Christian gift, he and Ariel fight it out in the colony to see whose 
vision of freedom is more sustainable.  
ARIEL: Poor Caliban, you’re doomed. You know that you aren’t 
 the stronger, you’ll never be the stronger. What good 
 will it do you to struggle? 
CALIBAN: And what about you? What good has your obedience 
 don you, your Uncle Tom patience and your sucking up 
 to him. The man’s just getting more demanding and 
 despotic day by day.  
ARIEL: Well, I’ve at least achieved one thing: he’s promised me 
  my freedom. In the distant future, of course, but it’s the 
  first time he’s actually committed himself.  
CALIBAN: Talk’s cheap! He’ll promise you a thousand times and 
 take it back a thousand times. Anyway, tomorrow 
 doesn’t interest me. What I want is (Shouting) Freedom 
 Now! … The stronger? How do you know that? 
 Weakness always has a thousand ways and cowardice is 
 all that keeps us from listing them.   
ARIEL: I don’t believe in violence.  
CALIBAN: What do you believe in, then? In cowardice? In 
 giving up? In kneeling and groveling? That’s it, someone 
 strikes you on the right cheek and you offer the left. 
 Someone kicks you on the left buttock and you turn the 
 right… that way there’s no jealousy. Well, that’s not 
 Caliban’s way… 
ARIEL: You know very well that’s not what I mean. No 
 violence, no  submission either. Listen to me: Prospero 
 is the one we’ve got to change. Destroy his serenity so 
 that he’s finally forced to acknowledge his own injustice 
 and put an end to it … I’m not fighting just for my 
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 freedom, for our freedom, but for Prospero’s too, so that 
 Prospero can acquire a conscience. Help me, Caliban.  
CALIBAN: Listen, kid, sometimes I wonder if you aren’t a little 
 bit nuts. So that Prospero can acquire a conscience? You 
 might as well ask a  stone to grow flowers.  
ARIEL: I don’t know what to do with you. I’ve often had this 
 inspiring, uplifting dream that one day Prospero, you, 
 me, we would all three set out, like brothers, to build a 
 wonderful world, each one contributing his own special 
 thin: patience, vitality, love, willpower too, and rigor, not 
 to mention the dreams without which mankind would 
 perish.  
CALIBAN: You don’t understand a thing about Prospero. He’s 
 not the collaborating type. He’s a guy who only feels 
 something when he’s wiped someone out. A crusher, a 
 pulverizer, that’s what he is! And you talk about 
 brotherhood! 
ARIEL: So then what’s left? War? And you know that when it 
 comes to that, Prospero’s invincible.  
CALIBAN: Better death than humiliation and injustice. Anyhow, 
 I’m going to have the last word. Unless nothingness has 
 it. The day when I begin to feel that everything’s lost, 
 just let me get hold of a few barrels of your infernal 
 power and as you fly around up there in your blue skies 
 you’ll see this island, my inheritance, my work, all blown 
 to smithereens… and, I trust, Prospero and me with it. I 
 hope you’ll like the fireworks display –it’ll be signed 
 Caliban.  
ARIEL: Each of us marches to his own drum. You follow yours. 
 I follow the beat of mine. I wish you courage, brother.  
CALIBAN: Farewell, Ariel, my brother, and good luck   
  (AT 27-28). 
 
This is a scene entirely about competing notions of racial freedom: Ariel 
wants to appeal to Prospero’s consciousness (or lack thereof) so that 
Prospero can undo his injustices and the three of them can create a new 
world. Caliban’s freedom from bondage could come at the expense of 
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destroying entire worlds, both theirs and Prospero’s. For Ariel, freedom is a 
new relationality between the conqueror and his slaves: love is the way to go, 
but this form of love cannot account for the undoing of freedom and the 
processes by which they were denied it in the first place. With a relationality 
based on love in place, un-freedom will simply be put behind as the three 
men make a new world where slavery and bondage never existed. Ariel’s 
futurity cannot or will not account for the original unmaking of the native 
into a mongrel. The future of life between racialized beings in the colony, 
according to the mulatto slave, resides is a distant time in the distant where 
his master might give him his freedom from slavery. Even though he wants 
to make race in a future possibly free from bondage under Prospero, he 
doesn’t see freedom possible in the present. That time of race is not what 
matters to the black slave, who’s only interested in the here and now. What 
Caliban wants is racial freedom without having to wait until their master 
agrees to give it to him. Racial freedom can only come today, when it 
matters most because it is at this point in time that their lives are being 
threatened, making the future an unlikely possibility should Prospero 
continue making them his slaves. Ariel’s wishful desire for Prospero to give 
them freedom leaves their future in the hands of the master, which also 
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leaves the slaves’ future of tomorrow in the trenches of slavery and racial 
bondage. His freedom is potentially not at all.  
For Caliban, the future of tomorrow depends on creating their own 
freedom now because it goes against Prospero’s colonizing nature to create 
it for them. Speaking from the time of slavery, he sees no possible salvation 
in that brand of freedom from colonial bondage and consciously chooses 
death over humiliation and injustice. If their humanity continues to be 
denied to them, the natives’ only hope left for salvation is to blow the island 
to smithereens with him and Prospero still on it.13 His impulse towards 
destruction is a mimicry of the Fanonian moment of decolonization: Ariel is 
anti-violence and, well, that is not Caliban’s way. The temporality of racial 
freedom that Caliban wishes to create is the same movement towards the 
undoing of colonialism and the making of blackness into humanity that 
Fanon calls for in The Wretched of the Earth. For Fanon, proof of the success 
of national liberation or decolonization movements only “lies in a social 
fabric that has been changed inside out,” and this “change” is quite simply 
“always a violent event” (Fanon 1961, 1). Both Fanon and Caliban see racial 
freedom and violence as part of the same project of emancipation: 
                                                
13 Neither Ariel nor Caliban makes a place for Miranda, or any other woman, in their 
plans for a future free of racial bondage. Their ideas on the futurity of race can only be 
put into action in a homosocial world where freedom exists among men in the absence of 
women.   
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unfreedom, slavery and racial bondage can only be undone in the present for 
the sake of a future where colonialism and the unmaking of humanity are 
not the order of the day. In the terrain of colonialism, there is no freedom 
without violence. A set of questions then arise regarding the nature of the 
violence that is inherent to Caliban’s decolonizing moves: what kind of 
terror is rehearsed when colonialism is being undone? To what extent is 
Caliban’s way itself caught within a discourse where relationality is always-
already anti-relational? Can Caliban give us a way out of tragedy so that life 
can exist anew now and in the future? In other words, just what is the future 
of race and relationality when the beast decides to act out his imaginary of 
decolonization? Ariel doesn’t want war because war will end everything, 
including their own lives. Caliban sees war as the only answer possible, even 
if “this island, [his] inheritance, [his] work, all blown to smithereens” is all 
that will be left. Caliban’s freedom would mean death. 
Césaire’s introduction of this question on the temporality of race and 
freedom is a correlative to Shakespeare’s limited engagement with the 
tragedy of conquest that invented the natives as subjects worthy of 
extermination. Consciously or not, Shakespeare’s play functions as a 
documentation of how the invention of America took place in the 17th-
century. After all, the man wrote down the experiences of slavery and 
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conquest in a manuscript quite literally providing the directions for a 
rehearsal of these historical experiences and events. When the Martiniquan 
playwright rewrites The Tempest, the original manuscript essentially becomes 
an archive documenting those events where the inhabitants of the New 
World were reduced to a materiality that was not human. The scene of the 
Requerimiento, with Caliban’s rejection of the Christian love speech act and 
the resulting acts of hate speech, is a transgression on the original document 
that corrects Shakespeare’s limited knowledge of tragedy. Most importantly, 
the scenes staging the discussion of racial freedom in terms of temporality 
push beyond the archive to provide us with a possible history of the present. 
Shakespeare’s Caliban was left in the 17th-century as a barbarian that could 
never possibly think of being free because he was without human reason. 
Césaire writes him back into the 20th-century to stake a claim against this 
denial of rationality and resist Prospero until the end of time.  
A Tempest closes with the two of them caught in a war until death do 
them part: 
PROSPERO: And now, Caliban, it’s you and me!  
What I have to tell you will be brief: 
ten times, a hundred times, I’ve tried to save you, 
above all from yourself. 
But you have always answered me with wrath and 
venom, 
like the possum that pulls itself up by its own tail 
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the better to bite the hand that tears it from the 
darkness.  
Well, my boy, I shall set aside my indulgent nature 
And henceforth I will answer your violence 
with violence! 
 
(Time passes, symbolized by the curtain’s being lowered 
halfway and reraised. In semi-darkness Prospero appears, 
aged and weary. His gestures are jerky and automatic, his 
speech weak, toneless, trite.) 
 
Well, Caliban, old fellow, it’s just us two now, here on 
 the island… only you and me. You and me. You-me… 
 me-you! What in the hell is up to? (Shouting) Caliban! 
 
(In the distance, above the sound of the surf and the chirping 
of the birds, we hear snatches of Caliban’s song:) 
 
CALIBAN: FREEDOM HI-DAY! FREEDOM HI-DAY!  
   (AT 66). 
 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest and Césaire’s A Tempest are scenarios of conquest 
rehearsing the processes by which the natives as invented as a racial subjects 
worthy only of damnation. The difference between their two traditions lies 
in the crux between modernity/coloniality and anticolonialism: the first one 
creates them as incapable of escaping damnation, but with Césaire, they at 
least shout their desire to be free. As time goes on, the conqueror is stuck 
repeating the duality of “only you and me. You and me. You-me.. me-you!” 
The conquered closes the play with a desire, a will, and a performance of 
“FREEDOM.” The time of the conquest, in other words, is essentially a 
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tragic modality that forever repeats itself and circumscribes the native 
subject within this same temporality.  
Freedom and its performative desire undoes this tragic mode of 
temporal existence when the last word is uttered by Caliban. The utterance 
of Caliban’s “FREEDOM HI-DAY!” is evidence of the monster’s racial 
performativity as he actively seeks a way out of tragic conquest. The slave, in 
the end, seeks a way out and a path towards achieving his freedom. The 
curtain drops on the anticolonial stage, and the last word belongs to the 
slave: he wants to be free. For Fanon, the definition of decolonization can 
only “be summed up in the well-known words: ‘The last shall be the first’” 
(1961, 2). Caliban’s desire for freedom, expressed in the lyrics to his song, is 
a speech act of decolonization. The anticolonial desire to reach for freedom, 
beyond the cites/sites of damnation found in the archive, is the Césaire’s 
first step towards decoloniality.  
 
 
2nd Rehearsal :  Freedom 
  
  For Wynter, The Tempest is a dramatization of the shifting of sociality 
from sexual to racial difference that took place with the discovery of the 
Americas. This mutation of the social world is most clearly played out in 
Caliban’s subjection to both Miranda and Prospero: 
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Caliban [was] an incarnation of a new category of the human, 
that of subordinated “irrational” and “savage” native […] now 
constituted as the lack of the “rational” Prospero, and the now 
capable-or-rationality-Miranda, by the Otherness of his/its 
physiognomic “monster” difference, a difference which now takes 
the coding role of sexual-anatomic difference, with the latter 
now made into a mimetic parallel effect of the former, and as 
such a member of the set of differences of which the former 
has now become the primary “totemic operator” (Wynter 1990, 
358). 
 
Caliban’s attempted rape and his resulting slavery deny the native both 
humanity and masculinity when heterosexual copulation is prohibited. Since 
and the only sexual relationship allowed is that of Miranda and Ferdinand, 
Caliban’s slavery also denied him access to a masculinity that could be 
heterosexual and interracial. His existence within “the global order that [was] 
put into place following upon the 1492 arrival of Columbus in the 
Caribbean” (360) meant his desire could not be mapped onto the colonial 
world because he had no female equal with which to fulfill his 
heterosexuality and masculinity. Just as important, Caliban’s unfulfilled 
desire for a mate also meant that no other being existed for him to have sex 
and procreate with. Indeed, “Caliban’s ‘Woman’” was “the ontologically 
absent genitrix –Caliban’s mate– of another population of the human” (360).  
 As Wynter’s logic goes, Caliban’s first act of rebellion was his attempt 
at reproducing himself and his vile race by impregnating Miranda. By 
protecting her, Prospero and Ferdinand prevented her becoming “the 
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potential genitrix of a ‘race’ which” could’ve inherit the monster’s “purely 
sensory nature” should Caliban have succeeded in producing his progeny 
(Wynter 1990, 361). The absence of Caliban’s woman ensures that he can 
never produce a group made of the same irrational materiality as his own. 
Denying him access to biological reproduction further negates ontological 
privilege to Caliban and those made in his image, insuring that only those 
made in the image of Prospero and Miranda can legitimately desire and 
possess reason. The silencing of a Caliban’s Woman framed the category of 
the human in light of an oppressive regime of colonialism. Black and 
Caribbean women writers, she says, offer an alternative mode of being 
human by asserting new models of cognition. As the inheritors of a legacy of 
conquest, they write within a mode of speech that makes present “that 
[original] absence of speech both as women (masculinist discourse) and as 
‘native’ women (feminist discourse)” (365). Wynter’s brand of decoloniality 
espoused in her argument makes black and Caribbean women into the 
embodiment of “Caliban’s ‘Woman’” and the ideological mates with which 
to reproduce his ontological condition, but with a difference. Rather than 
being his progeny denied ontological privilege by slavery and whiteness, the 
“demonic model” of Caliban’s Woman is that cognitive imperative to 
produce an episteme (364). These women’s episteme is demonic because it 
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takes place despite their being placed in ontological inferiority to Western 
knowledge. Claiming a kind of native sovereignty over epistemology in the 
New World, these women exist at the limits of a Postcoloniality that doesn’t 
take gender into account, and at the limits of a Western feminism that 
doesn’t account for race as well as gender and sexual difference. Caliban’s 
progeny is indeed demonic: Black and Caribbean women embody native life 
forms endowed with reason, and it is within reason that are set to remake 
the category of the human and restore Caliban to ontological and 
epistemological privilege.  
 Wynter’s essay and her long history of intellectual work has been 
foundational to generations of postcolonial and feminist theorists, including 
my own. The radicality of her work, particularly in “Beyond Miranda’s 
Meanings,” lies in the potential for theorizing the human outside of a 
humanity conditioned through colonial relations. The potential of Caliban’s 
Woman is her episteme’s correlative to Eurocentric philosophies denying 
race ontology and epistemology. As Caliban’s equal, Caliban’s Woman also 
exists in the racial formations that invented Caliban in the first place, but in 
producing a speech act from the historical absence of their speech, they are 
positioned lower on the scale of humanity that colonialism put in place. If 
Caliban had no reason or humanity, and Caliban’s Woman is entirely absent 
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even in Caliban’s world, then native women were further denied their 
humanity because they did not exist at all in Shakespeare’s Renaissance 
imaginary nor Césaire’s Anticolonialism. Speaking from the limits of 
modernity and coloniality, Caliban’s Woman is a radical speech act of race, 
otherwise.  
 What is also evident in Wynter’s decolonial imaginary is that she is 
theorizing both race and gender as strictly heterosexual when she reduces 
women –native women in particular– to their sex. Caliban’s Woman can 
only exist because she says Caliban needed a mate with which to biologically 
reproduce. Native women be capable of reason and brought to life only if 
they are heterosexual women desiring to copulate with Caliban, and willing 
to employ their uterus in the slave’s plan to “[people] this isle with Calibans” 
(TT 19). Wynter’s imaginary of racial, sexual and gender relations is founded 
on these women’s cognitive abilities to think and be at the limits of the 
colonial order of things, but it doesn’t make it possible for 
colonial/postcolonial women to also act and be with the same radical 
potential. Caliban’s Woman thinks at the limits, but her body is still bound to 
these limits; she does not perform her ontology, she thinks it. Just as 
importantly, she leaves native women partaking in the same ciclicity of tragic 
time that Caliban lives in. As his progeny and progenitors, native women are 
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bound to relive the tragedy Shakespeare and Césaire tell us is the only future 
possible. Decoloniality, in this scenario, does not mean that freedom for the 
damned can be achieved yet.  
 A correlative to Wynter and Caliban’s tragic time is a gift that comes 
to the damned in the hands of Migdalia Cruz, one of today’s most prolific 
and widely produced Latina playwrights. Previous studies of Cruz’s work 
have emphasized the abundance of women’s lives conditioned by violence, 
sexuality, desire, and race.14  Fur (1997) is exemplary of this discourse in that 
the plays’ protagonists exist in a deadly triangle of love, racial bondage, and 
sexual desire. In the play, Michael is a white man who buys a beast, Citrona, 
and imprisons her in a cage where Nena, a hairless Latina with a beautiful 
face, feeds her the animals she has trapped. Michael desires the beast, 
Citrona falls in love with Nena, and Nena desperately wants Michael to 
desire her beautiful body instead. The simplicity of the storyline betrays the 
complexity of Fur’s intertextuality, as the play is seemingly inspired by the 
colonialism of Shakespeare’s 17th-century and Césaire’s anticolonialism in the 
20th-century. No study of her oeuvre, however, has yet to address the 
Latina’s stage haunted by Caliban’s legacy condemning blackness to a thing 
                                                
14 Tiffany Ana López (2000) has written of the persistent connections between 
community formations and the perpetration of violence on Latina women’s bodies 
throughout Cruz’s plays. Most recently, Analola Santana (2009) has theorized the place of 
agency and love in two of these plays, Miriam’s Flowers and Fur. Santana’s is the only essay 
published to date that focuses on Fur. 
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of damnation. I locate Fur’s potential to perform a decolonial imaginary 
precisely when and where Wynter cannot: Citrona is bound to tragedy by her 
masters, but when she sees her body’s right to love constricted even when 
she’s let out of her cage, she kills the ones who imprisoned her inside it and 
only then is she completely free. In Citrona, what we have is a Caliban who 
sees the option for racial salvation through cannibalism. The beast 
cannibalizes both her white master and the other colonial subject after 
Michael makes it clearly evident that same sex love between the two Latinas 
is an impossible desire. Her only access to freedom from colonial terror is to 
not speak at all, but to shatter the speech act and lash out in a savage 
vengeance. Freedom, I argue, means the ability to perform ontology without 
and outside of subalternity.  
 The curtain rises on Fur’s stage with Michael and Nena inside “a 
sideshow carnival tent [and sitting] in front of a moving image of sideshow 
freaks, all mutations of humans with animals, such as a snakeskin man, a 
woman with the head of a pig, a dog-faced boy, etc… Nena gazes at Michael 
who watches the images, enrapt in them” (F 77). While she is fully 
enveloped in watching him, he is only concerned with the display of freaks: 
“There’s a new one today. I haven’t seen her yet, but I bet she’s a beauty,” 
he says (77). The absent freak already has an audience waiting impatiently to 
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gaze his eyes on it, a man who thinks of her alterity in terms of desire. He 
anticipates that the freak is both female and beautiful by the simple act of 
being different from him. In the exhibition scene, the one holding the gaze is 
the one who gets to give meaning to alterity because he is positioned at the 
center of the spectacle: the freaks are exhibited for him to see, he is not 
being exhibited for their sake. Exposition and alterity define the relational 
field between the one watching and the ones being watched, and they are 
only there to entertain his erotic fantasies. Nena, neither a carnival freak on 
display or the one buying them from the sideshow, exists outside of this field 
of alterity in that she does not at all partake in Michael’s vision. Beyond his 
gaze, she does not exist. The absent freak, however, exists even in absence 
because Michael has already defined what her alterity means –beauty.  
He is able to materialize this absence cognitively because he knows 
that whatever is about to be exhibited is already different from him, and 
what is different from him he defines as at thing made of a beautiful essence.  
Michael buys the freak, which first comes on stage as “a large, unseen animal 
in a sack” (F 78), trapped and kept safely at the white man’s reach. All he has 
to do is talk to it and serve it water from a distance: 
MICHAEL: C’mon beauty. Let me stroke you. Let me rub my 
 hands against your fur. I like furry things. They keep you 
 warm. You could keep me warm… You are so pretty. 
 You have soft eyes –soft brown eyes. You make me melt 
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 with eyes like that– when you look at me like that. You 
 know things about me. You know how to make me feel 
 better… You don’t have to be afraid. No one will touch 
 you … no one but me.  I won’t let anyone harm you 
 anymore. When you’re at Joe’s nobody can hurt you. 
 Animals are the business of my inheritance. Joe left this 
 shop to me. You’ll make me happy. I know you will. I 
 never would have guessed that love would cost so 
 little… Your mother doesn’t have a mind for business. 
 She told me to keep you in cage. “She’s a wild one,” she 
 said. But if you’ll love me I’ll set you free. Love me and 
 I’ll build you a palace (F 78). 
 
The speech act of love is also a speech act of hate: I promise to love you if 
you accept my love and love me back, but I will keep you in a cage until you 
do. The caging of the beast is an act of love, but only insofar as it is an act of 
self-love for Michael. Love is only possible if it always relates back to him, 
and the beast is to remain in bondage until she reflects back to him. As a 
messenger and deliverer of God’s creation, Michael is bringing the beast a 
taste of salvation, but her freedom from bondage comes only if she’ll love 
him. Salvation and freedom produce love on contradictory terms. First, the 
moment that freedom is offered, love becomes a means for establishing 
bondage by other means: “I’ll set you free” to love me, otherwise you will 
always be my prisoner and pet. The transference from one system of slavery 
to another system of bondage, from imprisoning the beast-human in the 
cage to owning her once she freely agrees to love him, inevitably sets the 
ontological conditions of Citrona’s existence in inverse mode. In loving 
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Michael, Citrona would no longer be the beast-human trapped in the cage, 
but a human being who is allowed to be free under Michael’s gaze. She 
would be human within the relation of love, but she would still be his 
property.  The only difference between the beast-human and the human-
beast conditions of her existence would be determined by her position inside 
or outside of the cage. Secondly, there is also the possibility of threat on 
Citrona’s life should she not heed Michael’s desire. His salvation of Citrona 
borders on the possibility of further damnation: no one but him will touch 
and harm her. In the name of love, hate remains ever more on the horizon 
of racial salvation.  
Michael is not a furry in that he doesn’t want to have sex dressed as 
an animal, but in that he wants the animal itself. His erotic fantasy of love is 
bestiality fulfilled. 
MICHAEL: I wasn’t looking for love I wanted to see the sights. 
 The ones I never saw before. That’s what sideshows 
 show you. Things, people, you’d never otherwise see. 
NENA: I’ve seen things there too –you found an animal there? 
MICHAEL: I found my wife. My woman. When she sang “I 
 wanna Hold Your Hand” –the world stopped moving 
 on its axis. For a moment. For a moment, I felt her hand 
 in mine and when I touched her I felt happy… I mean, I 
 imagined I touched her. Other people laughed –looked 
 at her and laughed. Her mother laughed the loudest. 
 That’s when I knew… I had to save her. Help me, Nena 
 (F 83). 
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The reason behind Michael’s presence at the sideshow was not love, but a 
purely self-satisfying experience. He wanted to see things and people he 
never see otherwise, and only in the sideshow freaks could he discover both 
things and people he had never encountered before. He went there to 
partake in the spectacle not as audience member unconscious of his 
subjectivity, but as someone who had already reasoned his will and ability to 
own people. Instead, his purchasing power makes his participation in the 
carnival’s exposition of ontological alterity into a rehearsal of scenarios of 
discovery. The white man is there and makes his presence visible as a 
discoverer extraordinaire who’s come to own the things and people he did 
not already own in his collection of pets.  
Michael’s voyeuristic gaze and purchasing of racial difference partakes 
in a spectacle of whiteness. He went there not looking for love per se, but he 
did go to the sideshow to access the things and people he desired because 
they were exotic to him. In the singing beast he finds love defined as the 
relationality between him and his wife-woman, as well as the essence of love 
itself manifested in the fetishized object –wife, woman, animal. Michael goes 
into an uncontrolled imaginary frenzy where the woman’s voice makes his 
world stop in her track, and he is able to fantasize about how happy he 
would feel by touching the young hirsute Latina. The discovery of the 
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singing animal on display sends him to a world where the mere touch of the 
exotic makes him happy as never before. Happiness, it seems, is a feeling 
unbeknown to him before a hairy brown woman comes on stage and sings 
The Beatles’ “I Wanna Hold Your Hand” for the audiences of the sideshow. 
The beast’s performance drives him mad with desire by its spectacular 
display of alterity.  In turn, he projects his own imaginary onto the scene: he 
feels love for a beastly woman trapped as the carnival’s freak, and she is 
waiting for him to come to her rescue. The salvation of the Latina from 
exhibition would also liberate her from being laughed at for being the 
carnival’s hairy woman, ridding her of her so-called-abnormality. Citrona’s 
animality, however, is a double-edged sword: her hairy body makes her a 
thing to be laughed at and she is thought to need salvation at the hands of 
the white man, but Michael loves her precisely because her hirsute brown 
body makes her exotic to his world. Liberation at the hands of whiteness is 
no form of racial salvation at all, because after he buys her and liberates the 
freak from the display cage at the carnival, Citrona is imprisoned in a 
different cage in the basement of Michael’s pet shop. Racial salvation, in this 
case, is part of a spectacle of whiteness doubling as an act of colonial terror. 
Citrona is held prisoner inside the cage and watched over by Michael 
for the majority of Fur’s duration. Every part of her daily living is always 
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there for him to see, and her exhibition reproduces the original scene of 
subjection that allowed him to own and define her life. The white man is 
free to reduce her privacy to a public exhibition and to produce her alterity 
as a matter of public visibility. She is imprisoned in the cage as the object of 
his gaze, so her livelihood is a performance that allows him to see her in his 
man-made natural habitat. Even in an oppressive world of racial difference, 
however, Citrona is nonetheless able to produce herself as a site of an erotics 
exclusive of her master’s cruelty: 
CITRONA: When it’s dark nobody can see me. I’m not ugly in 
 the dark. I can touch myself then. I can stand to let my 
 fingers part myself and touch my crown. You know 
 what? That’s the only thing I touch (F 80-81). 
 
Michael tells Citrona that he wants to call her “Beauty,” but she rejects the 
offer to change her into what he wants her to be. She only thinks of herself 
as not an ugly freak when she feels she is not being watched, and she 
touches herself in the one part of her body that Michael has not expressed 
desire for. The man erotizes her because her body is covered with black hair 
and she has dark-colored eyes, so he only erotizes what he can see. In the 
privacy of her own body, even though he is watching without her knowing, 
Michael cannot see that most intimate of her body parts. For Citrona, her 
erotic performance is an act of self-love and it takes place in isolation, 
thinking this is the privacy of her entrapment and not realizing that Michael 
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is watching her from the basement window. For Michael, the privacy of self-
love becomes a voyeuristic spectacle as he watches his trapped Latina love 
herself in the most intimate of ways, and polices both her racial identity and 
her sexuality from afar. Racial bondage, in this case, is also a kind of sex 
trafficking where the Latina is robbed of the privacy of intimate self-love for 
the sake of an oppressive public that is making intimacy the thing of 
exhibition.  
The raciality of the exhibition also makes the colonized subject’s 
pleasure into an erotics of conquest. The enslaved Latina learns to find 
pleasure and love in herself by herself in the same moment that she is 
robbed of the power of intimacy and self-love by her master. Citrona first 
learns the meaning of love through her mother, the one who sexually 
mutilated her before she sold her at the carnival.   
CITRONA: I wanted love and I used to dream about that. I had 
 dreams where my mother would hold me. I had dreams 
 all the time. I don’t dream anymore. I don’t remember 
 how to sleep. I don’t sleep because I’m a monster and 
 monsters are hard to love… People said I should be on a 
 TV show for gifted animals. I knew the words to every 
 Beatles’ song every written and I could divide big 
 numbers in my head –it was a gift. I was born with a caul 
 –that’s a sign of prophecy. People used to steal them to 
 steal the power of the child and the mother. My mother 
 kept mine in a glass case. It looked like a rotting cobweb. 
 But it kept Mother  from killing me –that’s what she told 
 me anyway. She knew I was here for a purpose –even 
 though I was too ugly to love. That birth sac was my 
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 strength. My survival. Mother waited for me to tell her 
 future. I could only see what would happen after she 
 died. She didn’t like that.  
  She hit me so many times on the head that I lost 
my gift. I lost my hymen too. Mother thought it best. 
She pierced me with a letter opener made of wood, then 
she sold me (F 90-91). 
 
Citrona’s relationship with her mother recalls Caliban’s magical island and its 
original owner. The mother never comes on stage in Fur or in both versions 
of The Tempest, but although forever absent, Syrcorax nonetheless appears as 
a formidable force throughout all three plays. In Caliban’s case, Sycorax is 
that powerful witch who controls the island prior to Prospero’s arrival. The 
power of the female character legitimates Prospero’s status as invader of the 
island and Caliban’s claim to colonized status. That is perhaps the most 
important reason for Caliban’s hailing of the absent witch mother as the 
source of his inheritance: in both Shakespeare’s and Cesaire’s versions of 
Caliban’s story, the beast always states his claims to native sovereignty vis-à-
vis Sycorax’s magical domination of the island’s native inhabitants, including 
Ariel. Magic and the feminine join in Sycorax to establish Caliban’s native 
sovereignty, but these are always left on the backburner and never given 
center stage, which is occupied by Prospero and Caliban in their perpetual 
fight for possession of the witch’s island.  
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 In contrast to Caliban’s thoroughly masculine interpellation of the 
witch mother, Cruz makes Citrona the one who wields magical powers. 
Sycorax emerges in Latina theatre not to legitimate the slave’s native 
subjectivity, but to reveal herself as the natives’ source of violence, hate and 
the threat of murder. The Latina’s livelihood doesn’t depend on her absent 
mother’s legitimate right to sovereignty, but on Citrona’s rejection of the 
deadly mother altogether. Citrona can only tell the future after the mother’s 
death, and this exclusion of the mother from the future signifies the very 
possible death at the hands of the beast. In turn, since the power of 
prophecy excludes her from the future of the living, Citrona’s mother 
desired the magic imbued in Citrona’s caul and she destroyed it when she 
could not own it. Magic, in the Latina’s case, means not the claims to a 
native inhabitance with which to challenge the colonizer’s violence, but the 
tools with which the beast can resist the origins of her birth beckoning her 
death and marking her as hideously unlovable.  
 Furthermore, while Caliban adores his mother and wishes her back 
from the world of the dead, Citrona’s mother would wish the beastly 
daughter dead and far away from her. The mother abuses her both physically 
and sexually because she is unwilling to kill her daughter: “She hit me so 
many times I lost my gift. I lost my hymen too. Mother thought it best. She 
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pierced me with a letter opener made of wood, then she sold me” (F 91). 
The loss of sexual purity and the loss of magical ontology are both lost at the 
hands of the mother who wished to rob the girl of her strength and reason 
for existence: “She knew I was there for a purpose … that birth sac was my 
strength.” Depriving Citrona of her sex and her celestial powers do not 
make her less valuable and desirable on the market of the sideshow, 
however. On the contrary, she becomes a more profitable transaction for the 
mother when she is displayed as a hairy woman who once held magical 
powers. As an already defiled female body, the Latina girl is sold on the 
market as always-already the receptacle of sexual violence for whoever buys 
her from the freak show. When Michael buys the Latina on display, the 
primary sexual conquest will not be his because the beast’s mother was the 
first one to lust after the magical power (once) held in Citrona’s caul and 
vagina. Rape, in this case, is a thoroughly incestual act meant to increase the 
mother’s possibility of a future where she does exist as a sovereign, albeit 
one that holds a sovereignty violently exercised over her own daughter’s 
freedom.  Both her mother and master define Citrona within an ideology of 
racial and sexual alterity and place her outside of humanity. The girl is too 
ugly to love as a human being, and only as a beast on exhibition can she have 
meaning. 
336 
Citrona finds love somewhere else and first unlearns her subaltern 
ontology by touching herself in the crown. Her performance of self-love 
denies both her mother and master as the proper venues for her to want and 
dream about love. Her rejection of the gifts of love under cruelty is also a 
first step towards a performance of ontology within a relational field of 
alterity –she loves herself, but she also loves herself in relation to the other. 
Michael hires Nena to hunt for Citrona’s food and to and clean up after her, 
and Citrona falls in love with Nena without caring that she is in love with 
her master. The first time Nena gets near the cage to feed the beast, Citrona 
grabs her by the ankle to tell her how attractive she is:  
CITRONA: Fine bones. The bones of a well-bred lady. A sweet 
 high-born beauty. Ankles of ivory. An elephant would 
 kill for your tusks, baby. Hey, hey, I know I got a bad 
 skin condition, but the hair covers it right up. Touch it. 
 My face is smooth for something covered in thick, black 
 fur… (F 84). 
 
Her attempt at enamoring Nena is to compliment her bone structure, ankles 
and good genes as beautiful as the whiteness of ivory. She reduces her body 
to what an animal would find succulent food, not realizing that this 
metaphor plays into Nena’s fears that beast will devour her. Although she 
fails to seduce the other woman, Citrona does identify herself as something 
other than a carnivorous animal. Instead of agreeing with Nena that she is 
the beast that could potentially eat her body and leave only her bones 
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behind, she says she has a smooth face regardless of the medical condition 
that covers her skin with thick black fur. If Nena’s good genes giver her a 
delicious bone structure and a beautiful body, then Citrona’s genes give her a 
face that could compliment Nena’s beauty regardless of the bad skin 
condition. The pairing of her biological impediment with the other’s 
biological perfection sets them as potential equals in the world of the cage. 
She recognizes her subaltern position living as a caged animal, but she makes 
her animality as equally desirable as Nena’s human perfection. 
Citrona wants Nena to recognize her as her potential lover, despite 
her being covered in blood after she devours the dead animals. Disregarding 
“the smell of blood and shit and urine [that] makes Nena gasp and gag,” she 
asks her to acknowledge her sexually: 
CITRONA: Hey … hey. Talk to me. Talk to me. Hey —you 
 know what?  You’re beautiful. You smell good. You 
 smell like rain. You bring rain with you when you come 
 here. You bring cold, hard rain. I like that. You know 
 what? I like that. You spray me when you come in. You 
 spray me like grass. I’m grass that’s not supposed to be 
 alive. Like there’s concrete covering me, so people think 
 I’m dead. But I’m not because you get here and then I 
 feel the blood in my arms again. It all starts to move. It 
 moves and it feels like it’s gonna come out through my 
 fingertips. The tips get real hard and read. And I think 
 I’m just gonna burst outta them —all of me reaching 
 through myself and exploding. And you know what? I’m 
 not like this — (She points at the pieces of animal on the floor.) 
 I’m white inside. I’m a moon and I want to orbit you. 
 Okay? You know, orbit? Bit. Let me bite you. You’re so 
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 beautiful. You’re so beautiful. I could eat you right up. 
 You know what? I get so wet when you come here. 
 Because you’re rain, right? Is that why? Is that why I 
 keep hoping? I got too much hair on my arms 
 probably… For you to love me (F 88-89). 
 
Nena is hired to treat Citrona like an animal that must be fed and cleaned up 
after, not as someone with whom she could have a conversation. The only 
way the beautiful Latina is to relate to the hairy one is as her keeper, not to 
engage with her as a living human being who feels as much as she does. 
Since the sensations surging through her body when she’s in Nena’s 
presence make her feel alive and want to exist in her orbit, it is precisely 
through feelings and emotions that Citrona relates to her keeper. Nena 
comes into the basement, but she does not enter the cage out of fear that 
she will get too close to Citrona’s hungry mouth. All Citrona wants is to be 
get Nena to talk to her, get past her hairy body, and recognize that she is not 
made of the same material as the dead animals laying around her. The 
sensations she feels as a result of Nena’s presence produce her animality as a 
thing made of human flesh and living blood as much as Nena is. Citrona is 
white inside, just like Nena.  
On the one hand, the equation of humanity with whiteness is a 
questionable move on Citrona’s part. Seeing Nena as her potential social and 
sexual mate makes Citrona her equal, but Citrona’s humanity can only be 
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measured insofar as Nena’s humanity is partnered with her racial privilege. 
The beast wants to be recognized as equally white as her keeper. On the 
other hand, the beast contradicts herself when her wish for human 
recognition is presented along the same lines as carniverosity. Biting Nena 
would let her access the embodiment of beauty and white humanity, so she 
keeps hoping that Nena will hear her voice and listen to her pleading. The 
call for recognition is destructive because it requires that an embodiment 
higher up in the scale of humanity (the white Latina) listen to and account 
for the existence of a homunculus whose body is covered in thick black hair 
(the cannibal Latina). Recognition for Nena means putting her life at risk by 
allowing the beast the opportunity to get close enough to bite her. 
Recognition for Citrona means having the opportunity to be loved for what 
she truly is: a human who’s been conditioned to see psychic attachment 
(love) as synonymous with eating the other’s body. Citrona’s act of 
cannibalism exemplifies a relational field of sociality where love is defined as 
the interiorizing the other into the self after the other has recognized you as 
equal. The self in her ideal love does not recognize herself as the other in 
alterity; it recognizes herself without alterity because she eats the other she 
could potentially recognize as herself. Cannibalistic love erases the other 
when the beast devours her, but it also erases the self as well because, after 
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eating the Nena’s flesh, Citrona will not have the other to make her feel 
alive. Her body will be fed, but the loving of the self will not be nourished at 
all.  
Love is impossible in this scenario with the cage holding unequal 
relations of power in place. Citrona can only speak from inside the cage and 
imagine the world beyond the bars along the same structure of power as her 
imprisonment. Inside the cage, she can only imagine the social world as one 
structured through colonialism. 
CITRONA: I never thought I’d really want someone to smell my
 real smell. I thought if I covered it up, built a cloud of 
 other animals’ smells over me, then I could save the real 
 me –the real smell of me– for someone I thought could 
 love me … And could stand that smell –even want it on 
 her. Maybe even long for it … (F 104). 
 
Citroana has been conditioned to live in a world where the social is always 
framed around establishing the incommensurability of racial difference, but 
her dreams of love want someone to recognize her in difference. Love is the 
only way that Citrona will learn to recognize her true self and to allow others 
to recognize her as well. She feels she belongs in her own skin in feeling the 
other embrace her true smells.  When she hungers for Nena, however, love 
as an act of recognition fails entirely because she thinks of love as always a 
move towards erasing the difference between her and the other two people. 
Meanwhile, “love” means very different things for Nena and Michael. For 
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Nena, love from Michael means self-satisfaction and recognition that she is 
beautiful, while love from Citrona means nothing but a tool she can 
manipulate to reach Michael’s love. For Michael, love from Nena is nothing 
but a means to reach Citrona’s love; love from Citrona is his way of fulfilling 
his oppressive power. A recognition of the self in alterity is impossible as an 
act of freedom in all three scenarios, and they all leave Citrona in the cage.  
 Michael eventually arranges a date for Nena to visit Citrona inside the 
cage. Once she is inside, Citrona flirts with Nena and the latter plays into the 
seduction game, only to remind the beast that she would never love her 
because she finds her hideously undesirable. The beast kisses her and Nena 
faints when she faces the possibility of her death in Citrona’s mouth. 
Michael takes advantage of the rejection to get Citrona to kill Nena with the 
same letter opener used to rape her, and afterwards Citrona eats Nena inside 
the cage. The first scene of cannibalism allows Citrona to destroy her first 
master that denied her recognition of humanity –Nena rejects her love 
because she is a monster, so the monster eats her. With the object of 
Citrona’s love now gone, Michael sets her free in hopes of getting her to 
marry and love him for eternity. Instead, Citrona eats him as well when she 
steps outside of the cage.  
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  His purchasing of Citrona out of love for human sideshow flesh gives 
Citrona the freedom from this forced exhibition, as well as salvation from 
future maternal violence. Citrona’s salvation from racial imprisonment, 
however, comes through the beast’s own hands when she devours Michael 
the moment he sets her free from the cage and still denies her full-fledged 
freedom. Willingly turning into a cannibal, Citrona unbinds Caliban from his 
never-ending slavery by devouring the white man and the hairless Latina 
who treated her as a carnivorous animal in the first place. Michael sets her 
free from the cage so she can love him and no one else, and she lashes out 
violently against him because his demands continue to constrain her 
freedom. Even when she’s free of physical bondage to him, Citrona’s 
freedom does not mean that she has been released from the mode of 
relationality where she is always Michael’s subordinate. Consuming the 
bodies of her keeper and her master gives her an exit from the colonial order 
of things and a life outside of punishment. Caliban may not have been able 
to kill Prospero in A Tempest when his master tells him to drive his sword 
through his bare chest, but his plan to destroy everything so he can be free is 
fulfilled by his female equal. Where the black slave fails, the Latina succeeds 
by killing the one who wanted her to love him precisely as a beast. Salvation 
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from racial oppression, in the Latina’s case, comes through the destruction 
of bondage and exhibition. 
 For Cruz, “the protagonist in Fur, Citrona, though considered a 
disposable piece of human sideshow flesh, comes to realize her own power 
through the act and reaction of love,” while Nena and Michel “[act out] in 
‘beastly’ ways to get the object of their affections to love them (Cruz 2000, 
72). Building on the playwright’s theorizing of love, I argue that Fur is about 
sexual desire as much as it is about relationality between subjects whose lives 
are organized by colonial relations. Damnation and love go hand-in-hand in 
each of these scenarios that ended by inducing negative emotions and 
painful physical reactions in the protagonist. Her mother sexually mutilates 
her because Citrona’s gift of prophecy foretold her death; she could not love 
the messenger of death, even if it was her own daughter. A mutilated Citrona 
is what Michael buys so he can possess the exotic-ness of the Latina woman, 
but the play is about his constant patience waiting for Citrona to love him. 
Michael’s was a brand of love that made her inferior in both race and 
freedom. The love he feels for the beast, entrenched in colonialism as it is, is 
also about a kind of relation that is not the conqueror coming to rape or to 
force the colonized into loving him. What he desires is for a connection to 
sociality between him and the mutilated beast he has just bought, a relation 
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where he is not free to overpower her emotions, even if he does trap her 
body. The beast’s psychic attachment to her master is what Michael wants 
because the master has already fallen for the salve, and the slave rejects him 
completely. In turn, the slaves fall in love with each other. Citrona lusts after 
the “woman who could be her twin –if only Citrona were as hairless as 
[Nena]” (Cruz 2000, 73). Nena is also attracted to Citrona, but she rejects 
the beast’s loving offer when she wants to kiss her. In the end, the beast 
overpowers them all, leading the play to end in darkness. 
 As with Caliban’s prophesized scene of darkness, Fur also leaves the 
subject of coloniality without a future beyond damnation. Nena envisions 
the time of love between women and holds the potential for a future beyond 
the bonds of Michael’s colonizing desire, but their master refuses to 
abandon the women’s imaginary and their material conditions under his 
servitude. The Latina’s cannibalism, committed under Michael’s guise, makes 
the time of same-sex desire and a different relationality between slaves 
without a master an impossible scenario. As the only way to exit the tragedy 
of conquest, the black slave’s project of destruction becomes the ultimate act 
of hate speech when Citrona kills all life around her and ends her days in 
isolation without knowing the feeling of intimacy (love) she so desired. 
Indeed, life for the cannibal free from slavery is a world where race means a 
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different anti-relational mode of damnation. Freedom abounds, but salvation 
is nowhere near the horizon of possibility. 
The scenes of damnation rehearsed by Shakespeare, Césaire and Cruz 
stage salvation in opposition to the Requerimiento. In its 16th-century mode, 
the Requerimiento’s Christian salvation meant subordination and death for 
the natives should they reject the conquistadors’ gift of love/hate. In its 20th-
century mode, Citrona’s and Caliban’s rebellious acts are essentially the act 
of Christian salvation in reverse. Citrona rejects Michael’s gift of love and 
answers him with a final gift of hate in return. She saves herself from 
subordination and death by cannibalizing both the man who bought her at 
the freak sideshow, and the woman who treated her as an embodiment of all 
that was abominable. Still, in both modes the conquerors and the damned 
sought out salvation as a necessary element of the colonial project. The 
white men thought the natives where irrational heathens who out to be 
saved through the word of Christ, with their loving claims bringing good to 
the New World. Caliban and Citrona, the natives, did not think themselves 
in need of salvation until after the white men conquered them in the name 
of Christian love. Caliban wants freedom from this tragedy so he can be his 
own king on his mother’s island, and killing Prospero would mean he would 
be free to go back to a pre-colonial world as if the white man had never set 
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foot on island soil. His plan of freedom doesn’t include salvation because 
with Prospero dead, the tragedy he created would altogether seize to impact 
life on the native’s island. In turn, Citrona’s experience makes Caliban’s 
decolonization an unfinished project because the terms of her freedom are 
unsatisfying.  Her freedom from racial bondage and her entrance into 
darkness mean that freedom from slavery is not enough to constitute new 
life, and that neither is a new kind of life untouched by colonialism possible 
once the master has been killed. Cruz’s native subject also ends her days 
floating in a sea of blackness, hollering for ontological privilege still. Living 
in isolation, Citrona’s decolonizing violence suggests that salvation depends 
on more than an ideological redefinition of freedom on native terms. 
Salvation from damnation also depends on the redefinition of the relational 
field along the lines of racial alterity.  
 
 
Dress  Rehearsal :  Salva tion 
 
Cruz’s ideal of love, however, is the decolonial option that fails to 
propel race beyond a tragic temporality. I turn to Nao Bustamante’s 
performance art where salvation and a new mode of relationality are made 
possible through race. Bustamente’s Indig/urrito was the Chicana artist’s 
response to the call for art commemorating 1492 and its invention of the 
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Indian as genocide-ready in 1992. Unlike Two Undiscovered Amerindians Visit..., 
performed by Coco Fusco and Guillermo Gómez-Peña that same year, 
Indig/urrito was not interested in playing off the audiences’ fears of racial 
difference by terrorizing them with what they feared most.15 Instead, she 
strapped-on a burrito and dared to summon white men to partake in a ritual 
of purification, a ceremony that would absolve them of their sins committed 
when indigenous people were invented as pagan worshippers eligible for 
damnation centuries earlier. As a ritual of salvation, her call was to challenge 
both natives and the inheritors of the colonizer’s legacy of whiteness to take 
a step away from living a tragedy, and to take a step towards a future where 
race can be done differently. Salvation from the sins of tragedy came from 
inside a burrito she strapped onto her semi-nude body, and consuming it 
would remedy their tragic flaws, not the Indians’ supposed irrationality and 
lack of humanity. Her performance in brownface, in other words, was 
designed to rehearse the original scenes that took place in the colony 
through an ideological apparatus that inversed the order of colonial 
interpellation. More importantly, salvation came to them as an act of love 
without hate. Salvation-as-love was the decolonial option offered to them by 
a woman with an Indian phallus.  
                                                
15 See chapter three, “Spectacular Indians: Artaud and the Cruelty of Latino 
Performance.” 
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To a certain extent, Indig/urrito was celebratory of historical tragedy in 
that Bustamante decided to dress herself as an Indian in exchange for 
funding sources for her project. She adorned her body with props standing 
in for stereotypical indigenous dress so she could play at being Indian for the 
sake of art (Figure 4.1).  
 
    Figure 4.1 
    Bustamante and a willing participant.  
 
Her body appeared on theatre stages throughout the U.S. wearing few 
articles of clothing, and she sometimes wore an Aztec headdress. At first 
sight, she seemingly appears to her white audiences exactly as how history 
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has told us Columbus and other conquerors after him saw the natives for the 
first time: naked because they were without European clothes. However, 
rather than uncritically rehearsing the Indian of the Arawak man’s exhibition 
and the Requerimiento’s racial speech acts, Bustamante’s was a spectacularity 
that could act-be from a site not found in the archive of colonial history. The 
Indian invented by Columbus, Christian love, the Valladolid trial, and then 
rehearsed by theatre and performance artists to our present day, cannot exit 
the time of tragedy because the archive and its repertoire have not quite 
succeeded in working through a tragic temporality. Citrona’s cannibalism is 
no different –her freedom means that her future is still in darkness. Therein 
lies the difference between the cruelties of Latino theatre and performance: 
the anticolonial stage has reproduced cruelty’s colonial roots and its artists 
aren’t able to move beyond the colonialism they set out to undo; 
Bustamante’s performance isn’t theatre of cruelty proper in that she is 
invested in saving bodies and lives, not inducing negative public affect that 
could change the meaning of life for the worst. Indig/urrito does treat bodies 
racialized in the present by an un-resolvable experience of the Conquest, but 
salvation between Bustamante’s Indian and her white audiences took place 
within a temporal mode altogether different. With a future made from 
tragedy but invented beyond the limits of tragic temporality, the gift of 
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salvation was an ideology of indigeneity only possible within the decolonial 
imaginary, not anticolonialism and decolonization. 
Indig/urrito rehearses an intimately familiar mode of inventing Indians 
when the artist tells her audiences that “[she’d] like to think of [her 
performance] not as audience participation so much as audience salvation.” 
Like the protocol summoning indigenous people to subordinate themselves 
to the Spanish regime of law, the brown priestess conditions bodies to think 
of her own body “as the representation of the modern indigenous peoples.” 
While the burrito on its own is not endowed with life, its attachment to the 
woman’s crotch makes the prop a part of her living body. The materiality of 
the burrito and the materiality of the woman are now joined to make one 
singular form of corporeality – a female body with a phallus gone brown like 
the color of the artist.  She says the burrito represents modern indigenous 
people while holding up the burrito on a silver platter for her audiences to 
see. She straps it on only after a group of men has decided to go up to the 
stage and lined up behind her. The propped representation becomes an 
embodiment when the scene of the Requerimiento has been properly set up: 
a group of white men have reported to meet the Indian and a gift has been 
offered. The bodies being hailed are now racialized as white, and the Indian 
is the one bringing them the gift. The speech act hails her audiences as 
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bodies in need of salvation, which is only possible in the act of recognizing 
that what and who is calling them into being is an Indian. They move to a 
position on the stage where they are asked to consciously accept the terms of 
their subjection: the woman with the strap-on burrito is an Indian, and they 
must heed her call so that they can be saved. Her call to action is not about 
audience participation because she’s not asking them to participate; she is 
asking them to recognize that they too are in need of salvation and should be 
willing to do what is necessary to achieve it. As opposed to the Christians’ 
gift, she is not telling them that they have to accept her gift of love or be 
damned. She is asking them to recognize that the Indian is offering them a 
gift of love and that they be willing to desire her gift without the risk of 
punishment should they negate her offer. Negating her gift would not mean 
their death or enslavement, as rejecting her would leave them as still the 
inheritors of white privilege. To accept her gift, then, meant that they 
recognized the 500 years of repression that indigenous people have been 
endured up to our modern times. Willing to work towards rupturing that 
cycle of violence, they report to the stage to recognize her as an Indian and 
as the subject of damnation asking them to receive the gift. When they bite 
the woman’s phallus, then, they willingly accept what she came to bring 
them. The act of intimacy between the white men and the brown woman is 
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the speech act of love as salvation that the Requerimiento could never 
perform.   
Side by side, these two events constitute a mode of relationality in the 
present that is haunted by the invention of the Americas in both the colonial 
period and the 20th-century. In the event that took place in the terrain of 
colonialism in the colony, indigenous people were faced with the option of 
conversion under the threat of Christian love. In the event that took place in 
the terrain of coloniality in the postcolony, Bustamante’s strap-on burrito 
was the embodiment of indigeneity that came to lovingly save the white men 
from centuries of colonial guilt. Evidently, in both the historical experience 
of 16th-century colonialism and the Chicana’s experience of coloniality 
centuries later, racial difference was engaged as a body conditioned by 
speech acts. Indigenous people were first called forth to face death and/or 
salvation at the hands of whiteness, and their lives were again hailed as a 
strap-on burrito endowed with the erotic and healing powers necessary to 
bring about racial salvation for both them and us. This collusion between the 
terror of the 16th-century performative text and the cruelty of 20th-century 
Chicana performance in producing an indigenous ethos is exemplary of the 
relationship between spectacularity and the temporality of race. 
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The native subject hailed by the Requerimiento, made ready for either 
salvation or damnation, may not necessarily be easily recognized as a burrito 
strapped onto a brown woman’s crotch in 1992. The satirical and over-the-
top camp performance of Indig/urrito, however, cannot be easily dismissed in 
that Bustamante’s ritual of purification is a rendition of the all too familiar 
primal moment of the invention of native peoples. In the priestess’ 
performance of indigeneity, what we have at stake is first and foremost the 
possibility of a “conceptual complicity” with the “culture of conquest” that 
still clearly “haunts today’s writing [and performance of] colonial discourses” 
(Rabasa 2000, 25). The Chicana’s Indian phallus provokes a series of critical 
questions regarding the nature of her art. To what extent is this instance of 
Chicana performance rehearsing the technologies of colonial terror for the 
sake of audience consumption? What is the purpose of this ritual of 
purification being performed 500 years after Columbus first captured the 
Arawak man and put him on display? If the original law “organize[d] the 
world for colonization” (25) in the 16th-century, how are the speech act of 
love and the speech act of hate joining hands again to constitute the racial 
performativity of indigenous people in the 20th? Finally, what does love have 
to do with it? What does love have to do now with the salvation of racialized 
subjects who are the perpetrators of damnation from centuries before?  
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As a scholar writing about a performance in the terrain of coloniality, 
I argue that Bustamante’s performance of cruelty did seek to deliberately 
reproduce a primal scene of subjection that took place in the colony. The 
burrito compels us, either as white men in the audience or as on-lookers of 
the naked brown female on stage strapping-on the embodiment of 
indigenous people, to relive the culture of colonial violence as a way of 
creating a possible history of the present. Most importantly, the burrito 
wants a future where this history of colonial terror is no longer the practice 
of everyday life. Unlike Artaud’s colonizing tricks that left the Balinese 
dancers and the Tarahumara Indians stuck beyond the time of the West, the 
reparative potential of Chicana performance art lays in its cruel desire to 
“build another story, [to uncover] the untold to consciously remake the 
narrative” of Conquest we have inherited from a past we had no say in 
creating (Pérez 1999, 127). The point of the strap-on burrito is to explicitly 
order both audiences and theorists of coloniality to partake in an act that 
reproduces the violence of colonial interpellation and together move along 
terror to overcome it. 
The live event itself created a mockery of colonial violence to bring 
about a different end to our tragic story. The phallus, in this case, is indeed 
endowed with healing powers when it is strapped onto the priestess who’s 
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come to lovingly bring the white men the gift of salvation. In rehearsing the 
scenarios of discovery and terror cited in the archives, Bustamante turns the 
original objects of colonial erotics into the subjects of an erotics of conquest 
–the Arawaks that Columbus imprisoned and put on display, the Indians 
captured by the conquistadors, the indigenous women raped and made 
mothers of mestizos throughout the hemisphere. Her erotics of conquest 
turn the underside of the Spanish colonial project into a spectacular event, in 
all of its absurdity, when indigeneity is created from the observations of 
racialized bodies under the artist’s critical gaze.  As the representation of the 
modern indigenous people, the burrito strapped onto Bustamante’s naked 
thighs very consciously makes a spectacle out of this particular experience. 
Rather than staging indigenous peoples’ experience with colonial 
catastrophes, the experience of colonialism that the burrito is addressing is 
the “Enlightened” side of modernity –the conquerors’ white masculinity. 
When Bustamante steps on stage she is at first unable to properly put on the 
harness, and not apologizing for her costume failure, she tells the audience 
that she is “not a ventriloquist and [she] is not a mime.” It doesn’t matter at 
all that she cannot properly adjust it, as long as the prop stays on to safely 
secure the burrito standing in for the dildo the harness is supposed to hold. 
Pure camp, the absence of the penis is rendered inconsequential and the 
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phallus trivialized: her access to both racial and male privilege is enabled by 
penile enhancement, an artifice of white men’s privilege used to get them on 
their knees ready and willing to open their mouths for the embodiment of 
indigeneity.  
Bustamante’s absent penis is one she herself creates and for her own 
purposes; she says she made the burrito herself and without dairy or chile, 
“just to be considerate of the white folk.” Being considerate of the white 
folk is an essential part of her ritual, as her good intentions –to not induce 
negative emotions or hurtful actions in her audiences– create her stage as the 
space where sociality can take place on a positive note. She is considerate of 
her audiences in making something that would taste good for them. Most 
importantly, she wants to give them a mode of living based on action. 
Ok, before we begin this holy sacred sacrament, I would you to 
state your name, anyway you want, and make a statement 
before absolving yourself. And, afterwards, I just want to 
encourage you to feel the healing rush that is going to surge 
through your body as you take the guilt for all those people 
who were too much of coward to come up on stage for you. 
Cause everyone is channeling all their shit right into your body 
right now, you know that, right? It’s ok, relax. And then what 
I’d like you all to do in order to participate, because we all 
know for everyone to participate in order for a ritual to actually 
work, is when his teeth actually bite down on the burrito… I’d 
like each of you to say ‘A Man,” not “Amen,” but “A Man” 
and think of somebody who you believe needs to be absolved 
for 500 years of guilt and repression so we can just move on. 
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Her performance designed to meet the funding requirements for artists of 
color is a racial fiasco. The event was staged to save white men from 
centuries of guilt of being white and male, but with the body of the 
performer, the performance staged salvation as only possible through a 
brown woman with a phallic vagina. On the one hand, salvation from violent 
racial relations comes at the expense of rendering themselves the receptacle 
of the body invented as “race” centuries ago: the Indian (literally) melts 
inside them. To absolve themselves on stage and in the name of the 
audiences who were too much of a coward to come up on stage for them, 
these men must inherently give up their gender, sexual and racial privileges 
and succumb to the brown priestess coming into them orally. At the same 
time, their consumption of the phallic Indian is not the reiteration of the 
consumption of racialized bodies put on display for observation and 
voyeuristic fantasies. Their eating of the burrito is a conscious consumption, 
and they know that what they are eating is rubbing their white guilt on their 
faces as a way of moving beyond the past. Salvation comes through the 
mouths of the white men being entered by the performer, and through the 
artist’s mouth moaning from the pleasure she gets in cleansing them through 
this holy scared sacrament. On the other hand, Bustamante cannot escape 
her own subjectivity: she enters the stage wearing two minimal pieces of 
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clothing and bends over, her backside to the audience, and proclaims “that 
might have been the highlight of the [event].” She too enjoys being watched 
and putting her nude brown body on display for everyone there to see. She 
enjoys her self sexually by putting on the burrito and feeling the phallic 
object inside the men: “You know I have to say that there’s almost nothing 
that makes me happier than people kneeling waiting to bite the burrito,” she 
tell us. The moans from each time her strap-on enters seven white male 
bodies are a display of sexual pleasure felt at being able to hail these men in 
need of forgiveness from the indigeneity that she is embodying. It is she who 
wants to penetrate them and rid them of the guilt they inherited from the 
first man who stepped on our lands; it is she who wants to top them on their 
knees. 
The simulation of oral sex is founded on sexual desire as much as it is 
about reformatting sociality for racialized subjects. Bustamante’s moans, 
grunts, smiles, and feelings of sympathy for the men who kneel with their 
mouths open suggest that her sex is the only one benefiting from oral sex. 
The act of penetration, however, involved both the woman penetrating and 
the men being penetrated orally, and penetration is only possible because 
they have recognized that she is not their subordinate, or she theirs. The 
repeated acts of intimacy require that all parties involved recognize that they 
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each are partaking in the ritual as equals. Commonality, not singularity, 
frames their most intimate of social relations. Also, she penetrates their 
bodies, topping them as they kneel before her, but their bottoming consists 
of biting and eating what is essentially a part of her. Topping white men 
gives her pleasure in her sex as they accept the gift of the burrito, bottoming 
gives them salvation when they receive the burrito in their mouths, and 
nobody leaves the ritual still living in unequal relations of power. She is an 
artist playing an Indian who puts her body in a very vulnerable position: 
come and eat my brown female body, eating me will finally bring you and I 
peace. Indig/urrito’s relational field was one of love: our experiences of 
conquest involve you and I both, you taking all of me in, and my sharing my 
history of damnation with you. Sexual intimacy takes place in the world of 
the stage where race, in both sociality and embodiment, is done side-to-side 
and not just top and bottom. The spectacular event, in its organization of the 
social alongside horizontal rather than hierarchical lines of power, was the 
Indian’s gift of salvation from conquest. 
For José Esteban Muñoz, the social nature of affect means that 
feelings are not particular because they arise out of the encounters between 
self and other, and are thus part of “a larger collective mapping” (Muñoz 
2006b, 679). He argues that the feelings of people of color are brown 
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feelings, “[the] manifestations of the ways in which ethnic modes of 
comportment not only represent anti-normative affect, but also challenge 
the ways in which dominant ideology prescribes certain modes of normative 
comportment” (Muñoz 2006a, 193). He also argues that since the social can 
be mapped through affect, we must begin “[deciphering] what work race 
does in the world” if we are to change the mapping of the social world 
beyond normative affect (Muñoz 2006b, 678). Unlike the decolonial claims 
to language and epistemology as the constitution of race, Muñoz’s work 
situates racial formations along the lines of affect and performance. He 
theorizes brown feelings as “a doing within the social that surpasses 
limitations of epistemological renderings of race,” a performance of affect 
that can make possible new structures of sociality by being attuned to the 
ways in which the feelings of racialized subjects relate to one another in 
difference (687). Essentially, Muñoz is proposing “Brownness” as a project 
of ethics, “one that attempts to incorporate understandings of the psychic in 
the service of understanding the social” by displacing an “attentiveness of 
the self to others [and] to see the other in alterity as existing in a relational 
field to the self” (681). Brownness is the potential of brown feelings to 
radically alter the social and transgress the negative psychic attachments of 
race. 
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Building from the Brownness of brown feelings, Muñoz has analyzed 
Bustamante’s performances as the places where the artist’s body becomes 
the vehicle through which centuries of racial oppression are worked out. As 
he suggests, in remapping the “antagonistic feelings, negative affect, and ugly 
feelings” of race, Bustamante’s brown feelings are “not simply cleaned but 
viewed as constitutive of subjectivity. [Her] performance and the feelings it 
generates, despite its ephemeral nature, do not disappear” (Muñoz 2000a, 
200).  In Indig/urrito’s case, he says that the performance was an affective 
scenario where people were conditioned by the “negative affect that haunts 
racial and sexual relations” (196). “Bad feelings can simply be bitten away” 
by the men on stage eating the artist’s purifying insides, “absolving their own 
burden of guilt” through her body (196). The performance was also staging 
“another fantasy of reparation” where the artist made “her bad feelings 
available, prone and vulnerable” as well (196). The artists uses her body as a 
kind of “reparative endeavor” whereby her “performance practice engages 
and re-imagines what has been a history of violence, degradation, and 
compulsory performance” seeking to bring about an-other way of being in a 
world where racial subjection is not the order of the day (193-194).  
As the embodiment of indigeneity, Bustamante insists on loving the 
body ravaged by centuries of colonialism, and she performs a brownness 
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that was born in a moment 500 years before. If for Muñoz the ethical 
imperative of brownness makes possible an “extraction of self from the 
affective burden of ugly feelings” (Muñoz 2006a, 200), then Indig/urrito’s 
Brownness lies in the artist’s desire to remake the relational field of race 
beyond the ugly feelings of colonialism. The artist’s racial performativity is 
“a political doing” and “the recognition of racial belonging, coherence, and 
divergence in the world” (Muñoz 2006b, 678). Bustamante removes herself 
from the oppression of the colony by offering her body as consumption. 
Her audiences, in return, remove themselves from a place of privilege to a 
space of alterity-in-difference. For everyone watching off stage, she 
encourages them all to step beyond the burden of colonial guilt, stop 
projecting their negative feelings onto those brave enough to face the 
consequences of colonialism, and participate in the ritual by uttering the 
words “A man” each time a white man is saved. The utterance is a 
transgression of the sanctity of the Christian “Amen,” reminding us that the 
one who first offered salvation to the New World was indeed just one man 
made of everyday human materiality and not divine essence. The audiences 
who did not heed her call and rejected her gift refused “to be absolved for 
500 years of guilt and repression so we can just move on,” but even though 
they rejected the offer, their repeated soundings of “A man” partook in the 
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ritual and made it work. The participation of the audiences who did not 
come up on stage was induced through affective interpellation: they didn’t 
accept the gift of salvation that she asked them to receive, so she tells them 
to participate and make the ritual work because they were still feeling racially 
guilty. White guilt made the men onstage feel the desire to be absolved, and 
it made the rest of the audiences stay in their seats feeling guilty of being 
white. Both scenarios had the same result: everyone’s emotions were 
mobilized for the political purpose of calling the artist and her audiences into 
racialized subjectivities.  
Muñoz’ analysis focus solely on Bustamante and the men on her 
stage, but the audience members not compelled to move from their seats 
were equally interpellated through negative feelings as much as those who 
did report to the artist. They too are vulnerable in being exposed as feeling 
racially guilty. Bustamante’s purpose of creating a relationality based on 
equality succeeded when audience members chose to participate out of guilt, 
either by accepting salvation or refusing to be absolved. Everyone who 
played a part in the ritual recognized that racial difference existed in 1992 as 
a legacy of colonialism, and they allowed the ritual to engage race as an 
affective construct between self and other. Bustamante was able incite a 
movement through the affective attachments of race: the ritual helped 
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everyone there move on from a time where doing race repeats the violence 
of colonial interpellation, and into a time when those involved can make 
racial difference not a thing of damnation. If postcolonialism is anachronistic 
at best, never having quite outlived colonialism’s (supposed) past, nor able to 
relive the days before the white man arrived, the live performance of 
indigeneity also propelled itself towards a future not entrenched in the 
ciclicity of tragic time. The scenes of Indig/urrito create a social world where 
the recognition of the self in difference from the other does not make it 
impossible to recognize ourselves in them. Overcoming the burden of guilt 
by accepting the Indian’s gift of love is an act of reparation for the white 
men on stage and the seated audiences refusing to go up. It is also a 
reparative act for the artist because her ritual worked in making everyone’s 
sense of relationality anew. The performance was an act of love reworking 
the relational field of alterity for the sake of belonging in the world. 
Rabasa’s (2000) ideas on the “cultures of conquest” seem most 
pertinent here. He refers to the term as the structures of feeling invested in 
understanding how the world is organized for colonization, and he asks 
scholars of colonialism and postcolonialism to not be complicit with 
conquest by projecting ideologies insufficiently critical of the history of 
colonialism onto colonial texts when we study the writing of violence. My 
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own ideas expressed throughout Impossible Indians, and this chapter in 
particular, partake in a culture of conquest when I study a theatre and 
performance art that directly compels both audiences and theorists of 
coloniality to partake in an act reproducing the violence of colonial 
interpellation in order to move past terror. As a decolonial performance of 
cruelty –colonial terror in itself–, the Chicana art piece sought to reproduce a 
primal act of subjection in the terrain of colonialism and re-do the 
Requerimiento. The simulacrum of that scene of violence hailed racialized 
beings, in all their colonial glory, to engage those moments where indigenous 
people were reduced to corporeality without rationality. The Indian on stage 
is at first reduced to a prop representing the modernity/coloniality of 
indigeneity, but when the prop is made part of a living being, the audience 
directly engaged with the embodiment of racial particularity, not an empty 
signifier. The audiences willingly engaged with Bustamante in thinking of the 
past of colonialism in the present, but their making of race as an affective 
construct unbound it from colonialism’s trenches.  
My study of Bustamante’s performance of the present seeks to 
comprehend the nuances of an art form that is asking us to be complicit 
with the colonial project. Indig/urrito compels us to create a decolonial future 
where this history of colonial terror is no longer the practice of everyday life. 
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I am not moving towards a post-racial argument, nor am I suggesting that 
Bustamante’s spectacular performance of indigeneity is essentially theorizing 
a time where race no longer exists as a result of her ritual. Rather, I do think 
that the brown priestess brings us racial peace after centuries of colonial 
terror, because she wants to imagine a time for decoloniality. The decolonial 
imaginary can only exist when a future is marked by the coming of that 
which is not left unsaid or unthought in the present. She is asking us to say, 
to think, and to do that which has not been said, thought, or done yet. The 
political potential of not doing race through a colonizing ideology produces 
a future where it will be possible to continue living through the past in the 
present so that the we no longer rehearse the tragedies of conquest. 
 In The Decolonial Imaginary, Emma Pérez writes that “[the] history of 
Chicanas, a feminist history, has been written inside a decolonial time lag, 
with a third space feminist critique, between what has been, what is, and 
what many of us hope will be. All at once we live the past, present, and 
future. History itself has encoded upon it a tool for a liberatory 
consciousness…. If we choose to enact the tool of history and call it third 
space feminist consciousness, […] then we begin to build another story, 
uncovering the untold to consciously remake the narrative” (1999, 127). 
Alicia Arrizón), theorizes the decolonial imaginary along similar lines in 
367 
Queering Mestizaje: Transculturation and Performance (2006), where she defines the 
term “as a method of reading that symbolically attempts to resist and contest 
certain systems of domination” (5). That is the brand of decoloniality that I 
suggest Bustamante is asking us to perform when the tragedy of Conquest is 
reproduced with a relationality of love in mind. A performance like 
Indig/urrito echoes decolonial strategies of reading in that it resists the urge to 
continue thinking indigenous people in terms of an unsurpassable tragedy, 
and it contests this tragic temporality by giving us a way out. With sheer joy 
and pleasure, she suggests that salvation from tragedy comes to us from the 
inside of the burrito: the white men want the fillings inside a brown woman’s 
strap-on burrito, and so the riddance of guilt comes from white masculinity 
bottoming for the signifier of indigenous subjectivity. The ideology of her 
spectacular indigeneity is a “decolonial imaginary [that] is enacted as hope, as 
love, transcending all that has come before” (Pérez 1999, 126). The purpose 
of the spectacle, I argue, was about liberating both them and us of negative 
feelings so we can just move on beyond a life in damnation. The brown 
priestess tells us that we can only perform our salvation in a future that is 
critically conscious of our common history of colonial terror, not when we 




Opening  Nigh t:  Doing  Race ,  Othe rwise  
 
The making of coloniality/modernity begins with the archives, in the 
citations of racial exhibitions and speech acts hailing brown bodies to submit 
to a self-entitled European master coming to enslave them in the name of 
Christ. Columbus’ exhibition of a body of the Indian was one of the first 
moments in history where the social world was structured around the 
reduction of physical life to a question of rationality. Even if the term “race” 
did not circulate then as we think of the term today, the ordering of the 
world through an embodiment of difference –rational/human inferiority 
could literally be seen on the Arawak’s body– was to be the order of 
colonialism after 1492. Colonialism, in turn, was an issue of racial difference 
as much as it was about the economic and territorial expansion of medieval 
Europe into the time of the Renaissance. Columbus’ thinking of the Arawak 
a thing to be captured reduced human life to life not at all. The conqueror’s 
exhibition of racial difference was the first act of damnation that made the 
world anew. Most importantly, for the sake of our present, the post-1492 
world order still haunts artistic practices wrestling with the archives of today. 
The Tempest is a rehearsal of that first moment of conquest in that 
Shakespeare brought the invention of the Americas to the Renaissance stage, 
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complete with an island that European men did not know existed prior to 
Prospero’s discovery, and the native enslaved in the name of Christian 
reason. The original citation of Caliban’s monstrosity partakes in the very 
real tragedy that Usigli tells us Shakespeare could never understand, as 
Prospero’s scale of humanity concludes his play by leaving the native forever 
damned to be the master’s slave. Césaire takes direct aim at Shakespeare’s 
limited imagination of tragedy when he rewrites the 17th-century play with an 
anticolonial project in mind. A Tempest takes place where the original 
manuscript could not go and his slave wants the freedom to destroy the 
world of masters and slaves, even at the expense of his own life. The slave’s 
decolonization never materializes because he is unable to kill his master 
when he is given the chance. His feelings of remorse at taking a life makes 
him more human than Prospero, because he reclaims the humanity denied to 
him by not killing the one who claims to dictate the meanings of the 
“human.” Caliban’s is a subaltern ontology, a homunculus that recognizes 
himself in the other and chooses not to end a life.  The recognition of 
humanity-in-difference, however, fails in both the archive (Shakespeare) and 
its repertoire (Césaire) when the anticolonial slave ends his days frozen in a 
timeless damnation.  
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The making of decoloniality begins with an artistic practice theorizing 
the relational field of race based on love and alterity, and from a supposedly 
tragic Indian that desires to dwell in an elsewhere altogether different from 
the archive’s historical records of damnation. Damnation and unfreedom are 
the legacies inherited by Migdalia Cruz and Nao Bustamante when their 
works of art organize the world around an axis of race. Citrona and the 
phallic brown woman, however, are different rehearsals of the damned. The 
difference between the projects of colonialism, anticolonialism and the 
Latina rehearsals hinges on the possibility of a different future for racialized 
subjects. The cannibalism of Cruz’s play surpasses Shakespeare’s inability to 
think the slave capable of being both human and free, as well as Césaire’s 
incomplete project of decolonization. Citrona outweighs Caliban’s 
ontological potential by destroying her masters and setting herself free of 
colonial relations. Freedom now in place, she is to spend the rest of her days 
in utter darkness; even in freedom’s future, damnation is still in place. In 
Bustamante’s Indig/urrito, the damné rehearses the scenes of her subjection 
that have been repeated for centuries and asks native and non-native alike to 
be complicit in not leaving tragedy in tact. For the damned, displacing 
damnation as their modus operandi takes place in a simulation of oral sex 
between white men bottoming for an Indian woman, as well as audiences 
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heeding the call to participate in their seats and recognize the sanctity of the 
ritual taking place. Thus, when their ritual of communal recognition worked 
and race was purified of its ugly feelings deriving from conquest, they 
opened the relational field to love, hope and freedom. The Indian’s 
spectacular performance of race through love is what can bring us out of 
tragedy and to create the future world where colonialism is not the order of 
the day. Fiercely utopist, this decolonial future is what I am calling the 
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